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ABSTRACT 
The study analyses the following aspects within the 
framework of international cooperation in education 
development: development trends in the Zambian education and 
training sector, aid process and coordination in Zambia, and 
foreign aid responses to Zambia's education development. 
The cases of British and Swedish aid to education and 
training are examined more closely for their policy changes 
and relevancy to Zambia's needs. The study has also sought 
to determine the position of donors on aspects of aid 
coordination in Zambia. 
Because aid operates in overlapping frameworks and responds 
to many signals. The study has therefore adopted a holistic 
approach in its analysis of the issues. The following 
analytic and theoretical frameworks have been used in the 
study: the systems analysis, the supplementary aid theory, 
and the exchange and power-dependency theory in 
interorganisation relationship. The methodology used is 
qualitative descriptive critical analysis. 
The findings indicate that the whole realm within which aid 
relationships are conducted is characterised by a complex 
mosaic of objectives and interests. 
British aid to education and training for example has been 
structured in a way which is intended to make it responsive 
to a wide-ranging set of objectives in Britain and in the 
overseas aid constituency. Swedish aid too has a 
diversified and equally complex aid framework and goals. 
This is still undergoing changes in approach and method. 
The findings of this study show that aid responses to 
education and training in Zambia has been given in the 
context described above. The aid relationships which has 
existed between Zambia and donors have accordingly been 
fairly 	 complex. Consequently, some 	 of 	 the 	 analytic 
frameworks used in this study have been found inadequate to 
explain some of the field experiences in Zambia's and 
donors' aid relationships. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aid to Education and Training Development: 
A Historical and Current Perspective 
External aid to education and training development in 
developing countries has been long standing. This support 
in what then were mainly dependencies and colonies, started 
appearing long before the outbreak of the first world war in 
1914. Christian missionaries, philanthropic foundations and 
colonial governments typified the parties that provided 
assistance to missionary and colonial education 
development.1 This triangular colonial relationship (TCR) 
around which the education crusade was centred marked the 
origins of international co-operation in overseas education 
development.2 
	
In this relationship some Christian 
missionaries not only received regular educational grants 
from colonial governments and their home constituencies, 
they also co-operated with other missionaries and 
philanthropic foundations in working out educational 
strategies for developing African education. A rider to 
this observation is that the recipients of colonial and 
missionary education were rarely consulted on western 
education programmes that were designed for and later 
imposed on them. 
It is important to note that these agencies created 
external influence situations that were no less complex then 
than what faces aid recipient countries today. Inter-agency 
competition, conflict, cooperation, and hidden agendas which 
characterises 	 contemporary 	 aid 	 relationships, were an 
integral feature in early inter-agency relationships.3 	 No 
sooner had missionaries entered new lands than they searched 
for suitable stations and broader areas of influence. Such 
expeditions were sometimes challenged by rival counterparts. 
Thus evangelisation and education development became immersed 
in what superficially appeared to be ecclesiastical rivalry, 
but which frequently entailed foreign policy expeditions and 
major power struggles involving their national governments. 
The significance of this reflection is that it helps one to 
see today's aid transactions in a much broader historical 
and political perspective. 
It was not until the post-independence era (1960s) that many 
newly independent nations saw a rapid growth, 
diversification and spread of official external aid in their 
national development sectors away from the unitary or even 
monopolistic influence of the former colonial powers. 
Seeking a historical repeat of the post-war aid-supported 
European economic, .recovery and development, many Northern 
governmental and non-governmental organisations became 
involved in giving external aid to developing countries. 
The designation by the UN of the 1960s as a 'Development 
Decade' and the subsequent UNESCO sponsored regional 
educational conferences (Karachi 1960, Addis Ababa 1961, 
Santiago 1962) served to bring to the attention of national 
governments and the international community the problems of 
education development in newly independent states and the 
scope for international assistance. The conferences 
helped to set up broad educational objectives from which 
individual countries drew their own education blue-prints 
and to which aid donors presumably were expected to 
respond.4 Education and training then were accorded a 
priority rating by both developing countries and external 
aid agencies, and educational assistance increased steadily 
in this period and in most years up to the early 1970s. In 
carrying out the tasks of drawing up educational plans many 
developing countries' governments were assisted by 
international education commissions, or experts from 
international agencies, especially UNESCO. These undertook 
detailed surveys of educational provision and gave their 
recommendations, often in the form of highly specific 
manpower plans, education plans and project specifications. 
In 1963, at the request of 	 the 	 first 	 majority-rule 
government, a 	 UNESCO commission comprising a group of 
Australian specialists visited Zambia (then Northern 
Rhodesia) to investigate and report on the country's state 
of education in light of the Addis Ababa conference 
recommendations. The Northern Rhodesia government also 
commissioned an Anglo-American group led by Sir John 
Lockwood, master of Birkbeck College, University of London, 
to advise on the development of a local University. Three 
months after Zambia's attainment of political independence 
in 1964, a UN inter-agency economic survey missions under 
the chairmanship of Dudley Seers, visited Zambia. Its terms 
of reference gave prominence to the state of education and 
manpower. The Transitional and First National Development 
Plans were based on the findings and recommendations of this 
survey, which found education and lack of skilled manpower 
to be the most serious handicaps Zambia faced at 
independence.5  
Following this the government drew up a comprehensive 
education expansion programme for the country, covering the 
three main education sectors. Despite a massive increase in 
public resources, Zambia could not afford to fund the entire 
programme from its own resources. Hence recourse to 
external assistance became inevitable, and was strongly 
encouraged by the new nation's international economic 
advisers because education and training had been designated 
priority service sectors in the country's development 
process.6 	 Consequently, many donors 	 directed 	 their 
assistance to the two sectors. Because of the scale of the 
expansion programme donor assistance covered many aspects, 
including capital, technical and software assistance. As 
Zambia's development prospects and problems continued to 
unfold, the government in keeping with its policy of 
non-alignment diversified its sources of external aid. 
Thus, both Western governmental 	 and non-governmental 
organisations, and Eastern bloc governments became involved 
in Zambia's education and training. This of course availed 
the government of diverse resources with which it was able 
to cope more effectively with the dramatic expansion of the 
physical plant and the huge increase in enrolments. 
For Britain the aid relationship with Zambia was not 
entirely new, but a continuation of the historical links 
through the medium of external aid and many other channels. 
It was also a demonstration by both parties that, while 
Britain's coloniser status in Northern Rhodesia had ceased 
on Zambia's independence day, her obligation to support her 
former colony's development remained. And, in any case, the 
legal, social and economic institutions with which Zambia 
embarked upon her development programme had been created and 
were still being manned in many cases by British colonial or 
ex-colonial 	 civil 	 servants. By 	 contrast, the 	 aid 
relationship of many western and eastern bloc countries with 
Zambia was based on a historical relationship with UNIP as 
an independence movement, and the then current political 
fashion of the industrialised world to associate themselves 
with the development problems of newly independent states. 
Therefore, for many 	 industrialised 	 countries 	 Zambia's 
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attainment of independence offered opportunities to widen 
political, social and economic relationships. Assistance 
given to education and training training played strategic 
roles in strengthening and widening the scope of these 
relationships. 
External aid to Zambia's education and training sectors can 
be put into two broad categories, technical aid in the form 
of training scholarships tenable in donor countries, and 
capital or technical assistance used in Zambia. The latter 
category of support (capital and technical) is often 
provided as a mix of both transferable and non-transferable 
external assistance. Over the years since Zambia's 
attainment of independence many donor countries and 
multilateral agencies have become involved in giving 
assistance to the two Ministries of Education. Each donor 
country has carved out a special enclave of concentration 
for its assistance. In so doing almost every aspect of 
education and training has been touched by the donorisation 
process. Against this background are a set of different aid 
policies and priorities which aid institutions are mandated 
to pursue. 
1.2 Official Stand on Foreign Aid 
Until the launching of the New Economic Recovery Programme 
(NERP), under the Interim National Development Plan in 1987, 
Zambia's official stand on foreign aid had been mainly that 
of maintaining neutrality on its sources of external 
assistance. This can be said to be the cornerstone of 
Zambia's official stand on foreign aid. For a long time no 
official attention had been paid to the conditions and 
working of aid in the Zambian development environment. The 
NERP therefore was the first public concern registered on 
development aid. The programme introduced 	 tight criteria 
for the selection and prioritisation of aided projects, and 
introduced also a whole range of organisational measures to 
accompany the proposals.7 This represented an 
extraordinary step. It was the first time that external aid 
to Zambia was ostensibly subjected to such exacting measures 
of scrutiny (see priority weightings in the appendix). 
Unfortunately these measures have never been implemented, 
which suggests that the exercise could have been merely an 
act of defiance and despair taken against the background of 
the social consequences of the IMF economic measures in 
Zambia. The step reflected also an attempt by the 
government to show the public that they were in control of 
the domestic affairs. This was particularly important 
during the internal crisis caused by the IMF economic 
measures. However, two recent events at different levels 
indicate that the organisation and administration of 
external aid in Zambia has not changed. The Ministry of 
General Education, Youth and Sport (MGEYS) review committee 
on foreign aid to the sector found in 1989 the existence of 
some of anomalies which NERP had attempted to redress. The 
present (1990) attempt by the Public Investment Programme 
(PIP) to create an External Assistance Department (EAD) 8  
in Zambia for aid coordination provides further evidence 
that, the 1987 measures were never effected or had simply 
failed hence the new initiative. 
1.3 The Study 
1.3.1 Statement of the Problem 
Zambia's external aid map for the education and training 
sectors indicates as in many other recipient countries a 
multiplicity of donors. This is apparent from the range of 
programmes and projects receiving external assistance in the 
two ministries of education. Besides the main donors, 
Britain, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Canada, the MGEYS and 
the MHEST have recently been offered diversified technical 
aid from an ideologically diverse number of countries, such 
as Saudi Arabia, USSR, China, and Japan. The Japanese are 
currently working lira Human Resource Development Project 
(HRDP) in the Department of Technical Education and 
Vocational Training (DTEVT) and have also just committed 
themselves to build two junior secondary schools. China has 
favourably responded to the Zambian request to provide 
lecturers for the country's technical colleges,9 whereas 
the USSR has pledged to help build a technical college in 
Chipata, and Saudi Arabia is still considering its offer to 
build three junior secondary schools. The EEC is supporting 
a Zambian Mathematics and Science Teacher(s) Education 
Project (ZAMSTEP), and the UNDP is managing the Zambia 
Science Equipment Production Project. 
Aid to education has become so extensive and complex that a 
recent study of Zambian education observed that it is 
difficult to get a comprehensive picture of the total aid 
programme in the education and training sector.1°  
Donors as a group are very diverse, each one of them has its 
own status in relation to economic and political power in 
the international community, historical linkages with 
Zambia's development process, the size of its overseas aid 
constituency, domestic education doctrines, aid policies to 
education 
	 and 	 training, project 	 administration 
	 and 
management styles and practices. This has given Zambia an 
undeniable opportunity to learn from varied international 
educational experiences and practices. It also means that 
in principle Zambia has enormous external resources at 
her disposal. 
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However, given the donor community's complex profile, a 
multiplicity of aid donors and resources could present 
serious problems to a recipient particularly where there 
are no clear policy guidelines for the recipient's education 
and training investment priorities. Donors may waste a lot 
of time and other resources in competing against each other 
for what they consider to be more attractive or strategic 
projects. Cassen et al. notes: 
In several countries the donors actually compete. 
They look for projects of a reasonable size and 
manageability, and go sometimes to great lengths to 
secure them for their owci aid programme rather than 
let them go to another.'" 
In a situation where there are insufficient guidelines it is 
also likely that donors could easily influence a recipient's 
order of priorities. 
Another serious concern to which this study addresses itself 
is 	 the 	 problem 	 of 	 aid 	 coordination. 12 	 There is 
dissatisfaction among many observers and critics with the 
existing arrangements and practices in aid administration. 
More specifically, it has been pointed out that there is 
lack 	 of 	 necessary 	 consultation, cooperation 
	 and aid 
coordination among donors in general. It is argued that 
this has negative consequences on the overall external 
support performan-ce. Coordination, which is at the centre 
of the current aid debate, could mean different things in 
terms of interpretation and application. The current 
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literature on this subject has failed to address itself 
adequately to the issue of what is meant by coordination. 
This study proposes to analyse how the meaning of 
coordination is perceived and applied by Zambia and its 
donors, and also intends to attempt to provide answers to 
any attendant questions such as these below: 
To what extent is there a problem of aid coordination in 
Zambia in general and in the education sector in particular? 
Would donors be willing to be organised into a strong 
coordinated framework or to cooperate among themselves 
beyond existing levels of operational linkages at project 
level? 
Given the diversity of the donor community in the education 
and training sector in Zambia, it is not clear what aid 
policies to education and training donors are pursuing. It 
is equally not clear what Zambia's policy is on aid to 
education and training which guides donors' assistance. 
There are big gaps in our knowledge of the aid environment 
in Zambia and other recipient countries, consequently there 
is demand for a better understanding of aid policies and aid 
administration and management in the context of both donors 
and recipients. Against this background it is important to 
examine how and whether Zambia's and donors' aid policies to 
education and training reconcile and fit into the country's 
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development context. It is equally important to examine how 
the administration and management of aid projects fit into 
Zambia's public administration framework. 
1.3.2 The Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this research is to make a critical 
examination of the aid policies to education and training of 
both Zambia and its donors as well as the administration and 
management of aid projects in the field of education and 
training. Thus, the study will focus on the following 
aspects. 
1. ZAMBIA'S AND DONORS' AID POLICIES  
An evaluation of aid policies during the period from 1964 to 
the present. 
2. AID PROCESS  
The donor-recipient aid process structure in Zambia. 
3. ZAMBIA'S AND DONORS' PRIORITIES  
Zambia's and donors' priorities in the field of education 
and training. In particular, how far has the implementation 
of the 1977 educational reforms been incorporated by donors 
in their aid programmes? 
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4. AID ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
Administration and management styles and practices in aided 
educational projects, Zambian and donor institutions 
involved 	 in 	 educational 	 aid 	 management, and 	 their 
administrative relationship and other important arrangements 
such as accountability within the broader framework of 
Zambia's public administration structure. 
5. AID COORDINATION  
The extent and level of cooperation, consultation and 
coordination among donors and also between donors and 
Zambia in the education and training sectors. 
6. NEW MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES  
Examine within the present public administration context the 
desirability of creating additional aid management structures 
or of reorganising existing management arrangements and 
institutions. 
7. AID AND DEVELOPMENT  
The extent to which aid to education and training has 
promoted or has hindered aspects of educational development 
and development as whole. 
To give the study a more concrete context this study will 
present case studies of two of Zambia's major bilateral aid 
partners, Britain (ODA), and Sweden (SIDA). The study will 
also analyse specific cases of aid projects such as the 
following: 	 The Self-Help Action Plan in Education (SHAPE), 
Zambia Educational Materials Production Project (ZEMP), and 
the Human Resource Development Project (HRDP). These will 
be analysed from the perspective of interorganisational 
cooperation and aid coordination. Non-governmental 
organisation's (NGOs) will be examined in relation to policy 
links and their institutional relationship with official aid 
agencies. Emphasis will be placed on identifying and 
analysing areas of strength and weakness in the present 
arrangements. 
1.3.3 Definition of Key terms and concepts 
1. DONOR 	 An 	 aid-giving 	 multilateral 	 organisation , 
government 	 institutions such as ODA, SIDA, JICA, NORAD, 
FINNIDA, non-governmental organisations (NG0s) and lending 
agencies offering concessional terms for development 
purposes eg. the World Bank, African Development Bank. 
2. Recipient 
A country, institution or sector receiving aid from a donor. 
3. External Aid  
External financial or technical assistance from a bilateral, 
multilateral or non-governmental organisation to a 
government or sector. 
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4. Educational Aid  
External bilateral or multilateral financial or technical 
assistance from a donor agency to a recipient's education 
and training sector. 
5. Aid Process  
Channels and procedures through which aid is negotiated, 
agreed, and administered. 
6. Coordination 
The 	 state of sharing by legal mandate, delegation or 
otherwise, responsibility 	 for 	 organising, planning 	 and 
regulating 	 the 	 outflow 	 of aid from donors, and the 
reception, administration and management of aid resources, 
among donors and between donors and recipients, at different 
levels. 
7. NGO 
Donor and recipient non-governmental organisations 
distinguished as 'donor NGO' or 'recipient NG0'. 
8. Donorisation  
The overwhelming functional dependency of a recipient 
country's development framework, sector or project on aid 
inputs. 
1.3.4 Methodology  
The methodology of this study is qualitative, descriptive 
critical analysis. Fieldwork was carried out through an 
extensive analysis of both primary and secondary data, and 
through a series of in-depth interviews of key officers in 
these institutions in Zambia, U.K. and Sweden. 
ZAMBIA  
Donors  
(a) Bilateral aid donors: British Council, USAID, HEDCO, 
FINNIDA, NORAD and SIDA 
(b) Multilateral aid donors: ADB, EEC, ILO, OECD, UNESCO, 
UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank 
Recipient Agencies  
Government Ministries, Departments and other Institutions  
(a) Ministry of Higher Education 
(b) Ministry of General Education and Culture 
(c) Ministry of Finance 
(d) National Commission for Development Planning 
(e) Bank of Zambia 
(f) University of Zambia 
In Zambia officers such as Permanent Secretaries, Directors, 
academic specialists on Zambian development and aid process, 
and those who have been involved in negotiating, 
administering and using educational aid resources were 
interviewed. Similarly, resident representatives and 
project field personnel of bilateral aid agencies were 
interviewed. 
Data has been collected from the following: 
(a) Literature on aid and development in general. 
(b) Literature on aid and development in Zambia. 
(c) Literature on development and aid to education in 
general. 
(d) Literature on development and aid to education in 
Zambia. 
(i) Zambia/Donor aid policy documents. 
(ii) Relevant Zambian/Donor institutional annual reports. 
(iii) Zambian budget documents. 
(iv) Zambian annual economic reports. 
(v) Zambian national development plans. 
(vi) Zambia/Donor educational aid evaluation memoranda, 
agreed minutes and joint review reports. 
(vii) Donors' project/programme evaluation reports. 
(viii) Official speeches. 
Fieldwork: 
Interviews were undertaken as follows: 
(a) ODA - London. 
(b) SIDA - Stockholm. 
(c) Donors 	 and recipient agencies- Lusaka, Zambia. 
The study follows and emphasises a holistic research 
approach because it allows an open and broader approach to 
gathering data and studying contexts of situations. This 
method is not only appropriate to investigating the present 
educational aid context, it also facilitates the 
identification of possible alternative solutions. 
1.3.5 Organisation of the Study  
The study has been organised into twelve chapters as 
follows: 
Chapter Two: 	 Surveys the theoretical and conceptual 
literature 	 on 	 external 	 aid, international 	 relations, 
interorganisational relations. The chapter identifies 
appropriate frameworks within which the analysis of the 
issues of the present study has been done. 
Chapter Three: Uses a macro-historical approach to traces 
the perspectives in Zambia's post-independence education and 
training development. The focus is on the policies of 
redressing past imbalances and deprivations during the 
1964-1974 period. 
Chapter Four: Examines the performance of the policies of 
expansion and development in the sector. Focus is also on 
the consequences of the economic crisis and its impact on 
the education sectors and the education reform movement, and 
the donor community. 
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Chapter Five: 	 Focusing on institutional actors and 
procedures, this Chapter examines aid process in Zambia. 
Chapter Six: 	 Examines the policy and institutional links 
between foreign and aid policies in the donor's context. 
Chapter Seven: Discusses British aid policies to education 
and training in a global perspective. The key developments 
in policy changes, aid organisational patterns are analysed. 
Chapter Eight: 	 Examines British aid to education and 
training in Zambia, 1964-1989. The focus is on the forms of 
assistance given and an analysis of policy changes. 
Chapter Nine: Discusses Sweden's aid policies and priorities 
globally since 1965. 
Chapter Ten: Analyses Swedish aid to education and training 
in Zambia. The focus is on forms of assistance given and 
its relevance to the local development problems, and the 
policy implications. 
Chapter Eleven: 	 Analyses aid coordination in the Zambian 
aid management framework. The current initiatives to 
enhance aid coordination are discussed against a background 
of a range of theoretical explanations on this subject. 
Chapter Twelve: Summarises and discusses the findings and 
the conclusions of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter surveys the theoretical and conceptual 
literature on international relations , interorganisational 
relations, and 	 foreign aid in an attempt to identify 
appropriate frameworks and models within which the analysis 
of the issues of the present study should be done. The main 
task of the survey is therefore to identify the relevant 
frameworks which can yield greater insights into the study. 
Although foreign aid to education can be treated separately, 
it is very difficult for the purposes of analysis to 
disentangle it completely from the totality of aid, and 
international relations in general. Aid, regardless of its 
designation is decided upon and given against the political 
background of both donors and recipients. In all donor 
countries it is an important part of their foreign policy 
instruments. This is clearly reflected in the institutional 
arrangement and relationship between their foreign 
ministries and aid institutions.' In addition, most donor 
countries' aid institutions have special relationship with 
Trade and Commerce ministries and departments, and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in aid work. 
Thus, a joint aid network exists. Therefore, aid in its 
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various forms operates from a broad and complex background 
including multilateral institutions from which aid 
institutions draw their sanctions and direction. Aid donors 
pursue a multiplicity of objectives and goals, some of them 
altruistic, others not.2  
Against this background it is being argued that a single and 
narrow analytic framework would not adequately perform the 
functions of describing and explaining many related issues 
surrounding aid to education and training. A single 
framework may not, for example, account well for changes in 
policy trends in aid to education, or the behaviour of aid 
institutions and their actors towards general or specific 
aid issues. A broad approach to the study is therefore 
called for. Before this is highlighted one important 
conceptual question requires to be addressed. What is aid? 
2.2 Definition 
Healey contends that aid is an ambiguous word and there 
is no common agreement on its definition and its 
measurement.3 
	
The task of attempting to define aid is 
made even more difficult because of the diversity of aid. 
Morgenthau4 identified six functional categorisations of 
aid. In real life situations aid has a very polymorphic 
profile. That is , the dividing lines between the form and 
function of one type of aid and another is blurred. Aid to 
education for instance may perform both humanitarian and 
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economic functions. Assistance which goes out to enable a 
poverty stricken recipient government to provide essential 
basic education services which the government is unable to 
provide, may 	 in 	 the 	 short term be classed both as 
humanitarian and budgetary support. It may well turn out 
also to be an economic contribution in the long run. The 
heterogeneity of aid therefore makes it difficult to cut a 
precise general definition of aid. Hence, the tendency 
among scholars has been to provide operational rather than 
general definitions. 
Despite the definitional difficulties, scholars and writers 
have not been deterred from making attempts to define it or 
classify it. 
Mosley defines aid as 'money transferred on concessional 
terms by the governments of rich countries to the 
governments of poor countries.5' 	 There are many other 
definitions which fall into this category.6 	 Although they 
are meant to be seen as operational, thus justifying their 
narrow perspectives, they nevertheless reveal 	 important 
insights. First, economic considerations which dominate in 
the definitions of aid . Second, aid is perceived largely 
as a mechanical system of resource transfer rather than a 
complex and dynamic process of interstate exchange, in the 
world economic and political system. Third, the aid 
transaction is only seen as taking place between rich and 
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poor developing countries. These assumptions are not 
entirely correct. Therefore many of the 'economic' 
definitions of aid need to be corrected and augmented. 
The term 'donor' is more often than not associated with 
developed northern countries. However, the concept should 
not be considered as synonymous with economic and financial 
might nor with a particular geographical or geo-political 
grouping. Indeed, the notion that aid transfer takes place 
only between rich and poor countries is disputable7. Some 
recipient countries 	 play donor roles to other countries, 
especially when foreign aid is perceived in a much broader 
sense than merely financial transfers. Among the 
recipient-donor countries providing aid to Zambia's 
education and training development are: Bulgaria, Brazil, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Turkey, Poland, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia.8 There is also evidence which shows that some 
rich OPEC countries have been recipients of generous aid 
from the western countries,9. 
The preceding arguments have served to highlight the 
inconsistencies between what aid is thought to be and what 
one usually sees in practice. 
Thus, in this study aid will be understood 
	 to 	 mean 
'conditional or unconditional resources offered to or 
transferred to a recipient country by any donor for the 
purposes of enhancing the promotion of a recipient's 
development objectives and donors' short or long term 
objectives'. The key descriptors in this definition are: 
Resources: Any form such as advice, material 
resources, technical assistance, capital or indeed 
other types of assistance. 
Donor: 	 Covers both official and private agencies, 
and multilateral agencies. 
Donor's Objectives: Refers to foreign policy and 
aid policy objectives that are intended to benefit 
from the aid transactions. The objectives may be 
humanitarian, economic or otherwise. 
Recipient: Any country that allows or asks another 
country to give it general or specific foreign aid. 
All the key descriptors 	 are used in their widest sense. 
Accordingly, the definition is open. Since aid is usually an 
open foreign policy strategy of donor countries this 
particular definition is more suitable to the holistic 
approach adopted for this study. Aid to education, as a 
sub-set of aid in general, partakes of the same essential 
characteristics. 
In the subsequent paragraphs an attempt is made to identify 
and discuss theoretical perspectives that have a bearing on 
the aspects of this study. The discussion will assess the 
relevance and adequacy of the analytic frameworks. 
2.3 Theoretical Perspectives 
Foreign aid theories have a historical context which gives 
important economic explanations for the emergence of aid in 
general. The origin of aid theories dates to the periods 
before and after the second world war. That era witnessed 
five important developments: the cessation of war 
activities, the establishment of the UN and the World Bank, 
the emergence of economic growth models and development 
theories, the application of Marshall aid to the war ravaged 
economies of European countries,US aid to Japan, and the 
beginning of the emergence of independent states in Africa 
and Asia. All these factors influenced profoundly the 
shaping of the initial profile of aid. 
Against the background of economic growth models which, 
among other things, emphasised the importance of foreign aid 
in the economic growth process, America committed enormous 
resources to the economic recovery programme of European 
countries. The success of the Marshall plan,1° left an 
indelible imprint on aid as an economic growth strategy. It 
is from this background that economists in western countries 
made conscious efforts to suggest that the strategy of 
economic aid could be applied to the development problems of 
newly independent 'countries in Africa and Asia. One 
observes therefore that economic aid theories grew out of 
both economic growth modelling and actual field experiences 
in Japan and Europe.11 
According to White,12; theories can be grouped into two 
main categories: economic aid theories which are referred to 
also as 'transfer' theories, and political theories of aid 
which are also known as 'transaction' theories. 
2.3.1 Economic Theories 
Economic aid theories are further subdivided into those that 
assert a positive relationship between aid, economic growth 
and development, and those 	 that 	 project 	 a 	 negative 
relationship between aid and development factors. Aid in 
the former category is perceived to be providing vital 
supplementary resources needed to support economic growth. 
The recently introduced aid for economic recovery in Third 
World countries would fall in this category. The resource 
transfer focuses on such economic factors as, national 
savings, availability of sufficient foreign exchange, and 
the state of human resource skills. 
Counter arguments against the notion of aid as an external 
economic resource supplement are provided by the 
displacement theory. It argues that, whatever increased 
savings are made by a recipient 	 as a result of the 
availability of aid savings are switched from development 
to non-development, .programmes, and some escape from the 
recipient's economy. But more importantly, it is pointed 
out that the availability of external resources causes 
recipients to reduce domestic initiatives to pursue 
development attempts on their own. Nowhere is this argument 
more pertinent than in aid to education in developing 
countries. Despite increasing debates on aid in the last 
few decades, the arguments against aid have made little 
practical impact upon the problems of the main aid actors. 
Aid programmes have continued unabated, some of them 
emerging on the ruins of hitherto failed aid projects. 
Alfred Marshall13 identified a number of essential factors 
which could influence both economic and non-economic growth. 
These 	 are: natural resources, climate, human character, 
education, social mobility, willingness and ability to save, 
improved transport, external economies, and the existence of 
extensive markets. Although Marshall did not formulate a 
theory his economic growth prescription had an impact on 
economists in Europe and America and how they viewed the 
economic growth process. In particular, economic growth 
models that were later developed took important cues from 
such earlier works. The Harrod-Domar14 economic growth 
model, for instance, stressed the importance of external 
assistance in helping an economy to overcome some of its 
domestic economic shortcomings. The model examined the 
balance among income, savings, investment and output in a 
developed economy. Thus, external assistance was seen as 
critical in assisting a country's economy to grow faster 
than would be possible with domestic resources alone. 
Subsequent models and theories drew heavily on earlier 
growth models. Rostow's historical stage theory of 
economic growth was one example.15 	 The theory related 
much to foreign aid and was developed largely within the 
Harrod-Domar paradigm. In his theory the 'take-off' stage 
in economic growth process become particularly important as 
well as controversial. The role of economic aid in 
facilitating the economic take off was perceived to be 
critical to a country's attempts to achieve self-sustaining 
economic growth.16 The notion of additionality in the 
Rostowian conception of aid belongs to the supplemental 
theory discussed earlier. 
Chenery and Strout provided yet another comprehensive 
theoretical explanation and justification for aid.17 In 
their framework aid is placed within the context of economic 
development - a much wider paradigm than economic growth. 
In this framework, as in others, the sights of aid are set 
on helping to transform a stagnant economy into one of 
sustained growth. According to Chenery, aid is able to 
relieve certain specific bottlenecks which inhibit 
development. Lack of or scarcity of foreign exchange is 
cited as one example. Critical transformation factors are 
identified as: an .increase in human skills, a rise in the 
level of savings and investment, the adoption of more 
productive technology and the development of new 
institutions. 
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2.3.2 Political Theories  
Political theories of aid are also of two types, one focuses 
on the donor as an aid - giver and the other looks at the 
recipients. The former is concerned with the treatment of 
aid as an instrument of foreign policy and donors' wider 
external interests. The latter is concerned with the impact 
of aid on domestic politics in recipient countries. That 
is, to see what impact aid has on interests of the recipient 
government vis-a-vis other competing group interests. 
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Unfortunately this particular area commands very little 
attention. Greater attention is paid to examining the 
virtues or shortcomings of aid from the donors' perspective. 
Within the realm of political theories of aid there are 
specific frameworks which attempt to give conceptual 
explanations of aid. The interventionist framework is one 
such example. 
According to Baldwin19 external aid may constitute 
intervention in terms of donor motivations, consequences, 
aid process or all three simultaneously. It is argued that 
intervention through aid is a type of influence: a 
non-military technique of intervention of modern statecraft. 
However, the concept of aid as intervention or an influence 
attempt should be placed within the larger context of aid 
and its place in international relations. The influence 
theory20 offers such a framework. 
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Though conceived for the purposes of providing an 
explanatory framework for general bilateral relations 
between nations of more or less equal power, the model gives 
the necessary perspectives which can be extended to cover 
many important aspects of donor-recipient bilateral 
relations which basically exhibit unequal power relations in 
most cases. 
The general properties of the influence model are that no 
nation is so completely isolated from all others that its 
activities have almost no effect on others. Nor is there a 
country so completely self-sufficient that it has no 
dependence upon others in order to meet its own real and 
perceived needs.21 To meet their various needs countries 
are engaged in an inter-nation influence interaction. 
However, and more importantly, the model points out that 
inter-nation influence is a two way transaction. That is, 
any country planning or attempting to influence another 
country, should consider that the target country is also 
exercising some influence upon it. In practical terms it 
would be argued that the very identification and classifi-
cation of a country by a donor as a potential aid recipient 
leads to some degree of influence by the recipient upon that 
donor. It is further argued that nations select their 
influence targets because of perceived importance of their 
relationship to, and dependence upon them. And that the 
direction of an influence attempt is largely dependent on 
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how the initiating country perceives the probable outcome of 
its future relationship with the target country, that is, 
whether the relationship would yield any beneficial or 
disadvantageous outcomes. Inducement of preferred future 
behaviour of the target country is said to be at the centre 
of the inter-nation influence model. 
The model recognises that a country has two techniques at 
its disposal in attempting to arrest influences, threats and 
promise of rewards. Each technique covers a very broad area 
and is usually carefully chosen to suit a particular 
influence situation. Threats may cover probable punishment 
which may take different forms such as witholding a reward, 
denying a preference or in extreme cases damaging that which 
the target country values. Promises may also include 
rewards and punishments for compliance or non-adherence to 
preferred behaviour. 
Seen in the context of the present study, the concept of aid 
as an intervention strategy links up well with the influence 
model. Aid plays a significant role in inter-nation 
influence attempts and ordinary bilateral relations. There 
are also several examples where aid transaction has been 
characterised by a 'stick and carrot' relationship between 
donors and recipients.22 But again, aid and its linkage 
to the influence model cannot be examined and understood in 
isolation. Both emanate from particular national state 
contexts 	 and 	 interstate 	 transactions. Thus, a 	 donor 
country's foreign policy is bound to show important 
reflections on various aspects of aid relationships. 
A country's national foreign policy framework provides 
important leads that give critical assistance in analysing 
not only the behaviour that may be observed in a country's 
relations with other states but also in identifying specific 
policy objectives and values attached to them. Against this 
it is important to note that the role of aid in reinforcing 
foreign policy objectives is widely recognised.23 	 Holsti 
in particular points out that nation states and other types 
of political units have needs and purposes, many of which 
they can achieve or meet only by influencing the behaviour 
of other states. Nation states are said also to be striving 
to achieve a range of private, collective, concrete and 
value objectives in their foreign policies. He sees foreign 
policies as largely a string of responses to initiatives and 
other actions of other actors, and that governments are more 
concerned with solving problems as they appear rather than 
defining long-range objectives.24  
An example illustrates the case of aid diplomacy as an 
instrument of foreign policy. Britain's 1983 decision to 
increase the number of scholarships to certain overseas 
students, of which Malaysia was a major beneficiary, was a 
foreign policy move which succeeded in countering the 'buy 
British last' campaign which Malaysia had mounted in 
retaliation for Britain's decision to impose full cost fees 
on overseas students.25 	 This action was taken to change 
Malaysia's negative behaviour into behaviour which was not 
harmful to British interests. This case illustrates several 
points. First, it shows the strong feelings donors have 
regarding their vulnerabilities. Second, one also notices 
the important roles to which foreign policy and national 
resources have been committed to protect both national 
commercial interests and those of private citizens. Third, 
aid intervention helped to normalise the relationship. The 
preceding points endorse some of the arguments in the 
assumptions regarding aid's linkage to foreign policies. 
The theoretical perspectives and models discussed in the 
preceding sections offer ample scope within which aid 
policies in general and aid policies to education and 
training in particular can be analysed. 
Aid to education and training should be perceived within the 
broader context of a recipient's national economy and 
development framework. There is a clear suggestion that aid 
goes out to enhance effective linking of various economic 
and development ,process factors.' In the context of 
developing countries such as Zambia, education and training 
is one such factor in the country's national development 
grid. From the economic perspective., aid to education and 
training is seen as a response to Zambia's particular 
economic needs in human resource development such as the 
acute shortage of domestic foreign exchange for the purchase 
of essential skills, equipment and materials. 
Thus, in the framework of supplemental theories, aid to 
education and training is given for the purpose of 
redressing specific scarcities and deficiences in Zambia's 
national economic process and development structure. This 
gives a partial explanation of why aid is given, but 
supplemental theories do not see any other significant 
relationship between aid and the choice of particular areas 
of support by donors. There is no acknowledgement that the 
significance of aid to education and training, to donors and 
recipients, transcends the regions of economic support. 
This narrows the view of a broad and complex phenomenon. 
The displacement theory of aid submits strong counter 
arguments against all pro aid theories. More specifically 
the displacement theory points out that aid inhibits the 
dynamic process of change in developing countries.18  
Alien values and patterns of organisation imposed by donors 
on recipients are perceived to be major stumbling blocks to 
development. The implications for aid to education and 
training are therefore obvious. Since the theory is 
dismissive of all approaches to aid, it cannot provide a 
comprehensive explanatory framework for analysing the 
political economy of aid in general and aid to education in 
particular. 
Yet, these perspectives are by themselves not sufficient to 
provide adequate interpretation of aspects of this study 
such as co-operation and coordination among donors, and also 
between donors and Zambia. Consequently, other analytical 
frameworks are considered in subsequent paragraphs. 
2.4 Exchange Model 
Organisational interaction has received wide attention from 
researchers in the sub-fields of sociology of organisations 
such as industrial sociology, political sociology and the 
management sciences. And more studies appear to have been 
done on interorganisational relationships that are set 
within a common political and economic environment26 than 
has been the case with interorganisational relationships 
that involve organisations from different settings. 
Although the main concern in the former has been inter-
organisational behaviour analysis in public service 
departments and industries, the insights and other 
explanatory knowledge gained from these studies have 
application to wider interorganisational behaviour analysis. 
In particular, the study of interorganisational 
relationships of aid organisations may require a judicious 
application of the principles of organisations. 
Although 	 they have organisational characteristics that 
are identical to industrial corporate companies, many, if 
not all do not function completely as such. Because aid 
organisations 	 are 	 politically 	 sponsored, their 
organisational behaviour towards other similar organisatidns 
and recipients will always be subject to political checks at 
some point. Donors' initiatives on grounds of political 
expediency may also override other considerations in ai•d 
policies and decisions. In aid, donors pursue 	 largely 
national 	 interests, be it a projection of a positive 
national image through charitable or other humanitarian aid 
or using aid to widen the circle of the donor's friendly 
countries or countries under donor influence of one kind or 
another. The primacy of national interests in aid 
objectives and policies is paramount in aid relationships. 
These inevitably have an important bearing on the extent of 
donors' relations. To examine aspects of inter-
organisational relationships researchers have employed 
various analytical frameworks. Among these is the exchange 
model. 
From a sociological perspective27 the exchange model rests 
on several assumptions. These are that: an actor will seek 
to interact with others who can satisfy his or her needs or 
facilitate attainment of desired goals, and the greater the 
probability that a potential exchange transaction will prove 
rewarding the more likely an actor is to initiate it. Thus, 
management exchange is defined by Levine and White as 
'any voluntary activity between two organisations which has 
consequences actual or anticipated for the realisation of 
their respective goals or objectives'.28 	 In this 
framework, interaction and subscription to cooperation are 
important elements. Levine and White stress the point that 
in the exchange framework symmetrical relations form when 
members of two or more organisations perceive mutual benefits 
from interacting. Therefore motivation to form a 
cooperative relationship comes out when each organisation 
perceives that it will be better able to attain its goals by 
interacting and cooperating rather than remaining autonomous. 
They suggest further that symmetrical relationships of this 
type form in periods of scarce or declining resources. 
2.5 Power-Dependency Framework 
On the other hand the power-dependency model contends that 
the motivation to cooperate among organisations is 
asymmetrical. That is, only one party is usually motivated 
while others are not, and that cooperation is often induced 
or forced on weaker organisations by the most powerful. 
Interaction of exchange in this model is characterised by 
conflict because each party seeks to achieve its own 
goals. 
It is evident in both frameworks that interaction and 
cooperation in interorganisational relationships is linked 
to motivation and goal achievement. The exchange framework 
carries a very explicit hypothesis which perceives 
collaboration among and between groups or organisations as 
inevitable at some point. However, what is erroneously 
implied in the two models is that relationships among actors 
are perceived to be either collaborative or conflictual. 
But any relationship is bound to show phases of cooperation 
and conflict at different points. Therefore both 
cooperation and conflict are probable in any inter-group 
relationship regardless of whether the groups or 
organisations involved in that relationship are unequal 
partners in terms of economic power or other attributes. 
This is indeed true of donor-recipient relationships and 
also among donors. Therefore there is more value in 
perceiving and analysing donors' interorganisational 
relationships as a whole. A more integrated approach in 
this case is consequently more suitable, both to broader 
donor-recipient relationships and aid coordination issues. 
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2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to lay theoretical 
foundations on which aid policies to education and aid 
coordination issues may be based and analysed. Both 
normative and descriptive theoretical frameworks and models 
have been identified to provide explanatory guidance to the 
study. For the purposes of this study it is perceived that 
the analytical frameworks that will be employed are linked 
in many respects. It is for example clear that, Singer's 
influence model and Baldwin's conceptualisation of aid as 
intervention and influence can best be understood by being 
incorporated into a larger analytical framework. In this 
regard McClelland's29 systems framework for analysing 
international relations provides scope for integrating 
various analytical frameworks and models. Aid in general 
and aid to education and training in particular can best be 
understood by adopting this broader approach. 
Against this analytical background the following assumptions 
are going to be examined, that: 
(1) Zambia does not have any explicit policy on foreign aid 
to its education and training sector. Consequently aid 
responds mainly to specific education and training 
problems. 
(2) Zambia's education and training priorities are 
influenced .by . the donors' aid priorities and the 
resources made available. 
(3) Zambia's present administrative structure, internal 
institutional politics, and staffing problems in the 
Economic and Technical Cooperation Department (ETC) of 
the NCDP offers limited scope for creating an effective 
central unit for coordinating aid. 
(4) Donors' preoccupations with protecting their national 
interests in their aid programmes and their major 
differences in administrative and management styles 
would be obstacles to greater donor cooperation and aid 
coordination beyond the present levels of 
interorganisational cooperation. 
(5) Donors' aid to education and training in Zambia forms a 
constituent of donors' global political, economic and 
commercial interests. 'Global' is used here to denote 
each donor's aid constituency. 
(6) Zambia's attempts to select its own priorities in the 
education sector has been caught in the donors' 
endeavours to develop and promote their interests 
abroad. 
The broader bilateral and interorganisational aid relations 
among donors and between donors and Zambia will be analysed 
within 	 the 	 contexts 	 of 	 the exchange, influence, and 
power-dependency, dependence/dependency analytic frameworks. 
Economic and political theories should also give important 
background insights on aid. These analytic frameworks are 
complementary. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ZAMBIA: POLICIES, PRIORITIES, EXPANSIONISM, AND PERFORMANCE 
IN THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SECTOR, 1964-1974. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces and analyses Zambia's policies and 
priorities in education and training development. It 
examines the policy environment in which broad and specific 
events and factors have occurred and given rise to 
Government initiatives. The analysis identifies the factors 
which have shaped public policy in education and training 
development, and assesses the sector's performance in 
achieving the policy objectives. 
Zambia's post-independence education and training 
development has been driven by a continuous process of 
making attempts to respond to two sets of factors: the 
colonial legacy and the search for a new philosophy in 
education, and 	 structural adjustments in the country's 
education and training system. Throughout the period, 
socio-economic and political events have exerted pressures, 
sometimes extreme, on policy and decision making in the 
sector. The development process appears to have passed 
through two distinct phases. The period from 1964 to the 
mid 1970s saw the introduction of new policies and 
expansionism in the system, and the review and structural 
adjustment phase has stretched from the mid 1970s to date. 
Education and training policies and priorities have thus 
reflected and been influenced by events associated with 
these factors. 
At 	 independence 	 in 	 1964, the education and training 
facilities for the African population were meagre, 
especially in comparison to the provision for non-African 
minority communities. Severe imbalances characterised the 
provision of these services among different racial groups. 
Restrictive access for Africans to trades and technical 
training, and prohibitive school fees were among the other 
policy issues the new government had to address itself to. 
The lack of educated and skilled manpower among the African 
population was felt rapidly and acutely. The scale of the 
problem was such that the UN Economic Survey Mission to 
Zambia in 1964 described it as a marked heritage of 
imbalance and contrast in the field of human development.' 
It is not too much to say that Zambia in terms of 
high level manpower, is one of the least educated 
countries in a most under educated continent. 
This demonstrable fact presents Zambia with its 
gravest danger on the eve of independence. Not only 
will the shortage of highly educated people be the 
greatest obstacle along the path to economic 
expansion, Vven political stability could be 
threatened. 
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In 1962 the three million Africans in Northern Rhodesia had 
26 secondary schools, the majority of which were junior 
schools. The European population of 75,000 was served by 13 
secondary schools, six of which prepared students up to form 
6 level. At the time of independence a cumulative total of 
1,200 African Zambians had passed the Cambridge School 
Certificate examination, and about 6,000 had attained two 
years of secondary education.2 The educational status and 
attainment of the African population are illustrated in 
Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
African Population by Province and Educational 
Status, 1963. 
% Population & Educational Status 
Province 	 Total Pop 	 No Schooling 	 Some Schooling* 
Central 	 482485 	 66.4 	 33.6 
Cop'belt 	 495855 	 55.2 	 44.8 
Eastern 	 477682 	 76.3 	 23.7 
Luapula 	 356461 	 65.0 	 35.0 
Northern 	 563003 	 71.4 	 28.6 
N/Western 	 210526 	 80.0 	 20.0 
Southern 	 457301 	 63.2 	 36.8 
Western 	 361905 	 73.6 	 26.4  
Zambia 	 3,405218 	 68.0 	 32.0 
* Includes different levels of schooling 
Source: Compiled from CSO, 1969 Census.  
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This social situation created a sense of urgency in the new 
UNIP government. In carrying out the tasks of introducing 
new changes in the education system the government was 
assisted by the reports of two other international groups, 
the UNESCO Mission and the Lockwood Committee, whose studies 
had been commissioned by the interim coalition government on 
the eve of Zambia's independence. 
The findings and recommendations of the three international 
missions to Northern Rhodesia in the run up period to 
independence provided vital data on the country's 
socio-economic 	 situation. UNESCO 	 was requested by the 
Northern Rhodesia government to investigate and report on 
Zambian education in light of the 1961 Addis Ababa education 
conference targets for Africa. It was the first full study 
of Zambian education ever to be undertaken.3 	 The Lockwood 
Committee of 1963 conducted a feasibility study on the need 
to establish a university in Zambia. The UN/ECA/FAO 
economic survey of Zambia in 1964 had a broader scope than 
the other studies. Besides education, other key productive 
sectors were covered by the study. Together, the studies 
provided the new government with an important planning base. 
The studies also served to draw the attention of the 
international community to Zambia's real socio-economic 
situation and areas where international assistance was 
needed. 
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A common theme which ran through the three studies was the 
identified need for Zambia to develop an education and 
training system which could meet the demands of a new 
political and economic order in the country. Thus, each 
mission put forward specific recommendations to help Zambia 
take on new social and economic responsibilities. The 
UNESCO group recommended that the highest priority in 
education be accorded to the expansion of secondary 
education. The government was urged to work towards 
ensuring that 75 per cent of the form 2 pupils proceeded to 
form 3 at the end of 1964, and that from the beginning of 
1966 the intake into secondary schools be increased by 1050 
each year up to 1970. These measures were intended to 
provide a quick response to the need to provide middle level 
manpower, and also to create a pool for a long term 
expansion programme. The Lockwood Committee recommended the 
establishment of a university in Zambia, a recommendation 
which was supported by the UNESCO team. Acting on the lead 
set by the two earlier missions the UN/ECA/FAO group made 
this recommendation: 
The first priority in the years until 1970 must be 
to build the foundations which are lacking today. 
Zambians must be trained for the civil service, 
for the mines, for 	 agriculture 	 and 	 industry, 
transport and commerce. All forms of education must 
be expanded, guided 11,y the future needs which extend 
far into the future.'" 
Consequently,wheff UNIP came to power one of the immediate 
tasks it tackled was to translate some its of its manifesto 
policies into action programmes. The changing of the old 
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policies and the expansion of the education and training 
system were accorded priority. 
Much of the Government efforts and resources during the 
first decade of independence, 1964-1974 were thus directed 
at instituting remedial policies and changes in the system. 
During the process of this development a number of factors 
and events emerged which exerted pressures and influence on 
policy decisions in the sector. Even before UNIP came to 
power in 1964 its leadership was aware of the enormous 
financial obligations which awaited them in their intended 
attempts to expand the country's education system. 
Nonetheless, UNIP was determined to find ways of financing 
the programme. Seeking financial assistance from the IMF 
was considered a real possibility.5 	 This determination 
became evident in the development plans which followed. 
Table 2 sets out the chronology of the main events in the 
evolution of education and training policies in the sector. 
The events outlined in Table 2 indicate only a partial 
context within which a blend of local initiatives, 
international 	 advice, policy 	 proposals, analytical 
investigations and legal provisions have occurred. Both 
domestic factors an4.international experiences have appeared 
to exert some influence on policies in the sector. 
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Table 2  
Chronology of Main Events in Education and Training Policies, 
1962-1989 
Year Event 
 
Goals/Objectives  
To restructure and expand 
ET on the principles of 
racial equality in access 
to ET. Free education/ 
and development of human 
resources. 
1962 UNIP Manifesto 
for first majority 
-rule election 
1963 	 First full Census 
of the African 
population 
1963 	 UNESCO Commission to 
Northern Rhodesia. 
1963 	 Sir John Lockwood 
Mission 
1964 	 UN/ECA/FAO Social 
and Economic' survey 
of Northern Rhodesia 
Count population and 
measure levels of 
attainment in 
socio-economic status.  
To investigate and report 
on the education 
situation in light of the 
1961 Addis Ababa 
Conference targets.  
To advise upon the 
development of a local 
University.  
To survey the 
socio-economic situation 
in Northern Rhodesia. 
1964 	 UNIP Manifesto 	 To reaffirm most of the 
for post independence 	 1962 pledges. 
election 
1964 	 Emergency Development 
Plan, 1964./65. 
To allocate 
resources for priority 
investments immediately 
after independence while 
longer term policies 
were being formulated.  
1965 	 The University of 
Zambia Act  
1965 	 Transistional 
Development Plan. 
(TDP), 1965/66 
To formally establish the 
national University. 
To increase and expand 
educational facilities. 
Greater enrolments at 
primary and secondary 
school level. UPE 
targeted for 1970.  
To regulate the new 
education system.  
To develop local manpower, 
to increase enrolments 
at all levels of 
education. Universal 
primary entry by 1970. 
More secondary schools. 
Expansion of technical 
education and teacher 
training. More facilities 
for adult and informal 
education. And more 
bursaries for UNZA.  
To establish a parastatal 
Commission for Technical 
and Vocational Training 
in order to expand and 
modernise technical 
education and trades 
training.  
To provide unified terms 
and conditions of service 
to teachers. 
1966 	 Education Act 
1966 
	
First National 
Development 
Plan (FNDP), 1966/70 
1967 	 Saunders Report 
1968 	 The Teaching Service 
Commission Act 
1969 	 Loans and Guarantees 
Authorisation Act 
(Cap 601) 
Law covering Government 
borrowing from local and 
external sources and the 
giving of guarantees to 
loans locally or from 
abroad. 
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Development Plan 
(TNDP), 1979/83 
To review education 
development five years 
after independence.  
To convert the parastatal 
into a Department for 
Technical Education and 
Vocational Training under 
the Ministry of Education.  
Continue expansion 
programme but at a slower 
rate. Stress emphasis on 
consolidation for quality 
education. Greater emphasis 
on practical subjects.  
Repealed Independence Act 
(1964). Established One-
Party structure, and 
Party supremacy.  
Greater emphasis on the 
role of science and 
technology. 
To change the education 
structure, increase 
curriculum 
diversification and lay 
emphasis on developing 
education with 
production. Improving 
qualitative aspects of 
education and training.  
To mobilise resources for 
implementing the 
education 
reforms. Completing SNDP 
projects. Coordination of 
education resources to 
ensure equality of 
opportunity between 
rural and urban areas. 
Diversification of Grade 
10-12 curricula. Emphasis 
on TEVT, primary and 
secondary teacher 
training. Establish new 
campus for UNZA at Ndola.  
1969 	 First National 
Education Conference 
1972 	 Technical Education 
and Vocational 
Training Act 
1972 	 Second National 
Development Plan 
(SNDP), 1972/76 
1973 	 Zambia Constitution 
Bill Published 
1974 	 UNIP National Policies 
for the 1974-1984 
Decade 
1974 	 Education Reform, 
1974-1977 
19/9 
 
Third National 
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1980 	 Population Census 	 Count population and 
measure the social 
-economic status of 
Zambia. 
1982 	 Creation of two 	 To give greater priority 
Ministries of 	 to science and technology 
Education, MGEC 	 in higher education. 
and MHE 
1983 	 Examination Council Act 	 To establish the Zambia 
Examination Council 
1984 Education Reform 
Implementation 
Project (ERIP), 
1984-1986 
To work out concrete 
proposals and a plan for 
implementing Universal 
Basic Education (UBE). To 
give advice to MGEC on 
financial and other 
implementation 
requirements. 
To train highly skilled 
manpower. Develop the 
education structure: Full 
time, continuous, and 
national service. To 
introduce compulsory 
schooling. Emphasise 
technical education at 
secondary school level. 
Development of science 
and technology.  
A temporary plan while 
the Fourth National 
Development Plan was 
being formulated.  
To establish the former 
Ndola Campus of UNZA an 
autonomous university. 
1985 	 UNIP Policies for 
the 1985/1995 Decade 
1987 	 Interim National 
Development Plan 
(INDP), 1987/1988 
1988 	 Copperbelt University 
Act 
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1989 	 New Financing Policy 	 Introduce new financing 
measures in higher 
education institutions. 
Students must contribute 
financially towards the 
full cost of their 
education or training.  
Sources: GRZ and UNIP documents. 1962-1989. 
3.2 Policies, Plans and Performance, 1964-1974 
3.2.1 Policies  
UNIP began its reign in a multiparty system. Disagreements 
over national policies are characteristic of multiparty 
politics but there was general agreement with the opposition 
party on UNIP's agenda for social reform, especially on 
matters concerning education. The African National Congress 
(ANC), the main opposition party, shared common views with 
UNIP on the need to democratise access to and participation 
in education. This gave UNIP a free hand to implement its 
education policies without restraint. 
The UNIP leadership came to power with a background of 
liberal political socialisation received from close contacts 
and association with liberal democratic political parties, 
other 	 organisations, and 	 left-wing 	 individuals. While 
studying in Britain, Harry Nkumbula had taken a 	 keen 
interest in the activities of the Fabian Society.6 In 
1957 Kaunda was invited by the British Labour Party to 
attend a socialist conference in London.7 Later Kaunda 
spent some months in Britain studying how the Labour Party 
was organised. These contacts brought UNIP into closer 
contact with liberal. democratic values, which later assisted 
them in forming their own outlook on political and socio-
economic issues. The influence of these contacts are well 
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reflected in the 1962 UNIP Manifesto. In its attempt to 
solicit support for some of its proposed social reform 
programmes the document drew attention to what it considered 
justifiably large investments in education in Britain.8  
But, embracing 	 and 	 projecting 	 socialist 	 or 	 liberal 
democratic values was very popular then among nationalist 
parties, and represented an effective ticket with which to 
mobilise public support. UNIP's broad education policy drew 
inspiration from these values. This was quite explicit in 
the 1962 Manifesto whose preamble to the chapter on 
education quoted extensively articles, 1, 2, and 26 from the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 It is within 
this set of values that UNIP set out to restructure the 
inherited colonial education system and UNIP's attempts to 
create a mass education system should be seen in this light. 
The domestic sources of influence on policies largely arose 
from the social and economic situation in the country. 
Population growth, social demand for education, and the 
state of the economy and the labour market all in different 
ways conditioned Zambia's education and training policy. 
And the nature of the problems in the sector determined that 
Zambia's education and training policy was largely 
reactive. 
3.2.2 Emergency and Transitional Development Plans  
To move towards a realisation of its objectives the 
Government took decisions that brought in several structural 
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changes in the system.The inherited colonial education 
structure had been racially organised into African, and 
non-African. African education was the responsibilty of the 
Northern Rhodesia Government, whereas that of non-African 
was the responsibilty of the Federal Government. Racial 
segregation in schools was abolished immediately after 
independence. 
Up to 1965 the primary school system had consisted of eight 
years of schooling, sub A and B, and standards 1-6. In 1965 
this programme was reduced to seven years, grades 1-7. To 
cope with the expansion programme, teacher training at 
primary school level was reduced from two years to a one 
year crash course programme in 1966. The measure was one of 
several that were designed to increase school/college output 
at various points in the education system. In 1966 this 
measure was partly responsible for the substantial increase 
in primary school leavers who proceeded to secondary 
schools. The introduction of this change enabled the grade 
7 and standard 6 pupils to sit a common secondary school 
entry examination. Other than reducing the course programme 
and increasing enrolment, it is doubtful if the decision had 
any 	 pedagogical 	 considerations. Correspondingly, the 
secondary school course programme which had been of six 
years length was cut down to five. Acceleration of the 
supply of secondary school graduates into the economy and 
quick entry into the university at '0' level standard were 
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the critical factors behind these changes. Although this 
measure was initially conceived as a temporary strategy, it 
has remained a permanent feature. 
Before independence craft training provided under the 
apprentice system had not been open to Africans until 1960. 
One of the important features of the apprentice system had 
been a traditionally long internship period (five years) 
during which trainees mastered their trade skills. Because 
of its long training programme the supply of graduates to 
industry took longer. After the Saunders report of 1967 
shorter term trades training programmes were introduced to 
replace the apprentice system. Zambia had also a few 
government and mission-owned Trade Schools for Africans 
which provided industrially skilled and semi-skilled 
manpower at and below middle levels for various engineering 
and construction fields. Many primary schools too had 
workshops attached to them with instructors. These provided 
training in woodwork, brickwork, basketry and other skills. 
Practical subjects in primary schools were however phased 
out soon after independence. 
The Emergency Development Plan (EDP) allocated large capital 
funds for the expansion of the education system. The aim 
was to accelerate the expansion of secondary education and 
also to increase educational facilities in the rural areas. 
Thus, eighteen new secondary boarding schools were under 
construction in 1965. The long term goal was to provide 
each district with a secondary school. During the 
Transitional Development Plan period, stage one of the 
University of Zambia and the building of two big Teacher 
Training Colleges were undertaken. Two technical secondary 
schools were opened in 1965 to accelerate the production of 
technical manpower. In the grant-aided Christian missionary 
education sector twelve new secondary schools were opened, 
nine by Catholic mission agencies.1°  
This rapid expansion increased vastly the country's school 
capacity in a very short period. In the secondary school 
sector the target was to create 8,435 new places, which 
represented a 100 per cent increase in enrolment. This 
served to demonstrate the new government's commitment to 
developing education as an important service sector in the 
country's development process. Because the economy was then 
strong, the government was able to finance 80 per cent of 
capital development in the public sector of the education 
system without significant external aid. 
The government's strong financial position was demonstrated 
more conspicuously in the recurrent provisions, since the 
expansion programme. was backed by a policy 
	 of 	 free 
education. In practice this meant that pupils/students at 
all levels not only received free tuition, but also got 
their full complement of the required school/college 
requisites appropriate to their level of studies. This 
included provision of exercise and textbooks, and minor 
equipment. In addition, pupils 	 in 	 boarding 	 secondary 
schools received free meals, bedding and toilet requisites. 
Students at the university and colleges were accorded the 
same facilities and were also paid regular personal and 
travel allowances at the end of each term.11 Indeed for a 
few years the expansion programme and the application of the 
free education policy seemed to have had no limits. It was 
largely due to this investment policy that Zambia was able 
to produce locally middle level educated manpower for the 
public service and the private sector of the economy in a 
relatively short time after independence. 
Nonetheless, this 	 development 	 took 	 place 	 against 	 a 
background of serious local manpower shortage in the 
education and training sector. In 1965, out of 294 teachers 
who were recruited for secondary schools, only 81 were 
appointed locally, and these would 	 have 	 been 	 mostly 
non-Zambians. Table 3 shows the profile of the teaching 
force in 1964. Although the number of non-Zambian teachers 
was large, a considerable number of them left the country 
soon after Zambia attained independence: 
Table 3  
Secondary School Teachers by Level of Qualification, 
Gender, and Nationality Status, 1964. 
Qualification 
Zambian Non-Zambian 
Total Men 	 Women Men Women 
Graduate Trained 14 2 289 147 452 
Graduate Untrained 2 - 89 45 136 
Sec/ed Trained 44 5 115 94 258 
Sec/ed Untrained 12 18 30 
Not completed 
Sec/ed Trained 33 1 4 3 41 
Not completed 
Sec/ed Untrained 2 2 4 
TOTAL 95 8 509 309 921 
Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report, 1965, p.51. 
In its efforts to introduce changes in the system the 
Ministry of Education had become overzealous. The teaching 
of practical subjects in primary schools which had been part 
of the school curriculum during the colonial period was 
phased out soon after independence. This was a rather odd 
decision and appeared to show manifestations of UNIP's 
overreaction to colonial education. Colonial education had 
been criticised for many shortcomings, of which one of them 
was its segmentation approach in preparing Africans for the 
labour market. Africans were slotted into manual and lower 
clerical jobs. Manual jobs, even including those 	 that 
required trained skills, were looked down upon by many 
Africans. The phasing out of trade schools and the removal 
of practical subjects appears to have been connected to this 
sentiment. The paradox was that, no sooner had the decision 
been effected than the Ministry and the public began to 
question their own wisdom in having taken that decision.12  
The 1969 education conference devoted considerable time 
discussing the content of the primary school curriculum. Its 
conclusion was that upper grades in primary schools needed 
training in practical skills, and in 1974 FINNIDA was 
requested to help the Ministry reintroduce practical 
subjects in primary schools. 
It has been shown that both the Emergency and Transitional 
Development Plans set the process of education and training 
development into motion. A number of short term objectives 
were achieved during this period, but some of the projects 
that were undertaken had long-term effects which have 
affected subsequent plans. 
3.2.3 First National Development Plan  
The First National Development Plan (FNDP) covered the 
period from 1 July, 1966 to 30 June 1970. The FNDP budgeted 
K563.6 million for public sector capital investment, of 
which education and training got K78.4 million.13 In 
addition the government raised two World Bank loans worth 
12.7 million US dollars to finance education projects. 
The FNDP educational plan stressed increasing enrolments at 
all levels of education and training: 
1. To 	 provide 	 sufficient 	 places 	 for primary 
education for every child aged seven in 1970. 
2. To provide opportunities for all upper primary 
school children in urban primary schools and 75 
per cent of children in rural primary schools 
to complete a seven year primary course. 
3. To improve the quality of teacher training, and 
up-grade the standards of existing teachers. 
4. To expand secondary schooling to provide manpower 
in the numbers and with the skills required for 
national development. This included preparing 
people for higher education, teacher training and 
technical training as well as for direct entry 
into employment. 
5. To provide the resources for the university of 
Zambia to enrol over 1,600 students in 1970 and 
develop it to take a leading part in the 
educational, professional and cultural life of 
the nation. Professional training in medicine, 
engineering, agriculture, administration, 
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teaching and law will be started. A broad range 
of useful research and scholarship will be 
encouraged and a National Council for Scientific 
Research established. 
6. To 	 develop 	 facilities 	 for adult education 
(including classes for women, regional libraries 
educational broadcasting) in order that 
opportunities are available to Zambians of 
every age in every part of the country. Every 
agency contributing to education- missions, 
industry, or individuals is assisting the 
educational develonent of the nation and is 
therefore welcome.1"I  
Except for one objective which focused on qualitative 
improvement of teacher education, all the other objectives 
were aimed at expanding educational and training facilities. 
The FNDP became a vehicle for attempting to complete the 
expansion programme started under the Emergency and 
Transitional Development Plans. 
Following the recommendations of the Saunders Report (1967) 
the new Commission for Technical Education and Vocational 
Training was established through legislation. At UNZA three 
additional academic Schools, of engineering, medicine, and 
agricultural sciences were established. Higher degree 
	
programmes, certificate 	 and 	 diploma courses were also 
introduced. Hence enrolment increased from 312 students in 
1966 to 1184 full-time students, an additional 285 were 
enrolled in part-time course programmes.15 
External loans helped Zambia realise some of the FNDP 
objectives for UNZA's development and expansion of 
facilities in secondary schools. The loans marked the start 
of external borrowing for capital development of education 
and training. The loans came at time when priority in the 
World Bank's lending programmes was for secondary and 
tertiary education to speed up 'human capital formation'. 
Between 1963 and 1970 the Bank approved 43 education loans, 
of which 33 were for secondary general, technical, and 
agricultural, plus some tertiary training projects." 
The FNDP made significant achievements in meeting some of 
the planned targets. For example, the school system 
expanded further to absorb the huge increases in enrolments 
which the previous plans had created. Intake at all levels 
continued 	 to increase during the plan period. In primary 
education the Plan achieved 89.4 per cent of the planned 
target for urban enrolment. The number of primary classes 
increased by 50 percent, from 12,837 to 18,118 in the same 
period. Secondary school enrolments more than doubled from 
23,000 in 1966 to 52,472 in 1970. 
However, against this background of some successes the 
Ministry faced a set of financial and operational problems 
in implementing the plan and maintaining a viable education 
system. In 1968 education estimates were cut by 26 per cent 
on the capital account, by the end of the FNDP budget 
stringency had made its full effects felt. The expansion 
programme in particular slowed down considerably, 
consequently the level of enrolment in form 1 remained more 
or less the same between 1968 and 1972. Capital development 
at UNZA fell more than a year behind. The planned building 
of three teachers colleges and the expansion of others were 
shelved. Outside the capital development programme there 
was great concern over the increasing numbers of grade 7 
push-outs who could not get form 1 places, and seemed to be 
heading for school leaver unemployment. 
The goal of universal primary education was not achieved by 
1970. The disparity in access to schooling at upper primary 
level between urban and rural areas had persisted. 
Progression rates from lower to upper primary in rural areas 
continued to be constrained by selection examinations 
because of the inadequate number of school places. At 
secondary school level the ministry faced the problem of 
recruiting trainee teachers into the Kabwe Teachers College. 
In 1968 places were offered to 120 applicants of whom 89 
accepted and 72 enrolled. In 1969 places were offered to 
115 applicants, but only 48 enrolled.17 	 Competition for 
students had become very keen among training institutions 
and employers. Moreover, it was difficult to retain Zambian 
teachers in the face of lucrative jobs outside government 
service. Consequently, heavy reliance on recruitment of 
teachers from abroad continued during the FNDP. 
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As the expansion programme took shape, so did the number of 
administrative, professional and qualitative problems in the 
education system. There was extreme pressure 	 upon the 
administrative and supervisory resources, a 	 significant 
decline in the professional quality of the teaching force 
could be seen, shortage of teaching supplies had gradually 
increased, heavy staff turnover, and student indiscipline 
all became worrying problems.18  
The scale and severity of the problems eventually gave rise 
to the convening of the first national education conference 
in 1969. At that point the Ministry of education had been 
headed by two previous ministers, John Mwanakatwe and Arthur 
Wina. Mwanakatwe had laid down the structural foundation of 
the new system, launched the expansion plans, and made the 
controversial decisions. Wina's tenure was brief but he 
opened up 	 some of the issues arising from the massive 
educational growth. When Wesley Nyirenda took over the 
Ministry in 1969 he chose to have a public debate on many 
issues that his predecessor had raised in parliament the 
previous year. 
3.2.4 First National Educational Conferece, 1969 
In September 1969, .the Ministry of Education organised a 
national education conference to take stock of the 
performance of the country's education and training system 
since independence.19 A cross section of practioners in 
the education and training sector from throughout the 
country were represented at the conference. The issues 
covered included education priorities, course content for 
primary schools, school leaver problems, financial matters, 
structure, organisation 	 and 	 control 	 of 	 educational 
institutions, teachers, and teacher training, examinations, 
technical education, curricula and syllabuses, relationship 
between the needs of industries and technical training 
programmes, education for girls, and discipline in 
schools.20 
This conference was significant in several ways. For many of 
the issues it addressed itself to, the conference came 
rather late. The wisdom and advice which came out of the 
conference should have prevailed at the time of drawing up 
the first post-independence education plan. Nevertheless, 
the conference gave Zambians two timely benefits, a quick 
inventory of the situation as it had unfolded and a focus 
on particular problems which had emerged, such as the school 
leaver problem. Despite the increasing financial problems 
which the government was facing, the country's resolve to 
continue the expansion programme had not diminished. The 
conclusions of the conference had pointed to this. The 
conclusions were that: 
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1. The majority favoured some form of UPE; 
2. All groups wanted to see a radical reshaping of 
the primary school system with emphasis on 
practical subjects; 
3. While the cost would be heavy, the country could 
and should provide UPE regardless of the rate or 
needs of economic growth; 
4. Boarding schools should be provided to cater for 
rural children who had to cover long distances 
and children of civil servants who were subject 
to frequent transfers; 
5. There was need for a comprehensive school medical 
service to ensure that pupils' progress was not 
being hampered by physical defects or 
malnutrition; 
6. Science should be taught at all levels beginning 
in grade 1; 
7. More technical teachers should be trained.21  
Before the 1969 conference the government had taken policy 
decisions in respect of the following changes which were 
presented to parliament: 
(a) to change the structure of the secondary school 
course; 
(b) to diversify the secondary school curriculum; 
(c) to maximise utilisation of space in secondary 
schools(increase class enrolment from 35 to 40 
and double-bunk instead of single beds); 
(d) to convert Hillcrest secondary school into a 
technical school; 
(e) to convert Chalimbana Teacher Training College 
into a special In-Service college for teachers as 
soon as funds become available 
(f) to diversify secondary school curricula by 
introducipici a wide range of practical 
subjects." 
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Following these two events the Ministry went ahead to 
implement policy proposals. Practical subjects in the areas 
of technical drawing, woodwork, metalwork, agricultural 
science, and business studies were introduced in secondary 
schools and Teachers colleges. 
An important political event which took place during the 
FNDP was the 1967 launching by UNIP of Humanism in Zambia as 
a national ideology.23 	 This was an attempt to stamp the 
Zambian people with a political ideology with which they 
could identify. Humanism was also intended to act as 
regulatory framework for the country's social and economic 
endeavours. UNIP faced an impeNNA 	 general election in 1968 
with severe internal strife. The struggle for fair tribal 
representation in the power hierarchy had become fierce.24  
Humanism therefore came at a most critical time. One could 
say that its political role was both visionary and 
diversionary. The ideology being man-centred, non-tribal, 
and non-exploitative was expected to act as a unifying 
factor in the nation. Hence, soon after its launching UNIP 
tried to introduce it as a teaching subject in schools. The 
1969 education conference considered this proposal but 
concluded that the implementation of Humanism in schools 
would face many practical difficulties. Besides, the 
opposition party and the general public had reacted 
cynically and suspiciously to the introduction of Humanism. 
Though difficult as the effort turned out to be, UNIP had 
made its first political mark on education. 
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Thus, within the FNDP period the governmnt carried out an 
unsuccessful attempt to introduce a party ideology in the 
school curriculum and renewed its efforts to mitigate past 
education and training deprivation through further 
expansion. Paradoxically, its attempts to introduce 
qualitative changes in the system came at a time when 
recurrent resources were under considerable pressure. In 
all, it is expansionism which appeared to direct 
	 the 
planning process. Although the Government was fully aware 
of the magnitude of the emerging problems in the country's 
economy and in the education and training sector in 
particular, the national conference in 1969 failed 
	 to 
produce any real public commitment to rationalising 
education and training expansion. Expert advice, such as 
the one below, which had been given to guide the thinking of 
the conference did not seem to make much impact: 
The scope of secondary and higher educational 
expansion, on the other hand has been defined by a 
calculation of two independent economic factors: 
Manpower needs and estimated financial resources. 
The magnitude of both depends upon assumptions about 
the rates of increase in production, wages, and 
employment. Many of the assumptions 
	 have 	 been 
falsified by events. The country faces the prospect 
of skilled manpower supply in excess of demand (as 
distinct from need),... and insufficient revenue to 
sustain the soaring capital and recurrent costg, of 
education expansion at the approved plan rates." 
Ostensibly becalise a large number of projects initiated 
during the FNDP had not been completed by the end of the 
Plan period in 1970 the Government extended the expiry date 
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of the FNDP to December 1971. Nonetheless, the political 
and economic problems which had arisen in the country 
following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Rhodesia made it very difficult for the extension to have 
any positive effect. The re-routing of supply lines in 
particular severely affected the supply of building 
materials and equipment.26 	 The school construction 
programme was delayed, and the objective to enrol all seven 
year olds into Grade 1 by 1970 became untenable. Intake 
into secondary schools faced similar difficulties. The FNDP 
average progression rate target of 33 per cent for Grade 7s 
had by 1970 slipped back to 25 per cent. 
In all, the FNDP saw both great strides in accomplishing 
some of the objectives, as well as frustrations in the 
failures to achieve others. In 1969 Technical Drawing was 
introduced into the Junior Secondary School Leaving 
Examination (JSSLE) at Form 2 leve1.27 	 In 1970 Statutory 
Instrument no 118 (Compulsory Attendance) was introduced, 
this made truancy in Government and aided schools a 
punishable offence in a court of law. Since school 
enrolment was not compulsory, but only 	 attendance, the 
effect of this improbable legislation was minimal and it 
soon became a dead letter. Tuition and boarding fees at 
secondary schools were completely abolished. The 
Government's commitment to expanding the education services 
was evident in the Ministry of Education's share of 
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recurrent expenditure (excluding public debt appropriations 
and defence), which remained at a higher 22.7 per cent in 
1968, 23.0 per cent in 1969, and 22.0 per cent in 1970. 
Zambianisation, a programme of replacing expatriates with 
Zambians had achieved some successes in some sections of the 
public and private sectors.28 This programme was not only 
closely connected to the development of secondary and 
tertiary education and training, it was partly responsible 
for its rapid development and expansion. Political symbolism 
and patronage had also promoted the drive for rapid 
Zambianisation. Unfortunately training for Zambianisation 
was caught up in the politics of education and training for 
development. Zambianisation has meant rapid access to 
training and accelerated promotions, quite often without 
regard to critical development and productivity requirements 
in industries and the public sector. Paper qualifications 
became important criteria by which peoples' potential to 
contribute to the development process are judged. The 
programme became reduced to a political objective rather 
than a developmental strategy. Because many investment 
decisions are still being made in education and training in 
respect of advancing the Zambianisation programme, it is 
important that a critical conceptualisation of the place and 
role of this programme is given thought by the Government. 
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The results of the 1969 population census had documented the 
worrying trend that massive numbers of people had moved from 
their villages into urban areas since independence. The 
economic implications of this for social services provision, 
such as education, were quite obvious. Moreover, the 1969 
manpower survey projected a continuing deficit of many 
skilled and semi-skilled people in the economy.29 For 
most of the jobs advanced education and extensive training 
were required. 
Politically, education development during the FNDP had taken 
place against a very trying period for the ruling party 
UNIP. Between 1967 and 1972 when the one party constitution 
came into being UNIP had faced serious internal problems. 
Factionalism, sectionalism, and 	 accusations of political 
dominance by some tribes were some of the serious issues in 
the inter-party and intra-party contests for power.3°  
UNIP leadership had come under severe challenge from both 
ANC and the relatively newer small parties, United Party 
and the United Progressive Party, each of which drew support 
from a predominantly ethnic and provincial membership. The 
run up to the 1968 general elections and the 1971 referendum 
for the one party system was a particularly difficult time. 
Thus the development process was being led and managed by a 
leadership that was, on the one hand engaged in a fierce 
internal power struggle and inter-party political contest, 
while at the same time leading an equally demanding and 
complex development programme. 
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3.2.5 The Second National Development Plan (SNDP) 
The start of the SNDP had been delayed by the Government's 
difficulties in recruiting expatriate planners to work on 
the plan: itself a confirmation of the thin resources of 
local expertise on which the government could draw.31 The 
SNDP came well marked with these features: a moderate will 
to pursue the quantitative growth process, a catalogue of 
continuing 	 budget cuts, and (despite the postponement) 
delays in completing many of the projects started earlier. 
During the Second Plan period a strong realisation emerged 
within the government that the country's education system 
needed to be critically reviewed and overhauled. 
The objectives of the education sector of the SNDP were: 
1. to provide sufficient new lower primary streams 
to keep pace with population growth. 
2. to provide sufficient new upper primary streams 
to achieve a national progression rate of 80 per 
cent from grade 4 to grade 5 by 1976. 
3. To complete the construction of three secondary 
schools, to make extensions to twelve secondary 
schools, and to build thirteen new full secondary 
schools and two junior demonstration schools at 
teachers colleges. 
4. To expand two Primary Teacher Training Colleges 
and to complete the construction of two Secondary 
Teachers Colleges. To build three new Primary 
Teachers Colleges. 
5. To expand Nortec and Evelyn Hone Colleges. To 
complete expansion works at four Trades Training 
Institutes. To begin the construction of Zambia 
Aeronautical Services Training Institute. 
6. To complete UNZA's World Bank financed education 
projects- 
	 School 	 of 	 education, School 	 of 
Engineering, student residences 
	 and 	 catering 
facilities.i2 
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The SNDP was launched at a time when the economy was in 
difficulties. Zambia's economic performance had suffered 
major setbacks at the close of the FNDP due to both internal 
and external factors.33 
	
Fluctuations in the price of 
copper, the main foreign exchange earner, had caused great 
concern to the Government. The financing of development 
capital inputs was very much dependent on foreign exchange 
reserves. Although the government had regarded the setbacks 
in the performance of the economy as temporary, their 
effects had nevertheless begun to take shape in the 
budgetary allocations. Table 4 shows the government's 
capital and recurrent expenditure on education during the 
SNDP. 
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Given that capital expenditure by nature does not follow an 
even path, and depends on project finance and the 
government's willingness to commence new projects, it is not 
surprising Table 4 shows that some sectors experienced 
fluctuations 
	 in 	 capital 	 expenditure. Overall, capital 
expenditure during the SNDP showed very negligible growth 
against a background of rising inflation in the country. 
The responsibility for capital development in the primary 
sector was transferred to the provincial administration 
towards the end of the Plan period. In the new arrangement 
the position of the Ministry of Education has weakened as 
education expenditure has to compete with other provincial 
needs. The tendency has been to balance allocations rather 
than give according to sectors. In concrete terms the 
reduction of funding in primary school development meant 
that the SNDP set targets could not be achieved. Double and 
triple shift systems were employed to cope with rising 
enrolments in a system that was expanding very slowly. 
A survey carried out in Lusaka by the Ministry of Education 
in 1973 revealed serious inequities in access to schooling 
within the urban areas. The results 
	 showed 	 that, in 
squatter areas only 36.0 per cent of the school aged 
children attended primary schools, in the site and service 
areas it was 57.0'per cent, whereas in the high and medium 
cost areas it was 87.0 per cent. In one squatter area the 
proportion of school age children attending school was as 
low as 18.0 per cent.34  
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It will also be observed that overall recurrent expenditure 
provisions in each subsector had not shown significant 
increases between 1972 and 1974. Thereafter the primary and 
secondary school subsector recorded dramatic increases which 
came as a result of a salary review in 1975. The emolument 
factor in recurrent expenditure is a mask which often hides 
negative realities behind aggregate figures. This can be 
discerned from examining allocations to individual functions 
as shown in Table 5 below which indicates expenditure 
allocation for student consumables that is, teaching and 
learning materials and replacement works. 
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The recurrent expenditure provisions in Table 5 should be 
considered against the actual number of students being 
served, the number of institutions and the state of repair 
in the institutions. A comparison of per capita cost across 
institutions is also useful in measuring the disparity 
between 	 the subsectors. In Table 5 it is evident that 
Teacher Training Colleges suffered the worst cuts. The 
reality behind this is was that qualitative aspects in 
teacher education received severe adjustments, erosion, or 
complete withdrawal due to lack of adequate funding. For 
capital intensive subsectors such as technical education, 
inadequate funding imposed very frustrating experiences 
because maintenance of plant could not be carried out 
effectively. The reflection of the Department of Technical 
Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT) on their 1975 
performance summarised a common experience which faced many 
institutions in the country: 
Institutions continued to experience difficulties in 
their pursuit of qualitative training of skilled 
personnel to meet manpower needs of the country 
because 	 of 	 inadequate 	 funds. The 
	 increased 
allocation 	 could 	 not, unfortunately 
	 meet 	 the 
training requirements because of the high cost of 
materials. The main areas were student requisites 
and boarding costs. Although some institutions kept 
within their allocations...they could not augment 
existing equipment by new purchases nor could they 
do the necessary maintenance. It is feared that most 
equipment, a lot of which is very expensive, may 
eventually become unserviceable, either through 
normal attrition or lack of maintenance. But a 
situation may be reached when any lessening of funds 
will make necessary to discontinue some training 
programmes.'''' 
A similar crisis of accommodation was experienced at UNZA 
around 1974.36 	 The under provision of capital funding 
which occurred between 1971 and 1974 held back the expansion 
programme of student accommodation and kitchen and dining 
hall facilities. This was at a time of rising student 
enrolment in the University. The net effect of the under 
funding of capital projects was that the replacement of 
decrepit school buildings , construction of teacher houses, 
provision of water, electricity, and sewage facilities in 
the sector fell behind scheduled targets.37  
Some indicators of efficiency in the education system had 
shown little improvement in the first decade of independence. 
The progression rate from Grade 4 to 5 had continued to show 
severe imbalances between regions and between urban and 
rural areas. The progression rate ranged from around 100 
per cent in the Copperbelt Province to 58.3 percent in 
Eastern Province.38 
	
The ratio of Grade 7 pupils 
proceeding to Form 1 during the SNDP had not risen in 
relation to the rising numbers of Grade 7 candidates. Table 
6 shows the trend in the progression rate from 1964 to 1976. 
TABLE 6 
Grade 7 - 8 Progression Rates, 1964-1976 
Enrolment 	 Enrolment 
Year 	 Grade 7 	 Progression (%) 	 Form I/Grade 8 
1964 14,781 
1965 18,090 44.6 6,601 
1966 36,076 60.6 10,976 
1967 41,973 41.5 14,963 
1968 59,242 35.4 14,869 
1969 64,659 26.5 15,721 
1970 67,222 23.5 15,175 
1971 73,859 23.4 15,753 
1972 80,506 21.3 15,747 
1973 85,213 21.8 17,570 
1974 93,891 22.6 19,254 
1975 99,693 22.8 21,462 
1976 103,699 22.2 22,113 
1977 107,145 21.8 22,659 
Source: MGEC. Education Statistics. Various years. 
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The trend had been clearly downward while the number of 
Grade 7 candidates kept rising. For many years many 
push-outs have dealt with their problem by repeating Grade 7 
to get a second 	 or third chance at entry into form 1. 
Unfortunately this 'solution' puts extra pressure on a 
system that is already over-stretched. Repetition has been 
responsible for overenrolment and crowding in most grade 7 
classes and rapid wear and tear of school facilities. 
Despite the financial and other difficulties capital 
development projects and extension works continued. The 
major part of the planned secondary school building projects 
carried over from the FNDP were completed and target 
enrolments for the secondary school level were achieved 
satisfactorily. Primary school enrolments rose from 810,234 
in 1973 to 858,191 in 1974, an increase of 5.9 per cent. 
Some 'upgradings' of primary schools (that is, to overcome 
the bottleneck at grade 4) in the Eastern Region were 
made possible by phasing out boarding facilities and 
converting dormitories into classrooms. However, whatever 
achievements the FNDP and the SNDP made they were secured 
under difficult budgetary and operational conditions. Most 
of these adverse conditions persisted during the Third 
National Development Plan (TNDP) with even greater severity. 
Both the FNDP and SNDP introduced no major shift in 
educational and training policy. Education and training 
programmes were still responding to the initial policy of 
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redressing past education deprivations in the provision of 
facilities, human 	 resource 	 development, and 	 the 
Zambianisation programme. The expansion which took place in 
the 1960s and early 1970s produced such a spiral knock on 
effect in the system in the last two decades that its 
consequences have lived on. In the face of these financial 
and planning problems resulting from this expansionism the 
Government's reaction has been mixed. On the one hand it 
has never disguised its recognition of the country's 
declining economy and its attendant consequences for public 
expenditure 
	 on development programmes.39 
	
However, the 
Government's planning and expenditure behaviour have on many 
occasions contradicted official concern over the 
unfavourable state of the economy. 
Throughout this period education and training development 
were caught up between the pressures of social forces, 
population growth in particular, and the internal politics 
of patronage. Because education provision and expansion 
cannot be held back against an increasing young population, 
it is imperative that objectives and priorities be 
rationally reviewed often if this takes place in a context 
of scarce resources. Politicians were more concerned with 
the delivery of education and training as a political good, 
as a vote winner. Consequently, professional advice on 
planning tendedtQbbe. overwhelmed by the political will to 
deliver the education goods. 
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During the SNDP three important events took place which 
opened a new chapter in the country's education development 
process. In 1973 the President appointed an Ad Hoc 
Committee (AHC) to consider and to make recommendations 
regarding education development in Zambia during the 
1974-1984 decade.40 The committee was one of many that 
had been appointed to review social and economic sectors as 
part of the preparation process for the new Manifesto in the 
immediate period after the creation of the one party state. 
In 1974 UNIP produced a document on national policies for 
the decade (1974-1984).41 In 1974 the government launched 
a far reaching education reform exercise in the country.42 
Other no less significant initiatives included the 
Presidential decree in July, 1975 to all education and 
training institutions that they should become 	 production 
units. Although these events were separated briefly in time, 
their broad subject matter shared a common background. They 
were all in different ways making attempts to provide 
solutions to the problems that had mounted in the country's 
education and training system. 
The 1973 Ad Hoc Committee reviewed a wide range of issues in 
the entire education and training system. Although the 
Committee spent only 25 days on this exercise, it was able 
to provide a comprehensive synoptic coverage of the issues 
on educational structure, administrative and professional 
aspects, technical education, and support 
	 services. Its 
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treatment of the issues showed a marked depth of critical 
analysis of the situation. Their recommendations on 
financing education were particularly critical and 
dissenting: 
The Committee regarded the feeding of pupils as the 
responsibility of parents and also felt boarding 
facilities to boarders, while day pupils in the same 
school do not enjoy them, introduces an element of 
inequality. The Committee therefore recommends the 
following: 
(i) There should be free tuition but not 
free boarding facilities; 
(ii) The government should continue to provide 
these facilities where they exist but 
everyone must pay for the services; and 
(iii) Boarding facilities in urban areas must 
be abolished and dormitories converted 
into classrooms- refectories should be 
retained to cater gor pupils who must pay 
for the services.4J  
In yet another recommendation relating to financing 
education, the report said: 
In order to realise the proposed education 
development in the coming decade, which we are 
convinced is essential, the financing of education 
deserves special attention. Everything possible 
should be done to raise additional funds from 
sources outside the budget. For example, serious 
consideration should be given to the possibility of 
an educational levy. Within the Budget, 
developmental priorities should be re-examined with 
a view to the re-allocation of fung§ to education 
from other projects in the country. 
This is the furthest Zambians had come to suggesting a 
change in the financing of some aspects of the country's 
education provision. The Ad Hoc Committee's report on 
financing education was at variance with the 1969 education 
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conference report. The conclusions of the 1969 report 
rejected any suggestion of reintroducing boarding fees. A 
more significant conclusion was that which related to 
bilateral aid. The 1969 report was for more bilateral aid 
to support the country's education development. In contrast. 
the 1973 report made no appeal at all to the government to 
look to bilateral aid. 
Several issues appear to emerge from the two reports. 
Firstly, the fees had just been abolished, consequently it 
made little sense to reintroduce them only a few years 
later. Secondly, UNIP's pride in Zambia's post independence 
era was its deliverance of the people from the colonial 
measures which had restricted their access to education. 
Therefore the fees issue was politically very sensitive for 
UNIP, and particularly for the President, personally, who 
made no secret of his views. 
Although the 1973 report made some observations about 
expatriate teachers, the recommendation on teacher supply 
avoided any reference to the need for this kind of technical 
assistance. Instead, the Committee emphasised the need to 
produce teachers locally and urged the government to provide 
better conditions of service for teachers. The important 
points about the 1973 report are that, it came at a time 
when some of the problems that had been discussed in 1969 
had 	 taken 	 definite shape, the grade 7 push-outs had 
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increased, and there were clear difficulties on the part of 
the government in maintaining levels of recurrent 
expenditure provision seen in the immediate years after the 
attainment of independence. 
The recommendations of the Working Groups culminated in the 
production of the 1974 UNIP Manifesto for the 1974-1984 
decade. The Party adopted most of the recommendations that 
were put forward by the Ad Hoc Committee. 
Curiously, none of the 1974 UNIP manifesto's proposals on 
national education policies addressed themselves to the 
central issue of financing education and training. The Ad 
Hoc Committee had clearly put a financing caveat on future 
education development in the country.45 	 How could this 
have happened? The final design of the policies was the 
responsibility of the party officials at Freedom House. 
This group was more inclined to pay particular attention to 
political sensitivities in 
	 the 	 policies. Therefore, a 
non-commital stand on this matter appeared to be preferable 
because it left the government with more open options. 
Despite caution over financial resources, expansionism and 
UPE remained important items on the agenda of education 
development. 
The Ad Hoc Committee and the result of the task it carried 
out should be seen in a broader perspective. The Committee 
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had no authority of sanction over the sector and the 
recommendations it was asked to work out. The authority to 
make policies and important decisions lies in the Social 
and Cultural subcommittee of the Central Committee of UNIP. 
The Ad Hoc Committee's task had therefore been largely 
administrative and facilitative for the decision making 
process of the Party. 
The result of the Ad Hoc Committee's work (the UNIP 
Manifesto) raises also a question about the purpose which 
the manifestoes serve. Essentially, they are part of the 
Party's propaganda to sell its image to the electorate, 
hence the careful selection of what appears in it. 
Seven months after the publication of the 1974 manifesto the 
Ministry of Education launched a major education reform 
exercise. 
The initial impetus for a comprehensive reform exercise 
which nevertheless built on the general unease about the 
educational performance, and the work 
	 of 	 the 	 senior 
officials in the Ad Hoc Committee was given by the Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation conference on formal education in 
Africa which took place in Tanzania. The Permanent 
Secretary for education, the late S.J. Kazunga and senior 
officials attended this conference, at the personal 
direction of President Kaunda. President Nyerere gave a 
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very challenging introspective opening speech on education 
and development." The discussions at this meeting 
sharpened the inspiration among Zambian official to move 
towards reviewing the education system. 
3.2.6 Educational Reforms, 1974  
The pressure for reforms which began building up in 1969 had 
by 1974 reached such proportions within the government that 
the need to initiate a reform exercise could no longer be 
deferred, nor could problems and issues 	 in 	 education 
continue to be perceived separately. Concern was no longer 
with such matters as the problem of increasing numbers of 
push-outs or indeed the importance of providing adequate and 
reliable transport for the inspectorate. The entire 
education system had been indicted: '...my analysis of the 
education system, provides overwhelming evidence of the need 
for us to undertake a survey of the entire system and 
formulate cogent, progressive and feasible reforms.47' 
The organisation of the reform exercise which followed 
involved a very comprehensive plan of consultation and 
discussions which extended far and beyond. 
Following extensive study tours of ten countries in Africa 
and abroad to examine the education models and reforms of 
other countries, and intensive evaluations of all sectors of 
the education system intensive discussions were held within 
the Ministry of Education and among a cross-section of the 
ministries, trade unions, academic and the Party. 
Consequently a draft document, entitled ' Education for 
Development: Draft Statement on Education Reform' was 
produced.48 This document offered radical socialist 
oriented changes in the Zambia's education system. 
The political climate within which the reforms took place 
gave strong impetus to the way the reforms were perceived 
and projected. The reform movement emerged in the long 
shadows of the socialist oriented Zambian Humanism which had 
been launched in 1967. Since then UNIP had been trying to 
find effective strategies for institutionalising the party 
ideology. Education had thus potential to act as a delivery 
channel as well as a target for ideological socialisation. 
A curious event around the time of the initiation of the 
reform exercise was the publication by Freedom House 
	 in 
197549 of a document of political education syllabuses 
It was a curious small document whose circulation was quite 
conspicuous and controversial, but little else was said 
about this document. The timing of its publication could 
not have been unrelated to the internal initiatives that had 
been going within UNIP since 1967. The document was part of 
the UNIP's attempts to introduce scientific socialism in 
education institutions. The schools did not approve of 
them. The Ministry of education was however not particulary 
opposed to it, but wanted a clear pedagogical guideline. 
This unfortunately was missing. The document provided 
political education syllabuses for pre-school level through 
to university level.Its socialist leanings were very evident 
in the suggested readings for each level. Literature on 
Humanism, anti-colonialism and marxism-leninism dominated 
the list. The least one can say is that the document 
bordered on introducing some form of indocrination. It is 
not quite clear whether the contents of this document had 
any influence at all on the reforms, but the thoughts of the 
1976 Draft Statement on the reforms were not very distant 
from some of the contents of this document. 
The key areas which the draft proposals covered were 
Education for development, education structure, education 
and 	 production, mobilising 	 and 	 managing 	 educational 
resources, teacher 	 education, curriculum 
	 development, 
education 	 materials 	 and 	 equipment, assessment, 
certification, selection and guidance, and organisation and 
management. The details of these subject areas were 
presented to the public for closer scrutiny and public 
debate.50 The reactions of the Zambian public to the 
draft proposals were mixed. There was consensus in favour 
of some proposals and complete dissent on others. Some were 
dismayed at the level and size of transformation which the 
proposals envisaged introducing in Zambian society. The 
reactions to the reforms are well documented elsewhere.51 
However, a few points of discussion from the draft document 
are worth further reflection and discussion. On mobilising 
and managing educational resources the Ministry took the 
view that direct financial contributions from the public and 
private sector were needed to support the new system of 
education. The Ministry proposed to target previously 
untapped financial resources to make a contribution in 
expanding the new education system.52 The Ministry called 
for greater sacrifices from the Zambian people in providing 
support to education; but the draft document refused to 
consider re-introducing school fees.53 It was felt that 
the fees placed a heavy burden on parents. 
Three things were clear from the Ministry's position on 
financing education. There was a willingness on the part of 
the Ministry to find and use new measures of involving the 
general public in sharing with the government the costs of 
education provision. In this task, the Ministry saw itself 
and the Zambian people as the primary source of financial 
resources. This left recourse to foreign aid at the 
discretion of the government. External aid appeared to be a 
difficult factor to bring into the equation of the country's 
education system which the government was attempting to work 
out. This underlined the government's new approach towards 
greater self-reliance and public sacrifice. The issue of 
the possibility of reintroducing school fees had clearly 
remained as sensitive as ever. But, more than anything 
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else, it had once again shown UNIP continuing to protect its 
own conscience and pride in the face of mounting practical 
difficulties. 
In presenting the final 1977 reform document the Minister of 
Education called attention to the greater demand the reforms 
would make on the country's financial and non-monetary 
resources.54 
The 1977 document's recommendation focused on introducing 
reforms in the following areas: 
a. Education and training system, that is, linkages 
within and between formal, non-formal, and special 
education. 
b. Qualitative aspects - that is improving resource 
inputs into education and training, professional 
support 	 services, efficient 	 management 	 and 
administration, examination 	 and 	 assessment, and 
curriculum reforms. 
c. Community support to government in education and 
training provision services. 
The government recommended introduction of a restructured 
and adjusted education and training system which could 
provide inter-sectoral links or continuity between different 
levels of schooling and training. A full complement of 
curriculum reform and facilities provision were to accompany 
the structural changes at many levels of education and 
training provision. Other specific recommendations were the 
need to continue using the English language as a medium of 
instruction from grade 1, putting more emphasis on science 
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and technology, strengthening the programme of education 
with production in institutions of learning, establishing 
resource 	 centres, to 	 offer 	 more 	 skills 	 training 
opportunities in continuing education programmes, to 
localise school certificate examinations by 1980, and to 
intensify the training of teachers.55. 
The approval of the 1977 reform document by the party and 
government sealed a comprehensive agenda for Zambia's 
education and training development. From then onwards new 
development plans have been required to respond to the 
reforms. Likewise, donors who would like to assist Zambia 
have been expected to choose projects which fall within the 
framework of the reforms. However, external aid as a 
separate subject of debate failed to find a place on the 
agenda of the reform exercise. 
The education reform turned out to be an extensive and 
intensive exercise which produced different experiences 
among the different groups. Were Zambians any wiser after 
the reforms? Only qualified answers can be given. Yes, 
Zambians came closer to understanding a little about their 
own social structure, values, and their 'imprisonment' in a 
servant system they could not restructure. In practical 
terms the reforms failed to come up with clearly defined 
priorities. Though the exercise was aimed at formulating 
Government policy for future education and training 
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development,56 the absence of discussion of the 
implementation strategies and detailed cost implications 
weakened the reforms considerably. 
3.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In analysing Zambia's post-independence education and 
training development, the EDP, the TDP, the FNDP, and the 
SNDP clustered together as an important period in which 
many new developments took place. The period carried the 
duty of translating UNIP's education and training policies 
into actual operational programmes. The period was also 
characterised by concerted initiatives to make major 
adjustments in many aspects of the country's education and 
training system. 
In the first section of this chapter it has been shown that 
during the first four Plan periods Zambia's education and 
training development responded mainly to the following: to 
UNIP's policies to redress past deprivations and imbalances 
in education provision, to the policy to abolish racial 
segregation in schools and to the policy to remove school 
fees barriers in access to schooling, to the need to develop 
indigenous educated and skilled manpower, and the need to 
diversify school curricula and training programmes in light 
of the changes that were taking place in the economic 
sector. Specific policy objectives included: attempts to 
provide universal primary education (UPE), and to provide 
free education and training at all levels in the public 
education sector. 
In this period expansion of education and training 
facilities were accorded the highest priority. The pace of 
capital development was such that by 1970 there were clear 
indications that the government was gradually beginning to 
experience difficulties in providing adequate recurrent 
expenditure provisions to service capital development. The 
start of the Third National Development Plan (TNDP) faced a 
context in which set objectives came up against mounting 
problems and constraints. A rearrangement of priorities 
became not only necessary but also inevitable. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ZAMBIA: POLICIES, REFORMS, AND PERFORMANCE IN 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT, 1975-1989 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the analysis and discussion focuses on the 
developments in the sector in a place that has been marked 
by economic decline and new education and economic reform 
initiatives. The discussion will focus on the education 
development objectives against the previous development plan 
performance and in the face of government financial 
difficulties. The education reforms and the subsequent 
attempts to find a strategy for their implementation are 
examined in the broader context of the new initiatives in a 
context facing increasing operational resource constraints. 
The perspectives of the recent national development plans 
objectives on education are also analysed to reflect the 
position of education in the current structural adjustment 
programme. In all, the discussion attempts to set the 
background to which increased donor assistance has been 
responding. 
4.2 The Third National Development Plan (TNDP) 
Since the conclusion of the education reform exercise in 
1977, the reform document became a policy guide to new 
developments. Its influence on subsequent policy decisions 
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was very explicit in the TNDP. The TNDP was designated a 
staging vehicle for the implementation of the educational 
reforms. In preparing the TNDP, for example, the following 
aspects from the reforms were instrumental in structuring 
the Plan: 
1. improvement of the quality of education. 
2. improvement of teacher education and professional 
development of teachers. 
3. elimination of regional and other imbalances in 
education provision at grades 1, 5, 8, and 10. 
4. expansion and diversification of continuing 
education. 
5. maximisation of use of education facilities. 
6. use of local materials and technology in new 
school 	 buildings. Building 	 simple, durable 
functional, and low cost maintenance schools. 
7. encouragement of self-help educational projects 
by communities. 
8. completion of localisation of school certificate 
examinations. 
9. planning well recurrent and capital expenditure. 
10. consolidation of production activities in all 
education institutions to bring out educational 
values, develop correct attitudes and production 
skills. 
11. development of resource centres. 
12. development of the new curricula that will 
accommodate the educational reforms..1 
One can see that the aspects listed above aimed at 
introducing five important measures; internal efficiency, 
rational 	 expansion, qualitative 	 development, local 
initiative, and curriculum diversification. 
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Thus the TNDP objectives were to: 
1. enrol into grade 1 all children who have attained 
the age of seven; and 
2. enable all children who complete grade 4 to enter 
grade 5 and proceed to grade 7; 
3. provide resources during the TNDP to commence 
work on several new schools that had not been 
completed during the SNDP; 
4. introduce measures to improve junior secondary 
school curriculum and organisation; 
5. open more than ninety grade 8 classes during the 
TNDP; 
6. design and introduce curricula for grades 10 -12; 
7. provide adequate training for teaching staff for 
senior secondary schools; 
8. provide suitable materials and equipment for all 
secondary schools; 
9. create a total of 980 additional places by using 
existing facilities; 
10. accord high priority to teacher education during 
the TNDP.4  
It is clear that the TNDP shared much of the previous Plan's 
emphases. It was intended to continue the expansion 
programme and also to attend to the need to improve the 
qualitative aspects of the education and training system. 
The specific objectives of the following subsectors; teacher 
education, technical education and vocational 
	 training, 
continuing 	 education, and 
	 special 
	 education 	 were 
particularly emphatic on the need to expand facilities and 
to enhance the quality of education and training.3 
However, the TNDP like its predecessors carried no clearly 
defined priorities in its long list of objectives as the 
TNDP declared: 
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Programmes and projects to be undertaken during the 
TNDP assume that all priority areas indicated in the 
education reforms are of equal status and that any 
reductions or curtailments should be on the basis of 
certain items which might be deleted or slowed down 
from particular categories rathe; than on the basis 
of eliminating whole categories..* 
4.2.1 Performance of the TNDP  
The interim period before the TNDP came into operation was 
dominated by two major events, the education reforms and the 
processing of the fourth World Bank loan for the education 
and training sector.5 	 Although the loan agreement was 
signed on 17th January 1977, long before the education 
reforms were finalised and published in October, 1977 the 
loan request contained expansion aspects of the reforms as 
part of the justification for the loan request. This was 
rather strange as the final recommendation had not yet been 
given the official endorsement. 
The performance of the TNDP was not different from its 
predecessor in major respects. The successes that were 
achieved had been counterbalanced by a catalogue of 
financial and operational problems. In accordance with the 
main objective in the sector of improving the quality of 
educational services a number of quality enhancing projects 
were undertaken. These included the following: 
a) The "Zambia Education Materials Project (ZEMP). 
This project aimed at production of teaching and 
learning materials 
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b) The Zambia Mathematics and Science Teacher 
Education Project (ZAMSTEP). The project is 
aimed at improving the quality of teaching in 
science and mathematics. 
c) The science equipment production project. 
d) The Self-Help Action Plan for Education (SHAPE). 
It is aimed at assisting colleges and schools in 
the development of self-reliance activities in 
areas of production work and professional 
improvement of teachers. 
e) The Practical Subjects Project (PSP). The Project 
was concerned with skills training for primary 
school pupils, and also to improve the teaching 
of practical subjects in Primary Teacher Training 
Colleges. 
These were all foreign aid funded projects involving two 
multilateral agencies and five bilateral donors. The 
practical subjects project has since been discontinued after 
more than fifteen years of uninterrupted support by FINIDA. 
Although these projects had been in the spirit of the TNDP 
and the education reforms they were not explicitly 
anticipated, and the PSP had in any case been operational 
already a little earlier. 
During the TNDP minimum expansion took place at both primary 
and junior secondary school level. Capital investment in 
primary schools fell far short of what had been planned. 
The actual expenditure reached about 43 per cent in 1984. 
Consequently, restricted development resulted. Additional 
school buildings and replacement of those which were beyond 
repair could not be undertaken.7 The primary and 
secondary sector suffered also from a severe shortage of 
qualitative inputs such as teaching and learning 
materials.8 Table 7 shows the results of a recent study 
to establish the availability of textbooks in a sample of 
Grade 8 classes in 1987. 
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Table 7 
Textbook Availability in Grade 8 Classes, 1987 
Number of Schools 72 
Number of Grade 8 Classes 337 
Grade 8 Enrolment 14,044 
Average Class Size 	 41.7 
Textbooks Available 
Owned by the School Owned by the Pupil Total 
English 4,414 36 4,450 
Mathematics 13,398 121 13,519 
Science 3,825 221 4,046 
Geography 6,688 239 6,927 
No. of Textbooks 
per Class  
No. of Pupils 
per Textbook  
English 	 13.2 	 3.2 
Mathematics 	 40.1 	 1.0 
Science 	 12.0 	 3.5 
Geography 	 20.6 	 2.0 
Other Books (not Textbooks) Available 
Owned by the School 	 Owned by the Pupil  
English 	 1,675 	 433 
Mathematics 	 1,742 	 276 
Science 	 853 	 144 
Geography 	 2,148 	 266 
Source: Kelly, M.J. 1987, Unpublished. 
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Table 7 gives only a small insight into what is a big 
national problem in the education system. The pitiful 
situation regarding textbooks is very clear in the table. 
Except for Mathematics whose situation had improved only 
recently because of a British supported Mathematics project, 
other subjects faced the same difficulties. In most schools 
in the country textbook sharing is the only way teachers 
cope with the present problem. It is a solution which has 
brought with it obvious organisational problems, and also 
challenges the old teaching practices which have not adapted 
to a situation of scarcity. What the table cannot show is 
the condition of the available textbooks in schools. Most 
of the stocks of books are very old and in need of 
replacement and not repair. Table 8 shows the summarised 
expenditure on pupil and domestic science requisites in 
primary schools during the TNDP 
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Table 8 
Expenditure on Pupil and Domestic Science 
Requisites in Primary Schools, 1981-83 
Item 1981 1982 1983 1981-83 
Exp'ture K1521504 K2955861 K1929705 K6413070 
Enrolment 1073314 1121769 1194070 3389153 
Per 	 Pupil K1.41 K2.63 K1.61 K1.89 
Source: Kelly, M.J. et al. (1986) 
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The preceding table shows the state of budgetary allocation 
during the TNDP in one subsector alone. It marked a trend 
which in 1987 culminated in the complete withdrawal of 
Government subventions for this function. It should be noted 
that by 1983 parents' annual average expenditure on learning 
materials per child had already exceeded K15. 
However, the TNDP increased enrolments at primary school 
level by using the practice of double and triple shift 
system in a large number of upper primary classes in both 
urban and rural areas. Because enrolments increased without 
proportionate increase in the number of classes, the average 
class size often exceeded the desirable limits. 
In the secondary school sector the planned and actual 
classes and enrolments had been achieved by the end of the 
Plan in 1983. Towards the end of the Plan period there was 
an increase in the number of self-help projects. Many 
former primary boarding schools in rural areas and other 
idle buildings were converted into self-help junior 
secondary schools,9 which rose from twenty-four in 1984 
to two hundred and eighty three by 1988. This particular 
step reflected an element of resourcefulness and also a 
sense of urgency • in the Government and among the people. 
The pressure for access to secondary school had built up to 
such a point that the normal expansion programme of school 
facilities had failed to cope with the demand. Besides the 
progression rate from Grade 7-8 had remained at around 20 
per cent. 
The Department of Technical Education and Vocational 
Training carried out a moderately significant capital 
development programme. The construction of three trades 
training institutes was started and the construction of 
eleven staff houses was completed. Though significant in 
some limited measure, the capital development programme had 
projects which should have been long completed had it not 
been for inadequate budgetary allocations. A 250 student 
hostel for Evelyn Hone College was completed, and the staff 
development programme for accelerating Zambianisation in the 
institutions of the Department was implemented according to 
the Plan. The level of Zambianisation in higher institutions 
rose from 35 per cent in 1979 to 60 per cent in 1983. 
Two major policy decisions were made which affected the 
provision of higher and technical education in the country. 
The Zambia Institute of Technology (ZIT) and Mwekera 
Forestry College were incorporated into the Copperbelt 
University, and Zambia Air Services Training Institute 
(ZASTI) was transferred from the Ministry of Higher 
Education to the' Ministry of Power, Transport and 
Communication. The grounds on which both decisions were 
justified were not made clear. In the case of expanding the 
Copperbelt University it would appear there was one probable 
reason, to economically justify the 	 position 	 of 	 the 
University as an autonomous institution. As a constituent 
campus of the previous federal structure Ndola Campus, as it 
was then known, had been running two faculties only, the 
School of industrial and Business Studies, and the School of 
Architecture and Environmental Studies. The incorporation 
of ZIT 'solves' the long -running problem of two different 
institutions sharing a single campus. The incorporation of 
Mwekera resolves the problem of a school of Forestry which 
the Government had previously assigned to a rural site in 
Soiwezi but never implemented. 
The major development affecting the University was the 
abolition of the anomalous federal administration structure 
which had been in existence since 1975. 
However, the timing and the very wisdom behind the policy 
decision is rather suspect. ZIT has been experiencing its 
own share of financial and operational problems common to 
all institutions in the country. Incorporation of a unit 
such as this one into a system facing its own formative 
organisational problems appears extremely unreasonable. A 
1989 ODA review of its support to University education made 
the following observations about the Copperbelt University. 
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The range of difficulties, both financial and 
academic, that have been discussed for UNZA apply 
even more to the new University, as it tries to 
merge different traditions, different levels of 
academic activity with all that this implies for 
facilities, resources and staff and 	 different 
funding arrangements and patterns of governance. 
The full implications of the new situation are not 
clear, including the very sensitive questions of 
staff appointments and salary sales, and it will 
take sometime to sort this out." 
In the teachers' college sector the major achievement during 
the TNDP was the completion of the Lusaka college for the 
teachers of the Handicapped (LCTH). The college provides 
training services to other countries. Related to this 
development was the successful conclusion of a national 
campaign to reach the disabled children in 1983. This 
exercise assisted the Government to see the actual profile 
of the disability situation in Zambia. During the TNDP a 
policy decision was made to raise the entry qualifications 
into Primary Teacher Training Colleges, from Grade 10 to 12 
with effect from 1985.11 This step was looked upon as a 
qualitative enhancing measure, yes, but only to a certain 
extent. The number of '0' level applicants had been growing 
in the colleges as opportunities for direct employment 
became scarcer. It was therefore only logical to subject 
applicants to a competitive entry into colleges. In fact, 
the time has come for the Ministry of Higher Education to 
consider introducing a proper recruitment screening 
examination in addition to the present '0' level 
requirements. 
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Achievements in other subsectors were the establishment of 
the Audio-Visual Aids Service (AVAS) and the increasing of 
broadcast time, and coverage of education radio programmes. 
Repairs to more than 2,500 radios was carried out and in 
addition the Education Broadcasting Council, which had been 
dormant since 1973, was revived. This was not until an 
external consultant had carried out an evaluation of the 
state of EBS in Zambia.12  
There is much to be said on the deficit side of the TNDP's 
balance sheet. The performance of the Plan had showed that 
the cumulative problems in physical and qualitative 
development had persisted, and in a few key areas the 
dimension of the problem had taken a very bad turn. Limited 
physical expansion, population growth and the 	 age 	 of 
admission policy into Grade 1 were all for example 
responsible for the failure to achieve the planned goal of 
enabling all seven year old children to enrol into Grade 1. 
Table 9 shows the problem of access to schooling at Grade 1 
level. 
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It is clear from the Table that a large number of Grade 1 
places were taken up by the 8, 9 and 10 year old children. 
This group alone had 66.2 per cent of the places. The 
possible negative efficiency and qualitative effects of 
mixing age-groups has never been given serious thought in 
the Zambian teaching practice. 
The target of enabling every pupil who completed Grade 4 to 
enter Grade 5 and proceed to Grade 7 was likewise not 
achieved. 
In the DTEVT the construction of staff houses, workshops, 
libraries and administration offices at four trades training 
institutes could not be undertaken because of budgetary 
limitations. The Teacher Training sector faced a similar 
situation, the objective to increase enrolment in existing 
colleges and to build an additional college and a science 
teachers college could not be realised because of financial 
constraints. Maintenance of college facilities also 
suffered severely as only a few repairs could be undertaken. 
As most colleges were old institutions, lack of maintenance 
and repairs imposed additional difficulties in their 
operations. Like other Government institutions the colleges 
have all along been dependent on Government funding. In the 
post 1975 period, competition for limited Government 
resources among sectors and subsectors became acute. The 
teacher training sector does not seem to have fared well in 
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this contest. The survey carried out on DTEVT institutions 
between December 1983 and June 1984 also produced a 
comprehensive catalogue of practical problems facing this 
department as a result of the limited funding13. 
The consequences of budgetary cuts over a number of years 
are reflected in Table 10 below. 
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Table 10 
The State of Training Operational Equipment 
in the DTEVT Institutions, 1984 
Equipment 	 No. in Stock 	 Working 	 Not Working Unserviceable 
Carpentry 148 97 51 33 
Bricklaying 52 27 25 20 
Metal Fabrication 46 19 27 9 
Metal Plumbing Sheet M 
	 36 9 27 20 
Electrical 576 424 152 104 
Auto Mechanics 152 43 109 41 
Autobody 42 17 25 2 
Radio + T.V. 226 122 104 - 
Kitchen Equipment 35 9 26 5 
Agric Mechanics 8 1 7 6 
Vehicles 89 71 18 4 
Commerce (Typewriters) 
	 186 165 21 - 
Mechanical 8 5 3 - 
Auto Chassis 10 2 8 - 
Auto Engines 78 40 38 14 
Library Equipment 21 8 13 1 
Total 1,713 1,059 654 259 
Percent 61.8 38.1 39.6 
Source: Compiled from DTEVT International Reports, 1984 
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Although the overall profile of the status of equipment 
appears favourable because of the weight of the entry on 
electrical equipment, the individual institutional cases 
from which the figures were drawn showed different pictures. 
In two cases (out of 4) the percentage of broken down 
equipment was more than 50 percent. It is clear from the 
quantity of broken down equipment that the toll must have 
been gradually built up over some years. The negative 
effects on the quality of training in such situations are 
quite obvious. It is hard to imagine how set objectives can 
be met in a system experiencing severe shortages of training 
equipment and other learning materials. 
By the end of the TNDP the average class sizes for primary 
and secondary schools had grown. Variations between regions 
showed that urban regions such as Copperbelt and Lusaka 
had the largest average class sizes in the primary school 
sector. Although the official figures have usually put the 
average class sizes for the two regions at 45 and 50 
respectively these figures mask the reality reflected in the 
upper ranges. In many schools it is not uncommon to find 
classes whose enrolments exceed 60 pupils, while in Grade 7 
classes, 70 pupils per class has not been a rarity in most 
regions. This is clearly a stark reflection of the 
pressures 	 the 	 system 	 has 	 come 	 under. 
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At the end of the TNDP the education and training sector had 
made some progress but, was overall not significantly any 
better than it had been in 1979 in a number of areas. The 
developments which had taken place during the Plan period 
had not been comprehensive enough to reduce the deficits 
that had built up over many years. Disparities in 
participation rates in schools among the various regions 
were still very evident. Although the national progression 
rate for Grade 4-5 had been raised, imbalances still existed 
in the nine regions. The goal of universal basic education 
was as distant as ever. The objective to enrol all seven 
year olds in Grade 1 was not achieved. The provision of 
instructional and learning materials had worsened. Less and 
less recurrent expenditure provisions were made for student 
requisites and other operational functions.14 It was 
clear that the sector had become less able to cope with the 
qualitative demands that were being made on its system. 
Despite all the difficulties the MGEC was facing the 
Government had remained relentless in its pursuit of 
universal basic education for all children. As the TNDP drew 
to a close the MGEC initiated a very comprehensive study to 
produce a detailed plan to help transform the old education 
system into the new structure proposed by the education 
reforms. The study was undertaken at the request of the 
International Development Association (IDA) in the context 
of Zambia's fifth World Bank education project. The study, 
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named the Education Reform Implementation Project(ERIP)15  
was undertaken by a team drawn almost completely from UNZA. 
4.3 The Education Reform Implementation Project (ERIP) 
The ERIP Study was the most comprehensive research oriented 
review of education ever undertaken since 1964 and also 
since the publication of Mwanakatwe's book The Growth of  
Education in Zambia in 1968. Other important points about 
the Study were that it took place six years after the 
conclusion of the education reform exercise, a quite long 
gap between the endorsement of the reforms and the 
initiatives to implement them. The state of the economy had 
changed much between 1977 and 1984. The declining export 
prices of copper and the heavy deterioration of the terms of 
trade had pushed the economy into contraction.16 
Correspondingly, Government public expenditure during the 
same period tended to reflect the consequences of this 
economic decline. The ERIP study was therefore clearly 
undertaken against a background of obvious economic and 
financial odds. Externally, Zambia was still faced with the 
freeze on lending from the World Bank. At the time of the 
study the lifting of the freeze was not yet in sight.17  
The ERIP study achieved four things. It reaffirmed the long 
standing need for the Government to marshal resources and 
ideas for the provision of universal basic education. It 
presented the Government with various financing modalities 
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which could be employed in developing the new education 
system. It also drew further attention to the need to arrest 
the deterioration of the quality of education and training 
by providing adequate qualitative inputs into the system. 
To these ends, the study produced large amounts of useful 
data and information on the physical and qualitative state 
of the education subsectors. The data covered a wide range 
of areas and aspects including the following: the present 
nature of Government financing of education, foreign aid, 
implications of universal basic education on resource 
inputs, maintenance of quality in the education system, 
curriculum issues, organisation and management of education, 
and assessment, certification and selection. The utility of 
such data and information for policy making and actual 
planning are quite obvious. 
The report presented 133 recommendations, of which the main 
ones focused on the need to provide the first stage of 
universal basic education, that is, seven years of primary 
schooling. The report was very explicit in its assignment of 
high priority to basic education. It declared that all other 
education targets were to remain subordinate to those 
measures identified to support the development of basic 
education. 
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However , the ERIP study suffered one major weakness. The 
study lacked a particular financial framework within which 
to work out the mechanics of implementing UBE. Alternatives 
in the study needed to be seen against definite financial 
boundaries. 
Perhaps the most enduring achievement made by the ERIP study 
is the impact its recommendations have had on recent 
Government policies on financing education. This alone made 
the study a turning point in Zambia's education policies. 
On the need for the Government to transfer some of the costs 
of education provision to users, the study took a very clear 
position of support. It advocated an arrangement whereby the 
Government could share some of the costs with parents and the 
communities.18 The fact that the study made the financing 
recommendations at a time when the World Bank was carrying a 
campaign to persuade developing countries to adopt a more 
market forces approach in financing social services happened 
to be coincidental. The Bank never put any direct pressures 
or indirect influences on the team over the direction of the 
study. The recommendations came out of the basic economics 
of Zambia's declining economy and public expenditure. The 
financial squeeze which faced the Government had left very 
few options. Therefore the coincidence of time and 
opportunity was more responsible than anything else. 
Consequently, between 1984 and 1988 the Government made 
increasing efforts to re-introduce user fees at primary and 
secondary school levels.19 	 In 1984 a policy shift, to 
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charge fees to non Zambian children attending primary 
schools, was announced. In 1985 the Government reintroduced 
boarding fees in secondary schools, an even more radical 
departure. Later, the colleges and the University were also 
affected. In terms of creating savings for the Government 
it would appear that some of the policy measures were not 
well conceived. For example, the primary school sector was 
a very small target in terms of the cost recovery exercise, 
not to mention the difficulties of establishing who the 
non-Zambians were. The principle was good. It can be said 
that a combination of a bad economic and financial climate 
in the Government, and external pressure, forced UNIP to 
abandon its long standing policy on financing education. 
No less important was a Government policy decision on 
training which the Cabinet Office announced on 6th December 
1983. In the Cabinet Circular No.19 the Secretary to the 
Cabinet issued new policy measures on training which 
superseded the earlier provisions of 1970. Among other 
measures the 1983 circular called for the following: the 
establishment of the corps of Manpower Development Officers 
(MDOs) to serve the ministries; the redesignation of 
responsibilities for technical assistance, administration of 
training awards and manpower development and training from 
the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) to 
the Directorate of Manpower Development and Training (DMDT); 
the setting up of a national manpower planning committee; 
assigning priority in training to in-country programmes and 
to staff in training institutions; and replacement of 
expatriates. The key sectors that were identified for these 
measures 	 were: 	 Health, Education, Finance, Engineering, 
Agriculture, Science, and technology.20 
	
Two factors had 
helped to shape the Cabinet policy on training. First, in 
March, 1983 a national seminar on manpower and training 
policy in Zambia was held in Lusaka. The seminar not only 
drew the profile of the country's manpower and training 
structure, but some papers took the opportunity to draw the 
government's attention to numerous shortcomings in the 
government's approach to manpower development and training. 
One paper had made the following observation: 
The manpower policy environment in Zambia is 
characterised by a separation of responsibilities, a 
duplication of some activities and a neglect 
of others. The organisations responsible for 
shaping manpower policy are generally in the 
public sector, whilst ,policy implementation 
takes place in all sectors." 
Coombe and Lauvas drew attention of the Government to the 
same problem in their study in 1984. The need for better 
institutional arrangements in manpower development and 
training had received very strong emphasis in the TNDP also. 
The Cabinet move therefore came as a response to many 
signals within the government. 
Following the conclusion of a joint GRZ/World Bank 
examination on Zambia's education sector's implementation 
and investment plans (ESDIIP) in July, 1987, MGEC requested 
the Cabinet to consider various recommendations. The first 
set of recommendations proposed cost-transfer and cost-
sharing measures in financing education and training 
provision. The recommendations included those that required 
that: parents/students pay for consumables, pupils attending 
evening schools to pay K40 annually towards teachers' 
salaries and K20 for books, Zambian students should pay 
subsidised boarding fees whereas non-iambians should pay 
economic fees, transport allowances paid to students in 
higher institutions be withdrawn, all students (except those 
at UNZA) should contribute towards the replacement of 
textbooks. Other measures aimed at introducing efficiency 
and improving quality in the education and training system. 
The measures were long overdue but came at the most 
inappropriate time for the majority of the people to stand 
up to the challenges of the proposed financing arrangements. 
The acceptance of the ESDIIP recommendation came as a last 
straw to the Government. The limits of principles had 
finally been reached. In March, 1989 the Minister of Higher 
Education announced to Parliament a new policy on financing 
education and training in tertiary colleges and the 
universities. This policy has shown the government's 
willingness to face problems with a more realistic approach. 
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4.4 The Interim National Development Plan, 1987-88 
The INDP which the Government introduced as a stop gap plan 
when the IMF/World Bank economic recovery programme was 
abruptly suspended on Labour Day in 1987, came as one of the 
most ironical steps taken by the Government during the 
country's economic crisis and also in the wake of the 
externally assisted economic recovery programme. The Plan 
was a hasty, poorly thought out protest against the IMF 
austerity economic recovery measures. The economic measures 
involved making fundamental changes in the core economic 
policies.22 	 Reduction and removal of subsidies, import 
liberalisation, market determination of foreign exchange 
rate, and the decontrol of interest rates and prices were 
among the key reform measures the IMF had introduced. 
The introduction of the IMF programme caused a sudden severe 
change in the economic and social lives of the people. The 
price of maize meal, the staple food, went up by 120 per cent 
overnight and so did other commodities. This caused such 
a traumatic shock among the people that it led to severe 
riots in Copperbelt province and the threat of a riot in the 
capita1.23 The scale and intensity of the riots were such 
that they frightened the Government into rescinding its 
earlier decision to hike food prices.24 	 This particular 
political event and the need for UNIP to go into the general 
elections of 1988 with a relatively less volatile political 
climate were the most probable reasons for suspending the 
IMF programme and the subsequent introduction of the INDP. 
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The IMF measures were so extensive and pervasive they 
appeared to have stripped the Government of its control over 
the economic affairs of the country. Even in a one party 
state such a position was not at all politically favourable. 
Against this backdrop the INDP was intended to function as 
an image prop in the face of UNIP's declining popularity 
during the crisis. As an economic strategy the Government 
has yet to show what purpose the Plan served. 
The INDP can best be judged by examining the objectives the 
Government apparently expected it to achieve in the eighteen 
month period. In the education and training sector the 
objectives had remained largely the same as in previous 
plans. The attempt to provide universal basic education and 
the improvement of the quality of education and training had 
firmly remained on the agenda. Cost-recovery measures 
formed another important objective.25  
On employment and human resources the INDP proposed to 
pursue three objectives which had direct implications for 
education and training provision. The plan decided that the 
government should use Zambian expertise in the 
implementation of .foreign funded projects which previously 
have utilised foreign manpower. Intensifying high level 
professional and technical training for Zambians in the 
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fields where expatriates are still predominant was another 
objective. Thirdly, the Plan reemphasised the need to expand 
and strengthen practical skills training programmes at 
primary and secondary school levels. However, an attempt by 
the Plan to prioritise the investment and work activities in 
the sector was not very successful. The donors in particular 
found the ranking of priorities not very clear in terms of 
identifying areas that needed assistance most.26 Table 11 
shows the INDP's planned investment and priorities in the 
education sector 
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Table 11 
Planned Investment in the Education Sector, 1987-88 
Programms/Projeat 
1987 Budget 
Allocation 
Interim 
Plan 
Provision 
'funding 
Donor GRZ 	 Foreign 
Priority A 
1. Construction of Primary Schools - 7,658 7,656 - 
2. Repairs and Improvements 
	 .. 500 2,650 2,550 - 
3 Teacher Training Resource 
Centre 	 . 	 - 	 _ 	 .. 700 4,550 4,550 - 
4. Staff Development (DTEVT) 	 .. 2,564 8,564 4,000 2,564 SIDA Grant 
Sub-Total 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 3,764 21,320 18,766 2,564 
Priority B 
5. Repairs and Improvement to 
Secondary Schools 
	 .. 	 .. 1,660 5,000 6,000 - 
6. Zambia Institute of Technology 80 282 182 80 CIDA Grant 
7. Rebabilitation project (LTNZA 
School of Agriculture) 	 .. 3,500 5,600 2,000 3,500 CIDA Grant 
8. UNZA 	 .. 	 .. 	 . • 	 .. 10,000 17,000 14;100 - 
9. Copperbelt University 	 .. 	 _ 682 5,000 5,000 - 
10. Tools and Equipment (DTEVT) 300 2,000 2,000 ' - 
11. Education for the Handicapped 400 700 400 300 BMA Grant 
12. National Council for Scientific 
Research 	 .. 	 _ 	 .. 1,500 4,000 4,000 - 
13. UNZA Staff Development 	 .. 3,400 9,400 6,000 3,400 SIDA Grant 
Sub-Total 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 21,392 45;362 38,682 7,280 
Priority 0 
14. Livings onn Trades Training 
Institute 	 _ 	 „ 	 .
. 
20 122 122 - 
16. Choma Tra,his Training Institute 20 122 122 - 
16. GRZ Secondary Schools 
Extension 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 3511 1,000 1,000 - 
17. Zambia Examination Council 	 .. 550 900 900 - 
18. ADB Education I 	 .. 	 .. 11 000 12,000 6,000 6,000 ADB Loan 
19. IRBD Maintenance Project 	 .. 8,000 16,000 8,000 8,000 IBRD Loan 
20. Planning Unit (HQ) 	 .. 	 .. 3,900 4,900 1,000 3,900 SIDA. Grant 
21. Administration of Zambia 
Education Projects Imple• - 
mentation Unit 	 .. 	 .. 848 930 930 IBRD Loan 
22. IBRD Education Project V 	 .. 13,000 13,300 3,1;0 10,000 IBRD Loan 
23. Improvement to Institutional 
Buildings. • 
	 • • 
	 • • _ 800 2,880 2,880 - 
24. Lusaka Housing Project (Houses 
for new (ZWBEP) 	 .. 	 .. 40 100 100 - 
23. Chipata Trades Training 
Institute 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 100 200 200 - 
28. Mongu Trade Training 
Institute 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 100 200 200 - 
27. Luanabya Technical and Voca. 
tianal and Teachers College .. 160 300 300 - 
28. Northern Technical College 
(NORTEC) 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 40 10'J 100 - 
29. 	 Staff Development 	 .. 	 .. 2,504 2,584 - 2,514 SIDA Grant 
30. Zambia Mathematics and Science 
Teacher Edur soon Project 
(ZAMSTEP) 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 3,360 6,000 3,250 2,760 
31. Education Br 'admitting 
Sorvicee .... 	 . 	 .. . _ 100 201 200 - 
2. Zambia Examination Council 	 .. am 700 700 - 
33. Evvil  n Iloilo 1'011•143 of Applied 
.art a 100 300 101 - 
34. °Mee and School Furniture 	 .. 500 560 580 
- 
35. Salweti Trades Trainmg 
Institute 	 .. 	 • . 	 . • 100 110 110 - 
Sub-Total 
	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 41,180 68,475 30,954 33,214 
Grand-Total 	 .. 	 .. 	 .. 57,5313 130,000 87,002 43,058 
Source: INDP (1987). 
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Table 11 requires clarification on several points. Given 
the distribution of the items across the three priority 
categories, it is not very clear how the priorities were 
drawn up and also how the items were ranked. The 
distribution and ranking of the items appear to have been 
done randomly. What appears to be high ranked items in 
Priority 'A' category are also found in other places down 
the ranking list. For example, repairs and improvement, 
which is ranked second in priority 'A' group, also appears 
as items (19 and 23) in priority 'C' group. Why does the 
Zambia Examination Council appears twice in group 'C' (17 
and 32) with different budgetary provisions? The staff 
development programme in DTEVT is ranked fourth in priority 
'A' group, whereas that of UNZA comes thirteenth in group 
'B'. The Zambianisation level in DTEVT had by 1984 already 
reached 66.2 per cent of the 178 filled posts, whereas in 
UNZA the ratio of Zambianisation varied from 48.5 to 51.4 
per cent in different schools in 1986.27 Staff 
development is meant, among other things, for replacing 
expatriates. If that is the case the prioritisation in this 
table defies logic. 
Since the Plan intended to show the current donor 
commitments in the sector it has not been explained why the 
assistance of some donors working in the sector was 
excluded. Consequently, the structure of funding in the 
Plan is rather deceptive. The Plan shows that Zambia's 
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contribution to the Plan investments stands at 67.0 per cent 
against 32.9 per cent of donor funding. If the commitments 
of the missing donors were included the balance would be far 
less in favour of the Government's contribution. All the 
preceding points raise a number of questions regarding the 
way the Plan was conceived and assembled. 
4.5 The Fourth National Development Plan, 1989-1993 
Thus it will be observed that the background to the Fourth 
National Development Plan had been characterised by 
sustained efforts and a search for solutions to the long 
list of growing problems in the education and training 
sector. The FNDP* objectives in the education sector were 
to: 
1. ensure improved performance in all education 
institutions 
2. provide pre-school education through community 
efforts 
3. provide more widespread and equitable educational 
opportunities at basic level and giving priority 
to expansion of primary education. 
4. widen access to primary and secondary education 
through distance education, night schools and 
part-time courses 
5. ensure carefully controlled expansion at all 
levels 
6. enhance the training and research capacities at 
tertiary level 
7. consolidate and extend the teaching of population 
education to all institutions and training of 
teachers for this purpose 
8. strengthen and enlarge the financial resource 
base for education provision, especially in the 
fields of mathematics, science and technology 
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9. monitor adherence to standargised chargeable fees 
by all private institutions. 
During the 	 FNDP*  the government wished also to pursue its 
policy to establish a Trades Training Institute in each 
province. It was therefore hoped that during the Plan 
period the construction of Trades Training Institutes in 
Eastern, Northwestern, and 	 Western 	 Provinces 	 would be 
completed. The achievement of FNDP objectives is expected 
to be guided by qualitative and cost-effective strategies. 
The planned investment outlay for the Plan period is given 
in Table 12. The full list of items in the investment plan 
is given in the appendix. 
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From Table 12 emerges a number of points. The indication of 
the levels of foreign aid resources the Government wishes to 
raise has never been outlined with such specificity. This is 
a useful guide in planning, but, how was the aid component 
worked out? One notices also an attempt by the Government 
to move away from staff development programmes that are 
dependent on foreign aid. However, the author's present 
observations have shown that donor funded staff development 
programmes have continued. Budget provisions for most of 
the items shows no growth at all during the Plan period. 
Planned 	 expenditure 	 on 	 equipment, books 
	
and 	 staff 
development shows this stagnant feature across all subsectors. 
Given the existing inflationary economic situation in the 
country the projections and provisions are very unrealistic. 
Even in its indicative from, the Plan does not fail to 
intrigue one regarding its lack of realism. 
The year 1989 experienced several sustained initiatives 
targeted at finding solutions to the effects of the economic 
crisis on Zambia. A number of bilateral, multilateral, and 
private consulting teams hired by donor agencies visited 
Zambia to evaluate the crisis further, to assess the 
measures that were being worked out to mitigate the crisis, 
and to offer advice.29 	 Against the background of the 
Fourth National- Development Plan, the World Bank and the 
Government of Zambia prepared the 'Financial and Economic 
Policy Framework' of the New Economic Recovery Programme 
(NERP) as well as the Public Investment Programme (PIP), to 
introduce structural adjustment measures and the new 
investment programme to accompany them. 
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In the education sector the new investment programme has 
reaffirmed that priority in education expenditure should be 
given 	 to primary education, especially among the poor 
communities in the urban and rural areas." 	 Other areas 
of special attention in the 1989-1993 PIP are : the 
rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities, and 
the provision of teaching and learning materials. To help 
reduce the financial burden of providing education services 
by the Government the following measures have been endorsed: 
involvement of the communities in the construction, 
operations, and maintenance of educational institutions, the 
encouragement of the private sector to play a bigger role in 
providing education, and the use of user fees to implement 
long term strategies of cost-sharing and cost-recovery 
financing arrangements. 
These measures are not new, they are part of a long standing 
difficult attempt to enhance the quality of education and 
the 	 institutional 	 facilities, and 	 to 	 implement 	 the 
adjustment and the revitalisation programme which the World 
Bank formally adopted in 1988.31 It is the escalation of 
the deterioration in the quality of education and the ever 
increasing disparities in access to education that continue 
to draw fresh domestic and international attention. 
Therefore, this suggests that both the PIP and the NERP 
measures are intended to give the adjustment programme a 
proper scope and a firm grounding. 
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4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter and its predecessor have provided an outline 
and discussion of the development of the development process 
and trends in the education and training sector in the two 
eventful periods of 1964-1974 and 1975 to date. 
It has been shown that Zambia's education policies and 
priorities during the first decade were strongly shaped by 
two important factors: the need to redress the past 
imbalances, deprivations and the racial segregation in the 
system, and the need to develop a large corps of educated 
and skilled local manpower. Consequently, the thrust of 
Zambia's education and training development involved a 
massive expansion programme of the system's infrastructure. 
Secondary school and University facilities were targeted for 
rapid expansion and extension. Increasing social demand for 
education and the expansion of activities in the economy 
kept the Government pushing this expansion programme further 
and further during the first decade. Because the economy 
was then strong and revenue from copper prices were very 
high, the Government was able to provide 80 per cent of the 
total funding for the capital development programme. The 
strength of the Government's financial position and its 
strong commitment to providing wider access to schooling 
were demonstrated in the Government's adoption of the policy 
to provide free education. 
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Throughout the first decade there prevailed a strong desire 
on the part of the Government to strive towards giving 
universal access to Grade 1 for all seven year old children. 
Unfortunately, that goal remains as distant as ever. Rapid 
population growth and resource constraints have remained 
major obstacles to achieving that goal. 
Following the expansion programme the Ministry of Education 
diversified the secondary school curriculum. Practical 
subjects in the industrial arts and business studies areas 
were introduced. In a school system that had not yet 
sufficiently developed and diversified its supply of 
teachers, the introduction of practical subjects caused some 
organisational problems in schools. 
The expansion programme which began at independence was 
however, soon overtaken by two social events. A rapidly 
growing population (at 3.2 per cent annually) fueled an ever 
increasing social demand for schooling and certification. 
Because these factors have never kept pace, inequalities in 
access to and participation in education between and among 
regions and various social groups have continued to persist. 
By the end of 1974 it had become very clear that despite all 
the remarkable achievements made during the first decade, 
problems in the internal efficiency of the system had 
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emerged to challenge Government efforts. Of course early 
warning signals regarding the looming resource constraints 
had been sounded as early as 1968. Initially the Government 
took very little notice of them. These problems and a 
gradual awareness by the Zambian officials that the 
inherited education and training system had not been adapted 
to respond to the post-independence social and economic 
situations compelled the Government to undertake the 
education reform exercise in 1975. 
Attempts to introduce the teaching of Humanism in schools 
did not succeed because of numerous practical problems. 
Thus, the first decade ended most appropriately by taking an 
inventory of the country's performance and searching for new 
goals and organisational measures for a new education 
system. There couldn't have been a better way to begin a new 
decade. 
The chapter has also shown that the beginning of Zambia's 
second decade of independence was heralded not only by the 
education reform initiatives, but ironically by the start of 
Zambia's economic decline. The financial difficulties which 
resulted from the economic decline manifested itself in the 
fluctuations and -increasing reductions in public expenditure 
on social development programmes. In the education and 
training sector evidence of reduced public expenditure on 
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development and recurrent functions appeared in many 
different ways. Initially, the trends showed themselves up 
in operational problems which often delayed the start or 
completion of projects, or indeed in the failure to achieve 
the 	 set 	 objectives. Later, the 
	 Government 	 found it 
increasingly difficult to provide resources commensurate 
with the adverse economic circumstances in the country.The 
Government could not provide real financial resources. As 
the situation took a stronger hold, the Government was 
forced to drastically reduce or withdraw subventions to a 
few vital functions in the running of the education and 
training system. Teaching and learning materials, and other 
administrative aspects suffered unacceptable budgetary cuts. 
Consequently, the beginning of the 1980s saw the start of 
an unofficial cost-transfer from the Government budget to 
the parents. Because schools could no longer provide 
learning materials parents were obliged to buy most of the 
school requisites themselves. This marked the most serious 
crack in Zambia's long standing policy on free education 
provision. Although the Government was aware of these 
financial difficulties its policy on financing education had 
officially remained unchanged. However, the difficulties 
in the economy grew so intense that the overwhelming 
financial problems forced the Government to concede defeat. 
The official policy of free education, had long become 
redundant, what had remained was the spirit of it being 
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moved by an unrealistic pride and principles. Between 1985 
and 1989 the Government responded to the financial 
difficulties by announcing new policies regarding the 
financing of education and training. First, a levy was 
imposed on all non-Zambian children attending primary and 
secondary 	 schools, this 	 was 	 soon 	 followed 	 by 	 the 
introduction of a nominal boarding fee of K100 per student 
per term in secondary schools. Finally, the Government 
in March 1989 announced a comprehensive new financing policy 
for the higher education and training sector. Later in the 
same year the Government and the World Bank endorsed all the 
earlier measures aimed at effectively implementing the use 
of user fees in the education sector. 
Looking back one notices that as a consequence of the 
economic crisis which has built up over the years Zambia has 
come under increasing pressure to adopt new policies and 
strategies in the education sector. Worried about the 
long-term effect of economic crisis on the national 
development of Zambia, the international donor community too 
has been exerting pressure on the Zambian Government to 
adopt more rational and realistic policies in the face of 
the present crisis. There is increasing pressure on Zambia 
to take more coherent policies and public actions. The 
present domestic and international efforts suggest that 
Zambia is going to continue to be under pressure to 
consolidate the adjustment and the revitalisation measures 
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which have just been instituted in the education and 
training sector. 
In conclusion it can therefore be said that while Zambia has 
made remarkable achievements in many aspects of education 
and 	 training, some 	 have 	 been 
	 secured 	 under 	 great 
difficulties while the achievement of many others would not 
have been possible without external assistance. The severe 
resource constraint situation which the Government 
experienced after the mid 1970s was responsible for the 
coming of a diversified corps of donors to the sector and 
the rapid donorisation of many aspects of Zambia's education 
and training programmes. Since then the coverage and depth 
of aid intervention in the sector has been wide and big. 
Given this background and this method of dealing with 
resource problems, what kind of aid policy framework have 
donors been offered by Zambia? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AID PROCESS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses aid process in Zambia. It examines 
the actors and the procedures involved in the aid process in 
general and in the education sector in particular. 
Among the least discussed aspects of the aid subject, aid 
process perhaps ranks first. Sensitivity to some facets of 
this matter forces both donors and recipients into a general 
reluctance to discuss this aspect more openly. Hence, quite 
often investigators are only able to get superficial 
features and trends. Reinforcing this view is the 
observation that aid policies are formulated in a context of 
complex pressures, and that little is known of the nature of 
such pressures and the channels through which they 
operate.1 Consequently some issues in the aid process 
have remained heavily masked or untold. 
Some controversial issues in aid matters can partially be 
explained by examining how donors and recipients conduct 
their aid process. Issues like aid coordination and that 
aid is heavily politicised can be better understood against 
the background of a donor's or recipient's management of its 
aid process. 
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Despite there being official obstacles to the full 
understanding of the aid process in many countries, it is 
still possible to construct to a certain level an aid 
process structure for any given country. There are basics 
to which all aid transactions must submit. Aid transactions 
for example operate within the interacting institutional 
frameworks of donors and recipients. Therefore the process 
complies with certain formal procedures provided by relevant 
governing institutions. At the operational level formal 
inter-governmental aid agreements provide guidance on how 
the aid process should be conducted. The aid process is a 
target of many influence attempts by interest groups, and 
this is particularly true of the aid environment in the 
western industrialised donor countries. 
Zambia's aid process arrangements are similar to those of 
many other recipient countries. Yet, a closer examination 
of its structure is able to reveal its own particular 
features and process flow. To gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the aid process in general and in the 
education sector in particular in Zambia, one should make a 
critical examination of, among other factors, institutional 
and individual actors. 
5.2 Institutional Actors 
The main institutions that are designated to run the affairs 
of Zambia's aid business with donors are, the Ministries of 
Foreign 	 Affairs (MFA), Finance (MoF) and the National 
Commission for Development Planning (NCDP). However, in 
practice other institutions get involved in various aspects 
of the aid process. The major institutions in this category 
are, the President's Office, the Prime Minister's Office and 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The work of 
the first three institutions entails executing specific 
functions relating to aid transactions. The MFA takes care 
of protocol and other donor-recipient courtesy formalities 
pertaining to the country's aid process. The NCDP attends 
to aspects of aid negotiations and their agreements. The 
Ministry of Finance looks after aid funds where aid 
agreements have made such provisions. These institutions 
together with recipient sectors form the operational base 
with which donors interact. The mutual service relationship 
among these actors is therefore more easily identifiable. 
Among the latter, institutional actors constitute a special 
category of their own. They have high political standing 
and leverage. However, unlike the other group, these do not 
share a regular aid process relationship. Nor do they have 
individually a regular aid process relationship with the 
MFA, the MoF and the NCDP. Some of the tasks relating to 
the aid process performed by these actors have therefore 
tended to be ddsretionary and highly political as will be 
seen in subsequent discussions. The task therefore is to 
examine the provisions that are there to guide the aid 
process and to examine also the actors' role in this 
process. 
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5.3 Procedures 
Procedures are an important part of any work of both simple 
and complex organisations. They help to regulate behaviour 
among actors. In this regard procedures perform functions 
that are intended to minimise or eliminate altogether 
inconsistencies and/or deviations from expected established 
practice. To serve their purpose more effectively and 
positively procedures ought to be explicit and well 
understood. Above all, there should be a commitment on the 
part of all actors to observe that the established 
procedures are adhered to. Frequent breaches of set 
procedures renders their very existence redundant. 
As far as the initial aid process is concerned Zambia has 
not laid down any explicit procedures which donors must 
follow. Consequently inconsistent and uncoordinated 
participation in the aid process has often occurred. 
Although ultimately aid agreements have to be discussed and 
concluded under the superintendence of the NCDP and the 
Ministry of Finance, in practice donors can initiate aid 
transactions with target sectors or individual institutions. 
Correspondingly prospective recipient sectors have been 
known to solicit donors directly for external assistance. 
This is contrary to what is considered should be the 
standard practice. For the NCDP this has meant that it is 
sometimes required to follow up aid transactions whose 
origins may not be well known to the commission. Sometimes 
directives to negotiate with donors are given when 
commitments to accept aid offers have already been made by 
target recipients or higher authorities acting on behalf of 
earmarked recipients. The NCDP has often found itself under 
pressure from both higher authorities and client sectors. 
As for the donors this rather loose and open system gives 
them opportunities to choose the best possible route to take 
in their attempts to 'sell' aid packages. 
5.3.1 The President's Office  
The President's Office's participation in the aid process is 
by and large not a regular feature. The office plays mainly 
a facilitative role. It is often used to enhance Zambia's 
search for external assistance. Country briefs which the 
President carries on visits abroad usually contain details 
of Zambia's possible areas of international cooperation 
which should be brought to the attention of potential donor 
countries. Many loans, grants and technical assistance have 
been secured using this method. At home the office can 
direct other relevant institutions such as the NCDP or 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to follow up aid transactions 
initiated by the President's Office. Sometimes this is done 
discreetly at the request of donors. It is at this point 
that the facilitative role dissolves but emerges later as an 
interventionist role. 
The President's Office has also been used by donors on some 
occasions to intervene in the aid process on their behalf. 
174 
Pressures are brought to bear on this office by donors who 
want to ensure that they get the projects they want or 
decisions which favour their line of thinking. The recent 
case of Russia's insistence on building a Trades Training 
Institute in Chipata against the recommendations of the 
Ministry of Higher Education (MHE) serves to illustrate the 
point on intervention. The Soviets played on Zambia's 
international and local political sentiments to persuade the 
MHE to agree to their decision on the location of the 
institute. This minute from the Director-General of NCDP to 
the Permanent Secretary of MHE conveys the message: 
"The USSR informed His Excellency the President that 
they would want to start using these funds with a 
project first in Zambia in honour of his leadership as 
Chairman of OAU. They want to do this before they 
start other projects in neighbouring countries. I am 
therefore pleading that you should speed up the 
comments so that ....the agreement is reached as 
quickly as possible to enable the project to start 
immediately.)  
Despite the MHE's strong recommendations that the new 
institute should be built in Solwezi, the Soviet Government 
managed by exerting pressure on the President's and the 
Prime Minster's offices to persuade the MHE to accept their 
demand.3 This was not by any measure an extraordinary 
case. It is quite common and donors are all too familiar 
with the value of employing a strategy such as this one. 
However, Zambia's submission to the Soviet's demand in this 
particular case must be understood in its wider aid and 
political contexts. The USSR has been a donor of various 
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forms of external assistance to the country since Zambia's 
attainment of independence in 1964. Technical assistance in 
both personnel provision and scholarships for training of 
Zambians in the USSR has for many years formed a regular 
feature of Soviet aid to Zambia. Therefore Zambia feels 
indebted to the Soviets for the valuable assistance given to 
the country. Against this background the Soviet demand might 
have appeared to the Zambian political leadership too small 
an issue to cause any serious bother. Secondly, the Prime 
Minister's office and the NCDP were fully aware that the 
location chosen for the new college by the Soviets was a 
bargaining strategy. The top Zambian leadership has 
important direct connections with the town. This the 
Soviets must have known was their most attractive political 
bait which could not be ignored or easily resisted by the 
two 	 offices 	 of 	 state. Nevertheless, all 	 these 
considerations do not in any way make lighter the long term 
planning implications which such decisions impose on the 
recipient ministries. 
Political intervention by higher authorities on behalf of 
donors has considerably weakened the Zambian bargaining 
position in aid matters. It has also tended to be 
disruptive as well as obstructive because officials in the 
sectors are not left .entirely free to make judgements and 
decisions. Therefore, in the face of such interventions it 
is very difficult for planners in particular to make 
rational infusions of external resources into the sectors' 
development programme. 
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5.3.2 UNIP  
Ever since the one-party state came into being in 1972, UNIP 
has made every effort to create a public image which 
projects the supremacy of the party over the Government and 
some of its other institutions. In practice UNIP has 
demonstrated this by exercising interventionary powers in 
domestic affairs. 
The party's participation in the aid process is mainly at 
the level of mobilising external resources from various 
donor countries.4 Because party members are represented 
in 	 many 	 policy and decision-making committees, UNIP's 
participation and influence on the aid process is very much 
diffused. Through the cabinet and the authoritative 
sub-committees of the party's central committee UNIP has 
wider access to matters of the country's international 
relations and economic assistance. It must also be 
remembered that it is the President who appoints the 
director-general of NCDP. Through these mechanisms UNIP is 
able to control and influence, directly and indirectly, 
Zambia's external aid affairs. 
5.3.3 NCDP  
The NCDP is the central institution in the country concerned 
with matters of external aid. The Commission is headed by a 
Director-General and six directors who are responsible for 
running the departments. However, it is the Economic and 
Technical Cooperation (ETC) department which has direct 
responsibility for aid affairs. The following are its 
functions: it acts as an aid broker between Zambia and 
donors, it 	 processes 	 Zambia's 	 requests 	 for external 
assistance, it also convenes and conducts national aid 
negotiation and agreement meetings. The other work involves 
assisting ministries and donors to review their existing aid 
agreements. Thus, NCDP's major tasks in aid process entail 
a great deal of administrative and consultative work. 
In recent years there has been a move to expand the 
functions of the ETC in the NCDP. There are plans to create 
an aid monitoring centre within the NCDP. This would be part 
of an expanded ETC structure. Among the other tasks of the 
NCDP Monitoring Centre (NMC) would be to establish a 
computerised monitoring system of donor's aid and project 
files.5 This initiative will soon be overtaken by the 
most recent attempts to step up the External Assistance 
Department (EAD). This is discussed in chapter 11. 
Although the NCDP is meant to process all external aid 
resources coming into the country the bulk of foreign aid 
from NGOs is not channelled through the NCDP and the 
national treasury. NGOs' assistance goes directly to the 
recipient sectors. Consequently the Commission has no 
control over such resources. This has made it very 
difficult for Zambia to measure NGOs' assistance to the 
country. Plans are now under way to ensure that in future 
all NGOs' aid flows are properly monitored by the NCDP and 
the treasury.6 	 The government would like to see, in 
particular, NGOs enter into formal aid agreements with the 
Zambian government. That the government had never thought 
of doing this much earlier gives further insight into how 
the aid business has been run in Zambia. 
Granted that the work of the ETC department is exclusively 
to look after Zambia's aid interests, it is imperative that 
one examines closely not only the institution but also the 
actors who man its system. As indicated earlier in this 
study aid business has become very complex for recipients, 
who have the added responsibility and burden of dealing with 
large numbers of diverse donors. Therefore, having skilled 
and experienced and well motivated personnel to man one's 
aid business is a very critical factor for a country like 
Zambia. Indeed, skills and experience which can effectively 
deal with broader and sometimes intriguing issues in aid 
relations are important attributes. There is no doubt at 
all that long years of working experience by NCDP staff has 
given them considerable abilities to deal with donors. 
However, such experience cannot effectively compensate for a 
lack of the specialised skills and competence which aid 
transactions often demand. 
The ETC department, like most other government departments, 
recruits its staff through the Public Service Commission or 
its officers are appointed/promoted from the ranks of the 
civil service into it. Long and varied interactions between 
the ETC and various donor agencies and their countries have 
inevitably produced characteristic behavioural patterns 
which the ETC department is now very familiar with. Such 
invaluable experience helps the department to deal with each 
donor in an appropriate manner. The observation below could 
be applied to many donors. Saudi Arabia for example has 
been found to be a very strict and hard donor to negotiate 
with. It usually demands to see properly carried out 
feasibility studies before it can consider requests for 
assistance.7  
While long term working interaction with donors has helped 
Zambians to form predictions of donors' behaviour, it is not 
enough for Zambian negotiators to be able to anticipate 
stands donors will take on certain issues and to prepare to 
meet those demands in advance. Their worth as skilful 
negotiators would be judged by how effectively they can 
manage negotiations and be able to shift a donor's position 
in favour of Zambia. That this aspect forms a serious 
deficit in the department and other recipient sectors is 
reflected in poorly negotiated aid agreements which now 
exist. Zambia is finding it extremely difficult to execute 
some of the provisions of such agreements, yet, it has an 
obligation to do so, or re-negotiate them. 
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For example, Zambia's request to the East German authorities 
to pay Zambian students in convertible currency was turned 
down by the East Germans because the East Germans pointed 
out that, under article 5 (2) of the GDR/GRZ agreement 
provisions are that Zambian students would be paid in local 
East German marks.8 	 Surprisingly, Zambia is required to 
provide Zambian students' maintenance allowances in 
convertible currency to the GDR authorities. This could 
have been an oversight on the part of the Zambian 
negotiators. However, whichever is the case this is an 
example of an agreement which was poorly negotiated by 
Zambians. The Zambian authorities have not only found it 
increasingly difficult to raise large amounts of foreign 
exchange to service the agreement, they have also realised 
that this shared scheme enables the East German government 
to obtain valuable foreign exchange from cooperating 
countries such as Zambia. Table 13 shows the number of 
Zambian students who studied in East Germany in the early 
1980s. 
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Table 13 
NUMBER OF GDR/GRZ SPONSORED ZAMBIAN STUDENTS 
IN EAST GERMANY BY FIELD OF STUDY AND YEAR. 
YEAR TOTAL 
FIELD OF STUDY 1981 1982 1983 1981-1983 
Agric. Machines & Equip. 10 16 26 
Agric. Machinery Fitt. 14 14 
Agric. Mech. 23 23 
Agric. 	 Tech. 10 10 
Agronomy 22 22 
Agro-Engineering 2 2 
Animal Husbandry 1 1 
Architecture 1 1 
Auto-Engineering 1 1 
Butchering 15 15 
Cattle Breeding 16 16 
Cattle Zoo Tech. 27 27 
Clothing Fab 11 10 10 31 
Electricity 12 17 29 
Electrical Engineering 1 1 
Electrical Fitt 15 15 
Engineering 1 1 
Economics 2 2 
Grinding skills 10 10 
Industrial smith 15 15 
Leather Fab. 7 12 19 
Min. 	 Engineering 1 1 
Machining 10 15 25 
Metallurgy 6 6 
Metal cutting 11 11 
Medicine 4 4 
Metal Processing 9 9 
Mining 2 2 
Nursing 8 8 
Pharmacy 2 2 
Political Education 5 5 
Power Plant Engineering 1 1 
Railway Transport 1 1 
Rolling Mills 15 15 
Sports Coaching 1 1 
Transport Tech 1 1 2 
Tropical Agric. 2 2 
Telecom Engineering 15 15 
Textile Tech. 8 8 
Vehicle Fitting 10 10 20 
Veterinary Medicine 1 1 
TOTAL 149 210 61 420 
SOURCE: 	 DMDT 	 (1983). 	 Pp.21-45. 
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The range of training programmes is obviously wide, but one 
wonders whether some of them could not have been better 
offered in a Zambian training and working environment. 
A separate case involving a 1967 technical assistance 
agreement to the University of Zambia has recently revealed 
similar characteristics. The University of Zambia Secretary 
in 1987 drew attention of the Permanent Secretary of the MHE 
to the difficulties UNZA had been experiencing in executing 
the 1967 GRZ/USSR technical assistance agreement to the 
University. The agreement provides, among other things, 
that Russian personnel at UNZA would be paid in convertible 
currency (sterling). Consequently since 1967 the Russian 
staff have remained a special category of expatriates in 
terms of remuneration.9 
	
Seen in a broader context, this 
case and many similar others serves to demonstrate that aid 
transactions with donors should not be approached with 
absolute trust and pre-conceived innocence by recipients. 
The argument being submitted here is that such costly lapses 
on the part of Zambian negotiators could have been 
significantly reduced or eliminated altogether had the 
negotiators been more skilful and not concerned with short 
term benefits alone. 
Because of the inadequate number of professional staff in 
the ETC department it has not been possible for them to 
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extend their services beyond administering aid agreements. 
It has not been possible for example to provide evaluation 
services to the recipient sectors. Evaluation studies have 
been done largely by foreign consultants hired by donors or 
by the donors themselves. This allows the Zambian 
authorities to see the performance of the aided projects 
though the perspective of donors or their consultants. 
Until the ETC department is able to conduct its own 
evaluations, it will always find it difficult to take 
definitive stands on certain aid issues against donors. 
On 	 the other hand, recruitment and retention of more 
professional staff by the ETC department faces the same 
problem which the entire civil service has had to live with. 
It faces competition from the private and the parastatal 
sector. 
Figure 1 indicates channels through which official donors' 
assistance gets to the National Commission for Development 
Planning. 
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Figure 1 attempts to show the multi- channel structure 
through which aid gets to various target sectors and the 
NCDP. It shows that the present arrangement gives the 
donors alternative routes through which offers of external 
assistance can be channelled. One conspicuous feature one 
can observe from figure 1 is the absence of an indication of 
where the starting point of the aid process is located. It 
is difficult to place, therefore it is not easy to try to 
put the stages of the aid process in a strict sequential 
order. The system has both direct and indirect approaches. 
In a more direct approach a prospective donor can inform the 
NCDP of its intentions to provide assistance. There are 
also instances when the NCDP is drawn into the process long 
after a donor and a Zambian sector have already had 
extensive 	 discussions. It 	 is not clear which Zambian 
institution has the responsibility to ensure that donors and 
recipient sectors follow consistent aid process procedures. 
The NCDP mandate on aid matters falls far short of covering 
this critical area. Consequently, the system has laid itself 
open to all sorts of pressures and manipulations. Even 
within the safeguards of agreement provisions one is still 
able to observe unrestrained behavioural aspects in the 
manner in which aid process is conducted. 
The University of Zambia and some Teachers Colleges e.g 
David Livingstone, Malcom Moffat and Charles Lwanga are 
educational institutions under the MHE which have had direct 
involvement in negotiating for their external assistance 
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from donors. Teachers Colleges solicit for assistance from 
overseas church affiliated NGOs or through the Christian 
Council of Zambia (CCZ). Until recently all aid business 
for the university was handled by the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor's office. Because of the increasing 
dependence on external aid the university has established an 
office in the Deputy Vice-Chancellor's Office to deal with 
technical and capital assistance matters. It can ask for 
assistance directly from the donors or channel the request 
through the NCDP." Schools have also solicited for 
external assistance directly from foreign embassies, 
bypassing the NCDP. In 1987 a small rural basic school in 
the Eastern Province asked the British High Commission in 
Lusaka to provide it with a duplicating machine.11 
Although such aid is usually small and generally regarded as 
merely a gesture of goodwill, all the same it reinforces the 
multi-channel situation portrayed in figure 1. 
5.3.4 Parliament  
Parliament as a separate institution does not play any 
direct role in national aid issues. Although it has on a 
few occasions raised issues on the country's conduct of its 
aid relations, these have been done on 
	 the 	 personal 
initiative of MPs. Parliament has not been assigned 
specific functions to debate and take decisions on national 
aid issues. For example, its Public Accounts Committee has 
never focused attention on aspects relating to how the 
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country manages its aid resources. Similarly, the Auditor-
General's annual reports have always kept a safe distance 
from examining Zambia's management of its external 
resources. This is very odd indeed. As a recipient Zambia 
has equally compelling reasons to monitor the perfomance and 
value of its external resource inputs. Parliament is one 
agency which can provide the necessary checks on qualitative 
and other aspects of external aid. By contrast, parliaments 
in donor countries play important roles in many aspects of 
their countries' aid business. 
Of all the actors involved in the aid process two occupy 
special positions. These are the donor and the recipient. 
The next few paragraphs will examine how the education 
sector conducts its aid process. 
5.4 The Education Sector 
The structure of the aid process in the recipient ministries 
is not in any way different from the general aid process of 
which the ministries are a constituent part. However, it is 
at this level that one is able to notice further features 
and trends in Zambia's aid process system. 
The key offices that .are involved in the aid process in both 
the MGEC and MHE are, the Permanent Secretary's office, the 
Assistant Secretary's office (Policy and Technical 
Cooperation), the Chief Education Officer's office (Policy 
188 
and Technical Cooperation), and the Planning Unit. The 
director of the Department of Technical Education and 
Vocational Training (DTEVT) is also often involved directly 
in aid negotiations when his department is to receive aid or 
has made a request to receive external assistance. The 
Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) has also had direct 
negotiating links with donors. In fact, through the SHAPE 
project, the CDC is now able to reach more donors. But, 
rarely would principals of tertiary colleges be invited to 
take part in aid discussions. 
The Permanent Secretary is the front-line officer in the aid 
process. All external aid requests from and offers to the 
sector are required to pass through his office for record 
purposes, for endorsement and subsequent submission to the 
NCDP or discussion with donors whichever the case may be. 
The actual process work is carried out by mainly three 
officers and their staff, these are, the Assistant Secretary 
(P/TC), the Assistant Secretary (Planning), and the Chief 
Education Officer (P/TC). The responsibilities and duties 
of these officers include among other things, processing aid 
requests 	 from the sector, negotiating with donors and 
interpreting government policy on aid to Zambia and the 
education sector in particular, keeping records of data and 
other information relating to external assistance, and many 
other normal administrative tasks. Indeed, except for the 
task of undertaking negotiations with donors, all other 
duties fall within the usual categories of government work. 
Despite the special nature of the officers' duties, their 
appointment to these positions is done under normal public 
service procedures. That is, officers are promoted 	 or 
transfered from senior and other middle education officer 
ranks. No special or additional training is given to them 
to equip them to handle the extra tasks of managing the aid 
process and administering aid. The non-professionalisation 
of the civil service in Zambia and other Eastern and 
Southern African countries has caused great concern in 
recent years. Critics have been concerned that there are no 
agreed upon conventions and modes of conducting business in 
the public service.12  
The MGEC and the MHE face 	 enormous internal problems 
relating to their own organisational structures, and the 
addition of new responsibilities.13 The authorities' 
reliance on general administrative aptitudes and long 
experience have proved increasingly inadequate to enable an 
old system to deal with additional administrative and many 
other challenges which aid presents. For a system whose 
development has been dependent on external assistance the 
difficulties being experienced by the MGEC and the MHE may 
be partly as a result of donors' neglect. Donors, both 
bilateral and multilateral, have spent vast amounts of 
resources in technical and capital assistance but none of 
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these has ever focused on equipping Zambian personnel with 
skills which could enable them to deal more effectively with 
aid management. 
The MGEC and the MHE have not laid down any procedures 
regarding guidance to prospective donors and Zambian 
officers. Hence the aid process in the Ministries is 
conducted in a variety of ways. Any Zambian responses to 
donors' initiatives have tended to be ad hoc. A donor may 
arrange visits to the Ministry to acquaint itself with the 
current situation and to seek official opinion and positions 
on issues in which donors have a special interest. This is 
one approach and is exemplified in the minutes of a meeting 
between the MHE and the Area Manager for Sumitomo 
Corporation of Japan. 
2.1 "The Chairman informed the meeting that Mr. 
Yamazaki, who is the area manager of Sumitomo 
Corporation for the Africa and Middle East Group, 
had been in the country to scout for possible 
areas where Japanese grant aid could be 
considered. 
2.2 The meeting observed that Japanese grant aid could 
only be considered in three areas as thus:- 
Agriculture 
Educatiokl, 
Medicine 14. 
This particular case helps to throw light on other important 
points. The Japanese had not only decided which areas they 
intended to support but made it clear also that earmarked 
areas would be expected to receive certain types of aid 
only. The education sector could in this case be considered 
for capital assistance (equipment). Consequently, the MHE's 
plea to the Japanese to raise assistance which could help 
complete the building of three Trades Training institutes at 
Chipata, Mongu and Solwezi could not go further than Mr. 
Yamazaki's ears. A further illuminating point is the open 
but quite substantial involvement of Japanese private 
corporations in development aid. 
The University of Zambia School of Education is the proud 
owner of a very expensive and impressive language laboratory 
donoted by the Sumitomo Corporation of Japan in 1987. 
According to the Zambian in charge of the laboratory, the 
negotiations which preceded this gift bore all the hallmarks 
of discussions that had not sufficiently taken account of 
how the gift would serve the recipient. The package 
contained two very expensive multisystem and multi-purpose 
T.V sets and two large and well equipped laboratories. The 
donation had been accepted against the advice of the 
technician by non technical senior officers. He pointed out 
that the entire laboratory facilities are redundant because 
of the small number of students who use them. The 
technician pointed out that his advice that half of the 
total cost of this gift should have been spent on other 
small equipment which could have assisted trainees in making 
various teaching aids had been ignored by both Zambians and 
donors. The costly multisystem T.V. monitor for instance 
is a ridiculous gift to an institution which doesn't have 
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basic manila paper for making teaching charts. And in any 
case, Zambia does not have a multisystem T.V. transmitter. 
What the Japanese representative was looking for in the 
meeting cited here was a commitment from the Zambian 
authorities that they would support specific forms of 
assistance to the sectors the Japanese had already 
earmarked. It is encounters such as this one in which the 
competence of Zambian negotiators is tested in many ways. 
Another approach by donors is sending a team on a fact 
finding mission as an initial response to Zambia's request 
for assistance. This is done either independently by donors 
or the consultants they have hired. Donors have maintained 
these independent approaches because the MGEC and the MHE 
have not produced a common procedural requirement which 
donors should follow. Consequently, it is quite common for 
donors to demand meetings with education officials at short 
notice, and these are usually granted. This often presents 
serious problems of internal consultation among education 
authorities. 
Nonetheless, whether donors' missions come on their own 
looking for markets for their wares or are invited to come 
and assist in specific areas, what really matters in the 
final analysis is whether Zambians can obtain favourable 
outcomes from such aid meetings. The extent to which 
Zambians are able to shift donors' positions in aid 
negotiations depends on many factors, among them being 
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Zambia's own ability to manage negotiations as well as the 
donors' level of stakes in the aid agenda. Ministry 
officials have reservations about their own capabilities in 
aid matters, as one senior officer observed. 
"In cases where the participants are inexperienced or 
	
imprudent in dealing with foreign aid, there 	 are 
problems of reaching national priorities on what forms 
of aid to request...participants who are not watchful 
may accept aid that may not only be difficult to 
maintain in the long run, both technically and 
financially4 but may ultimately benefit more the donor 
countries."' 
Although the odds are overwhelming against Zambian 
negotiators a few of them are on guard and able to point out 
anomalies in the aid process. The Zambia Mathematics and 
Science Teachers Education Project (ZAMSTEP) illustrates how 
intriguing aid transactions can be, and how they are 
sometimes unfairly conducted. 
Members of the steering committee of this project had 
expressed surprise that: (a) they had not seen the signed 
ZAMSTEP contract before the meeting was convened, and (b) 
issues which should have been discussed before signing the 
contract were being raised after the contract had been 
affirmed. It would appear that in order to facilitate the 
smooth passage of the contract document some members of the 
team had been bypassed by the higher authorities in the MHE. 
And in the short period the project has been in operation 
Zambian lecturers involved in the project to provide 
counterpart assistance have pointed out many insensitivities 
in the provisions of the project contract. The restrictions 
on the use of project vehicles in the colleges where there 
are no other means of transport has caused great concern and 
displeasure. So has the exclusion of Zambian lecturers from 
receiving additional payments for services provided to the 
project. Consequently, the feeling among some members of 
the committee was that this project had been tactically 
manipulated and imposed on Zambia.16  
Figure 2 shows a complex interactive pattern in the aid 
relationship between donors and the education sector, the 
NCDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What emerges from 
Figure 2 is again a clear difficulty if one attempts to 
trace the logical stages of the aid process. 
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Figure 2 
Aid Process Between Donors, NCDP, Foreign Affairs and 
the Zambian Education and Training Sector. 
Contacts between donors and Zambia institutions. 
	
 Aid requests by institutions and comments on considered 
aid offers are sent to NCDP through the ministries. 
The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to 
re-direct aid offers to appropriate institutions. 
	 N Aid offers given to ministries are sent to relevant 
/ departments or institutions for consideration. This 
is mainly applicable to the Universities and DTEVT. 
\  Aid destined for the MGEC and the MHE are channeled 
through the NCDP for more discussions with relevant donors. 
	
 NCDP contacts with education ministries and institutions. 
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5.5 Pressure Groups 
An examination and discussion of the aid process would be 
incomplete without making some reflections on the kinds of 
pressures and other influence attempts it is subjected to . 
It is well known that donors' internal aid machineries and 
process are frequently targets of influence attempts through 
lobbying and other open campaigns by aid interest groups as 
well as political parties.17. Britain for example has 
over one hundred non-governmental organisations involved in 
many aspects of overseas development work.18 	 A few of 
these are keen activists in lobbying the British government 
on overseas aid issues.19 Although these interest groups 
do not always succeed in shifting government policies and 
decisions on aid issues, nevertheless their lobbies serve to 
draw the attention of policy-makers to various issues. This 
they are able to do because interest and other pressure 
groups are an important integral part of the political 
fabric in donor countries. These groups are not only allowed 
to operate but they are also encouraged to play an active 
part in various aspects of development aid. The 
corresponding situation obtaining in recipient countries is 
rather different and varies from one country to another. 
Therefore the state of internal pressure and interest groups 
which can bring 4nfluence to bear on political and 
government machineries in Zambia has to be examined in the 
country's political context. 
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Prior to the establishment of the one-party state in 1972, 
Zambia had the full experience of operating in a multi-party 
system in a newly independent state. Opposition parties, 
the African National Congress (ANC), the United Party (UP), 
and the short-lived United Progressive Party (UPP) contested 
UNIP's government and challenged it on several local issues. 
UP was opposed strongly to the cancellation of the South 
African contract to recruit cheap labour from Zambia. It 
felt also that Western Province, the base of its political 
power, was economically lagging behind other provinces in 
the national development process. The UP also raised 
strong objections to the 1968 Mulungushi Economic Reforms, 
and further rejected Humanism as a vague ideology. By 
contrast the UPP's criticism of the UNIP government focused 
on agricultural policies, financial management, and 
leadership style. It was also opposed to UNIP's policy of 
economic disengagement from dependence on South African 
trade and trade routes.20 	 These were the forces behind 
the opposition parties' attempts to gain political power 
which would have given them more access to the fortunes of 
independence. 
The opposition parties' interest in UNIP's conduct of the 
country's international affairs was largely dominated by 
regional matters. Thus, the issues on which the parties 
contested power were predominantly local. Inter-party 
conflict and competition characterised much of Zambia's 
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domestic politics then.21 	 External aid could not have 
gained prominence on the agenda of Zambia's politics because 
aid was then generally regarded as no more than an important 
external input into the local resource base, therefore 
Zambian politicians did not see much to question about 
foreign aid. This unfortunately tended to blind critical 
perception. Severe criticism of aid by other parties would 
have been regarded as anti-developmental by UNIP. It would 
have also raised grave reservations among donors regarding 
Zambia's commitment and willingness to develop the country. 
Similarly, trade unions and other social organisations were 
also mainly concerned with their own internal politics. The 
trade unions were primarily concerned with making attempts 
to fulfil pre-independence promises of better pay, 
promotions, and 
	 other 	 good conditions of service. In 
domestic politics they were engaged in a fierce struggle to 
remain autonomous from government's attempts to control 
them.22 Although the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) had been a recipient of direct aid for some of its 
operations, the unions never took any strong public position 
on national aid matters until recently over the IMF case. 
Ironically, although aid has played an important role in 
sustaining the activities of many sectors in which their 
members 	 are employed, the unions have never taken an 
interest in the politics of aid 
	 distribution in the 
country's national development process. 
The position of interest groups in the MGEC and the MHE has 
to be understood in this broader context. The Zambia 
National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) and the hundreds of 
Parent-Teachers 	 Associations 	 (PTAs), represent 	 two 
important, but 	 structurally 	 different 	 groups 	 in the 
education sector. The PTAs are organisationally 
disaggregated and involved mainly in their school politics. 
By contrast ZNUT is a national organisation with limited 
access to international assistance. These groups have never 
been in the mainstream of actors in the sector's aid 
process. They do not have any representation even on 
externally funded projects which have direct consequences 
for their children and teachers. The SIDA-supported 
multigrade school project for instance began and has 
progressed without consultations with the teachers union. 
Yet the project aims at transforming the entire teaching 
pattern in the rural areas of Zambia. The self-help school 
project too to be mounted soon by SIDA and the ADB has 
passed through several preparatory and planning phases, none 
of which has involved the teachers' union. Yet the 
implications of this project for teachers have already begun 
to emerge. The communities want to know which agency will be 
responsible for hiring teachers and collecting house rent in 
this sector. The possible reasons why the union is kept out 
of such important discussions are the ministry's fears 
concerning the union's supposed militancy and radicalism. 
It is feared that these elements could threaten aid 
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negotiations and the flow of aid. Consequently, the ministry 
would like to see the union tied to labour movement affairs. 
In this regard the union and the PTAs have been left without 
any mechanism through which they could exert their influence 
on the aid process other than direct access to the MoE. It 
would also appear that the Teachers Union, as indeed is the 
case with other Unions, feel erroneously that external aid 
issues are too far removed from the bread and butter issues 
concerning their members. Yet many of the professional 
activities in the sector are sustained by external 
assistance. 
Church organisations and other NGOs involved in educational 
work form another set of interest groups in the educational 
sector. Organisations such as the Christian Council of 
Zambia (CCZ) and other individual denominations are no less 
distant from the politics of official aid in the educational 
sector. Their energies are concentrated on those issues 
affecting their educational institutions. Unlike PTAs and 
the ZNUT, church organisations have direct access to more 
diversified international assistance through NGOs in donor 
countries.23 This has given them a certain amount of 
independence and consequently has weakened their interest in 
official assistance. 
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One can therefore conclude that as far as exerting pressure 
on the aid process is concerned, interest groups have had no 
direct impact on it. The groups are first and foremost 
concerned with the welfare matters of their members. 
Because the effects of aid on interest groups are generally 
indirect and often subtle, aid issues have attracted less 
attention. Thirdly, because aid is a sensitive subject 
recipient sectors such as the MGEC and the MHE have made no 
provision to create structures which could allow more actors 
to participate in the aid process. 
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5.6 SUMMARY and CONCLUSION 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to construct and 
discuss the aid process in Zambia' and to identify its main 
institutional actors. It has been shown that the structure 
of the aid process is dominated by two sets of institutional 
actors, the political and the bureaucratic. The key 
political actors reside in the President's office, the Prime 
Minister's Office, and Freedom House. 
The NCDP forms one important single subject in the category 
of bureaucratic actors. It houses the ETC department which 
is directly responsible for administering aid negotiations 
and agreements between donors and Zambia. The other actors 
are recipient ministries and the University of Zambia. 
However, the present aid process structure and arrangements 
are such that interest and other pressure groups do not have 
a direct role to play in the country's international aid 
affairs. The groups for their part do not seem very keen on 
involving themselves in these affairs. Nor has the 
government given them encouragement to take an active part. 
The government would like to see interest groups concentrate 
on serving the immediate interests of their members. This 
serves to reduce public dissent on national policies and 
other issues. This'fear has however, denied the country 
getting the benefit of dissenting opinions on fundamental 
national issues. 
All the actors except for pressure groups operate in an aid 
process framework which is governed by inadequate procedural 
provisions. Hence, aid 	 transactions between Zambia and 
donors do not always follow a logical, strict sequence. 
This loose arrangement has ensured that the NCDP does not 
have absolute power over major aspects of aid to Zambia 
including enforcing aid process procedures. Thus the NCDP 
and its aid functions can be subjected without restraint to 
numerous and wide influences from higher political 
institutions. Unfortunately, donors have also 
	 on 	 many 
instances used the weaknesses of the present system to 
obtain their objectives. This puts undue pressure on 
recipient sectors and has left both the NCDP and the 
recipient sectors in weaker positions to take definitive 
decisions and to act independently on some issues. That the 
government has not raised the NCDP to a Ministry despite its 
critical importance and mounting aid work has also affected 
its functional relationship with recipient sectors. 
Even with the best of aid process arrangements not much can 
be achieved if the individual actors do not measure up to 
the demands of the tasks in the aid process. Both the NCDP 
and the MGEC and the MHE have indicated that their work in 
the aid process would have been strengthened if they had 
adequate and more. skilled manpower. In the NCDP the 
shortage of manpower has severely limited the services it 
can offer to the recipient sectors. Because the government 
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has not perceived the tasks of administering aid 
negotiations and agreements as a rather different set of 
undertakings requiring additional skilled expertise, it has 
continued to treat manpower cases in these institutions in 
the same manner it has treated manpower requirement problems 
in the entire civil service. That is, civil servants have 
often been required to take on additional responsibilities 
without parallel adjustments in their supporting staff and 
expertise. In the education sector, as indeed is the case 
in many other sectors, this has reduced the work of 
technical cooperation offices to one of carrying out 
clerical duties relating to aid transactions. 
Therefore it is the conclusion of this chapter that despite 
the large increase in the number of donors and projects in 
the country, the Zambian government has not made serious 
efforts to develop a very strong aid institution and a 
coherent aid process structure. The aid process has been 
caught up in the country's own political structure and 
administrative weaknesses. Donors' interests and intrigues 
have also made the aid process in Zambia less amenable to 
strict control. The effects of this on Zambia's development 
planning efforts and process are both short and long term. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE LINKS BETWEEN DONORS' FOREIGN AND AID POLICIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the links between foreign and aid 
policies. The focus is on the relationship in the 
institutional framework and the functional relationship 
between foreign and aid policies. The discussion will draw 
its illustrations mainly from the experiences of Britain's 
ODA and some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) concerned 
with development aid affairs. Thus the discussion's lines 
of debate will be around the structural, administrative, and 
policy links. Where appropriate examples will be drawn from 
the experiences of other donor countries. 
A country's foreign policy is a key national feature in 
measuring and assessing a nation's self-perception and also 
how it perceives the world around it. These perceptions 
produce observable behaviour in a state which follows 
discernible lines of action. These are aimed at achieving 
particular objectives, the ultimate goal being to seek, to 
secure, and to protect by various means one's national 
interests at home grid abroad. Behind foreign policies are 
motivations which are quite often very strong and complex. 
Today in a world that is often described as a context where 
there are no permanent friends, the conduct of foreign 
208 
policy has become highly demanding on the decision-making, 
diplomatic and executive machineries. The tasks of foreign 
policy making and execution call for greater foresight, 
subtlety and flexibility than ever before. Consequently 
foreign policy institutions and instruments assume a 
critical role in the management of a nation's foreign 
policy. 
Foreign policy institutions vary considerably in size, 
complexity, operations and amount of resources committed to 
them. The size and location of a country's external 
interests, position 	 in the international power league, 
self-perception and perceived world perceptions of itself 
are among the factors which help a government make important 
decisions on the resources and institutional arrangements it 
can deploy for managing foreign policy programmes. 
Countries such as Britain, the 	 United 	 States, Sweden, 
Canada, France, and Japan have interests that are located in 
far outlying areas of the world. This has necessarily 
called for extensive institutional arrangements to manage 
and protect those interests within the broader realm of 
conducting their countries' international relations. Hence 
to the traditional foreign policy infrastructure of 
ministries and their outpost stations around the world have 
been added new units to help shoulder the extra 
responsibilities. Official aid agencies and a variety of 
government-supported 	 or 	 recognised 	 non-governmental 
organisations (NGO's) fall into this category of essential 
auxiliary units in the machinery of the foreign policy 
plant. 
6.2 Institutional Framework and Links 
In all donor countries the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
appear to have some structural and administrative links with 
the 	 countries' 	 official 	 donor agencies. However, the 
relationship and the level of structural integration between 
the two institutions tends to vary from donor to donor, and 
so do the administrative arrangements. 
The ODA for example was created in 1965 to work as part of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Office (FCO), with 
responsibilities for development aid administration. Unlike 
SIDA, ODA is administratively an internal department within 
the FCO though it is housed outside the FCO main building. 
It is headed by a Minister who has delegated 
responsibilities from the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs. Though structurally not an internal 
department within the FCO, the British Council has a special 
and complex institutional link with the FCO via the ODA. 
The Council carries out its own programmes and also executes 
others on behalf of the ODA. Its special role is performed 
outside the UK across the world. Because of the nature of 
its field work the Council plays an important advisory role 
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to the ODA and the FCO on operational and policy matters 
concerning British development aid.' 	 Consequently, the 
Council's senior officers are consulted regularly by the ODA 
and the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on a range of 
subjects in their field. Similarly, the Council's field 
staff have for the same reasons close contacts with the HMG 
Missions. Through these mechanisms the British Council is 
able to provide important input into ODA's policy and 
decision-making process. Therefore the British Council's 
physical distance from the FCO, ODA and HMG Missions abroad 
appear to mean little in terms of the real internal 
administrative cooperation and consultation arrangements. 
SIDA by contrast was created in 1961 with the organisational 
and management structure of a parastatal agency. It is an 
external unit of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Its senior officers at the level of Director-General and his 
deputies are appointed by the government. West Germany's 
institutional framework however presents a rather 
complicated 	 picture. Unlike 	 Britain 	 and 	 Sweden, the 
Ministries of Economic Cooperation, Economic Affairs and the 
Ministry of Finance play a prominent role in development aid 
matters.2 Each institution is responsible for specific 
tasks 	 such 	 as international commodity agreements, and 
monetary issues. Its aid policy and administration is said 
to involve a fairly diversified spectrum of institutions. 
West Germany makes a clear distinction between financial and 
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technical assistance: the former is channelled through a 
government owned development bank while the latter is 
administered by the Gesellschaft Fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), a wholly government owned limited 
liability company. 
Donor governments have maintained management policy which 
allow 	 cross-transfer of personnel between the foreign and 
aid service organisations. Senior aid officers have often 
been appointed to senior foreign service posts.3 This 
arrangement gives the officers insights into developing 
countries from two vantage points, through aid work, and 
diplomatic access. Thus in concluding this part one 
observes that at the official level the extension and 
linkages between foreign and aid institutions is 
self-evident. However, this is not the case in the 
relationship between donor governments on one hand and the 
NGOs on the other. 
6.2.1 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)  
The links and relationships between the ODA and voluntary 
aid organisations are generally kept deliberately less 
conspicuous by both parties. NGOs' would like to project an 
independent image of themselves and their activities. The 
ODA too keeps a physical distance from the organisational 
and management aspects of NGOs' activities. For some NGOs 
the relationship starts with being a recipient of a regular 
grant from the government.4 Although the funding enables 
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+he ODA to maintain a light foothold in the NGOs' activities 
the relationship between them extends far and beyond giving 
and receiving annual grants. A closer examination of NGOs 
will show important informal features which provide NGOs 
with firms links with governments. 
Organisational and management structures of NGOs provide a 
second important link in their relationship. In the case of 
British NGOs their governing councils or executive 
committees often include active as well as retired high 
ranking government officials as well as private individuals 
and community leaders. The British Government has grant 
support schemes for many British NGOs. Under the Joint 
Funding Scheme (JFS) Oxfam, Christian Aid, Save the Children 
Fund, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), 
Catholic Institute for Internatonal Relations and other 
British NGOs receive regular operational grants from the 
government.5 
	
On the Board of Trustees (1988) of Action 
Aid for instance, were the following political personalities 
among others the Rt Hon Christopher Chataway, and the Hon 
Sir Bernard Braine MP. The 1986 Council and Executive 
committee of the VSO included among many others the 
Director-General of the British Council and former ODA 
senior staff members,. 
The examples given above serve two important purposes. A 
corps of distinguished active and retired officers serving 
on governing councils gives the NGOs prestige, but more 
important it is also a means through which the NGOs can 
maintain an active lobby in the private sector and 
government corridors. Through them the NGO is also able to 
generate public goodwill in Britain. It is also important 
to note that these officers take to the NGOs valuable local 
and international experience which benefits NGOs' policy and 
decision-making process. The government benefits also in 
two ways. This representation by proxy strengthens the 
spirit of collaborative work between the NGOs and the 
government. Secondly, this kind of representation provides 
an important checking mechanism on the policies and 
activities of NGOs, especially those that may have direct 
implications for Britain's standing internationally. Under 
this arrangement policy decisions and projects which 
threaten Britain's larger bilateral relations with other 
countries would not be allowed to go through unchallenged. 
In these informal and proxy ways the FCO is able to extend 
and maintain a presence of support and influence in NGOs. 
The partnership is a firm one, and of critical importance in 
the maintenance and management of Britain's public and 
private foreign policy objectives, as one scholar observed: 
Even in situations where private and state foreign 
policy appear to be in conflict the conflict may be 
more apparent than real. Thus while the British 
government was supporting the federal forces with 
arms in the Nigerian civil war, the Prime Minister 
called together a meeting of the voluntary services 
and urged them to do all they could to relieve the 
conditions on the Biafran side.6 
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NGOs are tied to the policies and national interests of 
their governments and the public in different ways through 
public support and government regulatory mechanisms. 
Consequently their policies and activities are subject to 
direct and indirect influences. Aid to education and 
training provided by NGOs to developing countries is given 
against this background. Closer insights into some of the 
issues raised in the preceding paragraphs can further be 
obtained by examining historical cases and specific donor 
policies. 
6.3 Foreign and Aid Policies 
Sweden's foreign policy objectives have been listed as: 
(1) To safeguard the security of the country. 
(2) Non-Alliance and neutrality. 
(3) To support struggles for national independence. 
(4) To mobilise international opinion against 
oppression and intolerance. 
(5) To support and promote economic and social 
equality and peace.7  
Compare objectives (3-5) with Sweden's declared aid policy 
objectives which are intended to promote: 
(a) Economic growth. 
(b) Economic and social equality. 
(c) Economic and political independence. 
(d) Development of democracy in society.8 
The overlapping between the two sets of policy objectives 
needs hardly any explaining, it is self-evident. 
In broad terms Britain's foreign policy objectives have 
remained concerned with issues of defence/security, 
prosperity, and liberal democracy. These have maintained 
their firm positions in the country's foreign policy 
framework. In a 1978 Government white paper the objectives 
of British foreign policy were listed as: 
(i) To safeguard the security of our country. 
(ii) To promote its prosperity. 
(iii) To uphold and extend the basic values and 
freedoms of our democracy. 
(iv) To honour our commitments and obligations. 
(v) To work for a peaceful and just world. 
(vi) To contribute to the achievement of the above 
objectives by providing assistance to the 
developing countries. 
Over the years donors have become less moralistic about 
their assistance. But also time and developments in the 
recipient environment have made it difficult for donors to 
continue masking aid projects with moral tags. Competition 
among donors has also helped to reveal the extension and 
intrusion of foreign policy objectives into foreign aid. 
Consequently there is a readiness among some donors now to 
admit that aid is a cover for many political and economic 
objectives. As Lord Pym acknowledged, British aid is: 
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An arm of foreign policy in both the political and 
economic senses. 	 It serves the diplomatic purposes 
of promoting better relations and also promotes 
commercial interests. There is no conflict here, in 
many cases the different objectives are mutually 
reinforcing. 
In the field, however, donor staff often make conscious 
efforts to play down this relationship. Field staff will 
avoid indiscreet discussion which could expose the larger 
boundaries of the political economy of foreign assistance. 
Perhaps it is the need to protect one's national interests 
which forces them to avoid close discussions of their 
foreign and aid policies. It is also a fact that these 
policies contain many sensitive aspects, hence the need to 
exercise extreme caution. The next section examines two 
British cases to illustrate further the relationship under 
discussion. 
6.4 Policies in Historical and Current Perspectives 
Britain's granting of political independence to her colonies 
opened the newly independent states to diversified economic 
assistance from other industrialised countries. For Britain 
this meant that the 'burden' of helping to develop her 
former colonies could then be shared with the international 
community. This development however brought with it 
economic and political challenges. First, there were fears 
for the security of British economic interest in newly 
independent states that had embarked on sweeping 
nationalisation policies. There were also fears in British 
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circles of Sino-Soviet influence spreading quickly in some 
of the newly independent nations.1° 	 Consequently, the Bow 
Group noted in 1962 that o- 4^- of Britain's purposes in Africa 
was to encourage the steady spread of education for its own 
sake and in the knowledge this will limit the roaming 
influence of the Sino-Soviet bloc. 
The conclusion of technical, economic and other cooperation 
agreements between the Soviet bloc, and China on one hand 
and some developing countries have in many instances 
heightened western countries' concerns for their own 
interests in developing countries. Thus Britain's 
post-colonial foreign policy objectives have been shaped by 
her own reaction to the perceived political and economic 
trends in the international environment. In particular the 
Sino-Soviet political and economic initiatives have tended 
to receive strong response and counterbalancing measures 
from western countries such as Britain as the case below 
indicates. 
The English Low-Priced Books Scheme (ELBS) was started in 
1960 by the commonwealth Relations Office and publishers in 
Britain to counter the spread of cheap books from the USSR 
and China.11 This, scheme which was operated by the Central 
Office of Information (COI) illustrates a number of 
important points in addition to the obvious educational and 
cultural 	 objectives. First, one 	 notices 
	 the 	 evident 
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cooperation between private industry and the government to 
further British interests abroad in areas of hitherto 
dominant British influence. One also observes the 
protection of private British commercial interests by the 
British government. Consequently, by pursuing the ELBS the 
British government built mutual reinforcing links between 
the government and the private sector within Britain's 
foreign economic relations framework.12 	 The scheme can 
also be isolated as a case where the British move was a 
response to a specific economic and political signal. 
Politically the ELBS should also be viewed as having been a 
British cultural/commercial element in the larger western 
containment strategy against soviet economic and political 
endeavours. 
The British concerns with promoting their interest abroad 
have over time directed attention to other sources of 
competition with British interests. Western competitors 
against British interests have equally made Britain feel 
very vulnerable: 
I have visited over 40 countries while working for 
Peat Marwick and have increasingly noticed a growth 
in acceptance of American education and cultural 
mores. Recently in China for instance I was part of 
a British Council mission visiting universities in 
the hope of fostering links and contacts. It was 
clear that We were treading in a path well worn by 
previous American university missions. From the 
obvious statistics of student exchanges between 
China and overseas countries Britain seemed to be 
slipping far down the league table. We noticed for 
instance extremely few English periodicals in the 
university libraries, while 	 the 	 American 	 ones 
predominated. Sadly, there were even fewer 
reference boys describing Britain or British 
Universities." 
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Some corrective measures have already been taken. A special 
scholarship scheme for Chinese students and academic staff 
to study and do research in Britain was announced during the 
Queen's visit to China in 1986. This move would have been 
made in all probability even in the absence of potential or 
actual competitors for the Chinese Market. The sheer size 
of the Chinese population, the liberal economic reforms then 
being adopted and also the economic market potential which 
China offers are enough incentives to attract the kind of 
attention manifested in Britain's recent educational aid 
decision. 
But against all this background lies Britain's third 
preoccupation after defence/security and the state of the 
country's economy. It is the concern for the country's 
international image, and the political or economic 
consequences which an unfavourable image abroad could pose 
for British interests. 
6.5 British Cultural Diplomacy 
The task of positive image building was recently tackled by 
a Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in its study and review of 
British cultural diplomacy. The government believes that 
the problem of image building can best be tackled by 
mounting an effective cultural diplomacy campaign. The 
FC0's memorandum of 7th November, 1987 to the FAC listed 
five British cultural diplomacy objectives as follows. 
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1. To convey the image of Britain as a creative 
well integrated and forward looking society 
based on liberal values- a social and cultural 
model to be emulated; 
2. To inspire respect and understanding for the 
people of Britain and their achievements; 
3. To correct wrong and counter unfavourable 
impressions of Britain; 
4. To explain policies and interests to decision-
makers and opinion formers overseas and. 
5. To promote British economic interests overseas 
including the export of British goods and 
services.14 
The memorandum identified six strategies which Britain could 
use to secure these objectives. These are: 
(a) Promoting knowledge and use of English language. 
(b) Promoting the British educational system 
overseas. 
(c) Disseminating knowledge of British achievements 
in science and technology. 
(d) Promoting British democratic values. 
(e) Explaining British policies in all fields.15  
The FAC report has listed six institutions which should 
share the responsibility for securing cultural diplomacy 
objectives. These are, the British Council, the Central 
Office for Information, the BBC, the FCO information 
department, private organisations and overseas students. 
The importance of this cultural diplomacy drive is manifold. 
It has critical direct implications for British aid to many 
overseas social and economic sectors, especially aid to 
education and training. 
Access to the British educational and training system gives 
overseas students opportunities to learn and appreciate many 
aspects of British endeavours in many spheres of life. The 
programmes are meant to expose the students to specific 
social, cultural, political, and economic values of British 
life. Assistance given to educational programmes abroad 
also containpelements of this objective. Aid to education 
and training therefore is critical to the achievement of the 
cultural objectives. That the presence of overseas students 
in Britain is seen in terms of their importance to the 
furtherance of cultural diplomacy objectives is shown in 
this statement: 
Government policy is to provide carefully targeted 
support to bring to the United Kingdom students who 
will benefit, both personally and as far as their 
countries are concerned, from British education, 
thus creating goodwill and strengthening links with 
Britain. Since 1983 the FCO has run its own 
worldwide scholarship and awards scheme, bringing 
selected people in all walks of life to study in the 
United Kingdom mostly for postgraduate work. There 
are special fee sport schemes for Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Cyprus. 
Given this policy background the reasons given by the 
British government for introducing a scholarship scheme for 
blacks from South Africa cannot be accepted without much 
questioning and debate.17 	 The scheme initially provided 
about 80 awards annually in the (UK) at mainly undergraduate 
level. A second scheme provides 50 scholarships tenable 
within South Africa. It is intriguing that in both schemes 
the South African government is actually cooperating fully 
with the British government. The South African government 
has issued passports to candidates and also gives the 
British Council a free hand to choose candidates from 
different professions including the Trade Union movements. 
The scheme cannot be understood only in terms of Britain 
making attempts to redress the consequences of apartheid on 
education for non-whites, the schemes must be examined and 
understood in the contexts of the current cultural diplomacy 
drive, the political and economic situation in the Southern 
African region, and Britain's political stand on South 
Africa. 
Britain's moderate approach to the international community's 
call for tougher economic sanctions against South Africa has 
led some members of the world community, especially the 
Frontline States and the black people of South Africa to 
accuse Britain of supporting apartheid. Over the years this 
and the radical politicisation of the youths have 
undoubtedly created strong antagonistic feelings against 
Britain in South Africa. Britain knows very well that 
allowing anti-British attitudes to run deeper and unchecked 
would not be in her interests nor in the interests of other 
western countries. In the event of major political changes 
taking place tomorrow or in the distant future Britain would 
not like to face the new era from an alienated and 
disadvantageous position. In this instance also Britain has 
found herself facing a delicate political situation in which 
it has strong interests at stake. Evidently this is a 
situation Britain is very much accustomed to and has dealt 
with many times over before. 
Britain's colonial as well as the post-colonial history is 
full of episodes in which the Crown has often faced delicate 
situations in which Britain is forced to balance immediate 
interests against long term national objectives and goals. 
This has often compelled Britain to take stands on 
international conflicts with alot of caution, especially in 
cases where the result of a settlement could go either way. 
Hence Britain's policy of discreetly accommodating and 
supporting officially and privately both parties in the 
conflict. Thus the Eritreans and Ethiopians are found in 
British educational institutions with support being provided 
by the public and. private funds. The Sudanese have had 
similar support extended to them. The policy seems to be 
never to close the door completely (et the Biafran 
approach). 
In the current situation British and other western 
countries' interests have become vulnerable. Consequently 
there is keen western interest in the groups that are 
seeking power to control a country in which their economic 
and other interests are substantial. 
The example cited should therefore be perceived in this 
light. They have a strong immediate and long-term political 
agenda. The current task seems to be to use educational 
programmes to draw away the young men and women from active 
South African radical political activities, or sustained 
exposure to related political activities in which British 
and other western interests are entangled. Though the 
numbers of scholarship holders is presently small the 
significance of the programme lies in the cumulative 
composition of those who get the awards and their future 
potential to deliver desired political goods on which the 
security of Britain and other western interests depends. 
The long term objective is simply to create a large pool of 
British educated and trained non-whites who, it is hoped 
would be favourably disposed to western liberal democratic 
values.18 The schemes demonstrate the employment of aid 
to intervene in ,and influence the course of political 
events. 
However, the recent concern with cultural diplomacy in 
Britain is not new but only a serious re-assertive move and 
reflections on how the British cultural diplomacy machinery 
has been working in the face of competition from other rival 
countries such as France, West Germany, and Japan. Thus the 
additional objective of the recent movement is to 
re-evxe.-cs- the cultural diplomacy machinery. 
As far as developing countries are concerned Britain's 
explicit cultural diplomacy objectives poses several 
searching questions. Are the British objectives compatible 
with those of the recipients in their development efforts? 
What implications do these objectives have for the choice of 
aid recipients, and the balancing of British priorities 
against those of the recipients in education and training 
programmes. The tendency will be for Britain to select 
carefully those priorities which can enhance the achievement 
of cultural diplomacy objectives. This puts at risk 
recipients requests which fall outside the cultural 
diplomacy targets. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this point to extend the 
discussion on cultural diplomacy to the aspects of 
dependence and dependency and their position in British and 
relationships with the recipient world. 
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6.6 Dependence and Dependency 
Radical theorists see aid as merely another vehicle for 
continuing the underdevelopment of the Third World countries 
by the industrialised capitalist countries in the North.19  
Hayter once described aid as the smooth face of imperialism 
and an enabling mechanism for sustained capitalist 
penetration.20 
	
It has been further contended that aid 
acts as an instrument that has a strong influence on the 
direction of political and economic events. It is believed 
that aid will cause events to go in the direction most 
suited to the interests of the donor countries. The 
critique is rounded off with a further argument that aid 
creates a subservient bourgeoisie class in developing 
countries, these become political alies of the donors 
because of their dependence on foreign aid. 
Dependence, also defined as external reliance is said to 
point to particular inequalities in the exchanges between 
individual countries.21 
	
In this relationship the less 
dependent has more bargaining power, and important factor in 
controlling the outcomes of specific events. Whereas 
dependency refers to a system of interstate exchanges which 
creates structural inequalities in the relations between the 
groups of countries,. The structural concept of dependency 
focuses on the manner in which developing countries are 
incorporated into a global aid system dominated by the 
western industrial states. Dependency is said to be a 
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higher order of structural power which involves the ability 
to manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance 
opportunities, and payoffs that actors may utilise. The 
asymmetry in the North-South relations are said to be caused 
by the overwhelming structural power which the 
industrialised western donor countries possess. 
McKinlay and Little (1979) analysed British aid allocation 
using a foreign policy model. The model is based on the 
premise that aid constitutes a foreign policy instrument 
which a donor can use to promote and protect its 
interests.22 
	
The proposition which the model pursues are 
that, through aid donor countries can establish commitment 
and dependency which help a donor to obtain some foreign 
policy advantages. Thus commitment in this model is defined 
as: 
A process whereby a state attempts to register its 
support for another state. Commitments provide two 
main benefits which account for the willingness of 
high-income countries to demonstrate a commitment to 
low-income countries. Commitments can be used both 
to deter intervention by a hostile state, and to 
discourage a developing country from moving out of a 
developed state's sphere of influence. The 
dependent party therefore holds a subordinate 
position, the dominant party possessing a potential 
for leverage or control. This potential for control 
constitutes the main advantage of creating a 
dependency relationship." 
The authors point out that this commitment and dependency 
are tied to western donors' interests in five areas: 
(1) the maintenance of spheres of influence, 
(2) discouraging associations with communist powers, 
(3) power politics, 
(4) economic and development performance and, 
(5) political stability and democracy.24 
This model focuses on the donor-recipient relationship 
viewed from the donors' perspective. While this model 
offers important lines of explanations in the aid 
relationship, there are aspects in it which require further 
scrutiny and a much more balanced projection. For example 
donors' aid relationship has not been confined to low-income 
countries as the model suggests. It is common knowledge 
that the search for commitment and dependency objectives 
have the rationality being projected in this model. Wealthy 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti, Libya, Iran, Iraq, 
and Bahrain received official western aid from the West 
every year form 1977 to 1979.25 	 Among the aid partner of 
Britain in recent years (1980-1989) were economically 
diverse countries such as, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Malawi, Ethiopia-and Ghana.26  
The dependency explanation in the case of aid relationships 
has tended to conceal the dependency and vulnerability of 
donors. Aid relationships have been projected in a way 
which emphasises the recipients' subordinate position in 
the relationship. No attention is given to the dependence 
of donors on aid to seek, secure and 	 protect 	 their 
intangible objectives abroad. It is also a fact that many 
western countries, economies and security are dependent on 
the supply of raw materials and facilities which can aid the 
protection of their global interests. West German's 
comparatively larger aid for Egypt in Africa is explained in 
terms of its overriding geo-strategic importance in the 
Middle East.27 
It is true that there is a close structural relationship 
between aid, dependence, and 	 dependency. Excessive 	 and 
prolonged reliance on aid can give rise to a dependent 
state. When the manifestations of the dependent state 
become entrenched, that state seeks to create a regular 
pattern in the relationships. No subject stands to offer a 
more illuminating discussion on the issues of dependence, 
and dependency than externally funded education and training 
programmes in developing countries. 
The current depressed economic and financial situation 
facing Zambia should provide a context in which dependence 
can be discussed. It is true that the absence of adequate 
national savings and the shortage of foreign exchange has 
forced Zambia to rely more on external financial and 
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technical assistance resources to cope with its internal 
deficits in its operations (see table 31). However, it is 
not aid in which the donors do not have some short or long 
term interests. In education as indeed is the case with 
other sectors, the degree of reliance on external aid tends 
to vary, but the higher education sector usually gets more 
foreign aid inputs than others. As Zambian's reliance on 
foreign aid is expected to increase rather than diminish the 
idea that Zambia is very dependent on foreign aid will 
increasingly become difficult to dispute. The account of 
Zambia's dependence is a simplified version of a more 
complicated relationship between Zambia and the donors and 
their aid objectives. The dependence discussed here rests 
on measuring quantifiable donor inputs, which apparently 
makes it easier to draw judgements on dependence based on 
possession and non-possession of resources. This gives an 
incomplete picture. 
Donor countries have created an institution on which they 
too have become dependent. Whether it is a short term and 
less pervasive dependence or not, the point is that donors 
suffer from its pressures also. These pressures have shown 
themselves often in the British aid business. The 
government has on many occasions pointed out the political 
and commercial benefits it expects to derive from investing 
in aid to education and training. Furthermore, there have 
been internal pressures within the British government, and 
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some pressure groups such as the Overseas Student Trust 
(OST) to persuade the government to invest more in aid. 
This is intended to ensure that Britain does not lag far 
behind its competitors, France and West Germany. 28 	 In 
these concerns there are strong indications that Britain, 
and other major donors are dependent on external aid to 
achieve their political and commercial objectives abroad. 
Therefore, the idea that Zambia gets aid only because ‘6S 
dependent on such support is not entirely correct. 
How does dependency relate to aid to education and training? 
The unequal structural relationship which exists between 
Zambia and the donor countries cannot be explained in terms 
of aid to education and training alone. This relationship 
is a function of a whole set of different structural 
exchanges, political, economic, cultural etc. Aid therefore, 
acts as a facilitator, it seeks to secure and maintain the 
relationships in patterns that will support the interests of 
donors, both in the short and long term 
	 perspective. 
Britain's cultural diplomacy objectives are about the 
achievement for Britain of favourable international 
relations in the world. It is doubtful whether in this 
initiative Britain seeks to create long term dependent 
partners. If the experiences in the Commonwealth countries 
relationship can serve to explain this point, it has been 
observed that, while Britain values the strong relations 
with the Commonwealth community, it is prepared to diversify 
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its overseas bilateral relations. Thus in recent years more 
students have come from Francophone countries to study in 
Britain. Ten years ago it was the turn of students from 
some Latin American countries. Cost-benefit considerations 
appear to be uppermost in contracting aid relations rather 
than the mere need by a donor to have a country as its 
dependency. 
6.7 British Overseas Student Policy 
After the introduction of the full cost fees had 
removed the indiscriminate subsidy for all overseas 
students, we introduced measures to bring students 
to Britain on a selective basis, notably the FCO 
scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS) aimed at 
increasing British influence by training in Britain 
future leaders and decision makers from overseas. 
We devote substantial resources to this scheme and 
other FCO support for Overseas Students. These 
programmes, together 
	 with 
	 other 	 government 
scholarship schemes, currently support some 20,000 
overseas stuents at a cost of about £100 
million.29 
The declarations in these statements are explicit about the 
current British policy on overseas students. The duality of 
purpose which Britain is pursuing through its aid to 
education and training, and the extent of involvement by the 
FCO 	 in 	 development 	 aid, are 	 all evident here, thus 
underlining the relationship between the British foreign 
policy and aid policy objectives. In this context the 
overseas students are viewed as assets for British foreign 
policy, for cultural diplomacy, and for commercial 
objectives. This is also reflected in the wide interest 
which the overseas student policy question has attracted 
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from interest groups such as the Confederation of British 
(CBI), and the Overseas Student Trust (OST). Among the NGOs 
concerned with overseas student policy affairs in Britain 
the OST occupies a special position. 
The role of the OST in lobbying for a better and more 
coherent overseas student policy exemplifies yet another 
case of a government-NGO relationship. For many years the 
OST has promoted active debate on the British Overseas 
Student policy issues. Its forum and regular studies on the 
subject enables the government to incorporate some of the 
viewspoints in the policy and decision-making process. For 
example, the OST was responsible for organising the debate 
by experts on the overseas student policy question in the 
early 1980s. Following this lobby the government adopted 
some of their recommendations in the subsequent scholarship 
and award schemes for overseas students introduced in the 
mid 1980s." 
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6.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has drawn attention to the institutional 
relationship between a donor government's foreign policy 
organs and their aid agencies. The discussion has focused 
mainly on the institutional framework and the functional 
relationship between foreign and aid policies. Throughout 
the discussion illustrations of the points have been drawn 
mainly from the experiences of Britain. The relationship 
between 	 the 	 official 	 aid 	 agency, ODA 	 and 	 the 
non-governmental organisations has been examined in the 
context of policy and functional links. Similarly, cultural 
diplomacy and the overseas student policy have been examined 
to identify the position of NGOs and the government at 
policy level. The issues of dependence and dependency have 
been discussed as extensions of the cultural diplomacy 
debate. The objective of the discussion in this chapter was 
not to seek generalisable findings, but to draw attention to 
the specific nature of foreign and aid policy links. 
It has been shown that the nature of today's international 
affairs has made its conduct complex and highly demanding. 
This has necessarily called for elaborate and extensive 
institutional arrangements to manage a donor country's 
international affairs. Aid agencies have formed essential 
support units in- the conduct and management of bilateral 
affairs. 
In the case of the ODA a. ks.boft internal department in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office. This is hardly 
surprising, and many donor agencies have similar 
institutional structures. 
The relationship between the FCO and the NGOs concerned with 
development aid has been found to be quite discreet. 
Although the FCO does not exercise direct control over them, 
the ODA makes regular contributions to the NGOs' budgets. 
Most governing councils of NGOs have on their membership 
retired and active senior government officers and other 
public figures. These perform the following functions: 
they maintain a lobby in the government and private circles 
on behalf of the NGOs, they give counsel to NGOs, through 
them they NGOS are able to generate public goodwill in 
Britain, the 	 help 	 to 	 strengthen 	 pluralism 	 and 
collaborative work between ODA and the NGOs. More 
importantly the representation provides a discreet screening 
mechanism on the policies and activities of the NGOs, it is 
a quality control mechanism and protection devic-C for both 
donors and recipients. In this way the NGOs have earned 
themselves a place in the management of some aspects of 
Britain's international affairs abroad. 
The discussion on the historical and current perspectives 
has served to explain further the relationship between 
foreign policy objectives and aid initiatives. The ELBS in 
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particular has shown how Britain was able to attempt to 
achieve many objectives in one scheme. The relationship 
between the government and private industry was very 
evident. Thus the ELBS was a two pronged instrument, a 
foreign policy tool and a commercial venture. 
Another context in which the links can be examined is within 
the cultural diplomacy movement. It is a movement whose 
objectives demand that the FCO, ODA and NGOs should work 
towards enhancing Britain's cultural diplomacy objectives. 
The objectives are a blend of a political, commercial 
economic, and 	 cultural 	 nature. Through 	 increased aid 
investment in education and other areas the FC0 and ODA 
expect to achieve better cultural diplomacy benefits. The 
movement is yet another example of the existence of the 
close links between foreign and aid policy objectives. 
Britain's international social relations objectives as 
contained in the Kershaw Report (1988) place a very heavy 
responsibility on social vehicles of cultural diplomacy. In 
this task none is more suited and in a better position to 
help Britain secure many enduring results than the medium of 
education and training. This has direct implications for 
Britain's aid programmes to education and training for 
overseas countries'.. Effects of this movement on specific 
countries would depend on how each country is economically 
and politically assessed in relation to Britain's immediate 
interests/priorities and long term goals. 
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Dependence and dependency have been discussed in the section 
on cultural diplomacy because the functioning of this 
movement is expected to rely heavily on aid investments. 
Correspondingly, aid giving has been criticised for its 
tendency to induce both dependence and dependency among the 
recipient countries. It has been argued that dependence, 
contrary to most of the ideas held in the current debate, 
cuts both ways. That is, donors give aid because they too 
are dependent on the benefits which it yields. However, in 
the current debate the tendency has been to project 
dependence as a phenomenon occurvin only in recipient 
countries. 
While accepting that aid plays a facilitative role in 
seeking to maintain structural relationships that are more 
favourable to Britain, doubts have been raised regarding 
Britain's intentions to enter into enduring dependency 
relationships with recipient countries. The experience of 
Britain in Africa has shown that Britain would like to 
diversify 	 its 	 bilateral 	 relations, especially in the 
Francophone countries. The approach appears to be one of 
weighing carefully the costs and benefits. This has been 
demonstrated in the choice of recipient countries by 
Britain. 
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The overseas student policy has been discussed to exemplify 
yet another special link between government organs and 
interest groups. The OST has-been highlighted to show how 
an interest group is able to provide a platform at which 
policy issues are debated, and policy ideas generated. 
These form important inputs into the policy-making process 
of the ODA. 
The links between foreign and aid policies are evident. 
They exist in different institutional forms and operate at 
different levels through a variety of mechanisms. For the 
recipients the policy links and the pluralism in aid 
delivery presents a complicated package. The findings 
raises questions about aid coordination in the field. 
Secondly, if 	 the NGOs have such close policy and 
administrative links with the Official donor agencies does 
it make sense for them to operate independently? Doesn't 
this approach create an unnecessary difficult situation for 
recipients' attempt to coordinate aid? Wouldn't it be more 
administratively practical if the donors' aid came packaged 
together? 
The next chapter examines British aid policies and 
priorities to education and training globally. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BRITISH AID POLICIES AND PRIORITIES TO EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING, 1965-1989 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines trends and changes in the policies and 
priorities of British aid to education and training over the 
last twenty-four years. Special attention is given to the new 
sensitivity of British aid to the changing needs of the 
recipients' education and training development process. An 
attempt will also be made to determine the extent to which 
British aid has been responding to its own internal signals 
within the diverse British aid constituency. The chapter 
therefore starts with a close examination of Britain's 
policies and priorities to education and training in its 
global context. 
Aid policies and priorities function as mirrors through which 
inner aspects and dimensions of donors' motivations, 
philosophies, and practices can be closely studied. There is 
strong agreement among donors that their aid policies to 
education and training are influenced by a battery of 
factors, including donor countries' own politics and 
ideologies, the advice of their education specialists and 
consultants, the experience gained from the field and 
recipients' policies and advice.' British aid like other 
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donors' aid, has been motivated and influenced by several 
factors.2 Although the emergence of the policies which 
appeared between 1970 and 1980 coincided with a period of 
economic decline in most of the recipient countries, it cannot 
be argued that the policies were primarily intended to respond 
to the changes that had prevailed in the recipients' 
development circumstances. Besides international economic 
factors, it was the internal factors in Britain which acted as 
a driving force in policy change and renewal. 
The following factors have in particular influenced British 
development aid policies: internal reflections on national aid 
performance, domestic 	 pressures 	 on 	 aid arising from a 
diversified donor constituency, public interest in development 
aid, and also the need to rationalise aid-giving in order to 
achieve more selectivity and cost-effectiveness. The 
pressures which these factors have exerted have tended to 
vary from time to time. However, they have affected many 
aspects of aid policies, in particular budgetary allocations, 
choice of sector and subsector concentration, and the form of 
assistance which Britain is able to extend to recipients. 
Thus there are different levels at which British aid can be 
studied. 
7.2 Aid Policies and Priorities 
7.2.1 Manpower Aid to Education and Training  
The 1965 White Paper on development assistance identified the 
shortage of professional and technical manpower as the most 
serious handicap which faced newly independent states.3 
The paper took note of the enormous expansion programmes in 
education and training systems which many developing 
countries had embarked on. These circumstances compelled 
Britain to give the greatest attention to the need to develop 
manpower in developing countries. The paper pledged: 
In our aid programme we shall give the highest 
priority to technical assistance, which is not only 
in itself a vital contribution to all forms of 
development, but is often a pre-codition of a 
successful programme of financial aid..*  
The practical application of this statement saw a massive 
mobilisation of manpower aid for the education and training 
sector in the form of teachers, lecturers and other related 
staff. Thus in the 1960s British aid concentrated on the 
following: 
1. The supply of large numbers of teachers to 
secondary schools and lecturers to tertiary 
institutions. 
2. Assistance to the development of universities. 
3. Large scale training programmes in the U.K. for 
students from the recipient countries. 
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Of 	 all 	 British technical assistance programmes, aid to 
education and training has perhaps gained more prominence 
worldwide than any other form of assistance. This aspect 
forms one of the pillars of British aid and one in which the 
British government places high intrinsic value5. The first 
category of technical assistance was organised under two 
schemes, the Overseas Supplementation Aid Scheme (OSAS) for 
secondary school teachers and the British Expatriate 
Supplementation Scheme (BESS) for lecturers in colleges and 
universities. The Ministry for Overseas Development (ODM) 
supplemented the salaries and allowances of staff in these 
schemes. ODM had however mounted this assistance with a clear 
understanding that the schemes were to be progressively 
reduced as recipient countries increased the stocks of trained 
local manpower. These schemes have provided invaluable 
assistance, but they have involved costs to the recipients, 
notably in the form of local salaries and subsidised housing. 
The importance which the British Government attached to 
education and training development is reflected in the 
following indicators. Of the 11,712 HMG financed personnel 
recruited in 1965 to work overseas in dependent and 
independent territories, 22.8 per cent were destined for the 
education sector. This was the second largest group after the 
category which went into Public Administration (23.9%). Given 
that manpower aid to other sectors included also some training 
components in areas such 	 as 	 police 	 work, agriculture, 
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fisheries, public works, health etc., the total number of HMG 
personnel committed to education and training development was 
much higher than the 22.8 per cent shown here. As argued 
elsewhere in this study, this level of involvement reflected 
the inadequate social development structure the British had 
left behind in their former colonies. Teachers represented 
86.4 per cent of personnel recruitment under the OSAS 
programme, a further indication of high involvement in the 
sector. British volunteer personnel showed a similar pattern 
of distribution. Of the 1,335 volunteers working abroad in 
1965, 69.3 per cent were classified as teachers.6  
Although the number of personnel recruited for the education 
sector kept fluctuating in the period between 1965 and 1969, 
by 1970 the number of HMG personnel recruited for the sector 
had risen to 33.1 per cent of the 13,991 people recruited for 
all sectors, and by December 1970 the total number for 
education was 35.8 per cent, the largest single group out of 
13,751 personnel in all sectors. This was the apex of the 
OSAS and BESS programmes and was fairly consistent with the 
growth and expansion programme that had been taking place in 
many 	 recipient countries, especially in Africa. However, 
soon after 1970 0DM 	 took a decision to scale down the 
recruitment of British teachers for overseas service. It has 
been said that 0DM took this decision in order to allow 
recipient countries to accelerate their teacher training 
programmes.7 However, there was more to the decision than 
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British interest in enhancing the localisation programmes. 
The operation of the OSAS and BESS programmes had not been 
without problems. They had become progressively more 
expensive for Britain, and some recipient countries had run 
into difficulties regarding their own contribution to the 
programme. However, the scaling down of OSAS and BESS has 
left large gaps in educational support which cannot easily be 
filled particularly in scarcity subject areas. 
Around 1975, closely following the first 'oil shock' and the 
rise in oil import prices, manpower assistance showed a marked 
change in favour of the renewable natural resources sector. 
In Africa, 38.8 per cent of the total of 361 HMG wholly 
financed personnel were in this sector, education accounted 
for 23.5 per cent. Other categories of personnel, the partly 
financed and the volunteers, in other geographical regions 
showed similar trends. 
The position of education against other sectors has not 
improved in recent years. As late as 1984, the renewable 
resources sector received 15.4 per cent, the highest share of 
Britain's £373.9 million bilateral project aid expenditure, 
while education received 0.6 per cent. This trend continued 
through 1986 with renewable resources and industrially related 
sectors receiving more resources. By 1987 the education sector 
had only managed to improve its previous position to 2.3 per 
cent of the £219.8 million project aid budget.8  
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7.2.2 Overseas Student Catchment Area  
Britain's catchment area for its overseas students/trainees 
has remained largely unchanged. Students/trainees from the 
Commonwealth constituency of Africa and Asia still dominate 
the student numbers in Britain. This reflects Britain's 
special relationship with the Commonwealth countries. 
However, each individual recipient country has experienced 
variations in its share of UK education and training places. 
As technical assistance in the form of education and training 
opportunities takes up a very large share of British aid 
money to the education and training sector, the number of 
trainees/students from each recipient country should be of 
particular interest in measuring, though crudely, Britain's 
relationship with recipients. 
For all the Commonwealth African countries, except Tanzania, 
the number of students/trainees going to Britain showed a 
consistent upward increase between 1965-1984. 
Table 14 shows the distribution and number of HMG financed 
African studies in the U.K. 
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The 61.9 per cent drop in Tanzanian students/trainees in 
Britain between 1965 and 1970 no doubt resulted from the bad 
Anglo-Tanzanian relationship over Tanzania's decision to 
discontinue paying pension benefits to former British civil 
servants who had served in Tanzania. Britain had suspended 
aid to Tanzania over this matter.9 
	
However, the period 
between 1984 and 1987 has seen dramatic falls in student 
numbers from all African Commonwealth countries. The decrease 
across the board comes in the wake of a heavy emphasis on 
close selectivity in the recruitment of overseas students, and 
the projectisation approach. 
The increases in recruitment and diversification of the 
composition of the overseas student body had been preceded by 
soul searching national studies on Britain's overseas student 
policy.10 
 The studies had raised a number of issues 
relating to Britain's recruitment, financing and management 
of overseas students. 
British policy in the field of overseas students 
has, until now, been largely unfocussed .... The 
result was a large increase in numbers and a large 
increase in the cost to the British taxpayer with 
little relationship between the pattern of those 
large student...numbers and Britain's own long-term 
priorities.' 
In his study of 	 overseas student policy Williams (1982) 
drew attention to the categories of countries which Britain 
could consider to favour in technical assistance on broad 
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political grounds. Among these were the Lome Convention 
group of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
The figures in Table 14 reflect the fulfilment of ODA's 
objective to extend British assistance beyond the 
Commonwealth constituency. The increase in the number of 
non-Commonwealth students clearly represents a new policy on 
Britain's technical assistance constituency, particularly as 
it relates to education and training, and the long term 
objectives of British aid. The policy clearly has its roots 
in the recent overseas student policy politics, which drew the 
attention of the government to the need for Britain to 
diversify the political and economic constituency of its 
interests, and also to avoid relying heavily on the 
Commonwealth basket for the safety and security of its 
interests in the long term perspective. 
The official worry that the 'profile' of Britain is under 
threat in some countries appears to have a relationship to 
the sudden increase in the number of students in those 
countries. It has already been considered as a way to redress 
the problem. For example, The British Council in 1986 raised 
the issue of Britain's position in Egypt in relation to its 
profile and the vulnerability of British interests posed by 
the declining size of the Egyptian Anglophile generation. 
Also the lead in cultural relations which was seen to be taken 
by France, Germany and Italy in Egypt had been particularly 
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worrying. To reverse this situation the Council urged the 
Government to provide more scholarships and prestigious arts 
events to raise Britain's profile.12 The new policy seems 
also to be an appropriate response to the concerns of some 
British industrialists on matters concerning entry into new 
markets. 
British contractors are seeking to challenge the 
French dominance in the Francophone countries in 
Africa as well as meeting the challenge of all 
international competition in other markets. To 
move into new markets is a risky and difficult 
process, which requires the laying of considerle 
amount of ground work in establishing connections. 
It is also evident from the figures in Table14 that Britain 
has obtained modest shares of student markets in countries 
that had been undisputed market preserves for France and 
Belgium for a long time. 
7.2.3 Education and Training Award Schemes  
Behind the statistics of British financed overseas students 
in Britain are now a range of education and training award 
schemes. Until the 1980s Britain had been providing awards 
mainly 	 under 	 three 	 bilateral 	 schemes, ODM/ODA, British 
Council, and Industry Scholarship Schemes. In addition 
British technical assistance had been reaching recipients via 
multilateral channels, such as through the programmes of the 
World Bank, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, UNESCO, CFTC, Colombo 
Plan and others. This has not only supplemented bilateral 
assistance in Britain's programme countries, but also ensured 
that those countries which cannot benefit from Britain's 
bilateral aid provisions can do so indirectly through the 
assistance extended to them by multilateral agencies. 
The awards given to developing countries were British 
responses mainly to external signals from recipient 
countries' demand for education and training awards. For 
many years the award schemes operated on a rolling scheme. 
Each year, all factors being favourable, developing countries 
could expect to receive their 'share' of education and 
training awards from the British government. The British 
wanted to help redress the skilled manpower deficits quickly 
in most of the former colonies. Because of the favourable 
economic conditions then, and also because of the residual 
British influence in many of these countries, Britain had 
taken a less critical approach in its technical assistance 
programmes. The design and programming of this aspect of 
technical assistance was, as Williams (1964) had described: 'a 
succession of ad hoc responses to events'.14 
	
When the 
Conservative Party came to power in 1979 the government 
downgraded the Ministry for Overseas Development to an agency 
of the FCO, and subjected aid to a thorough 
	 scrutiny. 
Subsidisation of -overseas students, education and training in 
particular came under severe attack. Consequently, a new 
policy to charge overseas students full economic fees came 
into effect in 1980.15 	 Surprisingly, Britain's decision to 
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introduce prohibitive fees came at a time when the crises in 
human resource development in many poor countries had been 
fully recognised by other major bilateral aid donors and 
multilateral agencies.'6  
The main reason given for the introduction of full cost fees 
was that the British Government wanted to remove the 
indiscriminate subsidy of fees for overseas students, and to 
introduce measures which could allow Britain to bring 
overseas students on a selective basis.17 This fees policy 
should also be viewed as part of a larger portfolio of 
changes which the Conservative Party have introduced in their 
aid programmes since they came to power in 1979. The changes 
have been characterised by both a reductionist and 
compensatory approach in the field of assistance to education 
and training. The overseas student policy was preceded by a 
£50m cut from the 1979/80 aid budget.18 The fees policy was 
intended to save the Treasury millions of pounds from the cuts 
in subsidies. Income to universities and colleges from 
privately sponsored students was likewise expected to increase 
as a result of the new policy. However, it was soon found 
that the difficulties which the fees policy would generate 
among recipient countries would in the short or long term have 
serious implications for British interests at home and abroad. 
Compensatory fees schemes were consequently worked out to help 
redress the difficulties which might arise from the fees 
policy. 
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The full-cost fee policy caused widespread protests from 
developing countries with close bilateral relations with 
Britain. Malaysia went as far as to boycott British trade as 
a protest. Local (U.K.) lobby groups on behalf of overseas 
students drew the attention of the government to the economic 
and political consequences the policy had imposed on Britain. 
Recognising the strong opinion of protest in many client 
countries and the need to get a more enlighted perspective on 
the matter, the Overseas Students Trust (OST) commissioned two 
important studies to examine wider issues relating to the new 
government stand on overseas students. 
The Government's introduction of full-cost fees for 
overseas students from September 1980 has yielded 
substantial public expenditure savings of perhaps £150m 
per annum. But it has also damaged Bvitish interests 
in the diplomatic and commercial fields.." 
The findings of the 1982 study (Williams) drew the government's 
attention to the whole range of political and economic 
issues concerning overseas students in Britain, and the short 
and long term implications for British interests. The study 
made proposals which focussed on the need for the government 
to mount a diversified award schemes. The study identified 
the following possible schemes: 
1. Separate specialised functional schemes of awards 
directed to research, business and 
	 trade-related 
objectives, diplomatic and cultural objectives, and 
overseas development. Several 
	 departments to be 
responsibile for policy in this field. 
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2. Research interests should continue to be catered for 
by the Overseas Research Students Award Scheme 
(ORSAS) on the DES vote. The scheme should operate 
more flexibly in terms, of the value of awards 
offered, meeting full tuition fees for some 
candidates, and eligibility should be extended to 
research students in polytechnics. 
3. Trade and Commercial interests should be promoted by 
a new scheme of Scholarships in areas of advanced 
engineering and technology on the Department of 
Trade and Industry vote, and the possibility of some 
collaboration by industry and commerce should 
be explored. 
4. Diplomatic and cultural objectives should be pursued 
through an expanded programme of British Council 
awards, funded on the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office information vote and not as part of 
overseas aid. 
5. Overseas development needs should continue to be 
catered for by the Technical Cooperation Training 
Programme (TCTP) under the ODA. The programme 
should be expanded to provide additional help for 
the poorest countries and for those most dependent 
on British higher education facilities, and for 
programmes of post-secondary education development 
in the Commonwealth. 
6 	 To make provision for individuals who would not be 
picked up under the government-to-government 
schemes, there should be a programme of general 
scholarship support through education institutions, 
operating 	 their own guidelines as regards type of 
recipient and size of award. Universities and 
colleges would disburse these funds and 10 per cent 
of awards funds should be allocated to this programme. 
7. Under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship 
Plan: Britain should support strengthening and 
expansion of the Plan and be ready to match any 
additional support from other Commonwealth countries. 
There should be special help through the Technical 
Cooperation Programme for the dqxelopment of 
Commonwealth, post-secondary education." 
The study urged also that some of the awards should be put on 
a part funding basis so as to cover a large number of 
recipients. 
The significance of the proposals of this study was in the 
design of the award schemes which emerged later. The 
proposals went far beyond suggesting relief measures to 
counteract the burden caused by the new fees policy. 
Critical features in the proposals were, the variety and 
sophistication of some of the proposed awards. The variety 
meant that in practice all able overseas students, in their 
own country or whilst they were in the UK, could have 
assistance extended to them on a government- to-government or 
on a one-to-government arrangement (FCC) awards). The 
rationale was to enlarge the overseas student recruitment 
catchment areas by freeing some awards from bilateral 
formalities. The structure of the entire award schemes was 
therefore intended to allow the government to pursue some of 
its aid objectives and priorities in ways that were not 
constrained by external actors. 
Indeed, although this particular study was commissioned by 
and done for a non-governmental organisation, it is very 
interesting to note That soon after its publication the 
government introduced a range of award schemes that were 
identical to the proposals of the 1982 study. The award 
schemes were: 
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(a) The ODA Shared Scholarship Scheme (ODASSSI: 
This scheme was introduced on 3 June 1985. The 
Scholarships are jointly funded by the ODA and some 
Universities and polytechnics. A total of 500 
awards are to be given between 1986-1991. The 
target group are students of high academic potential 
from developing Commonwealth countries who must show 
that they cannot support their studies or be covered 
by the government bilateral schemes. The awards are 
for both post graduate and undergraduate studies. 
Channels of application are Universities in the UK 
or British High Commission offices abroad. 
(b) FCO Scholarships and Awards Scheme (FCOSAS). 
This was introduced in February 1983. The target 
group 	 are 	 present 	 and 	 future 	 leaders, 
decision-makers and formers of opinion, including 
particularly able students from countries with 
whom the UK's economic relations are expected to 
develop. The scheme provides about 600 awards 
annually for a wide variety of countries. Awards 
are for unrestricted study at undergraduate, 
postgraduate and research levels. Candidates are 
selected by British Embassies in consultation with 
British Council officers, or the FCO in London. 
(c) Country/Territory Support Scheme. 
In addition to the FCO scholarships the Government 
in 1983 also introduced country support schemes. 
These are intended to reflect the special 
relationship in the education field Britain enjoys 
with 	 certain countries e.g. Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Cyprus and certain dependent territories. Hong Kong 
is a special economic dependent British territory. 
Malaysia has been an important trade partner of 
Britain for a long time, it is also one of the fast 
up-coming newly industrialised countries with 
considerable British investments. The scheme caters 
for full time studies. On completion of their 
studies graduates of this scheme must return to 
their home countries. The channels of application 
are the recipient's own education authorities and 
academic institutions. 
(d) British Council's Fellowship Programme  
The scheme started in April 1985 and replaced the 
long standing Scholarship Programme. The target 
group are people in key professions. The subsidiary 
schemes are the senior Fellowships and the exchange 
programme with Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet 
Union which operate under bilateral cultural 
agreements. The programme provides about 500 awards 
annually. There is no restriction on subjects of 
study. The scheme can cover different ranges of 
programmes from short two months attachments to 
three year postgraduate research programmes. The 
British Council is responsiblgi for publicising the 
awards and selecting candidates." 
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From the above schemes it will be observed that the 
objectives behind them cut across the following important 
areas: the political, economic/developmental and educational 
categories. The schemes have helped to crystallise the 
conception and projectisation of British overseas students 
support. This fragmentation of the overseas students into 
units related to British interests has been criticised for 
its shortcomings and apparent contradictions.22 At another 
level the schemes show Britain's efforts to address its 
international political and economic relations from all 
fronts. Investment into 
	
poor bright students from the Third 
World is particularly instructive. In it Britain recognises 
the political culture of most developing countries where 
leadership is not usually the monopoly of one class, clan, 
tribe or family. Britain is therefore engaged in the 
politics of anticipation and alternatives. The FCOSAS in 
particular appears to be intended to influence domestic 
politics in the recipient countries. In the absence of 
official opposition party frameworks and the intolerance of 
dissent in many recipient countries, this appears to be one 
way of attempting to influence events abroad. 
These schemes together with the other old bilateral award 
schemes have brought Britain in line with the policies and 
practices of other donor countries, which for a long time have 
maintained dual arrangements in award schemes: official 
bilateral government-to-government and 
	 private one-to- 
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government arrangements. France has for a long time operated 
special scholarship awards for earmarked developing countries 
especially those that are important French markets.23 With 
the emergence of sharp competition for effective spheres of 
influence and maintenance of reliable supply sources for 
certain raw materials from the Third World, these schemes are 
going to increase worldwide as the scramble for the minds of 
Third World students intensifies among donors. 
To the recipients the range of British award schemes provides 
what seems to be a multi-access entry into the British 
education and training programmes. The new structure offers 
great hope to many qualified overseas students who are in 
countries where selection of candidates for scholarships is 
less objective than it should be and also where some social 
groups are simply denied access to this aspect of social 
development and mobility. On this count the intentions of the 
schemes appear to have considerable merit. 
Although the number of awards under the new schemes is 
small, the schemes raise a number of issues and questions. 
The mark of British political and commercial motivations 
rather than recipients' development considerations are all too 
evident in the profiles of these additional schemes. It is 
contrary to the principles of honest partnership in 
development cooperation that Britain should pursue schemes 
which are deliberately designed to operate outside the 
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recipients' own national development institutions and 
development programmes such as manpower development 
frameworks. That the schemes, especially the FCO scheme, aim 
at recruiting policy-makers and opinion formers will only help 
exacerbate the existing donor competition for strategic 
influence in recipients' key policy institutions. 
For Britain the schemes reflect the feeling of dangerously 
lagging behind in areas that are critical to British 
interests. Thus, the British Council recently drew attention 
to these shortcomings in British approaches in this area. 
Indonesia is heavily dependent on overseas 
training. In 1984, according to the Ministry of 
Education, 350 Indonesians were studying in 
Britain but 4,000 each in France and Germany and 
considerably more in the U.S.A. The Ministry of 
Technology, with funds 	 to 	 train 	 1,500 	 staff 
overseas, did not initially include Britain among 
the countries to supply such training. The British 
Council managed to reverse this decision but has 
made no progress in other sectors such as 
agriculture and telecommunications because of lack 
of staff and resources. M. Mitterand, on a recent 
visit to Indonesia, underlined the importance 
which France attached to attracting university 
students and offered more scholarships. 
The Council views the situation with concern as the 
British share of the expanding training market (and 
hence related trade) is largely dependent upon 
its efforts. Penettion of this market requires a 
long-term strategy. 
Indeed concern regarding the position of Britain in overseas 
countries in relation to that of other donors appears to have 
been expressed with respect to many countries. In Ethiopia 
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recent concern centred around the massive annual Soviet 
scholarships and other Eastern bloc technical assistance 
programmes to which Britain could not respond more 
competitively. Similarly, in Jordan the share of the 
training market for Britain has shrunk to about two percent, 
whereas the USSR and its satellite states took a larger share 
of the market.25 	 It is clear here and elsewhere that award 
schemes and the overseas students have been caught in a very 
intricate web of donors' politics and economics. 
Interestingly, in the 1981 comprehensive review of aspects of 
British technical assistance in many developing countries the 
team paid little attention to the recipients' development 
problems.26 	 Recipients, as key actors in the equation, are 
seen from one perspective only, that is, as supply markets 
rather than grounds on which donors work with recipient 
partners to attempt to solve recipients' development problems. 
Income derived from self-financing and overseas agency 
financed students has for a long time formed an important 
part of the financial structure of many tertiary educational 
and training institutions in Britain. 
More recently it was revealed that the Egyptian government has 
been sending 500 PhD students every year at a cost of £10,000 
each per annum.27 It is the contribution of these overseas 
students to the economies of British Universities and 
263 
Polytechnics that were seriously threatened by the full cost 
fee policy of 1980. The various award schemes are on the one 
hand intended to ensure that self-financing students or those 
financed by their own governments are not completely deterred 
from coming to Britain for studies. The subject of overseas 
students is connected in a rather complicated way to the 
British policy on where their funded training programmes 
should take place. Thus 'in-country' and 'third country' 
training occupies a position in British aid which is discussed 
in the subsequent paragraphs. 
7.2.4 In-Country Training  
An important element in many aspects of development aid is the 
need to help develop local institutional infrastructures to 
sustain the pace of social and economic growth. In the 
education and training sector this has meant providing 
capital aid to establish schools and higher institutions of 
training. In spite of recipient countries getting such 
institution-building assistance it has not been possible for 
them to meet all their training needs within the framework of 
their 	 own resources. Consequently, overseas training has 
always been sought or provided to close the gap. On the other 
hand, In-Country training goes a long way towards meeting the 
objectives of development aid, and fostering self-reliance by 
providing training in the recipients' countries. It is also 
considered important because of the relevance of the 
programmes to the environment in which they are taught and 
264 
applied. Policy decisions concerning assistance to 
In-Country training are shaped by internal and external 
factors.28 
The key factors which have influenced donors' policy 
decisions on where their funded training should take place, 
and the balance they should maintain between donor-country 
and In-Country training are the availability of adequate 
training facilities, the relevance of training programmes 
offered by recipients as alternatives to overseas training, 
and the language of instruction. The internationalisation of 
the English language for example has limited the contribution 
which non-English speaking donors can make in providing 
training opportunities in their own countries. However, 
In-Country training has been affected by donors' political and 
economic interests as will be shown later in the discussion. 
Recipients too have not always been well disposed towards 
In-Country training. 
7.2.5 Third Country Training  
As far as many donors with strict training placement policies 
are concerned, Third Country training is not very different 
from own country training in that both involve the donor 
supporting institutions and training programmes outside their 
countries. Like In-Country training, it has often received 
qualified support from donors. The significance of Third 
Country training lies in its potential to enable both donors 
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and recipients to tap resources that would not otherwise be 
available to recipients, at costs that are sometimes more 
economical than donor-country training. 
The position of donors on this subject tends to vary according 
to each donor country's economic, financial, ideological and 
political circumstances. Many donors have however adopted 
carefully open-ended policies which allows them to respond to 
all three possible training locations according to their set 
guidelines. 
France for example had for a long time supported Third 
Country training. France funded training programmes in 
African countries in areas such as French language teaching 
for Ghanaian teachers in Togo and the training of Mauritian 
doctors in Senegal. This supplemented the opportunities 
offered to overseas students in France. West Germany 
recognises a few institutions outside its borders where it 
can fund 	 training for overseas students. Nairobi 
University and Ibadan in Nigeria are among those that have 
been recognised, otherwise the general policy is that most of 
the scholarships should be used in West German 
institutions.29 On the other hand the USSR and other 
Eastern European donors 	 do not directly fund In-Country or 
Third Country training. All their technical assistance 
awards have in the past been taken up at their own countries' 
training institutions. The practical realities of their 
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economies have been such that they could not finance training 
programmes outside their countries using hard currency 
reserves. Besides the ideological imperative in training 
overseas students in their institutions, foreign students have 
in fact functioned as a source of foreign exchange for their 
economies. 
Very little has changed in the basic policies and attitudes 
of donors towards In-Country and Third Country training. 
Donor funded training is still heavily unbalanced. 
Britain has pursued policies which have always given 
qualified support to both In-Country and Third Country 
training. Since the 1960s the policies have passed through 
important phases of adjustment. These attempts to 
restructure the policies have been very instructive in 
revealing the contradictions in British approaches to 
overseas students and also the difficulties the government 
has had in dealing with the issues of In-Country and Third 
Country training in the broader context of its aid policy. 
In as far as Britain is concerned the issues of In-Country 
and Third Country training have all along been closely 
related to the government policy on overseas students and 
also the more recent debate on Britain's cultural diplomacy. 
Of all the factors that have influenced ODA's policy on 
In-Country and Third Country training, none has been more 
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significant than the framework set by the Treasury within 
which assistance to In-Country and Third Country training 
should be conducted. Prior to 1976, when the ODM's Technical 
Assistance Training Department (TATD) announced ODM's 
decision to adopt a new policy on Third Country training, 0DM 
had been operating under a very rigid set of Treasury criteria 
as notified to BC Representatives by the Director TATD in 
1976: 
British technical assistance funds are not available for 
financing the training of Study Fellows overseas, and 
developing countries are normally expected to make their 
own arrangements for financing training in Third 
Countries. But limited delegated authority exists for 
0DM to consider proposals for Third Country training at 
institutions overseas where HMG already has some 
financial interest or is providing expatriate staff 
provided the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) There must be evidence that the training proposals 
cannot be provided either in Britain or in the 
requesting country; or that it can be provided more 
effectively or cheaply in the country proposed. 
(b) Neither the country for which training is provided 
nor that where it takes place can reasonably be 
expected to bear the costs, or that part of them 
which 0DM wishes to finance. 
(c) No Third Country training can be financed in any of 
the DAC donor countries, ie. Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, USA. (Condition C. is as set out by 
the Treasury; the intention is of course that all 
developed countries should be excluded). 
There is an overall annual ceiling of £50,000 for all 
Third Country training except for the special schemes 
(e.g, University of the Soutiq Pacific, the Asia Institute 
of Technology, Bangkok etc).'0  
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The criteria set out above can only be described as very 
restrictive, prohibitive and protectionist. The application 
of these criteria meant that technical assistance awards 
could not be taken up in the recipients' countries. Because 
Britain has a well developed and large higher education and 
training system, it is able to 	 offer 	 extensive 	 study 
programmes at various levels in a very wide range of fields. 
This alone made it difficult for 0DM to justify the financing 
of Third Country training. As for recipient countries, the 
criteria unfairly challenged them in some measure to offer 
competitive alternatives to institutions and programmes in the 
U.K. The exclusion of DAC donor countries from receiving any 
British technical assistance for Third Country training was 
aimed at leaving Britain as the only open alternative among 
the western countries. Eastern bloc countries were 
completely non-existent as far as consideration for Third 
Country training was concerned. The Treasury's objective had 
been to limit the number of places outside Britain where 
British money could be spent. Table 15 shows the balance 
between UK and outside based training. 
These restrictions are reflected in the number of awards that 
had been made by ODM/ODA for Third Country training between 
1979-1983. The pattern was maintained throughout the 
1983-1988 period.31  
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In 1976 0DM under the Labour Government made significant 
changes to the policy on Third Country training. Among the 
objectives of this move was an attempt to develop training 
facilities overseas so that future demand for training in 
Britain could be reduced.32 The reasons for this move were 
not made clear, but the move certainly marked the beginning of 
the government's critical attention to the overseas student 
question. It is also possible that the issues of immigration 
which in the early 1970s drew much public attention might have 
precipitated the need to review the policy on overseas 
students' training locations. ODM's interest centred on the 
need to identify suitable institutions in developing countries 
which could house Third Country training. A comprehensive 
exercise of consultation and discussion then followed over the 
proposals for the new third country training policy between 
the British Council's TATD and the overseas offices of the 
British Council and HM Embassies/High Commissions. This work 
also benefited greatly from two critical reviews of Third 
Country training commissioned by 0DM.33 	 It became possible 
under the new arrangements for Britain to finance Third 
Country training if suitable and willing institutions which 
could accept third country students could be found. On 
developing training facilities abroad, 0DM decided that such 
opportunities could be pursued whenever possible. It was also 
decided that 0DM could only support awards for In-Country 
training for developmental oriented programmes in developing 
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countries where financial difficulties to support such 
programmes were overwhelmingly evident. 
The period between 1977 and 1980 saw further efforts by 0DM to 
revive the old policy. In 1978 0DM stated that priority in 
using technical cooperation training funds would be accorded 
to placing 0DM sponsored students in Britain, This was a 
clear indication that the 0DM initiative had failed to get 
support. 
ODM's policy adjustment initiatives were significant for their 
failure to produce a major shift in Government policy on Third 
Country training. The exercise had put the Government to a 
big test which revealed the existence of opposing viewpoints 
on this subject matter. U K based training still dominates 
the location of training programmes. The recent establishment 
of more focused and selective scholarship and award schemes, 
and the competition facing Britain for overseas students means 
that Britain is unlikely to change its policy soon. In 1981 
ODA's review of its technical cooperation made this judgement 
on the matter: 
Third Country training is not unduly popular among 
recipients nor do we know sufficient about the 
institutions in which it takes place. It is not 
easy to fit int9 political, commercial and 
industrial criteria.J'f 
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The last statement above perhaps sums up the main reason for 
the lack of major support for both In Country and Third 
Country training. It is both insensitive and cynical. 
Moreover, in the Commonwealth community at least, Britain has 
been associated with the development of their higher education 
and training institutions in various ways, through technical 
assistance, capital 	 aid, curriculum 
	 development 	 and 
examinations. It is therefore cynical of ODA to claim 
ignorance. The statement was intended to provide a very 
strong basis for justifying a highly restrictive Third Country 
training policy. 
On the other hand the attitude of many recipient countries' 
leaders towards Third Country training has not been helpful in 
the arguments for more Third World based training. The IDS 
survey of Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and the Sudan in 1977 on 
attitudes to Third Country training produced findings that 
were as true then as are likely to be today.35 As far as 
the national leaders were concerned, Third Country training 
was acceptable as long as it met the training demands of the 
sending countries. However, beneath this public support were 
also strongly condescending attitudes towards Third Country 
training. All four countries expressed serious reservations 
about the quality of education and training programmes and 
facilities in African institutions. Consequently, Sudan could 
consider it only as a short term measure. Ironically, these 
same countries boasted of having extra capacity in their 
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institutions which non-nationals could utilise. However, this 
is not always the case. The lack of extra capacity in many of 
the institutions in Southern Africa has made it difficult to 
place Namibian students in that region.36 The survey found 
also that the fees in most of the potential Third Country 
locations 	 were extremely prohibitive. At that time, for 
example, it was more expensive to train a non-Kenyan in Kenya 
than in Canada. A very strong 'pilgrimage' attitude exists 
also among officials in the recipient countries. Historical 
ties and educational links in particular between Britain and 
the former colonies have made it natural for them to look upon 
Britain as the most appropriate venue for training. 
A recent (1984) British Council review of Third Country 
training shows that there have been no significant changes in 
the British position of Third Country training. Furthermore, 
ODA and the British Council have also in recent years 
complained of budgetary cuts which would make it difficult for 
them to cover Third Country training as well as British-based 
training. 
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The ODA review Neckw. 	 NcAsA recommended that ODA should 
continue to finance such training only where it was 
appropriate. This was also extended to In-Country training. 
The recent movement to reassert the value of cultural 
diplomacy in Britain (see Chapter 2) has added yet another 
obstacle to any attempts to move towards more training outside 
Britain. Recent studies sponsored by ODA to establish the 
number of political, religious, educational, legal, military, 
diplomatic, and business elites in recipient countries who 
have been educated in Britain serve to illustrate the wide 
interests that favour U.K based training against other 
locations.37 
It is therefore evident from the preceding discussion that, 
both aspects of overseas training have been caught in the 
intricacies of the British political economy of aid. Because 
Britain views the training of overseas students in the 
perspective pointed out by the 1981 ODA team earlier, where UK 
financed training takes place is of considerable political and 
commercial/economic 	 importance 	 to 	 Britain. Secondly, the 
educational and training infrastructure which Britain has 
built over the years to cover developing countries' needs 
offers very competitive ranges and qualities of course 
programmes. It is therefore technically very difficult for ODA 
to justify financing Third Country training, especially at 
advanced and postgraduate level, in rival 	 industrialised 
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countries. The negative attitudes of recipients to these 
alternative training arrangements are most unfortunate, but 
they also help to expose not only the lack of confidence among 
recipients in their own or their neighbours' institutions but 
also show how education obtained from abroad has effectively 
succeeded in eroding that confidence. It is indeed a big 
unintended score for cultural diplomacy objectives. 
There are a few institutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
which offer high quality and relevant training. The findings 
from a survey conducted by the Eastern and Southern African 
Universities Research Programme (ESAURP) Secretariat in 1982, 
revealed 	 that 	 most universities have a high degree of 
sufficiency with regard to academic staff requirements 
especially in the science faculties and the course programme 
coverage.38 In a recent report to the Commonwealth Standing 
Committee on Student Mobility and Higher Education in 1989, 
Coombe made reference to the existence of a few centres of 
specialisation in the Commonwealth countries such as Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Singapore, and in the West Indies.39 In any case, 
the United Nations University (UNU) is an institution which is 
committed to helping developing countries' institutions to 
upgrade their research capacities and capabilities. It 
therefore stands to support Third Country training where the 
programmes would meet its objectives. 
In arguing for a more supportive approach to Third Country 
training the author is aware of some of the social, cultural, 
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and political obstacles to the promotion of Third Country 
training among the recipient countries. 
Despite these odds Britain has continued to finance both 
training programmes in line with the provisions of the 
Treasury policy guidelines. Table 15 shows the present 
balance in the location of British funded training. 
276 
T
a
bl
e  
1
5
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
-
M
o
n
th
s
 
 
(
%
 in
 
 
B
r
a
c
ke
t
s
)
 
H
o
ld
er
s
 
 
by
 
 
L
o
c
a
t
io
n
 
 
o
f
 
 
T
r
a
in
in
g,
 
 
19
8
3
-1
9
8
8
 
U
.
K
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
 
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d 
St
u
de
n
t
/T
r
a
in
ee
 
 
F
e
l
l
o
w
sh
ip
 
 
a 
0 
43 
tv 
u 
0 
a 
0 
• 
0 
• 
0 
O 
Cl' 0) 
0) 
co 
0 
0 
0 
•-1 
•n•• 
C4' 
0 
cr) 
v. 
co 
0 
N 
Cn 
O 
Cn 
N 
i 
0 
0 
0 
1-1 
Sr,  
co 
L1) 
M 
N 
N 
0 
Cr-) 
O 
'4' 
In 
ko 
E-I 
0 
E-# 
•-.. 
t.0 
N 
0) 
co 
cs 
•--1 
4 
G) 
E 
.--1 
0 
= 
•• 
a) 
U 
1.4 
0 
0 
U) 
0 
nn•  	 Om', 
	
tf) 	 t's 
	
. 	 . 
	
Cr 	 0 
	
....../ 	 .....• 
(T 	 CO 	 Cr) 
'Zr 	 Cr) 	 LC) 
r-i 	 .-1 	 l0 
lf) 	 Cr 
CO 
..--. 
r-1 	 .-. 
0 
C' 	 LC) 
...... 	 ..... 
t.0 	 N. 	 •-1 
•-1 	 0) 	 0) 
Cn 	 •-i 	 N 
cs 	 •q. 
N 
..--, 
N 
0 
V)  
CY) 	 Cr 
•-• 	 ...... 
cs 	 N 	 ,-1 
o 	 o 	 N 
Ln 	 0) 	 Lc) 
1 
	
0) 	 in 
	
. 	 . 
	
CY) 	 0 
	
....... 	 ..-... 
	
v-1 	 0 	 N 
	
CO 	 •-1 	 110 
	
1-1 	 co 	 cr) 
	
0) 	 N 
to 
...... 
	
N ..... 	 o...... 
• 0 	 Cr) 
	
0 	 • 
	
0) 
	
,--4 	 N 
	
...... 	 -... 	 ...... 
.--1 
LC) 
N 
CO 
tO 
• 
t4 
0 T
h
ir
d 
Co
un
t
r
y
 
 
N 0 
LC) 
I-1 
14 
4.) 
a 
a 
0 
C.) 
H 
277 
Table 15 speaks for itself. Training awards are still very 
much tied to the 	 U.K.4° 	 However, ODA finances 	 many 
short-term in-service training programmes in recipient 
countries. There has been an interesting increase in Third 
Country training since 1984. There are also ODA funds for 
education seminars. Under this scheme recipients are 
encouraged to use these funds for local or regional short 
training purposes. Britain also makes regular contributions 
to some regional training institutions and multilateral 
agencies which fund Third Country training. The Association of 
African Universities (AAU) has in the past received financial 
support from the British government through the Inter-
University Council (IUC). Among the multilateral agencies 
which receive financial contributions are, the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank (ADB), ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, 
Commonwealth Secretariat and UNESCO(until 1985). 
In its assistance to education and training programmes Britain 
has also paid particular attention to the study areas for 
which aid is provided. 
7.2.6 Subject Areas  
Britain's initial approach to this aspect was open. Any 
subject which fell within the areas of social and economic 
development could expect to be considered favourably for 
assistance. But , Britain considered herself also as being 
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particularly qualified to give assistance in certain 
categories of subject areas, as the following list, from the 
1984 document indicates. 
1. Public Administration. 
2. Teacher Training. 
3. Technical Education. 
4. Economic Management and Financial Planning. 
5. Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
6. Education and Training in Industrial Development. 
7. Scientific Research. 
8. Medical and Nursing Training. 
9. Management Training 41. 
 
The coverage of the study areas indicates clearly that the 
demands of development and economic growth in the newly 
independent states had a profound influence on the scope of 
study areas chosen by Britain. Taken separately each study 
area focused on specific needs. Training in public 
administration was clearly linked to the need to develop 
indigenous skilled public administrators who could take over 
from expatriate and residual colonial civil servants. The need 
to redress the deficit of local skilled manpower that 
colonialism had created had been compelling. Support to these 
areas continued for almost a decade and half. This support has 
continued in adapted and diversified forms. 
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In 1975 the Labour Government produced a White Paper to 
announce its new policy on development aid.42 	 The paper 
focused on the policies in the main sectors receiving external 
assistance. In the education and training sector ODA took 
note of the changes that had taken place in recipient 
countries and the need for donors to provide more relevant 
assistance. Thus within the framework of the new policy of 
giving more aid to the poorest, ODA adopted a new policy on 
aid to education and training. Priority and emphasis were 
placed on giving aid to aspects which could yield greater 
developmental effects. ODA identified the following areas as 
new targets of their assistance: 
1. Development and reform of the curricula. 
2. Development of local examination institutions. 
3. Employment of diverse media in education. 
4. Provision of books. 
5. Provision of some teachers in some countries. 
6. Diffusion and improvement of the teaching of the 
English Language. 
7. Teaching of vernacular languages. 
8. Education management and inspection of school 
systems.43 . 
The preceding subject areas were carefully chosen to 
correspond with and to relate to the context of new 
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educational problems in developing countries. Around the mid 
1970s a number of African countries for example had either 
initiated a major educational reform or were in the'process of 
preparing for one. Zambia conducted her reform exercise in 
1975/76, Botswana in 1977, Lesotho in 1978, Togo in 1972. 
Other countries that undertook similar exercises were Kenya, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Malagasy. These attempts aimed at 
creating new educational systems with new philosophies and 
educational practices. Technical and vocational training for 
example drew a lot of attention in many of these reforms. The 
implications of this 	 for the development of new curricula 
were very obvious. The need to mobilise resources also became 
evident. For many countries several aspects of their reforms 
could not be implemented without external assistance. Among 
other matters the reforms focused on the need to localise 
external examinations. Some countries wanted to cut off links 
with the Cambridge University Examination Syndicate. Also, 
because of the problem of educational provision and access to 
schooling the use of alternative strategies such as the media, 
were considered attractive by many countries. 
ODA's new target areas could not have been more sensitive and 
relevant. The new areas carried a high potential to yield some 
commercial benefits to Britain as the reforms in many 
countries required governments to mobilise local and 
international resources. 
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The 1976 ODA guide document which followed the 1976 White 
Paper, served to elaborate on the points 	 dealing 	 with 
assistance to education. Mathematics, science, English, and 
technical and vocational training were singled out as 
developmental subjects which were earmarked for assistance. 
Education personnel from these categories, plus educational 
planners, specialists in examination techniques, curriculum 
reformers and teacher trainers were also identified for 
support.44 	 In 1982, 1984 and 1986 ODA produced similar 
policy guideline documents which all reaffirmed the 1976 
priority areas. The documents however went further to 
identify new areas which ODA was keen to assist. The 
additional areas were, English language teaching with specific 
emphasis on English for Special Purposes (ESP). This was to 
be linked to training assistance in industry, management, and 
agriculture. Other areas were distance education, experiment 
and innovation in non-formal education, curriculum development 
and reform, and educational materials production.45  
Over the last two decades assistance to English language 
teaching has commanded special attention from the ODA and the 
British Council. In 1986/87 the British Council had provided 
assistance to 63 countries in various aspects of ELT.46 
Countries that had the largest British Council ELT assistance 
programmes were Hong Kong, Greece, Ecuador, Iraq, Kuwait. 
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain and the United Arab 
Emirates. More emphasis is now being placed on ESP and 
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English for Non-Commonwealth countries. Both areas have great 
long-term significance for the political, cultural and 
commercial objectives of British aid. To non-English speaking 
developing countries, acquisition of English language skills 
is important for many purposes economic, cultural and 
diplomatic, including the establishment of communications with 
other donors. 
ODA has also taken a keen interest in subject areas that appear 
to fall far outside the main framework of support. Education 
and training in mother tongues became one of such areas which 
drew the British Council's attention in the mid 1970s. For a 
long time the development of mother tongues had been left to 
the recipients. The issues involved were in some cases very 
complex and too sensitive to attract external aid. However, 
following several international conferences, especially the 
6th Commonwealth Education Conference (1974), the Conference 
of Senior Officials of Ministries of Education in 25 Least 
Developed Countries, the IIEP Seminar on Education Planning 
and Rural Development, and the UNESCO Conference of Ministers 
of Education of African Member States it became apparent that 
many developing countries were intending to turn or return to 
the use of mother tongues in education, especially at primary 
school level. Recognising this development, and also its 
customary areas of specialisation, the British Council chose 
to offer assistance with curriculum development, research into 
the interactions between the subject-matter and the language 
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through which mother tongues were taught and learned, the 
development of improved educational methods and materials, and 
the training of nationals working in these areas.47 The 
University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies 
was identified as an institution with expertise to assist 
developing countries in mother tongue education. 
Subsequently, the Treasury agreed to have ODA extend its 
assistance to overseas students studying mother tongue 
languages. 
7.2.7 Book Aid  
Another form of British assistance to education that has been 
in existence for a very long time is book aid. There are two 
types of book aid. The first category are the low priced 
books which are produced under the auspices of the English 
Language Books Society (ELBS) which groups more than 50 
publishers. The scheme started in 1960 initially with the 
intention to counter competition from cheap Russian and 
Chinese books in the Indian sub-continent. Subsidisation by 
ODA of the production of these books enables recipient 
countries to purchase them at reduced prices. In 1986 the 
scheme had been operating in 87 countries, and the total sales 
since its inception in 1960 had exceeded £25 million by 1981. 
The second scheme is .the Books Presentation Programme (BPP). 
The programme was established in 1971. Its objective is to 
assist recipients' institutions with donations of essential 
books and reference materials. The scheme is also intended to 
284 
help give support to other British capital or technical aid 
projects. The scheme is run by the British Council or HM 
Embassies/High Commissions.48  
Because of the economic difficulties facing many developing 
countries and their serious effect on the countries' financial 
ability to purchase goods from abroad or to produce 
educational materials, the two schemes appear to offer perfect 
stop-gap measures. This has caused recipients to give 
uncritical appreciation of the assistance extended to them 
through these two schemes. The severity of the educational 
books and equipment situation has left little room for many 
recipients to question critically the book aid schemes and 
their implications for local educational materials production. 
It is true that ODA now gives some assistance to recipients 
engaged in local materials production, but this must be seen 
within the entire context and wider objectives of British 
capital and technical aid to a country and its global 
performance in this field. Particularly because of their 
undeniable attractions from the point of view of giving 
genuine development-oriented assistance, the book schemes are 
a challenge to ODA. 
7.2.8 Link Schemes  
In the catalogue of British assistance the assistance given to 
recipient higher education institutions (Universities and 
Colleges) to enable them to twin with counterpart institutions 
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in Britain is not well publicised. The scheme carries with 
it a training and staff development programme for the 
recipients where this is needed. Other features include the 
exchange of academic staff between institutions. The scheme 
may also offer material assistance including capital works, 
equipment and books. The link schemes operate in specific 
frameworks which define the objectives being pursued and also 
the mechanics of working towards those objectives. Among 
other objectives which link arrangements offer are, joint 
supervision of postgraduate students, development of more 
effective examinations through the work of external examiners 
and gaining access by the recipients to more resources such as 
textbooks and periodicals. The entire link scheme is intended 
to work within the realm of institutional building. 
However, where the institutions involved have drastically 
unequal resource backgrounds the gains from the schemes tend 
to be disproportionate. That is the kind of relationship many 
recipient countries' institutions have had with their 
counterparts in the U.K. The impact of the present economic 
crisis in many recipient countries' institutions has reduced 
their capacity to gain much from link arrangements. The 
problem of high staff turnover has meant that joint projects 
cannot be sustained for longer periods where this is 
necessary. Also, the general deterioration of operational 
resources has meant that researchers and other staff from 
Britain working in the schemes abroad cannot contribute their 
maximum effort. 
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7.3 Projectisation 
According to ODA the project framework is a paradigm within 
which aid packages or projects' with specific time-bound 
objectives should be developed.49 The project framework is 
meant to cover all major bilateral assistance. In 	 this 
approach an aid request should be presented in a project form 
with a precise outline of the input requirements, and the 
assignment of responsibilities between or among parties 
involved. Besides being a mechanism of tight control over aid 
work, the framework can allow a string of assisted projects to 
be properly served by aid. It would appear also that the 
project framework is guided by a search for complementarity in 
aid work. For example, assistance to English language teaching 
or book presentation would as much as possible be given not 
for its own sake, but to support other wider ODA projects. 
This marks a big departure from the previous approach when 
some forms of aid, such as awards for training, were given in 
a much looser form. Training awards in particular had 
operated as an open-ended scheme in which some awardees came 
from sectors in which Britain had little or no other aid 
investment at all. The consequences of this approach had been 
that Britain incurred training costs which other major donors 
in those sectors could have met. It was believed that Britain 
denied herself a,lso• possible commercial/trade opportunities 
which a carefully and well targeted aid approach could bring. 
The new policy is intended to overcome these shortcomings. 
The new policy introduces a closer scrutiny of recipients' aid 
requests. It also makes comprehensive negotiations over the 
projects inevitable, and therefore also longer. To benefit 
more from this approach recipients will need to negotiate more 
skillfully and will also need to demonstrate the ability to 
design better projects. Although it is too early to pass 
judgement on the performance of projectisation, recipients 
should expect to be asked more and more by ODA to come up with 
projects in which British capital and technical aid will be 
integrated and work to complement each other. The 
participation of British technical assistance personnel in the 
projects is likely to form an important feature. From this 
design a greater British impact on the aid scene is 
anticipated. 
7.4 Theoretical Assumptions: A Discussion. 
It is also important to review British aid and the principles 
and objectives behind it in the theoretical perspectives 
discussed in chapter two. The theoretical assumptions from 
the 	 systems 	 analysis, intervention, and influence models 
present an appropriate combination of explanatory frameworks 
within which the broader issues of British development aid can 
be discussed and analysed. 
There are two levels at which Britain and its development aid 
can be analysed. First, at the level of how Britain perceives 
the international system politically as well as economically, 
and how Britain sees its position in this system. The two are 
closely integrated in that, the way Britain perceives the 
international system also shapes its responses to the signals 
from they system. 
As an imperial power Britain's perception of the international 
system was one of a world context in which it had an important 
role to play and interests to protect. The empire then formed 
a sub-international system in which Britain was the main 
nation state actor. It was a subsystem with its own 
functional and complex relationships in political and economic 
affairs. As a nation state unit Britain's inputs into the 
empire were many and varied. It is these inputs, legal, 
economic, cultural and political which formed the basis of 
interaction and unequal interdependence. Nationalism and the 
independence movements in the colonies could, in the framework 
of systems analysis, be regarded as reactions to the colonial 
inputs in the empire system. 
The decolonisation process was loosening the system to allow 
it to forge new political and economic links in the 
international system. However, Britain still believed that as 
a nation state with enough resources it has a contribution to 
make to the orderly development of societies in the world,52 
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especially those in poorer countries. The motivation to help 
these poorer subsystem units is based upon this feeling 'the 
long term interests of the rich countries are inextricably 
bound up with the future of the Third World'53 This is how 
some British politicians have viewed the international system 
and the interaction between Britain and other state units. 
Others have been more specific in pointing out, 'We, and the 
West in general have a clear political interest in the 
stability of Africa • • • •,54 Here Britain feels it has 
substantial investment inputs and other connections to justify 
its interest in Africa's development. Britain's development 
aid should be viewed from these broader perspectives. The 
motivation to assist Third World Countries with aid has 
however not been without controversy. Some regard aid as 
intervention with interference or influence properties.55  
The view of some British politicians56 on this subject are 
that aid which seeks to develop goodwill, acquiescence and 
dependence is not unreasonable, because other development 
factors are usually taken into account. Nevertheless, the 
question of balancing development objectives against others is 
always a tricky one. But, there is evidence which suggest 
that aid is sometimes intended to intervene and to influence 
the outcomes in favour of Britain or values to which Britain 
subscribes favourably. Aid investment into the cultural 
diplomacy programme is an influence attempt on target 
countries. The FCOSAS is another explicit example of training 
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aid intended to yield effective influence on other countries' 
future leaders. This kind of aid reveals how Britain's 
perceives its weakening position in the international system 
and the need to do something about it. What emerges here is 
an international system in which complex and simple 
relationships are taking place. Britain as a nation state 
actor in the main system recognises in its thinking and 
actions it exists in an international system in which other 
nation state units exist. Britain has made it clear that it 
perceives the maintenance of a stable international system c 
important task. Thus Britain and other donors have attempted 
to justify their aid intervention in the Third World on this 
perception. 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion has attempted to build a profile of 
British aid to education and training as it has developed from 
the mid 1960s to the present time. The major finding is that 
Britain has made shifts in its aid policies to education and 
training over the last twenty-four years. The policy changes 
appear to have concentrated on two key areas: the target areas 
of 	 assistance, and 	 the 	 administrative 	 and operational 
procedures of conducting aid business. It is clear that in 
the policy changes which have taken place, Britain has been 
responding to a wide-ranging set of signals from three main 
sources: from Britain's own internal administrative, economic, 
and 	 political 	 constituency, from 	 the aid policies and 
activities of other 	 donors, and 	 from 	 the 	 development 
environment of Britain's overseas aid constituency. These 
factors have tended to influence and to provide the framework 
for the scope and direction for British aid. 
Although changes of government initially tended to affect 
mainly the organisation of British aid administration)  since 
1979 when the Conservatives came to power the impact on aid 
policies has been particularly marked. Nonetheless, British 
aid policies have had both enduring aspects and those that 
have yielded basicaly to changes over time and renewal 
initiatives. 
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British aid to education and training has been regulated by a 
series of policies and decisions which have appeared at 
intervals since the mid 1960s. Some have dealt with broad 
issues relating to the entire British aid programmes while 
others have focused on specific aid subjects such as the 
position of Britain on assistance to ELT, ESP, vernacular 
languages, Third 	 Country 	 training, book 	 aid, technical 
education or universities, curriculum reform and development, 
localisation of examinations. In terms of major trends, 
British aid has moved from a somewhat open-ended process to a 
much more selective and tightly controlled approach in recent 
years. 
In the 1960s ODM's aid focused on three main areas: on 
technical assistance for providing British teaching staff for 
secondary schools and universities, capital assistance for the 
development of universities in the former colonies, and the 
provision of large scale training programmes in the UK. Based 
on the principles of assisting in the fields where Britain has 
resources and expertise, recipients had to fit their aid 
requests according to these set categories. Most recipients' 
external aid needs fell precisely into these sets of 
categories. Over the last two decades technical assistance in 
manpower provision and staff training in the UK has formed the 
mainstay of British aid. On this account the policy had 
remained relatively closed. Aid requests that were outside 
these two areas could not easily be considered. However, it 
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was also possible for other aid requests to be considered if 
they were built around the main target areas. For example, 
the scope of subject/course training programmes in technical 
assistance was very large, and included many varieties of 
staff training programmes. 
In 1975 the policy focus was widened to include new areas for 
assistance. The areas were: curriculum development, provision 
of books, diffusion and improvement of ELT, and education 
management and supervision. Assistance in all areas could be 
given through technical assistance. The policy therefore 
received alterations which amounted to little adjustments to 
take account of changes in recipients' needs. A little after 
1975, ODA 	 identified the following subjects for special 
assistance: mathematics, science and English 
	 language 
especially English for Special Purposes (ESP) - and technical 
and vocational Training. These were designated as 
developmental subjects. Later, around 1977 a decision was 
taken to extend assistance to the improvement of the teaching 
of the local languages in the recipient countries. This 
provides very limited evidence that Britain has periodically 
made policy adjustments to respond to the wider needs of the 
recipients. This particular decision took a compassionate 
form and was more inward looking. Assistance was tied to 
training programmes tenable at designated British 
universities. However, these adjustments have not altered the 
main focus of British aid. Assistance to education and 
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training has all along been dominated by various aspects of 
technical assistance to the higher education sector. 
Britain's policy on Third Country training has always been to 
give it qualified protectionist support. In principle Britain 
supports the idea of funding training programmes in recipient 
or Third Countries. However, HMG's Treasury has set criteria 
which few recipient or Third Countries can meet. The criteria 
are designed to prevent British funds being applied in other 
countries which are viewed as competitors against Britain in 
offering training programmes. Hence the protectionist 
criteria. This policy is however backed up by a very 
competitive education and training infrastructure which few 
industrialised countries can rival. In-Country and Third 
Country training are very sensitive issues to the inner 
objectives of British aid and any liberalisation of the 
present stand would severely weaken the cultural diplomacy and 
economic policy objectives of British technical assistance. 
The abortive 1976 initiative to liberalise the Third Country 
training policy confirms this point. In short, In-country and 
Third Country training are simply not compatible with the key 
principles and objectives of cultural diplomacy being pursed 
by Britain through assistance to education and training. 
Given also the very Small number of overseas students who are 
HMG funded in the UK in any year (see Appendix III Table 7), 
it would not make sense for Britain to shift a substantial 
part of these training awards abroad. 
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Significant changes have taken place in ODA's policies since 
1979. The coming to power of the Conservative Party in that 
year brought a succession of new policy initiatives. 
In 1980 the government introduced full economic fees for all 
overseas students coming to study in Britain. Students from 
the EC countries were exempted. The consequences which 
followed were that the number of overseas students, 
especially those in the fee-paying category fell considerably 
in the year immediately following the introduction of the 
policy. Fearing the possible long term political and 
commercial damage which the policy would inflict on Britain, 
the government responded with yet another policy drive. The 
loss of foreign students was redressed by enlarging the 
catchment area for overseas students. Thus in addition to the 
traditional Commonwealth student markets Britain sought to get 
more foreign students from francophone and other 
non-Commonwealth countries. A set of diversified and 
projectised compensatory scholarship schemes tenable in the UK 
has run parallel to the student recruitment drive. 
These policy actions show both moral contradictions, and also 
economic logic. Charging students from developing countries 
full economic fees while students from rich industrialised 
countries in the EC receive concessional treatment does not 
make any moral sense at all. However, the view that foreign 
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students have an economic value in Britain makes the policy on 
student fees a little easier to follow. The student fees 
policy, the decision to enlarge the student catchment area, 
and the new scholarship schemes underline the new policy 
position of the Conservative government on foreign students in 
development programmes. The government appear to perceive the 
overseas students in terms of short and long term economic and 
political value to Britain. In pursuing these objectives 
Britain wishes to compete against other donors more 
effectively. The approach to technical assistance is 
reflected in these pointers: 
The Department of Trade and Industry have 
identified a list of countries which they see as 
especially strong candidates for aid to promote 
trade. They advance this list also for TC 
purposes, and particularly as examples of countries 
in which TC might be used to establish or 
re-establish opportunities and entries for British 
industry. 
Current Ministerial policy is that concessional 
transfers (and TC is generally free) should be 
directed mainly to the poorest countries.... These 
countries have not the capacity to absorb aid eg. 
require help in education before their other needs 
can be approached. It is not to be assumed that 
because they are poor they do not answe to 
political, commercial and industrial criteria.-"1  
The overall picture which emerges suggests that aid to 
education and training is given within a very broad and 
complex policy framework. The motivation behind external aid 
sees the transfer of resources to the recipients as performing 
functions that exceed the role of providing supplemental 
resources. Aid is perceived as apolitical and an economic 
inducement to be used to obtain favourable political and 
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commercial benefits from aid relationships. This aspect is 
especially evident in the case of British aid. This is the 
framework within which Britain and its client aid recipients 
have to attempt to solve development problems affecting 
developing countries. 
In conclusion it must said that the discussion in this chapter 
has shown that British aid to education and training exhibits 
both simple and complex characteristics. It has been shown 
that the scope and focus of British aid have been subjected to 
frequent adjustments to respond to the changing needs within 
its own constituency and that of the recipients. However, 
this adaptability must be seen in relation to the broader and 
specific aid objectives being pursued by Britain. It is clear 
that development is not the only objective being pursued in 
Britain's 	 aid 	 relationships, political 
	 advantage 	 and 
commercial benefits for Britain are considered as legitimate 
objectives in British aid programmes. Given this background 
the notion that aid functions as a supplementary resource 
becomes an extremely inadequate explanation for what is a 
complex phenomenon. 
Within the broad framework of its own objectives and criteria 
for giving assistanCe, aid to individual recipient countries 
varies and is kept under constant review by ODA. The diverse 
criteria for the selection of recipient countries are given in 
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the 1981 ODA report on technical cooperation. It gives 
explicit reasons why countries are aided. For some it is 
because they are poor but nevertheless may possess some 
distant commercial, political and industrial potential. Some 
rich countries are aided because they are considered to be 
'take-off' countries with effective capacity to absorb aid 
resources. Trade potential in these countries is of 
particular importance, whereas others have received aid as a 
means of facilitating the entry or re-establishment of British 
businesses and industries in those countries. What this 
points to is a careful targeting of British aid. It also 
means that a broader analysis of aid to education and training 
as a constituent element in a coordinated aid policy would be 
illuminating. 
The next chapter examines British aid to education and 
training to Zambia against the background given in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
BRITISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN ZAMBIA, 1964-1989 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out to analyse British aid to education 
and training in Zambia since 1964. The objective is to 
identify the forms of assistance given to Zambia, and also 
to examine the British aid policy framework within which 
aid to Zambia is given. In particular, the discussion 
will also assess the relevance of British aid to Zambia's 
education and training development needs and problems. From 
the analysis in this chapter it should be established 
whether Britain pursues global or country specific policies. 
In the absence of access to ODA Country Policy Review 
(CPR) documents on Zambia it becomes very difficult to 
make an accurate and conclusive analysis of what Zambia's 
standing has been in British aid politics over the last 
two and half decades. Though valid in their own right, 
proxy measurements are likely to give only a general 
indicative assessment of a situation which has a great 
deal more to it. Thus, levels of aid given over time, the 
number of scholarships awarded to a country, the number of 
HMG financed personnel working in a country, do not reveal 
much about the inner political thinking and attitudes 
303 
which lie behind that assistance. Therefore, in order to 
attempt to assess the British aid relationship with Zambia 
it will be necessary to begin with an examination of 
Britain's broader economic and political relationship with 
Zambia. 
In the period between 1965 and 1970 Britain had a strong 
economic/trade relationship with Zambia within the African 
Commonwealth group of countries. In 1968 the book value of 
British investment in Zambia was £25.6 million, the fifth 
in position in the African Commonwealth after Nigeria, 
Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone in that order.' 	 Zambia 
had the highest rate of return on British assets in the 
same year. The rate was 14.5 per cent, that was 5.4 per 
cent higher than the rate of return for East Africa 
(9.1%), and 5.7 per cent higher than the rate for West 
African Commonwealth countries put together (8.8 %).2  
Up to 1970 Britain was Zambia's principal source of 
imports and had been also the main destination for Zambian 
exports (chiefly minerals) until Japan took the lead over 
Britain in 1970. Table 16 shows Britain's trade 
relationship with Zambia within the African Commonwealth 
group in 1971. 
Table 16 
British Trade with Commonwealth Africa, 
British 
1971 	 (Lai) 
Country Imports Exports 
Nigeria 139.476 164.980 
Sierra Leone 26.910 12.672 
Ghana 32.182 44.614 
Gambia 4.564 2.707 
Zambia 56.789 49.292 
Kenya 30.062 65.540 
Uganda 19.283 15.631 
Tanzania 24.692 23.669 
Malawi 12.910 8.575 
Botswana 2.782 1.487 
Lesotho 2 63 
Mauritius 17.347 8.349 
Swaziland 9.436 230 
TOTAL 386.435 387.809 
Source: Arnold, G. and Murray, R. 
	 (1973, 3). 
305 
It is evident from the table that Zambia was the second 
main source of British imports from Commonwealth Africa. 
It was also the third main destination for British exports 
to Commonwealth Africa. 
It is also important to note that during this period a 
number of major British companies operating in 
Commonwealth Africa and elsewhere were represented in the 
Zambian economy through their subsidiaries. Among these 
were: Blackwood Hodge Limited (100 % share), 
British-American 	 Tobacco Limited (B.A.T. 100 % share), 
Charter Consolidated Limited (through N.C.C.M. 49 % share)-
the Zambian subsidiary produced 20 per cent of Charter's 
investment income then- Lonrho Limited ( Lonrho Zambia, 
African 	 Commercial, Heinrich's 	 Syndicate, Industrial 
Credit, Mobile Motors, and National 	 Breweries), Mitchell 
Cotts Group Limited (Fraser & Chalmers Zambia Limited), 
and Unilever Limited (Lever Brothers Zambia Limited).3  
The diverse areas of operation which these companies 
represented are particularly instructive in understanding 
the role which the British companies played in the Zambian 
economy. Fraser and Chalmers for example was an important 
contractor in many heavy work operations of the Zambian 
mining industry. 
Zambia's important economic/trade relationship with Britain 
was underlined by it being the main supplier of copper to 
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Britain in the 1960s. In reacting to the political row 
with Britain over the Rhodesian case after the UDI, 
Zambia had made indications that it could use its control 
over copper supplies to Britain to bring pressure to bear 
on Whitehall.4 The vulnerability of Britain over this 
matter was summed up in the words of the then British 
Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson: 
Zambia was, in a real sense part of the third 
constituency. Britain was utterly dependent on 
her copper supplies. Had they been cut off, by 
the Rhodesians or by Zambia made sullen by our 
refusal to use force, we would have hgd two 
million unemployed within a matter of months.'" 
Thus Zambia had emerged as an economically strong trade 
partner with Britain in the African Commonwealth group. 
Zambia was then well able to support significant British 
economic and commercial interests. Bangura (1983) points 
out also that Zambia's large sterling holdings in Britain 
gave it additional leverage in its political relationship 
with Britain, especially over the Rhodesian case.6  
The period between 1971 and 1979 can be regarded as a 
transition era during which time the Zambian economy 
faced progressive problems of adjustment and economic 
decline. It was not until the 1980s that the net effect 
of the economic decline took full effect. The 
Anglo-Zambian economic relationship however took a new 
turn at the beginning of the 1970s. Conscious of the need 
to diversify its export markets, and also influenced by 
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Britain's response to the UDI, Japan took the lead from 
Britain as the major destination for Zambian exports, 
mainly copper. As the effects of the economic decline 
grew stronger it became inevitable for some of the 
international companies to reduce or completely close down 
their operations in Zambia. Fraser and Chalmers of the 
Mitchell Cotts Group wound up, and Blackwood Hodge was 
sold to local businessmen. In short, the British presence 
in the Zambian economy has experienced a significant 
reduction since the 1970s. Consequently, while trade has 
continued between Britain and Zambia, Zambia's position 
has shifted further down in relation to Britain's trade 
with 	 other 	 African 	 countries, especially 	 in 	 the 
Commonwealth Group. The copper leverage which Zambia 
previously exerted has long been undermined by scientific 
advances in copper substitutes and diversifying Britain's 
sources of supplies. There is abundant evidence to show 
that Zambia passed through the last two decades as an 
economically weak country. Aid partners of Zambia have 
had to contend with what this economic crisis has meant in 
terms of various aspects of the aid relationship. 
Politically, the 	 Anglo-Zambian 	 relationship 	 has 	 been 
generally stable against a background of a number of 
international issues on which Britain and Zambia have 
taken different standpoints. The significance of these 
differences will be examined shortly. In broad terms it 
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is the colonial connection that has defined the 
Anglo-Zambian political relationship. The Commonwealth 
group is an extension of this same framework. However, 
each former colony has had a relationship with Britain 
which has been subjected to continuous reviews in the 
light of national and international events. 
If Zambia has attracted any significant political 
attention from Britain in the last twenty five years it 
has been because of the following inter-related cases: the 
Rhodesian UDI problem, Zambia's support to the liberation 
wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia, and the problem 
of apartheid in South Africa. All cases have now been 
resolved except the South African problem. Zambia's large 
involvement in these problems as a base and sanctuary for 
freedom fighters and a peace and freedom broker, put it at 
the political centre stage of Southern African politics. 
Because of the logistical support Zambia has offered to 
the liberation movements, it has had a certain leverage 
over the activities of the guerrilla movements. This was 
a vital pressure point which western countries like 
Britain which favoured a more moderate approach to the 
resolution of the conflicts could use, not to stop the 
wars completely but to keep channels of negotiations open. 
The UDI case illustrated this point perhaps more strongly 
than others. The creation of the Frontline States in the 
Southern African region helped to emphasise an attempt to 
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approach regional conflicts from a common perspective, and 
in the process outlined the role each regional actor like 
Zambia was playing in the regional politics.7 In the 
face of the overwhelmingly radical marxist guerrilla 
network around Zambia's borders, it was critical that 
Zambia was not left feeling completely isolated by the 
Western powers. Zambia's role in the settlement of 
regional issues gave it a certain amount of political 
importance. 
During the period 1945-85, the Western countries' view of 
Southern Africa as a strategic region for East-West power 
politics has had implications for how each member country 
in the region is perceived in the west, politically and 
strategically.8 	 Apart from the outright politics of 
East-West regional presence, Southern Africa has long been 
known to contain strategic non-fuel mineral deposits.9  
Maull's (1987) framework for mineral risk assessment of 
Western countries' dependence on Southern African minerals 
indicates the level to which some western countries have 
been dependent on cobalt supplies from Zambia.1° Zambia 
and Zaire together share 71 per cent of the world's cobalt 
reserves (1985/86). Cobalt is listed among the serious 
risk minerals in the area. A very high dependence on this 
source is therefore clearly evident. 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that though 
Zambia is in a serious state of economic crisis, it has 
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taken comfort in the knowledge that it possesses a mineral 
of critical importance to Western industrialised countries. 
Securing uninterrupted supplies is very important to those 
countries which need it. Both national and regional 
political stability become very important factors in this 
complex equation. Western aid to developing countries has 
often been given against all odds to ensure that political 
stability is maintained in countries or regions containing 
strategic interests. In conclusion, it is observed that 
the Anglo-Zambian political relationship has existed in a 
continuously 	 shifting 	 broad and complex, economic and 
political framework. The aid relationship has originated 
from this complex framework and functions as an important 
part of the framework. The aid relationship is constantly 
reviewed to ensure that redundant policies and measures 
are dropped in the face of new policy initiatives. 
British aid to education and training must be seen in this 
broad context. 
8.2 Aid to Education and Training 
Britain's aid response to Zambia's needs in the education 
and training sector have since 1965 concentrated in these 
areas. 
1. Limited capital development aid 
2. Manpower aid 
3. Training 
4. Books and libraries 
5. Institutional link schemes 
6. Vistorships to the UK 
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8.2.1 Capital Development Aid  
The only major British capital aid to Zambian education 
took place during the First National Development Plan 
period. Britain provided aid to establish the University 
of 	 Zambia's 	 main 	 library.11 
	
Similar, but smaller 
assistance was extended to the Zambia Library Service 
(ZLS) and the Education Broadcasting Services (EBS). 
Since the UNZA capital assistance there has been no 
comparable British capital assistance to the education and 
training sector. 
That British capital development aid to Zambia's education 
and training sector was provided on a smaller scale at a 
time of Zambia's new development programme is not at all 
surprising. The British Treasury, while recognising that 
some newly independent former British colonies faced 
economic problems at independence, also pointed out that 
former colonies could not expect blanket financial 
assistance from Britain.12 	 Aid was given according to 
the Treasury policy which applied to newly independent 
states. Under the policy terms the British Government 
made a financial settlement to an ex-colony at 
independence, the amount received reflecting the aid a 
territory would have received from Colonial Development 
and Welfare sources had it not become independent. The 
British Government was also aware that this form of 
assistance was not in all cases adequate to cover 
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development programmes. However, it 	 noted 	 that 
	 newly 
independent states had recourse to financial assistance 
from many multilateral and bilateral financial sources, 
including access to the private London financial 
market.13 
At independence Zambia had inherited a strong economy. 
Between 1964 and 1969 the very high price of copper 
resulted in the economy averaging a 13 per cent annual 
growth rate in real terms.14 The Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at market prices rose from K502 million in 1964 to 
K1,140 million in 1969.15 The value of the Kwacha 
against the UK pound was then around K2 = £1. In light of 
this Zambia must have appeared financially well off and 
therefore eligible only for limited assistance. True, 
Zambia had made its own plans for mobilising local as well 
as external resources to finance the capital development 
programme of the education and training sector. But, 
global observations have tended to show that Britain has 
generally chosen to commit limited capital development 
assistance in its aid to education and training. 
Britain's 'generosity' has appeared in other areas of 
assistance. 
8.2.2 Manpower Aid  
The expansion programme which took place in the tertiary 
and secondary school sector produced a demand for teachers 
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and lecturers which could not be met locally. In fact by 
1970 only one in ten secondary school teachers was a 
Zambian. Consequently, reliance 	 on 	 recruitment 	 of 
expatriate teachers became inevitable. During the FNDP 
the Zambian Government signed technical assistance 
agreements with several countries for recruiting contract 
teachers. 
Britain's response to Zambia's manpower problem in the 
teaching profession took two forms. ODM provided 
inducement allowances to British teachers and lecturers to 
encourage them to go out to work in Zambia. It also 
provided training scholarships for Zambians to study in 
Britain. Manpower aid to this sector has always consisted 
of the following categories of personnel, the OSAS, BESS, 
and British Council fully-funded KELT Officers. To these 
groups must also be added volunteers from HMG funded 
voluntary organisations. The number of HMG funded British 
personnel going to work in the education and training 
sector in Zambia rose steadily from 546 in 1966 to 1,076 
in 1970 when the OSAS programme reached its peak. In fact, 
after 1966 the number of British expatriate personnel in 
the education sector was much higher than in other sectors. 
Table 17 shows the number of ODM funded personnel in Zambia. 
Table 17 
ODM funded British Personnel in Zambia by Sector 
and Aid Schemes in Selected Years, 1966-1972. 
Sector 1966 1968 	 1970 1972 
Education 546 942 	 1076 742 
Devi 	 Planning 31 64 	 34 44 
Public Admin 691 480 	 295 206 
Social Services 63 43 	 25 10 
Works/Communications 484 751 	 736 484 
Mines/Industry/Comm 60 62 	 37 22 
Agriculture 292 254 	 222 
Health 221 363 	 395 93 
Natural Resources - 211 
Other 295 309 	 229 147 
All Schemes 2683 3268 	 3049 1941 
OSAS % 85.5 99.6 	 99.7 99.5 
Source: 	 Compiled from, 	 ODM, British Aid Statistics, 
various years. 
NOTES: 1. 1968 included 575 officers assisted under BACS. 
2. All figures as at 31st December. 
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In 1969 Britain provided 60.1 per cent of the total number 
of secondary school teachers in Zambia. Table 18 shows 
Britain's share of the teaching force against other 
countries. 
Table 18 
Number of Expatriate Secondary School Teachers 
by Country of origin, 1969. 
Country 
	
Number 
Britain 	 900 
Norway 	 27 
Denmark 	 49 
Russia 	 15 
Other European Countries 	 13 
Canada 	 63 
USA 	 13 
West Indies 	 12 
Aden 	 7 
Ceylon(Sri Lanka) 	 7 
India 	 4 
Pakistan 	 1 
Australia 	 2 
New Zealand 	 3 
South Africa 	 143 
Ethiopia 	 136 
Tanzania 	 25 
Kenya 	 21 
Uganda 	 21 
Nigeria 	 13 
Rhodesia 	 13 
Other African Countries 	 19  
Total 	 1,497 
Source: M/Educ, 1969 Conference Report. 
Pp. 90-91. 
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British secondary school teachers formed the largest group 
in the OSAS programme. Very few British teachers were 
recruited to work in the primary school sector, as this 
area unlike others faced rapid Zambianisation due to the 
large pool of local teachers that already existed in the 
country and the crash programme that was mounted in 1966 
to train teachers for this sector. A small number of BESS 
lecturers were recruited to teach at the University of 
Zambia and other tertiary institutions. Not all OSAS 
teachers offered competitive work experience. As one 
report noted: 
Examination of a sample of 48 OSAS teachers 
serving in government schools in September, 1968 
showed that 13 had a total of less than two years 
experience, and 25 less than four years. Of 12 
wives of OSAS staff teaching in government schools, 
8 had less than four years total teaching 
experience.)  6 
This finding gives some insight into the recruitment of 
British teachers for Zambia. It is evident from this 
finding and also from ODA statistics that a large number 
of OSAS teachers went to work in Zambia at the beginning 
of their teaching careers. It follows from this also that 
ODM/GRZ failed to recruit long experienced settled 
teachers, due perhaps to perceived risk factors. Zambia 
faced also some competition from Britain's internal 
teacher's employment market, and from other newly 
independent countries within the Commonwealth. 
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There is no doubt at all that all categories of OSAS 
teachers have played a very important role in Zambia's 
education and training development. Expatriate teachers 
took with them to Zambia diversified rich experiences. 
And it is true that many of them worked in less attractive 
locations and conditions. 
Britain's technical assistance to Zambia during the Second 
National Development Plan continued to be mainly in the 
area of manpower supply. However, around 1975 0DM made a 
decision to scale down manpower aid to education and 
training. This decision had come against a background of 
new policy guidelines from 0DM on British aid to education 
in developing countries.17 	 The thinking in 0DM on aid 
to education had taken a new turn in 1972. Not only had 
0DM taken note of the quick changing development scenario 
in most developing countries, it took steps to identify 
what it believed were appropriate aid responses. Among 
other things the new thinking in ODM's policy emphasised 
greater freedom and discrimination in making judgements 
about who and what to assist. On human resource 
assistance 0DM felt that many countries no longer needed 
to recruit British teachers in large numbers.18  
In the case of Zambia it has been pointed out that the 
decision to scale down manpower aid to secondary schools 
in particular was based in anticipation the belief that 
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the Zambianisation programme had made enough progress to 
take care of new manpower needs in the sector.19  
Furthermore, there was also a strong feeling within ODM 
that the time had come for Zambia to embark on a serious 
long term staff development programme, especially at the 
University level. 
Possibly, there were other reasons for reducing the OSAS 
personnel in Zambia. Zambia's economic difficulties had 
by the mid 1970s confirmed its down turn course. The 
Zambia Government had continuously found it difficult to 
remit expatriate gratuity payments to overseas banks on 
time. Many expatriates had to wait for more than a year 
to get their money. Other conditions of service, such as 
accommodation and transportation facilities etc could not 
be met by Zambia_without much difficulty. This had caused 
ODM great concern. Therefore reducing the OSAS staff was 
a logical step to ensure that ODM's involvement in 
problems arising from the GRZ teacher's contracts were 
kept to a minimum. There is also no doubt that the OSAS 
and BESS programmes had become progressively very 
expensive for ODM. 
The decision to start reducing supplemented teaching staff 
came at a time when local teacher training institutions 
for secondary school teachers had barely got firmly 
established. Nkrumah Teachers College opened in 1967, and 
319 
its first graduates came out in 1969. The University's 
first small batch of teachers came out in 1970. One could 
hardly have considered the output of local teachers strong 
enough to justify the early decision to reduce 
supplemented personnel. Zambia's recourse to the 
recruitment of large numbers of expatriate teachers from 
the Indian sub-continent and from the Republic of Ireland 
was confirmation of the fact that the Zambianisation 
programme was nowhere near meeting adequately the manpower 
needs in schools. There was also another side to the 
decision. The exercise to reduce supplemented staff in 
secondary schools gave way to Zambia recruiting many 
non-standard English speaking teachers for Zambian 
schools. This was quite contrary to ODM's broad objective 
of improving the English language standard in recipient 
countries. Even more intriguing was the decision later to 
include English language among the subjects which were 
earmarked for cutbacks. 
In the last decade recruitment of HMG supplemented 
teaching staff for secondary schools, colleges and the two 
universities has continued, but under very careful and 
constant scrutiny in the run down exercise. 
Table 19 shows the progressive running down of the OSAS 
group. 
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Table 19 
OSAS Personnel in the Education 
Sector by Subsector, 1980-1983 
SECTOR 	 1980 	 1981 	 1982 	 1983 
Secondary 	 250 	 245 	 178 	 135 
Teacher Training 	 15 	 16 	 16 	 12 
DTEVT 	 49 	 55 	 50 	 45 
Support Services 	 10 	 13 	 12 	 10  
Total 
	
324 	 329 	 256 	 202  
Source: MGEC (1985) Unpublished Inspectorate Reports. 
It is clear from Table 19 that the real effect of running 
down the OSAS programme in the secondary school sector 
began to be felt. It would also appear that other than 
the secondary school sector other sectors retained more or 
less a constant level of strength of OSAS staff. 
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It is quite evident that supplementation support has been 
concentrated in a few subject areas. Notice also the 
variations in the scaling down exercise between subject 
areas. Subjects 	 such 	 as 	 Geography, Mathematics 	 and 
English experienced large cuts whereas others have 
remained with relatively the same strength of OSAS 
teachers. 
Since 1980 the ODA/GRZ joint manpower reviews for the 
education and training sector have revealed the following 
on ODA's manpower aid. The decision made earlier in the 
1970s to run down the OSAS and BESS programmes has been 
upheld. It is still being implemented with some 
adjustments being made to accommodate special cases. Some 
allowance has been given for compensation and shifting of 
resources between sectors to reduce any undue imbalances 
or deficits in staffing due to the cutbacks." However, 
this is all kept within the ceilings given for 
supplementation. Also, MGEC, DTEVT and MHE and its 
institutions have been encouraged to identify priorities 
in their manpower needs to assist ODA's run down and 
redesignation 	 exercise. In 	 addition, ODA 
	 agreed 	 to 
increase Zambia's UK training awards in 1981/82 to help 
accelerate the Zambianisation of the supplemented posts. 
In this regard ODA increased the awards by 30.0 per cent, 
from £1.05 million to £1.35 million.21  
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The reaction from the OSAS and BESS personnel to ODA's run 
down exercise has not at all been welcomed by the majority 
of teachers. Many of them had been working in Zambia for 
a long time and would have liked to continue serving in 
Zambia. However, under the present economic circumstances 
in Zambia they can only do so under the favourable 
protection of a supplementation scheme. There is evidence 
to show since the run down exercise began that each ODA/GRZ 
manpower review has turned into a forum in which pleas 
to retain many OSAS teachers have been made.22  
In the last few years, supplementation in both secondary 
schools and tertiary institutions has shifted to cover 
projects which ODA is supporting in the education and 
training sector. In 1987 the DTEVT had four ODA supported 
projects in the following areas: 
	 Technical Maintenance, 
Craft 	 Training, Business 	 Studies 	 and 	 Engineering 
Manpower.23 UNZA and CBU have theirs.24 This is how 
British manpower aid through supplementation has evolved 
from the mid 1965 to the present day. 
There are a few points of discussion which should follow. 
ODM's assumptions that without the OSAS and BESS 
programmes newly independent ex-colonies would have found 
it very difficult to retain the residual corps of colonial 
civil servants or indeed to recruit new British personnel 
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did not strictly apply to Zambia at the time of 
independence and for a few years thereafter. 
Between 1964 and 1970, the period the OSAS programme was 
at its peak in Zambia the country had a strong economy as 
indicated earlier. Remittances of expatriates' salaries 
and allowances to their countries faced little 
restriction or delay then. It is therefore argued that 
given those favourable conditions Zambia would have been 
able to recruit new teachers from Britain without many of 
the financial difficulties which the British Government 
had anticipated. 
The launching of the two supplementation assistance 
programmes was also closely followed by an accelerated 
decolonisation process which saw the independence of the 
following former colonies: Tanzania 1961, Uganda 1962, 
Kenya 1963, Sierra Leone 1963, Malawi 1964, Zambia 1964, 
The 	 Gambia 	 1965, Lesotho 	 1966, Botswana 	 1966, and 
Swaziland 1968. Individually and collectively these 
countries held considerable British investment and 
involved sustantial two way trade. There was therefore a 
strong argument for maintaining a British presence in the 
countries. 
In many of these countries independence brought with it 
severe apprehension among the British settler and civil 
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service communities. There were fears over their careers 
and future under new Black governments. Many had in fact 
voted with their feet in some of the countries.25 
	
The 
rapidity of the decolonisation process threatened to flood 
Britain with thousands of returning colonial civil servants. 
That prospect would have caused HMG some serious 
redeployment problems. There was therefore an economic need 
to retain many of the British civil servants in overseas 
service in the initial years following the granting of 
independence. The two schemes provided the respite and 
additional incentives for retaining the British staff. The 
schemes also gave the British expatriates an assurance of 
their government's continued commitment to their welfare. 
If anything, the new OSAS and BESS staff needed this kind of 
assurance more than the former colonial civil servants. 
On the other hand Britain's political and economic 
interests in the former colonies did not come to an end 
when colonies became independent. There was also a 
political interest on the part of Britain to retain some 
continuity in its influence in the former colonies. 
Independence had opened up the former colonies to other 
European 	 powers, such 	 as 	 the 	 Soviet Union and its 
satellites. Consequently, the threat of communist 
influence in the newly independent states was never taken 
lightly then by the British government. Therefore, the 
retention and recruitment of British staff through the 
schemes provided the much needed political continuity in 
British influence through the presence and institutional 
legacies in the former colonies. It is therefore not 
possible to argue that the OSAS and BESS schemes were 
merely a one-way aid response to the social and economic 
situation in the former colonies of the Commonwealth Group. 
The schemes had an agenda which cut across the interests 
of both Britain and the former colonies. Manpower aid was 
a response to political, economic and development signals. 
The recruitment of teachers from abroad was an expensive 
exercise for the Zambian government. Although now it 
would be difficult to measure that cost in exact monetary 
terms because of poor record keeping and the 
inaccessibility of this kind of government information, 
there are indicators which provide a basis for this 
judgement. 
The inputs into the OSAS programme give some illustration 
of what it cost Zambia to maintain the programme. The 
Zambian inputs into the programme included the creation of 
a recruitment office in London, and appointing officers to 
administer the recruitment. The officers were maintained 
in London at great expense, which included not only basic 
salaries and allowances, but also boarding education for 
their children and private medical facilities. The 
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Zambian government was also responsible for the costs of, 
advertising the teaching posts, medical examinations of 
applicants, return air passages for appointed officers and 
their families, and school holiday passages for the 
officers' children who could not accompany their parents 
to Zambia. 
The OSAS and KELT agreements stipulate that the host 
institution should provide supplemented staff with all 
necessary transport, housing, equipment and other 
facilities.26 
While in Zambia the expatriate teachers received 
subsidised 	 furnished 	 accommodation, free 	 medical 
facilities, occupational support services in the schools 
and colleges, and a gratuity at the end of each completed 
thirty month contract. There were also indirect benefits 
which Zambia gave to officers on OSAS contracts. The 
tours of work in Zambia have given many OSAS teachers 
opportunities to improve their economic/social situations 
in Britain. It is also true that a teaching post in Zambia 
offered expatriate teachers opportunities to develop their 
African experience in their careers which may have been put 
to effective u-se. These have all been undoubtedly 
attractive and generous incentives in considering overseas 
appointments. 
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Since independence the Zambian Government has accepted 
technical assistance of this kind without a single guiding 
statement to direct the donors.27 It is only recently 
in 1988, that the Cabinet considered a policy position on 
technical assistance.28 Zambia's attention in technical 
assistance has apparently been directed at short-term 
benefits, rather than assessing 
	 the 	 entire 	 technical 
assistance against its own short and long-term inputs and 
costs. Manpower aid from Britain and elsewhere induced 
costs from the Zambian Government which should have been 
carefully checked against all technical assistance inputs 
and expected benefits. Real aid is in the margin between 
donor and recipient cost inputs. The Zambian case 
demonstrates a familiar but always tricky situation where 
aid has been caught up in the politics of responsibility 
between a donor and a recipient. To assert its 
independent position the Zambian Government is obliged to 
take greater responsibility in matters concerning the 
financing of its development programmes. 
As far as the present and the future is concerned, the 
ODA 	 project framework offers some limited opportunities 
for Zambia to continue to obtain technical assistance from 
Britain. However, to get the maximum benefits from the 
new system it will require a skilled, competent and also 
shrewd cadre of Zambian aid personnel, that is, Zambians 
328 
who are very skilled negotiators. It is very doubtful if 
in fact foreign aid in its long years of existence in 
Zambia has produced Zambians with sharp negotiating 
skills. Nor has the local environment encouraged it. The 
GRZ recommendations following the NATCAP report on 
technical assistance do not go far in making changes to 
the ways in which Zambia has managed technical 
assistance.29 	 It should therefore be expected that, for 
various reasons arising from both the donors' and Zambian 
political and economic constituencies, donors are going to 
continue to take the greater responsibility on matters 
concerning technical assistance. 
Table 20 shows Zambia's position regarding manpower aid to 
education within the African Commonwealth group and in the 
rest of the British education aid constituencyin 1982/83. 
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Table 20 
British Education Manpower Aid to African Commonwealth 
Countries, by Functional Categories, 1982-1983. 
COUNTRY KELT TCO OSAS BESS CAT IV TOTAL 
Botswana 1 - 92 13 - 106 
Gambia - 1 5 - - 6 
Ghana 1 - - 15 2 18 
Kenya 5 - 81 26 - 112 
Lesotho - 2 11 13 - 26 
Malawi 4 - 8 95 - 107 
Nigeria - - - - 2 2 
Sierra Leone 5 - - 13 3 21 
Swaziland 2 - 32 8 - 42 
Tanzania 5 - - 11 - 16 
Uganda - - 12 - - 12 
Zambia 5 1 220 30 - 256 
Zimbabwe 1 - - - - 1 
TOTAL 29 4 461 224 7 725 
Zambia's % Share 17.2 47.7 13.3 35.3 
(Afr. 	 Commonw'lth) 
Zambia's 
(Global) % Share 22.3 36.3 11.6 24.1 
* = Negligible. 
Source: ODA, (1984) Education Sector Policy Paper. Table 5. 
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Zambia's share of the OSAS is extremely high. It would 
appear that Zambia is treated as a special case. 
Britain's manpower aid programme in Zambia is today the 
largest in the world. In 1988 there were 178 posts in the 
civil 	 service, parastatals, and 	 other 
	 institutions." 
Of these more than 50 per cent have been working in the 
education and training and related work. 
8.2.3 Aid to Training and Staff Development  
Parallel to manpower aid, Britain has been giving extensive 
assistance to Zambia's manpower training and staff 
development. The coverage of this aid has been so extensive 
and pervasive that no public sector can claim not to have 
benefited in one way or another at some point from British 
Council or other British training programmes. 
In 1965 there were 45 Zambians on ODM funded education and 
training programmes in the U.K. Both education and 
training programmes covered a large area of public sector 
activities. The concentration however appeared to be 
stronger in the area of education in the initial years.31  
By 1970 the number of scholarship awards for Zambia had 
progressively increased and diversified. Other sectors 
besides education had clearly built up their claims on the 
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scholarships. In the subject areas, the social sciences, 
and agriculture came close behind education. In the 
training area, public administration training programmes 
dominated all other fields. In both cases the priorities 
that were attached to the need to train manpower in those 
two fields are reflected in the number of awards allocated 
to them. In 1981 the number of ministries/departments 
receiving British Council training awards had reached 48 
in all.32 	 These ranged from parastatal companies and 
District Councils to large Ministries. The subjects and 
training fields covered even more extensive ground, from 
laboratory technology training to film production plant 
taxonomy, chemical engineering etc. Table 21 shows the 
extent of the coverage of the British Council education 
and training programmes. 
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Table 21 
British Council Sponsored Education/Training Programmes 
for Zambians by Sector, 1981 and 1982. 
NAND 
Co-operative 
Irrigation Engineering 
Agriculture Engineering 
Animal Husbandry 
Hydrology 
Poultry Husbandry 
Agriculture 
Lab. Technology 
Agric. Extension 
Fisheries Management 
Technical Education 
Vet. Lab. Science 
Agricultural Economics 
Technical Education 
Soil + Water Engineering 
Tropical Medicine 
Rural Social Development 
EDUCATION 
Teacher Education 
Education 
Health Education 
Education (Maths) 
Education Management 
Craft Design/Technology 
English Teaching 
Science Education 
Special Education 
Education TV Production 
Agricultural Science 
Education Administration 
Learning Resources 
DTEVT 
Engineering 
Technical Education 
Supply + Mat. Management 
Further Education 
Architecture 
Education 
Library Studies 
Education Administration 
HND Engineering 
Mechanical Engineering 
Printing 
Civil Engineering 
Physiotherapy 
Exam Management 
Management 
Advanced Radiography 
UNZA 
Electrical Engineering 
Industrial Studies 
Physics (PhD) 
Manpower Studies 
English 
Auto-Engineering 
Caflputer Science 
HEALTH 
Paediatric Nursing 
Lab. Technology 
Advanced Nursing 
Nuclear Medicine 
Pharmacy 
Nursing Administration 
Medical Physics 
Public Health 
Radiography 
MRCP (Medicine) 
Health Education 
Nursing (BSC) 
Technical Education 
Opthamology 
Drug Quality Control 
Food Technology 
X-Ray Dept. Administration 
Health Service 
Occupational Hygiene 
OTHERS 
Parliamentary Procedures 
Purchasing + Supply 
ICS Administration 
Law 
Cartography 
Geology 
Accountancy 
Project Management 
Aircraft Engineering 
Social Policy 
Pest Management 
Estate Management 
Industrial Relations 
Horticulture 
Agricultural Economics 
Land Survey Management 
Cost Accounting 
Training Management 
Building Engineering 
Accountancy AAT 
Commercial Forestry 
Analytical Chemistry 
Development Finance 
Telecoms Traffic 
Photolithography 
Tax Collection 
Quantity Surveying 
Ratings + Valuations 
ACCA 
Entomology 
Applied Statistics 
Book Production 
Pre-School Education 
Home Economics 
Customs + Excise 
Leather Technology 
Building Conservation 
SOURCE: DMDT (1983). 
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Until the introduction of the projectisation framework British 
scholarship awards to Zambia were rather open-ended. The 
procedure was that Ministries were given their share of awards, 
thereafter the Ministries and their departments nominated and 
later selected the candidates. These were then presented to 
the British Council for placement in U.K. institutions. This 
was a perfect example of a donor giving its recipient the 
autonomy to identify within the broad focus of its aid to 
education the manpower in need of further education and staff 
development. However, this liberty produced its own flaws. 
Procedures and criteria for selecting candidates were not tight 
nor was the manpower development planning and coordination very 
effective,33 consequently, undue emphasis in offering 
training to one category of personnel or subject area in a 
ministry or department was not at all uncommon. 
The focus of aid to education and training has been 
periodically shifted as has been indicated in the preceding 
chapter. New areas for support which 0DM identified in the mid 
1970s included Mathematics, Science and Home Economics subjects 
which then had just been designated developmental subjects. 
Nevertheless, when requests for training assistance which fell 
outside these areas arose, the British Council often treated 
them with discretion. Thus, despite the declared interest to 
support only a few selected subjects, the British Council at 
one time agreed to sponsor two Zambian teachers for training in 
Music and Special Education respectively.34 
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Although there have been shifts in the subject areas which ODA 
is willing to support, the key principles and objectives in the 
policy on aid to education and training have remained 
unchanged. They embrace political, and commercial interests, 
and the need to strengthen human resource development and 
institutional capacity in recipient countries. While this is 
true, there has been a paradox in the way ODA has pursued the 
objective relating to the need to strengthen institutional 
capacities in recipient countries. The case is explained 
below. 
ODA's sponsorship of Zambians to study in the U.K. benefits 
Zambia in many different ways. Students gain access to new 
technologies, management techniques, and other skills, not to 
mention the rich international experiences of studying in the 
U.K. However, the policy and practice of sending Zambians 
abroad for training has also in the process affected the 
capacity of local institutions to develop new training 
programmes and to strengthen existing ones. Britain and some 
other donors are not willing to allow a share of their 
scholarship awards to be tenable at the Zambian institutions. 
Nor has Britain been willing to disclose the actual amounts 
allocated for training awards, an important element in planning 
and negotiations. A little of the amount spent on training 
Zambians 	 in the U.K. could go some way in lifting and 
sustaining capacities in local institutions. It is not just 
access to international currency that local institutions would 
benefit from, it is a whole range of possibilities which would 
come with such kind of arrangements. 
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Today (1989/90) the cost of tuition alone for one Masters 
student for one academic year at the Institute of Education in 
London is £4,300. This amount would cover full cost fees for 
five foreign students (more if they are Zambians) at the 
University of Zambia in the Humanities, and Education areas. 
This of course raises questions about Britain's interest in 
strengthening local institutions. It would appear that Britain 
conceives the achievement of that objective in a way which does 
not see the sponsorship of Zambians for training programmes at 
local institutions as an important aspect in developing and 
strengthening local institutions. 
Admittedly, the issue under discussion is surrounded by a 
rather tricky situation. It is a fact that Britain makes 
contributions to the development and strengthening of Zambian 
institutions in other different ways including staff 
development. The argument is simply that Zambia does not have 
the liberty to decide whether to take up the scholarship awards 
for staff training or use that money earmarked for overseas 
training for improving the state of institutional facilities. 
Nor does Zambia have the privilege to decide where it wants its 
staff trained with the British scholarships that are offered. 
The demand to train some Zambians locally on ODA sponsorship 
raises a whole range of politics surrounding development aid. 
There is competitive protectionism on the part of Britain. The 
ODA and HMG Treasury know that British higher education 
institutions are as good if not better than many of their 
counterparts in the industrialised world. On this account they 
would find it hard to justify spending training money outside 
Britain. This is a case of tying British aid to British goods 
and services. The politics of responsibility also come into 
play in this issue. Donors are reluctant to extend their aid 
into other areas because they feel it is the responsibility of 
recipient governments to finance development and maintenance of 
facilities outside areas which donors are prepared to assist. 
This is a very tricky illustration in which donors are 
justified in refusing to render assistance, which in their 
opinion would only displace recipient governments' efforts. On 
the other hand donors have often used the responsibility 
argument as an easy defence mechanism when they do not want to 
provide requested assistance. There is also the consideration 
of British cultural diplomacy which has already been dealt with 
at some length in chapter 6. 	 Local training programmes would 
undermine the principles and objectives of cultural diplomacy 
which Britain pursues through education and training programmes 
offered in the U.K. 
Therefore, because British training awards like those of other 
donors answer to many calls other than development needs in 
Zambia, very little change in the British policy can be 
expected. In any case, the issue has now been overtaken by 
events. The introduction of the projectisation approach has 
meant fewer scholarship awards are offered, and many of these 
are tied to specific projects as essential inputs. This has 
already been implemented in Zambia.35  
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For some time now the ODA and the Directorate of Manpower 
Development and Training have been operating a unique shared 
funding arrangement for parastatal companies to send their 
personnel abroad for further training. To overcome this 
problem ODA agreed to support parastatal personnel for training 
and to pay 25 per cent of the total full cost fees for each 
student. The only condition was that the other 75 per cent of 
the fees was to be paid in local currency (Kwacha) to the DMDT. 
This money was earmarked for utilisation by local training 
institutions. The arrangement has achieved two objectives. In 
theory the arrangement should enable profitable parastatal 
companies to send their personnel abroad for training, but 
contrary to all expectations many parastatals have not taken 
advantage of the arrangement.36 The arrangement has created 
a small pool of financial resources which local institutions 
can use for training, development and improvement of local 
facilities. 
ODA agreed to this scheme because it does not breach the 
Treasury creed on aid. The numbers that have been involved 
have been too small to cause any serious upset in ODA's overall 
assistance to Zambia's training programme. It would be 
interesting to see if ODA would be persuaded to agree to such a 
funding arrangement for training programmes that are tenable at 
Zambian institutions. 
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8.2.4 Book Aid and Library Development  
Book aid to the sector's institutions and to public libraries 
has formed another important element in the whole configuration 
of British aid to Zambia's education and training development 
programme. Like training scholarships, it is difficult to 
imagine which public sector institution has not been at one 
point a beneficiary of British Council book assistance, either 
directly or indirectly. Assistance with books has usually 
taken two forms. Ad hoc and discretionary goodwill book 
presentations have been made by the British High Commission or 
the British Council to schools, higher education and training 
institutions or indeed to a specific subject area.37 The 
second mechanism is the long standing British Book Presentation 
(BPP). 
Like education and training scholarships, ODA book assistance 
has covered almost every conceivable subject in the sector's 
endeavours. This can be discerned from the wide range of 
subsectors which receive book support. In the MGEC and MHE the 
recipient institutions have in recent years ranged from subject 
associations to large institutions such as the University of 
Zambia. In 1984/85 fifty-one institutions received book 
support from ODA which amounted to £65,000.38 In 1985/86 the  
number of recipient institutions had risen to 57. By 1988/89 
the allocation for Zambia's BPP had risen to £130,000, covering 
50 institutions. The allocation between institutions tends to 
vary according to the identified needs. 
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The role which the BPP has played in the education and training 
development process in Zambia in recent years is quite obvious. 
In the face of increasing balance of payments difficulties, the 
government's ability to import educational books and other 
support supplies has been reduced drastically or completely 
ceased in some subsectors. The BPP has been assisting to fill 
those gaps. And for some time to come Zambia is going to 
continue to fall back on this assistance. This aid covers not 
only the supply of textbooks but other general and reference 
materials for institutional libraries. 
For a very long time the BPP has followed a simple 
administrative procedure. Local institutions participating in 
the scheme are asked to place orders for books worth the amount 
allocated to them. The orders are processed through the 
British Council who through their U.K. channels purchase the 
books. The books must be purchased from British publishers and 
book sellers. The BPP is now undergoing trial changes. A new 
look coupon system along the lines of the UNESCO scheme has 
been introduced.39 A few recipient countries including 
Zambia have been selected to take part in the trials. In the 
new scheme the scope has been widened to include a few Zambian 
bookshops to take part in the scheme. Bookshops can purchase 
coupons from the British Council with local currency. In turn 
the coupons enable bookshops to purchase books and other 
supplies from U.K. sources. There is no doubt that this is an 
excellent scheme in Zambia's present dire financial 
circumstances. 
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However, the economics of ODA's book assistance to Zambia 
raises a few questions. The scheme has been characterised by a 
single important restriction. That is, Zambia cannot use ODA's 
book money to purchase from the cheapest or any other source of 
its choice. Secondly, British books have been pouring into 
Zambian institutions at a time when the country has been facing 
perennial local publishing and printing problems at Kenneth 
Kaunda Foundation (KKF).40 Yet, under the conditions of the 
book assistance Zambia cannot use that money to accelerate the 
rehabilitation and the improvement of the publishing and 
printing industry. The paradox is further heightened by the 
fact that during the difficult years KKF has been going 
through, ODA has from time to time provided KKF personnel 
training scholarships knowing very well that at the end of 
their further training such personnel would be returning to a 
work environment in which conditions would not facilitate the 
maximum application of the new skills. The tying of bilateral 
aid to British goods and services accounts for this. And as 
long as ODA has minimum interest in developing Zambia's 
publishing and printing industry, Zambia can only expect the 
minimum of support from ODA. Dependence on British books and 
suppliers has been ensured by the application of the measures 
described here. In this way also Britain has ensured the 
maximum protection of Britain's book trade markets against 
other potential competitors. In the face of the current 
foreign exchange difficulties in Zambia the BPP ensures also 
that the British book industry is not cut off from the market. 
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0DM assistance was also instrumental in Zambia's establishment 
of the Zambia Library Service (ZLS) soon after independence. 
Britain provided technical assistance in the form of books and 
training of Zambians to run public libraries. ODA support to 
the ZLS has continued, in 1985 the BPP voted £3,037.50 for ZLS 
support. However, support to the ZLS from BPP has in general 
not been regular as has been the case with other sectors. In 
1987 and 1988 British Council did not allocate any money to 
ZLS.41 	 The BPP assistance has been concentrated in 
educational and training institutions where the need and demand 
for books has been extremely acute in recent years. With ever 
declining public expenditure on social services such as library 
services, and also being an institution which attracts very 
little donor funds, the ZLS has little commercial value to 
Britain's book industry. The case for other institutions is 
quite different. Most, if not all the other institutions 
covered by BPP fall into sectors which receive substantial 
financial aid from abroad. The relationship between this point 
and BPP is that, besides answering to direct recipient needs, 
the BPP is an introduction to and a directory of the British 
book industry. Through the BPP 'advertisement' it is always 
hoped that independent orders outside the British aid support 
could follow as a recent case illustrates. A British firm has 
just completed its supply of books worth around £2 million 
arising from the -African Development Bank (ADB) junior 
secondary school project in Zambia.42  
Table 22 shows the level of BPP support to Zambia in recent 
years. 
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Table 22 
BPP Expenditure on Approved Projects for Zambia by 
Sector, 1984-1988 (£) 
Sector 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
MGEC 1,600 11,727 44,000 25,000 
MHE 7,400 22,092 9,000 23,000 
UNZA 6,500 13,432 16,500 26,000 
DTEVT 18,000 15,997 9,900 19,000 
Health 8,500 5,670 16,500 16,000 
Agric 11,800 7,155 6,000 6,000 
Public Admin. 9,950 9,089 15,500 13,000 
TOTAL 63,750 85,162 140,000 117,400 128,000 
Source: Compiled from British Council BPP expenditure lists for 
Zambia. 
Note: (1) Public Administration covers a whole range of central, 
local government, and parastatal institutions and 
departments. 
(2) For 1986 no breakdown is given for the expenditure 
in the source. 
8.2.5 University Links  
Although somewhat removed from the mainstream of aid most 
people are familiar with, links between the various UNZA and 
CBU departments and their counterparts in British institutions 
have formed another channel through which ODA aid to education 
and training reaches Zambia. The British Council has played a 
key role in establishing these links, and often they have made 
the first initiative to sound the British interest in 
establishing links.43  
In 1988 there were ten links between UK Universities and the 
various departments at UNZA and CBU. These were: 
Subject Area 	 Zambia 
Bristol 	 Education 	 UNZA 
Glasgow 	 Vet. Medicine 	 UNZA 
Leeds 	 Physics 	 UNZA 
Stirling 	 Geography 	 UNZA 
Birmingham 	 Mathematics 	 UNZA 
Newcastle 	 Archt'& Environ' Stud. 	 CBU 
Swansea 	 Electr'& Electronics 	 UNZA 
Manchester 	 Manpower Research 	 UNZA 
Aberdeen 	 Environmental Studies 	 CBU 
London 	 Medicine 	 UNZA 
The administration of'the links is through the British Council 
and the Universities in the UK to whom funds for the links are 
given. The links cover the following: the exchange of staff 
U.K 
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and students, and donation of equipment by British universities 
to counterparts. Student exchange has been directed mainly at 
the staff development programme for the Universities. The 
links have been designed to serve among other purposes the 
following: institutional development, training of technical 
staff, course and curriculum development, technology transfer, 
and research collaboration. 
For Zambia the links are characterised by an unequal 
partnership. The Zambia institutions have entered into the 
link relationship as subordinate counterparts, especially from 
the point of resources. In short, they have little to offer to 
their counterparts from Britain. The limitations from the 
Zambian side are quite severe. If this is the case, why 
	
do 
ODA and British Council bother to create links with Zambian 
institutions that do not have half the required operational 
resources which could enhance the objectives of the links? 
One can give different explanations for this, but all of them 
arise from the way Britain has perceived the position of 
recipients' institutions in their portfolio of overseas 
economic and political interests. The link arrangements serve 
to maintain some British presence and continuity in recipients' 
institutions, most of which will have had already infusions of 
other British aid (books, BESS staff, scientific equipment etc). 
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The motivation to compete against other donors from an 
advantageous position forms another reason. Closely related to 
this is the need to maintain academic enclaves which would look 
to Britain for support. It must be noted that the two 
universities in Zambia have balkanised departments. Donors 
have taken up their areas of concentration. The School of 
Agriculture has a dominant Canadian and Belgian support. This 
extends to training of staff to provision of support resources 
such as vehicles. It is not surprising that even within this 
school clear boundaries exist between the Belgian supported 
Soil Science department and the rest of the School. The 
Economics department at UNZA has a link with a German 
university. The courtesy of steering away from counterparts' 
areas of interest by ODA may account for these and other 
departments not being on the British Council link list. The 
links also help Britain to maintain overseas departments and 
institutions in the orbit of its international academic network. 
The links also serve an important purpose of 'selling' the 
British academic industry. The links are therefore inward 
looking. It is also important not to see the links between UK 
institutions and their Zambian counterparts in isolation. The 
Zambian links are part of Britain's worldwide academic network 
which is centrally supported and controlled. From its position 
of weakness in resources. Zambia faces a very difficult task 
in becoming more independent. 
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Britain has also been involved in giving assistance to time 
specific projects. These have not been many but are equally 
important in following the trend of British aid to education. 
The Mathematics Textbook Pilot Project focused on assisting 
eighteen secondary schools that were initially involved in the 
trials 	 The KELT project (1980) in the DTEVT has 
concentrated on developing and improving communication skills 
through curriculum development, teacher training and staff 
development in ESP, and assistance with the development of 
effective national examinations in ESP.45 ODA has also for a 
long time provided support to the Curriculum Development Centre 
(CDC) through the funding of English Language Teaching adviser. 
The British Council is also providing a management service to 
the Zambia Mathematics and Science Teachers Education Project 
(ZAMSTEP). This is an EEC funded project in Zambia. Together 
with other projects outside the education and training sector, 
ODA has a large aid portfolio in Zambia. 
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8.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter it has been that in the first five years of 
Zambia's independence, the aid relationship between Britain and 
Zambia took place against a backdrop of thriving trade 
relations between the two countries. Within the African 
Commonwealth countries group Zambia had commanded a respectable 
position in British trade. Zambia's position as the main 
supplier of copper to Britain had enhanced Zambia's importance 
in its relationship with Britain. Whitehall felt then that 
some of its industries had become vulnerable because of 
Britain's heavy reliance on copper supplies from Zambia. The 
threat of political turmoil from the Rhodesian UDI cutting off 
or severely interrupting flows of British imports from the 
region had in particular caused great concern. Further 
evidence of Britain's large economic presence in Zambia in the 
immediate years after independence was on the number of major 
international British firms with subsidiary companies in 
Zambia. The copper prices were good, the economy was buoyant. 
This however, was quickly followed by a nationalisation policy 
and other controls over the economy, much to the displeasure of 
international companies. 
The period between 1971 and 1979 saw the Zambian economy going 
through progressive 'problems of adjustment and continuous 
decline. The net effect of the economic problems which started 
at the beginning of the 1970s appeared in their full maturity 
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in the 1980s. Zambia's trade position with Britain has 
correspondingly changed drastically. Apart from Zambia's own 
internal economic decline, several external 
	 factors 	 have 
intervened to give the Anglo-Zambian trade relationship a new 
structure. Today Britain perceives Zambia mainly in terms of 
possessing economic potential rather than power, and also being 
part of the important Southern African geopolitical belt. 
Politically, the Anglo-Zambian relationship has been fairly 
stable except for the running disagreements over the best 
strategies to adopt in making attempts to secure solutions ac 
the independence struggles in the region. The case of the 
political situation in South Africa has continued to be a 
source of frequent friction 	 in the Anglo-Zambian political 
relationship. Despite these frictions and Zambia's support to 
the marxist guerrilla movements on her borders, Britain and 
other Western countries which were opposed to a violent 
settlement of independence disputes maintained a warm 
relationship with Zambia. Isolating Zambia would have risked 
losing it to the Eastern camp. The strong thaw in East-West 
relations means that soon or later Britain must find new 
variables on which to base its perception of countries like 
Zambia. In all, Anglo-Zambian relations have existed in a 
broad and complex economic and political framework. In this 
the aid relationship has appeared as an extension of the core 
relationship, it 
	 is 	 not 	 independent. Aid has 
	 become 
increasingly linked to Britain's economic and political 
objectives overseas. These Britain is more prepared to defend 
than ever before. 
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Development objectives in British aid have never been stated 
in detail beyond that they seek to create self-reliance and 
secure sustainable growth. These are open-ended goals which 
often attract different interpretations both in conception and 
method of achievement. Self-reliance suggests a limited 
zoo-like induced development. This can satisfy limited needs 
and demands. Aid with its checks is designed to produce 
precisely this restrained type of development. The development 
environment in the developing world has changed. Whereas basic 
needs can be met by a carefully planned and executed 
self-reliant 	 economic and development programme, sustained 
development looks beyond local initiatives. For this, 
competitive economic growth and development come into play. 
A few recipient countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and South 
Korea have managed to embark on this course, much to the 
discomfort of industrialised countries. The challenge to 
donors is, in the face of these developments, can donors allow 
aid to induce or enhance competitive economic development? 
Britain's aid responses to education must be placed in this 
broad perspective. 
The profile of British aid to education and training in Zambia 
shows that, Zambia has not attracted any special major aid 
policy from ODA. Aid has been given according to ODA's global 
aid policy settings. However, within this framework it is 
known that ODA maintains a certain amount of policy discretion 
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to allow it to respond to special cases. These have been kept 
to the barest minimum for two reasons. Over the years Zambian 
officials have come to know well what ODA will agree to assist 
or not. Thus they will avoid taking a path they know will lead 
nowhere. ODA exercises its discretion to give assistance 
outside the designated frameworks very carefully to avoid 
upsetting set boundaries of expenditure and overall long-term 
objectives. 
ODA's application of its global policy goals to Zambia has 
revealed quite interesting features. On one hand the policy 
settings have always been reconciled with the broad needs of 
Zambia. This coincidence has been to the advantage of 
ODA-operations. Discussions that have been held on assistance 
to Zambia have been able to deal with clearly defined areas 
that already exist. ODA's manpower aid in the mid 1960s and 
book aid in the last decade fall into such categories. That 
ODA is dealing with an education and training system with 
multiple problems presents donors like Britain with unlimited 
opportunities to provide assistance. Almost every aspect in 
the system is in need of one form of assistance or another. On 
the other hand in avoiding country-specific aid policies ODA 
has failed to stand up to the challenges of the broader 
problems of recipient countries such as Zambia. The country's 
education and training development problems today go well 
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beyond the needs of English language teaching, mathematics and 
science. They also go well beyond the need to provide British 
supplemented or fully-funded staff. 
Yet it has been demonstrated that despite the rapidly declining 
conditions in Zambia's education and training system, ODA's 
support has not varied significantly in content or method, 
despite projectisation. The lack of explicit policy on aid to 
education and training on the part of the Zambian Government 
has unfortunately given unintended support to this situation. 
If Zambia had explicit policies on the aid it receives from the 
UK and other sources it is almost certain that ODA would have 
been compelled to respond to Zambia's needs in a more country 
specific manner. Aid process between UK and Zambia would then 
cease to be an exercise in Zambia fitting its needs into ODA's 
support framework, which is the case now. 
In terms of forms of assistance given to Zambia, British aid 
has maintained its major features. Britain has kept away from 
building projects. The concentration on human resource 
development and manpower aid continued to receive greater 
attention in the 1960s and early 1970s until the decision to 
scale down support came into force. Book aid and links between 
institutions have continued. Somehow the donation of books has 
not come under the project 
	 framework because the BPP is 
regarded as a project in itself. However, one is tempted to 
say that the changes that have occurred to British aid in 
Zambia have emerged from ODA's global response to its 
international aid constituency. Secondly, some of the changes 
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that have occurred in British aid to education in Zambia have 
been targeted at introducing closer scrutiny and selectivity in 
ODA's assistance. This again is a hallmark of ODA's support 
found in most countries of its aid constituency. In short, 
there has been no dramatic shift in policy which one could call 
a special policy response by ODA to Zambia. 
Using the case of some aspects of British aid to education and 
training in Zambia as a point of reference, the notion that 
external aid functions as supplementary resources is rather 
shallow and too naive. The notion arises from the narrow 
economic sense of the need to fill up the deficits in national 
development resources. Hence the adoption of what appears to 
be a value-free proposition. Relating the supplementary aid 
theory to the Anglo-Zambian aid relationship, a few practical 
difficulties emerge. It has been argued in this chapter that 
the real aid still lies hidden between what ODA has given to 
Zambia and the hidden costs Zambia has had to carry in 
receiving foreign aid. Notice that these are over and above 
the contractual counterpart funding which sometimes Zambia has 
been asked to meet. There are also opportunity costs. Because 
ODA and other donors have carried the responsibility of making 
important decisions on external inputs which should go into the 
Zambian 	 education system, Zambians 	 have 	 lost. 	 The 
supplementary aid theory therefore proves to be an inadequate 
explanatory framework for what aid is and what it seeks to 
achieve as observed in the case of British aid. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SWEDISH EDUCATION AID POLICIES AND PRIORITIES 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses Swedish education aid policies and 
priorities from the time SIDA was established in 1962. The 
key education policy documents of 1972 and 1986 are closely 
examined to trace and compare any major shifts in policies 
and priorities. The chapter attempts also to identify 
factors that have exerted some influence on Swedish 
policies. 
The stated points of departure in SIDA's aid policy for 
education and training are that it recognises its policy and 
priorities are a function of many factors. SIDA 
acknowledges that recipient governments' own education 
policies and priorities have had some influence on its own. 
Other factors that have exerted influence on SIDA are said 
to be other bilateral donors' policies, SIDA's education 
specialists and consultants, SIDA's now long experience in 
the field of education in developing countries, and Sweden's 
own domestic politics and ideologies 0AcOki good concerning 
education.1 The degree to which each of these factors 
has influenced SIDA's policies has tended to vary. 
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Education and training were the first areas to receive 
Swedish development aid, and for a long time remained the 
mainstay of Swedish development assistance. Emphasis on 
education and training in earlier Swedish assistance stemmed 
from that country's decision to give assistance to sectors 
in which Sweden had sufficient experience. Vocational 
education and training in particular had a high reputation 
in Sweden as being very well organised and practical.2 In 
the mid 1960s Swedish development assistance came up against 
three related factors: the accelerated decolonisation 
process, especially in Africa, the lack of resources needed 
to develop human resources for the development process, and 
the height of manpower planning activity in the context of 
the human capital theory. The development debate then was 
dominated by the assumptions which saw manpower planning and 
human resource development as the most critical factor 
needed in development process. The weight of these factors 
exerted some influence on early Swedish responses to the 
development needs of newly independent countries.3  
Starting with a small overseas aid constituency of three 
countries in 1961, Sweden increased its programme countries 
to eight a decade later. Today the constituency covers 
seventeen politically and economically divergent countries. 
The range extends far, from the erstwhile embattled 
revolutionary state Nicaragua to large and small multiparty 
states such as India and Botswana. This could be 
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interpreted as Sweden's extension and expression of its 
policy of neutrality in the international development aid 
framework. 
There are however some interesting features in the profile 
of SIDA's programme countries. Ten out of the nineteen 
programme countries are former British colonies. And, nine 
countries in the aid constituency are located in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region, with a further concentrated presence 
in 	 Southern 
	 Africa: 	 Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
	 Zimbabwe. In 
fact, this group of countries forms nearly 50 per cent of 
SIDA's aid constituency. Except for Tunisia, it is quite 
clear that Sweden has not made inroads into Francophone 
Africa. Could this be attributed to the economic grip 
France has maintained on its former colonies or could it be 
linked to Sweden's preference for English as its first 
foreign language? In terms of education assistance 
disbursement, the Commonwealth group in SIDA's constituency 
received 63.5 per cent of the MSEK3.120 disbursed between 
1981 and 1986 to all programme countries.4 That SIDA's 
aid to education is concentrated in the Commonwealth 
programme countries, and in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
evident from SIDA's aid statistics since 1980. 
Because there are other developing countries with more 
unfavourable economic and social conditions than some of the 
countries being aided by SIDA, it is difficult to justify 
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SIDA's selection of programme countries on purely social and 
economic need. Six of SIDA's eleven programme countries in 
the 1980 decade were classified as middle income 
countries.5  
Among the low-income countries that in recent years would 
have presented a deserving case to SIDA are, Uganda, Burkina 
Faso, Chad and others. The economic odds against these 
countries have ranged from negative GNP growth rates, to 
high 	 inflation, rapidly 	 increasing 	 populations, 
disproportionate government receipts and expenditure, 
disabling external debt repayment and educational decline. 
For example in 1983 primary school participation rates in 
Burkina Faso, Niger and Somalia were 27 per cent, and 21 per 
cent respectively. A corresponding pattern existed for 
their secondary school sectors.6 These features compare 
very unfavourably with those of selected programme countries 
like 	 Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia 	 and 	 Lesotho. It 	 would 
therefore appear that Sweden, like other donors, applies 
selection criteria which do not restrict itself to a single 
consideration. 
Countries with socialist oriented development programmes 
certainly seem to have attracted Sweden's attention. In 
this 	 category 	 are 	 countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, Cuba, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola 
	
and 
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Guinea Bissau. It cannot be ruled out that economic 
potential is another important factor in selection of 
programme countries such as Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana. 
Anti-apartheid attitudes and anti-colonialism have also been 
important political factors which have attracted sympathetic 
attention from Sweden. Thus, many independence liberation 
movements in Africa received considerable practical support 
from Sweden during their struggles. The PAIGC 
(Guinea-Bissau), FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), SWAPO 
(Namibia), ANC (South Africa), ZAPU and ZANU (Zimbabwe) have 
been among the movements which have received considerable 
assistance from Sweden. This support and development aid 
have served to highlight the achievement of Sweden's 
internationalist political objectives. There is a 
possibility that Sweden, like other donors, could expect in 
the short or long term to derive economic benefits from 
these aid relationships. Therefore like many other donors 
Sweden seems to pursue a range of objectives in its 
assistance programme. 
Although Sweden had been giving development aid as far back 
as 1945, it was not until 1962 that Sweden passed a Bill to 
create SIDA, an institution, which could undertake an 
enlarged scope of official development assistance. 
9.2 The 1962 Bill 
Among other adverse economic and social conditions which 
motivated Sweden to create a formal framework for assistance 
were the problems of inadequate education facilities and 
poor living conditions which faced newly independent 
states.? 
	
The cornerstones of the 1962 Bill were 
international solidarity, humanitarian concern, the need for 
social equality and social justice. This policy set up an 
assistance framework in which the transfer of Swedish 
resources to developing countries could be promoted and 
regulated. The Bill in Sweden came against the background 
of similar initiatives in a few industrialised countries.8  
Although SIDA had been involved in a number of education and 
training projects abroad, directly or indirectly through the 
multilateral agencies, it was not until 1972 that 	 it 
produced its first policy on aid to education. Before that 
it had been easier for SIDA to operate without an elaborate 
policy framework. The aid constituency was small then and 
aid was concentrated into the single area of vocational 
training and technical education. 
Internationally, this policy came against a background of 
important events in the aid field. The UN's first Decade of 
Development had just come to an end. Inventories of 
successes and failures were being compiled by countries and 
relevant multilateral agencies. The World Bank had 
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published its education sector policy paper in 1971. The 
paper drew attention to the quantitative aspects of 
education development and other trends in education systems. 
It paid particular attention to efficiency and productivity, 
education and labour markets, and the financial constraints 
facing developing countries.9 	 The Kericho conference in 
Kenya in 1966 had brought together some African countries to 
assess their post 1961 Addis Ababa conference achievements 
in relation to rural development and employment.10 The 
Commonwealth Secretariat produced a report in 1970 which 
dealt with issues concerning out-of-school education and 
training for agricultural development.11 At the time the 
policy was made a number of Swedes who had worked abroad in 
international organisations such as the World Bank had 
already returned to work for SIDA.12 Together these 
provided a wealth of experience from which SIDA could draw 
some guidance. 
9.3 Policies 
9.3.1 The 1972 Policy  
The policy's point of departure was that it identified the 
following problems in education systems of developing 
countries: 
1. The 	 high cost of education in relation to 
available resources. 
2. The dominance of western values in the education 
systems. 
3. Inadequate provision of primary education to the 
majority of children. 
4. The high priority assigned to the traditional 
' theoretical' secondary and tertiary educatiov.,as 
against agricultural and vocational training." 
This was a belated indictment of the inherited colonial 
education system in most of the developing countries. In 
making attempts to address these problems SIDA took note of 
the priorities which had been identified for developing 
countries by some multilateral agencies. The UN for example 
assigned a high priority to the following aspects of 
education and training in the second decade of development: 
a. Teacher training 
b. Technical education 
c. Vocational training 
d. Supplementary vocational training 
e. Development of the 	 curricula 	 and 	 teaching 
materials. 
f. Use of media in education.14 
Against this background SIDA drew up its own priorities in 
education and training sectors as follows: 
1. a. Non-formal education including adult education. 
b. Education for employment promotion and raising of 
production. 
c. Elementary basic education. 
d. Vocational and agricultural training. 
e. Training and supplementary training of teachers 
and administrators within non-formal education, 
vocational training and primary schools. 
2. 	 a. Secondary education especially that which is 
directed to science, technology and agriculture. 
b. Training and supplementary training of secondary 
school teachers. 
c. Tertiary education.15  
Many donors had become sensitised to the movement towards 
providing more practical, rural and agriculturally oriented 
education and training. Sweden's long experience in such 
fields as vocational training and the Folk High School was 
an additional source of influence in the choice of 
priorities." 
The policy pledged to provide three forms of assistance: 
financial, material 	 support 	 including 	 buildings 	 and 
textbooks, and the supply of personnel. In technical 
assistance SIDA put great emphasis on the need to provide 
personnel who could provide outreach effects in their work. 
Planners, administrators, and teacher trainers were all 
considered to be in this category. 
The key aspects which characterised the 1972 policy were 
that it was highly prescriptive, stricter, and specific 
on the target areas to which Swedish assistance should go. 
The framework for assistance had been worked out from a 
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Swedish perspective.17 	 The assumptions were that what 
had worked well in Sweden's development process should be 
good and also work well for developing countries. This was 
clearly an attempt by Sweden to internationalise some 
aspects of Swedish experiences in the field of education and 
training. The policy was also based on strong elements of 
idealism. This and the sufficient international experience 
and knowledge of the depth of the problems in developing 
countries helped to shape Sweden's approach in development 
aid. 
Following the publication of the policy in 1972, SIDA 
initiated many education projects in Bangladesh, Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In accordance with 
the policy guidelines, assistance concentrated on vocational 
training and technical education projects. For example, 
between 1979 and 1986 SIDA's assistance to education and 
training in Sri lanka went to the establishment of an 
institute 	 for 	 industrial 	 foremen/supervisors, pre- 
vocational, vocational, technical, and science 
	 education, 
and educational planning and management. The MONAP Projects 
in Mozambique had a similar concentration on the 
establishment of training institutions. The areas covered 
were agricultural and veterinary training. Between 1974 and 
1984 SIDA assisted Kenya with the expansion of technical 
education. In Tanzania assistance went to the establishment 
of the Moshi Vocational Training Centre and also to the 
improvement of the National Vocational Training Division. 
Other assistance went to support qualitative aspects such as 
education materials production in Botswana, Ethiopia, India, 
and Mozambique.18  
There is evidence of many achievements made with Swedish aid 
in the education and training sectors of the recipient 
countries.Certainly Swedish capital aid has helped many 
recipient countries to build education and training 
institutions. However, SIDA cannot claim that these 
achievements have moved the recipient countries much closer 
to 	 peace, freedom, social justice, and social equality. 
What assistance did was to provide great amounts of relief 
and resources in areas where there was acute scarcity. This 
perhaps removed the first obstacle to initiating a self-
generating development process. 
SIDA's response to the much derided education systems in 
developing countries was rather paradoxical. Western models 
of education, weak or broken indigenous teaching traditions, 
and heavy conformity with western values, are among the 
aspects SIDA considered obstructive to educational 
development 
	 in recipient countries.19 	 In Africa, for 
example, education systems were 
	 criticised 	 for 	 being 
examination and certificate oriented.20 Looking at the 
projects undertaken by SIDA before and after 1972 there is 
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little evidence to show that the Authority made any attempts 
to redress the weaknesses it had identified. Instead, most 
of its projects became merely additional western models in 
the system that was already congested with other alien 
models or experimental projects. On the one hand this 
highlights the limitations of Swedish idealistic optimism in 
its attempts to induce change in foreign social systems. 
But, above all SIDA found it difficult to avoid getting its 
projects embedded in the existing entrenched western 
oriented education systems. This is a frustrating reality 
which SIDA has had to come terms with in developing 
countries. 
In 1982 SIDA produced a guideline paper on assistance to 
education. 
9.3.2 The 1982 Paper 
This paper had been preceded by a Parliamentary directive in 
1978 which urged SIDA to direct its aid resources towards 
the following areas: economic growth, economic and social 
equality, political and economic independence, and also the 
development of democracy. A critical discussion of these 
objectives follows later. 
SIDA's emphasis on primary education is reflected in its 
assistance to the sub-sectors as shown below: 
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Table 23 
Education Assistance Disbursement to Sub-Sectors 
1982-1987 
Sector 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Primary 40 29 49 58 55 58 
Secondary 6 16 9 5 3 3 
Tertiary 5 7 1 2 2 3 
Vocational 34 27 23 22 26 21 
Adult 11 13 8 10 8 8 
Misc 4 8 10 3 6 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: SIDA (1989) Appendix 3. 
However, as 	 a percentage of the bilateral assistance, 
education aid has been on a slight decline since the 
beginning of the 1980s as shown in Table 24 below. 
Table 24 
Education Assistance as a Percentage Share of Total 
Bilateral Assistance, 1982-1987 
Function 	 1982 	 1983 	 1984 	 1985 	 1986 	 1987 
Bilateral 3615.7 	 ' 806.3 	 3972.4 	 4283.4 	 4649.5 5045.3 
Education 284.0 246.2 314.9 250.0 242.9 276.3 
% Share 	 7.9 	 6.4 	 7.9 	 5.8 	 5.2 	 5.5 
Source: SIDA (1989). 
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Correspondingly, the proportion of education 	 assistance 
going to individual programme countries has reflected this 
trend. In the case of Tanzania the drop in assistance has 
been over 50 percent in the period between 1983 and 1987. 
Some countries such as Cuba, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Swaziland 
have now been dropped altogether from the list of the 
education programme countries. It is not yet clear why 
these countries have been dropped. Could SIDA claim to have 
accomplished its mission in these countries? Or are these 
eliminations part of its rationalisation of its assistance? 
Are they meant to give way to new programme countries? 
Table 25 shows the changes that have taken place in SIDA's 
aid to the education sector in the recent years. 
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1987/88 
Guinea Bissau 
India 16  2% 
Mocambigu• 21% 
Sri Lanka 6% 
Botswana 13% 
Tanzania 19% 
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Z•mbi• 8% 
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11111111111 
 
Bangladesh 8% 
Angola 9% 
'7/ 
Ethiopia 12% 
Botswana 12% 
a Sri Lanka 
Ouln•• Bissau 
India 111 VI  
Kenya 4% 
Mocamblou• 4%. 
Portugal I 
Ethiopia 18% 
Swaziland 2 
Tanzania 34% 
Vietnam 0% 
Table 25 
Education Assistance by Country 1983/84 and 1987/88 
1983/84 
Zimbabwe 19% 
Source: SIDA (1989) Appendix 2. 
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SIDA's education projects have included the provision of 
equipment and furniture to 500 SIDA financed schools in 
Botswana, a national literacy programme mounted jointly with 
GTZ and UNICEF in Botswana, assistance to the Teaching Aids 
Production Unit (TAPU) in Tanzania. Other areas were 
education materials printing programmes, special education, 
teacher training, educational planning, vocational training 
and adult education.21 	 It is evident here that SIDA's 
assistance was quite widespread with some accent on the 
qualitative aspects. Towards the mid 1980s SIDA's response 
to the growing crisis in education in its Southern African 
constituency turned to the need to provide more qualitative 
inputs into the education systems. 
The period between 1972 and 1986 when a new policy came 
into effect saw rapid changes in the socio-economic 
conditions of SIDA's African programme countries. Adverse 
social conditions were emerging as a result of declining 
economic performance in most countries. Education was one 
of the social services that quickly bore the brunt of the 
crisis. Ironically, it was around this very time that many 
programme countries initiated extensive educational reforms. 
Four liberation movements which Sweden had actively supported 
had become full fledged governments in Mozambique, Angola, 
Guinea Bissau, and Zimbabwe. Consequently the scope of 
Swedish assistance to these countries had to widen to deal 
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with the needs of national development after the liberation 
wars. For donors like SIDA this period was an anxious time. 
They watched to see which direction the reforms would take 
and also assessed the impact of the economic crisis and the 
implications which these factors had for external assistance. 
9.3.3 The 1986 Policy  
The main cornerstones of the Swedish development aid 
programme remained unchanged in the 1986 policy objectives. 
Social development and equality, democracy, and independence 
remained as the guiding posts. In education SIDA 
conceptualises equality in terms mainly of access to and 
participation in education programmes by different social 
groups in society. Reaching the slow learners and the 
handicapped learners forms an important part of this 
objective. Access to education is also perceived to be 
a strategy which can bring about greater social and economic 
equality.22 
These are all relevant objectives in SIDA's programme 
countries. Their operationalisation however is challenging, 
They are even more exacting when directed at developing 
countries' social and economic contexts. If SIDA had 
complete policy control over its programme countries' 
education systeMs its commitment to welfare education 
would yield quick results. But this is not the case. 
There is no doubt at all that SIDA's assistance to education 
has enabled more children to enter school systems in its 
programme counties. However, greater equality of access to 
and participation in education programmes has yet to be 
achieved at significant levels in both primary and secondary 
schools. Except Cuba, since 1970 all of SIDA's programme 
countries have shown little improvement in the attempts to 
narrow the participation gap between females and males in 
the primary school sector.23 	 Examination of access to 
schooling under other labels, social labels, might reveal 
even more startling trends. In this objective SIDA is up 
against odds which go well beyond the need to provide extra 
classroom space. The social attitudes of some people 
towards education, economic factors, domestic policies, and 
donor policies are all parts of the problem being addressed. 
The pursuit of greater social and economic equality in 
developing countries presents a different set of debatable 
issues. Education provides opportunities to change one's 
socio-economic position, but it does 	 not 	 ensure 	 the 
achievement of equality. The notion of equality brings into 
play many complex social and economic factors which 
education cannot overcome. Today the situation is even more 
difficult. The economic adjustment measures being 
implemented in, for example, the Sub-Saharan African 
countries are making the movement towards this objective 
more difficult for recipient governments. Cuts in public 
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spending on social services and the accent on privatisation 
of social services such as education stand in the way of 
this objective. Therefore SIDA is in a much weaker position 
in trying to implement it. 
The goal of independence in SIDA's aid programmes has two 
functions, to educate and train indigenous manpower with a 
view to reducing the recipient countries' dependence on 
expatriate manpower, and to enable recipients to move more 
towards independent education development programmes. Both 
are 	 well 
	
meaning 
	 objectives. However, although 
	 many 
successes have already been achieved in the field of donor 
supported training programmes, experience has shown that 
once physical dependence on expatriates has been removed or 
reduced it has been replaced by psychic and institutional 
dependence on external assistance. This is even more 
disabling in terms of developing local initiatives. It 
limits the independence which donors like SIDA are helping 
to achieve in to their recipient countries. Similarly, 
SIDA's conviction that its aid would move recipient 
countries towards independent development needs careful 
examination. Chapter six has shown how donors aid 
preferences have the potential to distort national 
priorities. 
SIDA's 1986 policy objectives are balanced and welfare 
oriented. They are well meaning in their own right. 
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However, they must be seen against the background of the aid 
environments in recipient countries and SIDA's operations in 
the field. 
SIDA's 1986 policy guidelines for aid to education and 
training present a profile full of significant new features. 
Unlike its 1972 predecessor, the draft of this policy was 
subjected to scrutiny across a wide spectrum of people 
within Sweden and also among the recipients. This was a 
well meaning gesture. The ground setting of the policy 
adopted a rather sober and reflective approach to many 
issues in development assistance to education. Major shifts 
on previously key areas in SIDA's assistance to education 
are very evident in the 1986 guidelines. There is also a 
recognition by SIDA of the entrenchment of the colonial 
heritage and its strong influence on the educational systems 
in many developing countries. 
Drawing on its now long experience in the education field, 
SIDA has re-examined its position on some key areas of its 
assistance, such as practical training. SIDA believes this 
programme and a few others have become too expensive to be 
made available on a broader basis.24 Plant requirements 
in practical subjects have been found to be advanced and 
expensive. Teachers too require an extensive training 
background. Vocational training and other aspects of 
technical education had featured very prominently in the 
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1972 policy document and also in previous Swedish 
assistance. 
On formal education and training SIDA has conceded that 
there is a need for an institutionalised type of training 
connected to the work place.25 	 This marks a departure 
from the 1972 objective which put priority on non-formal and 
adult education. There is also an attempt to take a 
balanced view on many issues. Thus, while emphasising that 
SIDA's support should go to education programmes which are 
directed at raising rural agricultural production, attention 
to the needs of urban populations has also been called for. 
9.3.3.1 Priorities  
The most outstanding comparative feature in the 1986 policy 
is the designation of priorities. The policy has directed 
SIDA to put more emphasis on assistance than before on basic 
education. The scope of this has however been enlarged to 
include programmes of various types rather than primary 
education alone. There is also a move to concentrate on 
areas where Swedish performance has been particularly good. 
The following are also in the priority category: 
institutional vocational training, apprentice training, 
maintenance aspects, education planning, natural science, 
and technical subjects, public service training, and 
production of textbooks and teaching aids. As for 
assistance to other programmes, SIDA 	 is 	 required 	 to 
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determine its response on an individual basis after a 
careful analysis of the request and a consideration of the 
political goals of Swedish development cooperation.26  
The document is not explicit on what those political goals 
are, consequently there is some inevitable confusion. It is 
not clear whether SIDA is making reference to the goal of 
promoting democracy and political autonomy among recipients 
or to a set of new political goals within SIDA which have 
yet to be made public. 
9.3.3.2 Technical Assistance  
The policy envisages that foreign personnel in key positions 
and for special assignments are still going to be needed by 
developing countries. Against this background Swedish 
personnel going out on technical assistance assignments are 
expected to be engaged on a long term basis as a way of 
providing effective service. The view of some SIDA 
personnel is that previous short-term assignments were 
unsatisfactory, especially when considered against the odds 
of working in new environments, the scale of some of the 
programmes and the need to provide a sustained service.27  
The decision on long term technical assistance appears 
therefore to have come in response to SIDA's own lessons 
learnt in the field. 
The most dramatic change in technical assistance concerns 
the guidelines for Swedish personnel in Swedish projects in 
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which foreign personnel participate. The policy urges SIDA 
to project a more distinctive profile of Swedish 
participation in such projects than had been the case 
before. This is a new emphasis in SIDA's position which for 
a long time had been liberal. Until the coming of this 
policy SIDA had paid little attention to the overt politics 
of image-projection which characterised the projects of many 
other donors. Under the previous provisions foreign 
nationals were employed by SIDA to work on short or long 
term projects. The emphasis moves SIDA into a role of 
conscious image-projection and also introduces overt 
protectionism in Swedish education projects. 
SIDA's new position on technical assistance could be 
explained in different ways, all of which point to its 
attempts to change, to adapt, and above all to engage in the 
aid business following the common donor practices.29  
Given the long period SIDA has been in this business now, it 
is also possible that SIDA feels it has built up a cadre of 
Swedish nationals who can attend to SIDA's aid work abroad 
without as much recourse as before to foreign personnel. 
And yet, SIDA continues to engage non-Swedish consultants, 
to send recipient countries students for training to 
non-Swedish institutions, to have a non-exclusive 
procurement policy - although a strong preference for 
Swedish products is evident. 
9.3.3.3 Forms of Assistance  
Besides capital assistance, the new policy has pledged to 
extend support to some of the recipients' recurrent costs in 
the poorest recipient countries. This assistance does not 
however cover teachers' salaries. Recurrent cost assistance 
is not a favourite item on the agendas of donors. Many 
regard it as a bottomless pit. The opposition Swedish 
Conservative Party and the export promotion interest groups 
are not at all supportive of SIDA providing local cost 
financing on the commercial grounds that such assistance 
gives the recipients much needed foreign exchange which they 
can use for all types of imports, including those from 
Sweden's commercial competitors.30  
While SIDA's decision to provide this kind of assistance has 
been motivated by the sheer need to reduce the financial 
hardships facing recipient countries, the move also raises 
questions regarding how far the boundaries of development 
assistance should extend. Offers of external aid in this 
area may serve only to block the development of local 
resource development initiative. 
9.3.3.4 Overseas Training 
SIDA's expenditure on staff development and in-service 
training across- all the sectors it provides aid to is quite 
enormous. It is also common knowledge that most SIDA 
funded training programmes have in the past directed 
students to third countries, mainly the U.K., Canada and 
U.S.A. Yet, despite this large involvement in this area and 
SIDA officials revelation that Sweden intended to increase 
its stock of Third World students, the 1986 policy (English 
version) has kept quiet on this key aid item. 
Sweden has started hosting training programmes for which 
previously students from recipient countries were sent to 
the U.K. or Canada. In 1987 thirty-four students attended 
various short courses and attachments in Sweden31. The 
courses ranged from telecommunication administration and 
management to financial 	 management, physical 	 planning, 
personnel 	 management, economic 	 statistics, tax 
administration and local government structure. Together the 
courses and attachments represented 114 man weeks. In 1988 
the number of trainees rose to sixty-three, and carried 
behind them 567 man training months. This excludes the 
Masters training programme period for fifteen Zimbabwean 
students not indicated in the SIDA report. Correspondingly, 
the range of courses and Swedish institutions providing 
training has widened. Courses included office machine 
repairs, teacher training, applied technical maintenance, 
foundry 	 work, industrial 	 electricity 	 and 	 public 
administration.32 This development represent a new policy 
front with far wider implications for Sweden, the U.K., 
Canada, U.S.A., and the recipients. 
Although the mechanics of these training and attachment 
programmes are not yet fully known, a few points appear to 
be quite certain. The number of trainees is progressively 
increasing. SIDA or the Swedish Institute has assumed 
additional responsibilities in the placement of students and 
student welfare. This role is identical to that of the 
British Council. In this policy SIDA is pursuing, both 
directly and indirectly, a programme of cultural diplomacy. 
Trainees are going to be exposed to Swedish industrial and 
public administration culture as much as they would have 
been exposed in Canada or Australia. This aspect is 
important for Sweden's long term trading relationship with 
recipient countries. As fara0-vitrecipients are concerned, 
this part represents a new dimension in their donor-
recipient relationship. It has opened up another training 
front and could provide more overseas training opportunities. 
Donor countries that have previously housed SIDA funded 
staff development training programmes should expect 
progressive cuts in the number of SIDA sponsored students. 
The accent on competition against other donors is quite 
evident. Another way of looking at this development is 
simply that SIDA has chosen to fall into line with trends in 
foreign assistance.33  
9.4 SAREC 
Since establishment in 1972 SAREC has played a key role in 
promoting research activities in developing countries. Its 
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activities are important in the task of attempting to 
measure the total sum of SIDA's development aid activities. 
A trace of SAREC's activities are also important in 
attempts to see Swedish aid in a broader perspective. 
SAREC's assistance to development research has covered a 
very wide spectrum of subject areas in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. The subject areas have ranged from religion 
to land nationalisation, health planning, and a survey of 
the working capacity of Liberian males suffering anaemia of 
chronic malaria.34 	 The investment into these programmes 
has been enormous as some of the projects have had a life 
span of several years. At the centre of SAREC's assistance 
have been a number of Swedish academic or research 
institutions which cooperate with their counterparts in 
developing countries. Part of the link arrangement here has 
involved the acceptance of doctoral students from 
cooperating developing countries at Swedish institutions to 
do research. 
In 1978 Swedish institutions had research contacts with more 
than 79 developing countries. This cooperation has been 
concentrated on mainly SIDA's programme countries, as Table 
26 shows. 
Table 26 
The Number of Swedish institutions Cooperating 
with Developing Countries 
Country No. of Swedish Coop' Institutions 
India 40 
Tanzania 30 
Kenya 29 
Ethiopia 26 
Nigeria 21 
Pakistan 12 
Egypt 11 
Mozambique 2 
Vietnam 4 
Guinea-Bissau 4 
Cuba 6 
Source: 	 SAREC (1978, 147) 
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At that time the balance of institution contacts tilted more 
towards Africa (54%), mainly in Central and Southern Africa. 
It is important to note that besides SAREC funded research a 
small number of research activities are supported by the 
Swedish business community. Today SAREC has an office in 
Harare, a mark of a decentralisation process and possibly 
increased activities. 
The significance of SAREC's research activities lies in 
their coverage of subject areas and their implications for 
Sweden as a donor country. In helping to solve some of the 
problems in developing countries through research, SAREC has 
in the process built up vast knowledge for Sweden. This is 
important for Sweden's broader relations with the outside 
world. Consultants often find it useful information. The 
cooperation schemes also serve a useful function of being 
entry points for Swedish interests in the programme 
countries. 
9.5 Broader Cooperation Framework 
Sweden's approach in Africa was a decade ago described as 
'an approach which combines big business operations with one 
of the most idealistic aid programmes'.35 Sweden's 
business interests in Africa date back to the 1950s when 
Sweden and Liberia jointly owned and ran Lamco. Since then 
the boundaries of Swedish business interests in Africa have 
crossed many borders. Swedish companies have been 
interested in specific as well as general industrial 
projects and investments in Africa. Swedish companies were 
keen to take part in the planned extensions of the Cahora 
Bassa hydroelectric Scheme in Mozambique.36 There are now 
two types of Swedish business presence in developing 
countries, the direct investment subsidiary companies of 
transnationals, and the joint ventures under the financing 
arrangements of Swedfund. The latter are generally small 
scale operations. 
Among the Swedish transnational companies that have been 
operating in developing countries are the following: 
Saab-Scania, Volvo, Tetra Pak, Sweco, Svenska Rayon, 
Ericsson, SKF, Sandvik, Atlas 	 Copco, Stal, Cellwood 
Machinery, Artin-Kores, Emahart Teckni, Skega, Stafsjo Bruk, 
and Smedmark.37 This list represents a whole wide range 
of products and services. In economic and commercial terms 
the list represents Sweden's partial competition against 
rival products and services. Volvo trucks have to compete 
against Leyland—Daf, Mercedez Benz, Renault or Fiat trucks. 
Where does this all fit in SIDA's aid business? 
Although only a small percentage of Swedish bilateral aid is 
tied, it is common knowledge that almost 50 per cent of aid 
returns to Sweden through purchases and service payments. 
Therefore the Swedish aid represents commercial and trade 
opportunities in overseas countries for Swedish companies. 
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SIDA is not only aware of this fact, but has also made 
arrangements within its structure to facilitate the 
companies' access to new trading markets where they do not 
exist yet. Through the same arrangements recipients are 
able to get access to Swedish suppliers through SIDA's 
purchasing department.38 Some Swedish companies have won 
large contracts in SIDA's overseas aid projects." What 
emerges here is a strong pointer that the Swedish companies 
may not be as distant from their country's overseas aid as 
people might think. But how close is aid to education and 
training to this reality? 
It is important to note that aid to education is nothing but 
essentially money to be spent on project goods and services. 
It can be the purchase of hardware or the engagement of 
short-term feasibility study consultants. The larger the 
proposed aid investment in education and its projects, the 
more likely that Swedish companies would feel inclined to 
bid for contracts. Aid to education is perceived by Swedish 
companies in terms of its potential to provide contracts and 
openings for marketing Swedish products and services. The 
consulting services of such companies as the Inter-Science 
Group, and 
	 Winblad 	 AB 	 have been highlighted in the 
subsequent chapters. Other factors being equal, this makes 
aid to education as attractive to Swedish companies as aid 
to aspects of industrial development. 
The overall trade relationship between Sweden and African 
countries for example has shown a mixed profile. Table 27 
makes an attempt to highlight the level of Swedish trade 
relationship with some African countries. 
Table 27 
Sweden's Volume of Foreign Trade (Exports)to Selected African Countries 
and Years, 1974 - 1988 
(Million US Dollars) 
Country 1974 1976 1978 1980 1984 1987 1988 
AFRICA 504 429 627 707 736 789 683 
Angola 11 14 27 66 26 21 30 
Egypt 35 54 88 141 - 173 178 
Ethiopia 5 5 15 13 30 46 54 
Ghana 7 9 8 12 3 5 6 
Kenya 21 13 24 34 16 31 31 
Nigeria 27 71 123 120 63 34 40 
South Africa* 134 97 91 180 188 106 7 
Sudan 7 6 10 13 27 19 19 
Zaire 10 6 18 11 9 14 23 
Zambia 25 16 20 28 9 15 16 
Zimbabwe - - - 2 13 13 19 
Tunisia 17 29 21 65 43 30 20 
Tanzania 14 11 35 28 31 37 40 
Morocco 35 55 36 66 49 68 87 
Liberia 169 139 252 112 10 191 5 
Mozambique - 7 12 17 13 20 26 
* Includes Custom Union. member countries. 
Source: IMF, The Direction of Foreign Trade Statistics, various years. 
It will be noted that some countries such as Angola, Egypt, 
and Tanzania have shown consistency in the increase of their 
volume of trade with Sweden. The majority of the countries 
in Table 27 have had an erratic trade relationship with 
Sweden. Interestingly, it is the countries that are outside 
Sweden's aid framework, such as South Africa which have had 
the biggest volume of trade with Sweden. Another important 
feature in the table is the spread of Sweden's trading 
relationship. Though small in most of the countries Sweden 
has penetrated the markets of many developing countries. 
This feature reduces the economic force of the point about 
Sweden not having been a former colonial master. The spread 
of trading relationships today between the industrialised 
countries and the developing countries seems to have 
diminishing relevancy to the previous colonial 
relationships. Japan has demonstrated this quite ably in 
some African countries like Zambia. 
SIDA's aid policy objectives must be seen within the overall 
context of Sweden's aid policy framework. The objectives 
for development aid laid down by the Swedish Parliament seek 
to 	 promote 	 growth 	 of resources, economic and social 
equality, economic 	 and 	 political 	 independence, and 	 a 
democratic development of society in SIDA's programme 
countries. The philosophical underpinnings of these 
objectives are said to be found in Sweden's social and 
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political ideology 	 of 	 social 	 liberalism, integration, 
solidarity, equality, justice 	 and 	 social 	 security". 
Thus, Sweden's welfare state, and the corporate structure of 
the Swedish polity are also among its domestic factors that 
have influenced SIDA's overall development aid policy. From 
these objectives it is easy to see the origins of Swedish 
aid policy objectives in the education sector. 
What emerges here are a number of explanatory points about 
Sweden's development assistance and its perception of the 
developing countries. Development assistance is intended to 
be used as intervention in recipients' social political and 
economic systems to influence the development process. The 
need to internationalise ideologies and other concepts 
regarded as fundamental in Swedish society is very evident. 
This is one of the major weakness in Swedish aid. Recipient 
countries are not completely devoid of their own ideologies 
and other values on which they would like to develop their 
own societies. Though SIDA's principles imply a more 
contributive role, that is, engaging recipient governments 
on their policies in order to influence them]  t?re-conceived 
aid objectives and their principles tend to be the first 
obstacle recipients have to face in their efforts to create 
a development process based on recipient values. Yet, in 
the same breath it is said that SIDA's aid is intended to 
enhance self-reliance for the recipient countries. This 
does not reconcile with SIDA's aid intervention which is 
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intended to develop societies in the programme countries 
which are compatible with Swedish social and political 
ideologies. The premise of Swedish development aid here is 
rather flawed and contradictory, yet it is the best 
justification Sweden could use to win public support for 
aid. 
The specific aid policy objectives call for closer scrutiny. 
Sweden's claim that it seeks to better the social and 
economic conditions of the economically poor countries must 
be examined against the choice of programme countries. In 
Africa none of the low-income semiarid countries, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Gambia, Niger or Somalia have ever been on 
SIDA's aid list. Yet their economic and social indicators 
make them more worthy candidates for aid than countries like 
Botswana41. In terms of the public criteria set for 
giving aid Botswana seems to occupy an odd position on 
SIDA's list. A few examples illustrate this point. 
Botswana's GDP annual average growth rate for the 1973-1984 
period was 10.7 per cent. Only five countries in the whole 
of sub-Saharan Africa managed to get a 5.0 per cent growth 
rate or better in the same period42. Perhaps, Botswana 
qualifies for Swedish aid on account of being a Frontline 
state. Since 1982 Botswana has maintained the highest 
international reserves among the SIDA programme countries 
(1982-1986). Table28 attempts to give some insight into the 
economic and social positions of selected African countries. 
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Table 28 
Social and Economic indicators in selected African Countries 1985 
Population 
(Million) 
Country 
Adult 
Literates 
GNP* per 
Capita 
Foreign 
Reserves 
(US $ m) 
External 
Debt. 
(US $ bn) 
Debt/ 
Export 
Ratio 
Total ODA 
per Capita 
(US $) 
Algeria - - 2590 2672 15.33 108.7 
Angola 9 41.0 - - 2.70 - 10.1 
Benin 4 25.9 270 4 0.82 310.3 23.9 
Botswana 1 70.8 840 713 0.34 38.6 96.8 
Burkina Faso 7 13.2 150 127 0.54 340.4 28.2 
Cameroon 10 56.2 910 - 2.92 103.4 15.9 
C.A.R. 3 40.2 290 - 0.34 190.4 34.9 
Chad 5 25.3 - - 0.18 184.2 36.3 
Ethiopia 42 55.2 120 142 1.88 340.0 16.9 
Gambia 1 25.1 230 2 0.25 279.5 50.1 
Kenya 20 59.2 300 358 4.39 275.2 21.9 
Lesotho 1 73.6 370 40 0.17 59.2 94.4 
Malawi 7 41.2 160 41 1.02 362.5 16.1 
Mali 7 16.8 180 21 1.48 581.2 54.2 
Mozambique 13 38.0 210 - - - 23.0 
Niger 6 13.9 260 125 1.20 479.3 50.7 
Somalia 5 11.6 280 3 2.07 1622.0 70.7 
ilinzania 21 - 250 15 3.88 983.4 23.1 
Tunisia - 1140 218 4.92 162.8 - 
Uganda 15 57.3 230 - 1.16 310.6 12.2 
Zambia 6 75.7 300 182 4.64 535.3 54.8 
Zaire 30 61.2 160 188 5.89 293.3 10.8 
Zimbabwe 8 74.0 620 112 2.20 168.7 29.6 
NOTE 
1. Bold = SIDA Programme Countries 
2. * 	 = 1986 data. 
SOURCE: Compiled from World Bank, ECA and ADD documents, various years. 
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It is interesting to note from Table28 that not only is 
Botswana in a favourable position in many areas, it has also 
the highest per capita aid. This suggests that there could 
be a less well known selection criterion being applied in the 
choice of programme countries. The table confirms also the 
earlier criticisms which have been levelled against SIDA on 
this issue43. It would also seem from this finding that 
Swedish aid policy in respect of programme country choice is 
not very different after all from that of other donors. 
Some of West Germany's aid recipient countries have similar 
characteristics. Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco are not low 
income nor are they debt distressed countries, yet the three 
countries account for a relatively high share of the total 
aid for the entire continent of Africa.44 	 It has been 
observed that no correlation exists between the volume of 
West Germany's aid and the political and socio-economic 
orientation of the recipient countries.45  
Sweden would like it to be known that it is a different type 
of donor in many respects. However, indications are there 
that the differences in the core objectives between Sweden 
and other donors are gradually becoming thinner. Sweden is 
going to come under increasing pressure to respond to the 
events in the international development environment without 
the aid complex and restraint which has characterised SIDA's 
aid practices in the past. 
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9.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The major findings in this chapter are that SIDA has made 
important shifts in its aid policy to education and training 
in the twenty-eight years, since 1972 when the 	 first 
education policy was published. The policy concentrated on 
two key areas: the target areas of assistance and the 
administrative and operational procedures for conducting aid 
business. The 1986 policy followed a similar pattern. It 
outlined the priority areas of support and also indicated 
the method and procedures to be employed. 
SIDA is a case of an institution whose policies on aid to 
education have undergone rapid but careful and selective 
adjustments. Adherence to set priorities has been 
maintained with a measure of discretion reserved to deal 
with deserving cases. 
The 1972 policy presented a set of thinking within the 
Swedish Parliament and SIDA which appear to have been 
overwhelmingly weighed down by ideology, domestic perception 
of education problems, and overreaction to the aid signals. 
Thus, the policy was characterised by a rather prescriptive 
and idealistic approach to education development issues. 
The internationalisation of Swedish development experiences 
were the guiding principles. This and the results from the 
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field quickly gave Sweden the vital lessons from the 
realities of the recipients' development environment. 
Consequently, development aid sights had necessarily to be 
adjusted. 
The 1986 policy was therefore partly a product of the 
realism gained from the 1972 policy experiences. It was 
also as much a response to a wide ranging set of signals 
from the domestic and the external constituency. The policy 
has adopted an open approach and a more balanced position on 
some key education development issues. The specificity 
which marked the 1972 policy has been severely adjusted to 
make it a loose political and theoretical aid framework. 
Aid to education and training is perceived in a new light. 
Apart from the responses to the realities of the recipient's 
development environment, the 1986 policy has shown strong 
evidence of its response to the policies and practices of 
other donors in the aid community. 
In this particular regard SIDA has adopted quite openly 
protectionist and image-projection methods in its 
assistance. Overseas training is one aspect which has been 
targeted for more Swedish participation than has been the 
case before. This has moved SIDA into a whole new area with 
far reaching implications and consequences for Sweden, other 
donors and the programme countries. One immediate 
implication is that a few Swedish education and training 
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institutions have been drawn to respond to SIDA's overseas 
aid commitments in providing training for staff development. 
Though presently small, this is SIDA's competition to which 
other donors like Britain must now stand. The decision to 
have a distinctive and perhaps more competitive Swedish 
profile in the technical assistance component of its 
projects is not particularly surprising, given the volume of 
aid funds involved, the growing internationalisation of 
Swedish higher education, and the considerable depth of 
experience of Swedish personnel and institutions in 
developing countries. 
It can therefore be concluded that Swedish aid policy on 
education has undergone major shifts in some aspects while 
retaining a flexible stand on others. More importantly, 
SIDA appears to have moved its new policy into the orbit of 
international aid practices. There is a definite move to 
sharpen Swedish aid on all fronts and against other donors. 
It can also be said that since 1986 SIDA decided to face 
education and training development needs with an enlarged 
scope of assistance accompanied by some new rules of 
engagement. Seen in its broader perspective, SIDA's overall 
development aid of which the aid policy on education is part 
still retains a few'contradictions. As SIDA moves out more 
to compete against other donors the more apparent the 
contradictions will become. SIDA's aid to education and 
training in Zambia is examined against the changes that have 
been discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTRE TEN 
SWEDISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN ZAMBIA 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses Swedish aid to education and training 
in Zambia against SIDA's policy objectives and Zambia's 
development priorities. The discussion also examines the 
adequacy of the aspects of supplementary and displacement 
theories of aid. 
Unlike Britain which had a long colonial relationship with 
Zambia, Sweden's aid relationship with Zambia started 
against a background of a weak trade relationship. Sweden 
has never been among the major trading partners of 
Zambia.1 
	
Sweden's presence in the Zambian industrial 
sector has for many years been mainly through the four 
subsidiary companies of large Swedish transnational 
companies, Ericsson, SKF, Sandvik, and Atlas Copco. These 
were direct investments outside the aid programme. The only 
company to emerge out of the aid initiatives has been the 
Zamseed joint venture. Other initiatives such as the 
attempt to set up a Volvo trucks assembly plant failed to 
materialise.2 
Given this background it would be difficult to argue that 
Swedish aid has been shadowing Swedish commercial 
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investments. This trend is consistent with observed Swedish 
aid and investment behaviour in developing countries. The 
major recipients of Swedish investments are usually not on 
SIDA's list of aid recipients.3  
10.2 Factors in SIDA's aid to Zambia 
Six SIDA officials from the level of Deputy-Director General 
through to the Head of Education and programme officers were 
asked to identify factors which had exerted influence on 
Sweden's decision to give aid to Zambia. The reponses to 
the structured interview and the verbal discussions revealed 
a blend of perspectives. The degree of agreement or 
rejection tended to vary on each question. However there 
was a common agreement that Swedish aid had been motivated 
by among other factors, the feeling that Sweden had the 
capability to provide development aid. The influence of 
cultural exchange factors, foreign policy objectives, as 
well as trade considerations yielded mixed responses, some 
said they had no influence at all while others said they had 
to some extent. This points to a suggestion that SIDA 
officials have not yet come to terms with the reality of aid 
business. There was also a reluctance among a few of them 
to officially commit themselves to a position which would 
compromise SIDA'i declared public stand on these issues. The 
same kind of response was obtained when the same officials 
were asked if SIDA was engaged in attempts to counterbalance 
other donors' assistance in Zambia. The influence of 
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Zambia's education priorities on SIDA's decision were given 
a qualified agreement.4 The overall finding here seems to 
point to the suggestion that Swedish aid has been 
influenced by several factors other than the problems of 
development in the Zambian education system. In this way 
the aid policy can be said to be responding to multiple 
constituencies. 
10.3 SIDA's Aid Structure 
Support to education and training began in the early 1970s. 
The programme started with capital assistance to the 
University of Zambia and the Department of Technical 
Education and Vocational Training. The scope has now been 
enlarged and diversified, and consists of capital, technical 
and recurrent budget assistance. 
10.3.1 Capital Aid  
Capital assistance marked the first phase of SIDA's 
programme in Zoh-,,,-\°- Ax- The University of Zambia received K1.2 
million towards the total construction cost(K1.53m) of the 
School of Mines. In addition, the School received a further 
K0.57 million for research and teaching equipment.5 SIDA 
was also asked to provide a fully funded professor in 
hydrometallurgy to the School.6 The Swedish contribution 
to this project went well beyond supplementary support. At 
another level this project served to highlight the beginning 
of the Government's inability to finance capital projects 
without outside financial intervention. 
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Since then capital assistance to the University of Zambia 
has been extended to the School of Engineering in 
Telecommunications and Electronics, and in Land Surveying. 
The support to this project started in 1979 in 
Telecommunications and Electronics through an international 
link between the school and the Royal Institute of 
Technology of Stockholm (KTH) which oversees and services 
the link arrangements including equipment supply. The 
agreement provides for a SIDA employed lecturer, and a 
scholarship for staff development.7 	 Cooperation in this 
project is 	 still running. The course programmes being 
supported by SIDA in this project represent an area in which 
the country has been facing an acute shortage of manpower.8  
SIDA has also been providing aid to the Land Surveying 
degree programme at UNZA since 1982. The aid package has 
included 	 the 	 supply 
	 of 	 laboratory 	 equipment, staff 
development training, and providing technical assistance 
(teaching staff) on a limited basis.9 Again, it hardly 
needs mentioning that this is one area in which the 
relevance of the assistance given cannot be questioned. 
However, the operationalisation of this support programme 
draws ones attention to a few issues. The cash 
contributions of SIDA in these projects is overwhelmingly 
predominant. In the 1988 SEK 1.764 million for the 
Electrical/Electronic engineering programme Zambia's 
contribution amounted to only 1.4 percent. In the category 
of equipment purchase in which the Zambian share appeared, 
its contribution was 8.6 percent out of the SEK300,000 
allocation.10 Is this another mark of the Government's 
declining capacity to finance capital projects or simply an 
aspect of an enthusiastic donor? Most likely both. 
An examination of the equipment procurement for the projects 
reveals interesting comparative features. The orders for 
equipment, accessories and books worth SEK 96,270:81 in 1984 
were placed with Swedish firms. The books were ordered from 
Almqvist 	 & Wiksell, electronic 	 instruments 	 from 	 the 
following: Luna AB, Sv Deltron AB, Gosta Backstrom AB, and 
from ELFA. The Land Survey programme is unlikely to have 
bought its equipment outside Sweden. In both cases, two 
Swedish institutions have been engaged as third parties to 
service the cooperation agreements. These are the KTH and 
the National Land Survey of Sweden (NLS). It is therefore 
not surprising that in purchasing equipment for Zambia they 
turn to their own industries. 
This represents protectionism as well as commercial 
penetration at different levels. These purchases protected 
Swedish aid from slipping to other rival companies in other 
countries. It would seem it is for this reason that funds 
for the cooperation link arrangements are overseen by 
Swedish institutions rather than their counterparts in 
Zambia. It is important to note also that the use of 
Swedish third parties in cooperation arrangements 
conveniently distances SIDA from the protectionist decisions 
such as the ones cited here. Through such purchases Swedish 
industrial plant penetration into new markets has been 
facilitated through aid channels. Although KTH and NLS have 
no express instructions to use SIDA money on Swedish 
products only, they are nevertheless expected to use their 
discretion 'wisely'. What comes out of these projects is 
therefore a whole host of educational and non-educational 
aspects. This behaviour is in no way peculiar to SIDA, many 
other donors exhibit it. Britain has a comparable 
universities link scheme which produces identical results. 
Other major capital projects which SIDA has undertaken have 
included the construction and extension of the following 
institutions: 
1. The Cooperative College 
2. The Luanshya Technical and Vocational Teachers 
College 
3. The Mpika College of Agriculture 
4. The Lusaka College for Teachers the Handicapped 
5. Chainama Hills Health Training Centre 
It will be noticed that SIDA's capital assistance cuts 
across the three main sectors of agriculture, education and 
health. The assistance has also ranged from providing full 
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construction as in the case of LTVTC 	 to extensions of 
existing facilities as was the case with the Chainama Health 
Training Centre. It has been the case that some of SIDA's 
capital projects have gone into institutions in which other 
donors are working on other aspects. The CHHTC which has 
just been cited is a good example. Belgian aid has been in 
that centre for many years.11 
	
In terms of manpower 
development each one of these institutions has been designed 
to play a special role. A discussion of capital assistance 
is incomplete without reference to technical assistance which 
often accompanies it. 
10.3.2 Technical Assistance  
This has been provided mainly in five forms, SIDA funded 
Swedish personnel, SIDA funded third country personnel, 
teaching assistants, Minor Field Study Swedish Students, and 
funding for staff development programme across all sectors 
being supported. 
The fully funded staff have been 	 employed in key posts 
where local manpower has been difficult to obtain. 
Lecturers have been provided at UNZA, LTVTC, Mpika College, 
and other experts have been seconded to the Ministry of 
Education under technical assistance arrangements. A second 
category of Swedish technical assistance has been the 
teaching assistants sent to work in the Department of 
Electrical and Electronic engineering and in the Land 
Surveying programme. Although their numbers are very small 
in any academic year, the teaching assistants are said to be 
providing vital services, especially in recent years when 
the shortage 	 of full time staff has been very acute.12  
A third category of assistance has been the provision of 
special teaching assistants under the auspices of the Minor 
Field Study (MFS) Programme. These have also been working 
in the University and other projects. 
The MFS programme is a recent SIDA initiative in their own 
institutional capacity building programme. Its objectives 
are to stimulate the interest of younger people, especially 
those at colleges and universities in overseas development 
work. It provides financial grants for field studies in 
developing countries in which SIDA is working.13 	 Sectors 
in which SIDA is working are given priority in receiving the 
services of MFS assistants. Although SIDA has presented the 
MFS as a separate initiative, it is hard to believe that 
this is not part of the 1986 new policy initiatives, 
especially those aspects relating to new guidelines on 
technical assistance. 
A more significant feature arising from this programme is 
that it appears to.be a long term strategy by SIDA to build 
a pool of Swedish third world specialists and institutions. 
406 
The programme will be administered by colleges and 
universities with which SIDA will draw up special 
agreements. These organisions will constitute SIDA's 
institutional consultants.A.* 
The parallel between this programme and the ODA programme is 
quite obvious. ODA has for a long time supported a 
programme of a similar kind, but involving experienced 
personnel who wish to go and work abroad. The programme 
marks changes in SIDA's aid in the late eighties and 
SIDA has also been renowned for its role in generously 
funding staff development training programmes. A range of 
training programmes covering short-term courses to PhD 
programmes have been supported in diverse fields. The DTEVT 
has had the most large scale SIDA funded staff development 
programme. In the 1986/87 academic year 20 lecturers were 
studying in the UK and Ireland on SIDA scholarships. The 
programmes ranged from tourism to metal fabrication and 
electronics. Between 1982 and 1986 SIDA supported 98 man 
years of training for Zambians across twenty public 
organisations. Table 29 shows the extent of the coverage by 
subject areas: 
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Table 29 
SIDA Funded Training Programmes in the U.K. by Field of 
Study and Sending Agency, 1982-1986 
Field 	 Ministry/Organisation 
Psychatric Nursing 	 Health 
Agriculture 	 MAWD 
Statistics 	 C.S.A. 
Public Health 	 Health 
Marketing and Export 	 Commerce and Industry 
Lab. Technology 	 Geological Survey 
Fiscal Studies 	 Finance 
Accountancy 	 Lusaka District Council 
Applied Entomology 	 MAWD 
Food Science 	 Health 
Pharmacy 
	
National Drug Co. 
Education 	 Education 
Public Prosecution 	 Legal Affairs 
Business Administration 	 Mwaiseni 
Project Finance 	 Finance 
Accountancy 	 Finance 
Systems Analysis 	 Finance 
Fiscal Studies 	 Finance 
Further Education 	 NIPA 
Food Science 	 Health 
Development Administration 	 Commerce/Industry 
Accountancy 	 NHDC 
Development Administration 	 Finance 
Technical Education Management 	 DTEVT 
Further Education 	 NIPA 
Further Education 	 NIPA 
Education 	 MGEYS 
Criminology 	 Home Affairs 
Econometrics 	 NCDP 
Curriculum Evaluation 	 MGEYS 
Education Administration 	 MGEYS 
Project Finance 	 Finance 
English Language 	 Education 
MBA 	 ZSBS 
Purchasing & Supply 	 ZNWMC 
Nursing Administration 	 Ndola District Council 
Social Planning 	 NIPA 
Higher Education 	 MHE 
Agric. Economics 	 Indeco 
Further Education 	 NIPA 
Hotel Management 	 DTEVT 
Development Administration 	 Mines 
Timber Technology 	 Rucom Industries 
Environmental Planning 	 NCDP 
Education Planning 	 MGEYS 
Architecture 	 Indeco 
Land Resource Management 	 MAWD 
Economics 	 NCDP 
Occupational Health 	 Health 
Management 	 Cabinet Office 
Civil Engineering 	 LUDC 
Public Health Nursing 	 Health 
International Relations 	 UNIP 
Mathematics 	 Education 
Wildlife Management 	 MNLR 
International Affairs 	 UNIP 
Advanced Flying 	 Power and Transport 
Management 	 MSB 
Source: DMDT (1983). 
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There are two significant things about Table 29. One is the 
extent of. the coverage of the sectors and the occupational 
categories, and the second is the fact that these courses 
were funded outside Sweden. The latter feature is contrary 
to most donor practices. It is even more interesting to 
note that during this period there was only a handful of 
Zambians studying in Sweden, only four in 1984.15 	 This is 
how far SIDA's generosity went on the overseas training 
front. However, as indicated earlier SIDA has taken steps 
to gradually alter this aspect, to place more overseas 
students in Swedish training institutions. This development 
appears to be closely related to the objective of the Minor 
Field Study (MFS) programme which was announced in 1985. 
It is an undisputable fact that SIDA's assistance and that 
of other donors have shared the burden of propping up the 
Zambian education and training system. The short-term 
results in particular have been overwhelming. However, seen 
in terms of a long term strategy to build up the 
institutional capacity of Zambia, SIDA's policy on funding 
training is not supportive of that objective. It refuses to 
finance in-country training through the payment of direct 
fees, but will provide scholarships for training abroad." 
By refusing to fund local training programmes, especially at 
the University and associated colleges, the achievement of 
institutional capacity development is being delayed. The 
policy has for example delayed the development of many 
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postgraduate training programmes. The support for 
institutional capacity development must be on all fronts, 
which is not the case now. This can be attributed to 
donors' wish to protect their institutions against 
recipients' institutions, this argument is even stronger now 
that SIDA has adopted a new overseas student training 
policy. 
Because of the declining public expenditure on education and 
training and its consequences for education provision and 
the quality of education, SIDA in recent years has paid more 
attention to providing quality enhancing inputs into the 
education and training system. 
10.3.3. Recurrent Budget Assistance  
This has been extended to cover many operational ministry 
requirements at both the headquarters and the sub-sectors. 
The grave situation which has given rise to this emphasis is 
depicted in Table 30 below. 
Table 30 
Public Recurrent Expenditure by Level of Education and Type 
of Expenditure, 1970, 1980,1985, 1986 
(in constant 1970 Rvacha Million) 
Expenditure 1970 1980 1985 1986 
Administration: 
Personal emoluments 1.60 1.61 2.11 2.03 
Duty travel 0.64 0.28 0.25 0.19 
General & Other expenses 1.18 0.75 0.32 0.56 
Sub-total 3.42 2.64 2.68 2.78 
Primary Schools: 
Personal emoluments 15.33 18.59 17.92 15.28 
Teaching materials 4.53 0.56 0.33 0.00 
General expenses 1.00 0.50 0.54 
Sub-total 19.66 20.15 18.75 15.62 
Secondary Schools: 
Personal emoluments 6.73 6.46 4.15 4.41 
Teaching materials 5.40 0.46 0.72 0.00 
Boarding costs 2.24 2.85 2.93 
General expenses 0.82 0.41 0.41 
Sub-total 12.03 9.98 8.12 7.75 
Teacher Training: 
Personal emoluments 0.56 0.74 0.37 0.60 
Teaching materials 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Transfers to students 0.76 0.41 0.42 0.48 
General expenses 0.17 0.09 0.18 
Sub-total 1.32 1.38 0.92 1.30 
Technical Education: 
Personal emoluments n.a. 1.52 1.43 1.25 
Teaching materials n.a. 0.19 0.07 0.09 
Transfers to students n.a. 0.60 0.49 0.44 
General expenses n.a. 0.93 0.44 0.50 
Sub-total 2.25 3.24 2.43 2.28 
University: 
Operating grant 3.54 4.77 5.46 5.67 
Bursaries for students 0.62 0.87 2.33 2.44 
Sub-total 4.16 5.64 7.79 8.11 
TOTAL 42.84 43.03 40.69 37.84 
n.a. 	 not available 
Source: 	 Fdgerlind, 	 I. 	 et al. (1989) 
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The sharp decline in expenditure on teaching materials is 
very evident in the primary, secondary teacher training and 
technical education sectors. Personal emoluments too have 
also shown a consistent decline in all sectors except the 
University. For the secondary school and the technical 
education sectors, the decline may also be attributed to the 
high turnover of expatriate staff. 
The provision of qualitative aid inputs has taken many 
forms, including staff development across the sector. Since 
the beginning of the 1980s SIDA has provided the MGEC 
headquarters with operational equipment, other materials and 
funding for staff training. Equipment has included 
typewriters, calculators, copiers 	 and 	 vehicles. Staff, 
mainly inspectors and education officers, have benefited 
from SIDA funded overseas training. The courses have ranged 
from educational planning to project financing undertaken in 
London and Paris.17 	 The mobile education planning 
training programme which has been undertaken across the 
country would not have succeeded without the transport 
support from SIDA. Study visits to neighbouring countries 
by senior education officers have formed part of the 
assistance programme. In 1987 SIDA supported a feasibility 
study aimed at finding ways of improving data processing at 
the MGEC headquarters. In all, it is technical assistance, 
staff development programmes for Zambian personnel and the 
provision of equipment that have formed the core of SIDA's 
assistance to the Ministry headquarters. 
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Educational materials 	 assistance in the primary school 
sector has been concentrated on the provision of the 
following: text-books, exercise books, teachers handbooks, 
maps and desks. 
The desk programme began in 1980, in response to the acute 
shortage and wear of desks that had built up over many years 
through lack of financial resources to replace old furniture 
and the sheer lack of timely restorative maintenance. 
Between 1982 and 1985 over 100,000 two seater desks were 
provided to primary schools in all provinces.18 The 
programme represented almost 90.0 percent of the total 
assistance voted for education materials by SIDA, and has 
represented over 50.0 percent of the education sector 
support (ESSP) in some years.19 	 The desks have been 
distributed at enormous cost. Following the recommendations 
of a consultant in 1985 on the desk programme, the provinces 
are now responsible for the production of desks with SIDA 
support. 
Like the desk programme the books assistance programme has 
been addressed to a particular need in the internal 
efficiency of the system. Under this programme SIDA in 
cooperation with FINNIDA have been assisting Zambia in 
producing textbooks, teachers handbooks and exercise books 
which have been in short supply. 
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The crisis which Zambia has been facing with regard to 
teaching and learning materials has already been discussed 
in Chapter 3 part II. SIDA's 'financial input into this 
programme has been very substantial. As Table31 shows, 
between 1984 and 1989 this programme came second to the desk 
programme in financial allocation. 
Table 31 
Swedish Aid Allocation in Education, 1984-1989. 
(in Million SEK) 
Programme 1984 1985 	 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Educ. Materials 6000 5800 	 4100 9200 17900 13300 
Desk Programme 8200 17207 	 15150 2500 3000 4000 
Planning Unit 1524 2645 	 3135 3000 3369 5450 
SHAPE/Teacher Train. 655 92 	 2000 2500 4097 5375 
DTEVT 720 1911 	 12600 2564 3600 6500 
Special Educ. 3484 3294 	 4169 3112 3180 4500 
UNZA 3480 3352 	 3062 2614 5700 6700 
Unallocated 2137 - 	 226 - - - 
Total Allocations 26200 34301 	 34342 26490 40746 45825 
Source: 	 Fagerlind, I. 	 et al. 	 (1989). 
Although the books programme was recently criticised for 
operating without a clear target of the total need in the 
system,20 the assistance has been very vulnerable. Its 
scale underlines the magnitude of the problem being 
addressed. 
The Self-Help Action Plan for Education (SHAPE) has its 
origins from the education reform movement of 1974. The 
reforms advocated among other new changes the notion of 
resource based learning, resource teachers and innovations 
in curriculum and method.21 The reform document endorsed 
also the need to establish resource centres around the 
country. Beginning with a church sponsored College resource 
centre the Ministry of Higher Education sought foreign aid 
to establish more resource centres throughout the country. 
The centres introduced techniques of do-it-yourself 
production of educational materials and apparatus. Local 
support and recommendations of 1984 study by Coombe, T. and 
Lauvas, P. 	 gave the initiative an extra boost. A 1985 
study by Coombe, T. and Hoppers, W. and a locally-based team 
enlarged the scope of self-help activities in education by 
pointing out the need to integrate the various school 
activities such as the FINNIDA supported practical subjects 
activities and school production activities. With the 
support of SIDA and NORAD a more comprehensive scope of 
self-help enterprise (SHAPE) aimed at promoting qualitative 
aspects in the system was launched. 
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The programme started in 1987 with an initial allocation of 
SEK 2.5 million.22 NORAD too provided financial support. 
SHAPE has since its establishment been involved in 
organising the teacher resource centres at colleges and in 
schools, the development of school production units, and 
training seminars and workshops for teachers in all regions. 
Donor support has enabled the programme to purchase field 
and workshop equipment 	 which 	 has 	 included, bicycles, 
motorcycles, motor vehicles, duplicators, and typewriters. 
In a carefully worked arrangement the provision of equipment 
has been used as an incentive. In order to qualify for the 
provision of equipment school and college communities are 
required to raise local resources through self-help 
activities 	 to 	 support the operations, maintenance, and 
sustainability of the SHAPE activities. The response to 
these conditions from the local schools and colleges has 
been very positive and supportive. Thus significant 
achievements have been made in creating a strong spirit of 
self-reliance, self-sacrifice and 	 enthusiasm 	 in 	 SHAPE 
activities. A recent evaluation of the SHAPE project has 
indicated that despite there being a few operational 
problems, SHAPE is firmly on the ground and that it should 
continue to operate.23 Several recommendations have been 
made to help adjust and firm the SHAPE activities. 
Given the effective integration of donor inputs and local 
efforts and the strong commitment of the organisers, the 
short-term achievements have not come as a surprise. The 
SHAPE programme is being run by Zambians and so far 
education recurrent funding by the government for its 
activities has been minimal. This should encourage further 
the development of self-reliance. Overall, SHAPE has been 
recommended for continued support by all the recent 
evaluation studies and suggestions for improvement have also 
been made.24 	 Because SHAPE has only been in existence for 
a short period of less than four years, the real test of its 
standing as a self-action plan of activities is yet to come. 
In the meantime SIDA's financial support to SHAPE has 
provided valuable start-up inputs which are being provided 
within the framework of the SHAPE guidelines. This should 
be regarded as the first achievement. The second 
achievement will require SIDA to gradually disengage its 
financial support to give SHAPE an opportunity to prove that 
it can stand on its own feet. This will be the most 
difficult test for Zambia. The tendency to seek outside 
intervention at the sight of a problem will be tested here. 
It would therefore be wise for Zambia at this stage to show 
a clear commitment to phasing out donor support from SHAPE. 
At the moment this commitment is not explicit. Zambia could 
consider a phased withdrawal of donor support from 
particular aspects' of the programme. This would give SHAPE 
the test it will have to face sooner or later. 
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Following the recommendations of the 1983 Fagerlind report, 
SIDA started funding a multi-grade schools pilot project. 
The objective is to make the organisation and operation of 
the scattered small ungraded primary schools in rural areas 
more efficient and economical. Since then funds have been 
provided for re-training the teachers for the project 
schools and for the provision of back-up school requisites, 
books and desks.25 
	
The project which started with four 
schools in the Mkushi district has now been extended to 
cover more than 165 schools. A recent evaluation of the 
project found that the operation of the system still faced 
problems associated with the remote location of the 
schools.26 
	
The other specific problems were that, the 
college that had been designated to house and run the 
multigrade teaching had failed to successfully integrate 
this mode of teaching into the mainstream of its teacher 
training programme. The District Education Officers however 
saw the multigrade system mainly as a means of upgrading 
the ranking status of the schools. Despite these problems 
the project has been successful in initiating good 
community-school relations and teachers have shown a strong 
commitment to it. 
The multigrade school project demonstrates the multifaceted 
nature of donor projects. The project is within the 
boundaries of the SIDA aid objectives, especially its 
interests in promoting development in rural areas. That 
420 
from four pilot schools the project has been extended to 
over 165 schools with many of them being upgraded in the 
process is a measure of success.for all parties concerned. 
More children are able to attend school in a reorganised and 
resourceful system. SIDA has not introduced any new 
extraordinary pedagogy, but money and resources which has 
motivated people to act and see things. The other side of 
the project is that it demonstrates the level of inability 
by the Zambian Government to act independently without 
donors' aid intervention. Zambians did not display the 
necessary initiative but have nevertheless responded very 
well. 
A more recent project funded by SIDA is the pilot self-help 
schools, project in Petauke district in the Eastern Province 
of Zambia. The background to the project is this. As a 
response to the mounting social demand for school places and 
also aware of the stark financial difficulties facing the 
Government, the communities with the encouragement of the 
Government began building self-help schools. The MGEC 
Buildings Section produced basic guideline plans to assist 
communities in their efforts. Minimum safety requirements 
were demanded of new buildings being put up or old ones 
being converted. By 1984 the number of self-help schools, 
especially junior basic Secondari Schools had reached its 
peak.27 Northern Province recorded the highest number of 
self-help schools. 
	 A major start in real self-reliance had 
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once again begun, and communities understood very well that 
the development of auxiliary school facilities had become 
their responsibility. Gradually, communities had awakened, 
and were beginning to ask relevant questions which indicated 
they knew the business they were in. Nor did they pretend 
that self-help schemes were easy.28 
Soon SIDA and the African Development Bank became interested 
in Zambia's self-help efforts. After some discussions with 
the MGEC officials SIDA's interest manifested itself in 
sponsoring a study tour of SIDA supported self-help schools 
in Ethiopia by two MGEC personnel and an external 
consultant. This was quickly followed by a pre-feasibility 
study 	 of 	 the sample districts, Katete and Petauke.29  
Three models of self-help schemes, the 'total self-help', 
the 'community- oriented' and the 'government oriented' were 
all considered. SIDA has opted for the community oriented 
model, i.e. aided self-help." 
	 In 	 this 	 model 	 local 
communities and PTA receive some material and financial 
support. The project was formally started in 1989 and is to 
be evaluated in two years time. 
At the economic level the self-help project could be argued 
as simply another.exit point for surplus Swedish financial 
resources. It has provided overseas consultancy work for a 
Swedish firm, Winblad Konsult AB. In Zambia the project has 
provided ground for research for the University of Zambia 
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and will also contribute to sustaining some levels of 
employment in Zambia in the sectors that will be engaged to 
supply materials to the project. 
On the one %,*,.;Ait is perhaps not hard to imagine why the 
MGEC should have agreed to external intervention in these 
self-help schools. Aid has the ability to deliver quicker 
results. This is important especially in Zambia's present 
depressed economic circumstances and the effects it has had 
on the education sector.31 There are also other benefits 
associated with the project from which the MGEYS could 
benefit, the availability of transport vehicles at the 
Ministry headquarters or in Katete and Petauke could assist 
the operations of the Ministry in several ways. But these 
are likely to be short term benefits. Both the ADB and SIDA 
support to the self-help schools should initially be seen in 
this light. 
Like any other donor supported project the pilot self-help 
schools have two profiles, the Zambian and the aid profile. 
An analysis of the Zambian profile has been given. It has 
shown that the schools are just a manifestation of the 
current problems the sector is facing and the attempts it is 
making to solve them. The aid profile is an extension of 
this local manifestation, but requires its own analysis. 
The donors support to self-help schools should also be seen 
in the context of Zambians making their own efforts to solve 
their problems, and the long term perspective of the need to 
give the Zambians an opportunity to face the challenges of 
their development single handedly. In this light the wisdom 
of the MEGEYS and the donors to give assistance to self-help 
schools is questionable. The fact that the MGEYS gave 
consent to the donors to give aid does not exonerate them 
from what appears to be a bad judgement and decision by all 
parties concerned. After all, isn't the difficult times the 
best time to test the endurance and resourcefulness of the 
people? 
SIDA's increasing participation and spread in the field of 
education and training can be discerned from comparing the 
Government expenditure on capital and recurrent functions 
against that of SIDA's financial commitments in the various 
education and training related fields across all sectors. 
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Table 32 
GRZ/SIDA SHARE IN FUNDING SECTOR TRAINING RELATED 
ACTIVITIES, 
PROJECT/ACTIVITY 
1988 (Kwacha). 
GRZ SIDA 
Teacher Res. 	 Centres - 700,000 
Special Education - 940,000 
DTEVT Headquarters 100,000 2,500,000 
ZIT - 2,564,000 
MGEC (Planning Unit) - 3,900,000 
Educ. Broadcasting 400,000 300,000 
MLNR Training Programme - 568,000 
Cooperative College - 1,376,000 
MAWD Training Colleges - 2,970,000 
n 	 n 	 n 
- 338,000 
Research - Seeds 1,000,000 1,550,000 
Research - Soils 200,000 1,500,000 
Research - Crops - 3,300,000 
NRDC - 1,160,000 
Lima Extension Training - 2,450,000 
NOTE: GRZ = Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
Source: GRZ (1988, 379) Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure. 
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It is obvious from Table32 that SIDA has had a far greater 
responsibility in funding training activities than the 
government. To the Zambian government the table is yet 
another illustration of the financial difficulties which 
have mounted over the last decade. The anatomy of the 
system is laid bare here to show how dependent it is on 
foreign aid support. 
The demands on SIDA to increase and widen its support have 
continued. In 1987 the acting Chief Inspector of Schools 
(MGEC) presented SIDA with a long catalogue of areas in need 
of assistance.32  The items included four-wheel drive 
vehicles for school inspection work, chemicals for science 
teaching, kilns, looms, resources 
	 for 	 locally organised 
seminars, funds for overseas seminars 
	 for 	 inspectors, 
spinning and weaving equipment, and leatherwork machinery. 
In the same year the University of Zambia presented its 
needs proposals for consideration to SIDA.33 Their list 
was for the general institutional support in the following 
areas: staff development and retention, library services, 
and the local production of lecture notes and reprinting of 
textbooks. Specific requests were for training scholarships 
in Engineering, Medicine Environmental Studies, and Natural 
Sciences. There" was also a request for staff 
supplementation to help retain senior staff. SIDA has 
already responded by accepting to supplement salaries of 
third world country lecturers in the University.34 The 
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Swedes and Zambians are not eligible for this facility. The 
request from the Library was for subscription to the 
journals. The request for 1988 from DTEVT included funds 
for the following purposes, book allowances, seminars, TVTC 
library books, and library books for all DTEVT colleges.35  
Even against the support of a single donor the Zambian 
education and training system has exhibited characteristics 
of a system that is just barely making it operationally. 
The operational difficulties are many and widespread, but 
have only been made less disabling by the intervention of 
external aid. The financial difficulties produced by the 
economic crisis are quite obvious in this case. But, how do 
the economic theories of aid attempt to explain the 
situation facing the Zambian education and training sector? 
A full description of the theories and their basis is given 
in chapter two. 
10.4 The Supplementary Theory 
The key precepts of this theory are that aid is perceived to 
be a vital supplementary resource in the economic growth and 
development of recipient countries.36 The function of aid 
is seen as that of supplementing domestic savings and 
especially providing much needed foreign exchange in the 
recipient economy. The maintenance of a good level of 
investment is one of the goals to be derived from aid by 
recipients. 
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The assumptions in the theory are that the recipient country 
will have an economy and a performance which can derive 
benefits from the infusion of foreign aid. These conditions 
existed in Zambia in the immediate period following the 
country's attainment of independence until the mid 1970s. 
The Government then had sufficient financial resources to 
invest into many major capital projects. In the education 
and training sector the government undertook the expansion 
of facilities with very little external capital aid, as 
discussed already in chapter three. Hence, aid concentrated 
in those areas for which the government could not provide 
easily, such 	 as 	 skilled manpower. Aid filled up the 
deficits but it is doubtful if it helped Zambia make any 
significant domestic savings. Therefore, one could only say 
with caution that a supplementary aid relationship existed 
then in certain areas of Zambia's development process. 
It is true also that since the mid 1970s the problem of 
foreign exchange shortages which the government has been 
experiencing has only been eased by the intervention of 
external aid as illustrated by SIDA's much higher financial 
contribution to the projects. From this it is quite clear 
that aid has in recent years assumed a much larger 
responsibility than providing supplementary aid in the sense 
in which the theorists intended. 
Although Zambia's total share of government expenditure is 
still far greater than donors' especially by virtue of 
salary payments, the supplementary argument cannot still 
hold because of the following points. It is common 
knowledge that donors have on a number of occasions helped 
Zambia to raise counterpart funds, even salaries of teachers 
have received indirect donor inputs through a rather 
complicated process. 	 Therefore the government share of 
general budget support may not in fact be 100.0 percent 
after all. It is therefore difficult to explain donors' 
contributions and the role their aid is playing in purely 
supplementary terms. Distortions have occurred right across 
the aid spectrum. And, on the one hand, donor decisions 
to give aid are not motivated by needy situations alone. 
Other considerations such as political influence and 
cultural diplomacy have been shown to be just as important 
in other donors' aid portfolio. Zambia's economic 
situation, on the other hand, has been devastated and 
reduced to a level where aid in certain operations is the 
only means of ensuring continuity in the operations. 
Ideally, the act of supplementation should focus on joint 
funded projects in which the ratio of financial 
contributions could be worked more realistically. This may 
require Zambia to fix a percentage share for donors' 
participation in local projects. Clear and firm policies 
and a strong economy are important prerequisites. These are 
absent in the present circumstances. 
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10.5 The Displacement Theory 
This theory believes the transfer of external resources to 
the recipient's development process inhibits the dynamic 
process of change in developing countries. It points out 
that from an economic point of view aid does not enhance the 
capacity to mobilise domestic resources. Quite the contrary, 
aid is said to have the effect of easing the pressure on 
recipients, so that they feel less inclined to make the 
efforts themselves.31- 
SIDA's support to the self-help schools project must be seen 
against these theoretical assumptions. As pointed out 
earlier external aid to this particular community initiated 
project threatens to stall or completely remove the 
motivation in the community to find solutions to their 
problems. The project answers also the assumptions that aid 
introduces alien values and patterns of organisation. The 
notion of externally aided self-help is alien and somewhat 
contradicts the very principles and spirit of self-help 
initiatives. Implicit in SIDA's and the MGEYS's decision 
is a grave doubt regarding the potential of the Zambian 
communities and Parent and Teachers Associations (PTA) to 
undertake development projects alone. The element of 
displacement exists in every aspect of external aid given to 
Zambia, because' technically aid represents Zambia's 
opportunity cost. 
10.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The main areas of discussion in this chapter have been as 
follows. Unlike Britain whose colonial relationship with 
Zambia had created and left a political and economic 
framework within which the post-independence aid relationship 
has been conducted, Sweden's aid relationship with Zambia 
began against a weak trading relationship and a small 
Swedish economic presence in Zambia. This status exists 
even today. Therefore the assumptions that aid follows 
donors' economic investments cannot be generalised. 
However, this case should be seen in the light of Sweden's 
long term aid strategy in the programme countries. 
Sweden's decision to assist Zambia has been influenced by a 
number of factors. Although the level of agreement among 
SIDA officials has tended to differ on the factors and the 
degree to which each one of them exerts influence, the 
available evidence suggests that Swedish aid like that of 
other donors is intended to respond to Swedish foreign 
policy, economic and other objectives. SIDA is an agency 
under the MFA after all. 
Swedish aid to education and training in Zambia has included 
capital assistance, technical assistance in the form of 
manpower supply and the funding of training programmes for 
Zambians, and in recent years it has included the provision 
of recurrent budgetary assistance. The balance among these 
components has tended to vary. In the 1970s SIDA had big 
capital projects, in the 1980s these gave way to more 
projects emphasising the provision of qualitative inputs 
into the system. However, an analysis of the balance in 
each subsector is likely to show slightly different patterns 
depending on the major needs of each one of them. 
Although officially Swedish aid to education is not tied, 
this study has found that SIDA projects at UNZA have 
procured equipment and books mainly from Sweden. UNZA's 
cooperating and overseeng Swedish counterparts have not 
breached any SIDA policy or regulation by buying Swedish 
products for UNZA. The finding nonetheless draws attention 
to a discreet practice of protectionism by SIDA's appointed 
link scheme cooperants. Gradual market penetration is being 
achieved through the spread of Swedish equipment and 
technology in the Zambian market. Swedish technology is 
being offered as a competitive alternative to Zambia's 
future market-the graduates from engineering and technical 
colleges. It is therefore fair to say that alongside SIDA's 
generous aid policy a very careful strategy is being carried 
out to utilise aid channels for entries of Swedish 
commercial presence in Zambia. The attempt to establish a 
Volvo truck assembly plant in the '1970s is one case in 
point. 
The coverage of subsectors which started with capital 
projects at UNZA and in the DTEVT in the 1970s has now been 
extended. The list now includes formal regular primary 
education, special education, teacher education, and special 
projects such as the SHAPE. Although SIDA's policy 
emphasises the need to support basic primary education, its 
assistance in Zambia has shown that some graduated balance 
has been maintained, with more going into primary 
education and its related services. 
Technical assistance from SIDA has been concentrated in 
three components. The provision of Swedish and other 
specialists appointed to work in special tasks in SIDA 
supported Zambian institutions. The Swedish teaching 
assistants at UNZA form another group. They are the 
equivalent of the British cadets who came to teach in Zambia 
alongside the regular British volunteers and expatriates in 
the 1960s. The third group comprises the Minor Field Study 
students. The MFS programme is for Sweden's own internal 
organisational development as much as it is a response to 
other donors' practices. The element of sharpening SIDA's 
development aid competitiveness against other donors appears 
evident in this programme. 
Assistance to staff training programmes stands out as one of 
the most outstanding aspects of Swedish aid to Zambia. It 
has been shown that a very wide variety of professions and 
trades across many sectors have been supported. The key 
features in this programme has been SIDA's inclusion of 
training 	 components 	 in its projects, and the liberal 
approach to the selection of overseas training locations, 
contrary to the practice of most donors. And for a long 
time SIDA's assistance has been based on Zambia's 
articulated needs in the sectors and projects rather than 
SIDA's own pre-selected areas. Although SIDA supports the 
need to strengthen the institutional capacity of Zambia 
through training)  Ironically SIDA has strong objections to 
paying fees for Zambian students enrolled at UNZA regardless 
of the nature of the training programme. 
The consequences of the economic crisis on education in the 
last decade has made SIDA to come under increasing pressure 
from Zambia to give more aid in many areas where the 
Government cannot provide sufficient budgetary allocations. 
SIDA's response has been to give more qualitative inputs 
into the system in those areas that are covered by aid 
agreements. 
SIDA's assistance to the self-help schools has drawn much 
attention in this study because of SIDA's lack of genuine 
sensitivity to local community development initiatives. It 
has been pointed out that the decision to aid self-help 
schools threatens to deny the communities a chance to try 
their initiative capacities to the limits of their abilities. 
Both SIDA and the MGEC are guilty of opportunism in this 
pilot project. 
Putting Zambia's present economic situation into the 
economic aid theoretical perspective, the findings of this 
study has observed that the supplementary aid theory is 
today inadequate to stand up to the critical economic 
circumstances enveloping many developing countries such as 
Zambia. The theory's assumptions about aid going to enhance 
the generation of domestic savings has been caught up in the 
flexible reinterpretation of the objectives of aid today. 
The need to provide supplementary resources is not the only 
criterion donors follow in their aid decisions. At another 
level SIDA's decision to aid the self-help schools would 
seem to confirm the assumptions of the displacement theory. 
But, on the other hand Zambia's economic performance has 
shown that there is very little to be displaced by aid. 
Thus, in conclusion it can be said that the relevance of 
SIDA's aid to education and training must be measured in the 
context of economic performance and the consequences it has 
had on the development of the social sectors such as 
education. The multiple needs in the system have in 
particular made, it. difficult for Zambia to project an order 
of priorities. Consequently, every assistance has turned 
out to be 'essential' to the survival of the system. Over 
the last two and half decades SIDA's assistance to education 
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had grown and has been diversified. Attempts to respond to 
particular needs arising from the consequences of the impact 
of the present economic crisis in education have thus 
dominated SIDA's aid. However, on developmental grounds 
both SIDA and the MGEC have been found lacking in 
sensitivity and critical judgement in the decisions to aid 
some of the projects. 
SIDA's conduct of its aid in Zambia has revealed important 
parallels between SIDA's practices and those of other 
donors. Would this aspect make it easier for SIDA and other 
donors to coordinate aid or indeed to be coordinated? These 
issues are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
COORDINATION ASPECTS IN EDUCATION AID MANAGEMENT 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines coordination in education aid 
management in the present overall aid management framework 
in Zambia. The analysis focuses on the following: the 
assumptions on coordination in the current debate, the 
institutional arrangements for educational aid management, 
the views of both Zambian officials and donors on 
coordination, and 	 the 	 present 	 'New Economic Recovery 
Programme' initiative to create an External Assistance 
Department (EAD). Cooperation and coordination is analysed 
in the context of the exchange and power-dependency 
theoretical assumptions. 
11.2 The Debate and Assumptions 
Donor cooperation and aid coordination have received 
attention throughout the recent history of development aid 
mainly from the donor countries themselves. In 1970 less 
formal meetings were held at Montebello (Canada) and 
Ditchley Park (UK) to precede a formal conference at 
Heidelberg (W. Germany).1 The conference discussed ways 
of improving aid business. Information exchange, 
consultation between donors and recipients, and aid 
coordination were the main subjects of discussion. 
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Since the mid 1980s there has been renewed interest in the 
issues concerning donor cooperation and aid coordination. 
In 1986 the European donor agencies held a conference in 
London to share experiences and to show each other their 
preferred areas of aid concentration.2 Subsequent 
conferences have been held in Ireland (1987) and the 
Netherlands (1988). At the multilateral level the World 
Bank has taken several initiatives to organise aid 
coordination meetings on behalf of member states. Ghana had 
such a meeting organised for it in 1986 in Vienna.3 In 
the follow up to the Education in Sub-Saharan Africa policy 
paper the Bank organised similar meetings at regional level. 
The economic adjustment programme being implemented in many 
Sub-Saharan countries has also put a new accent on the need 
for these countries to have effective aid coordination 
institutions. 
The major criticism in the debate has been that there has 
been weak or ineffective aid coordination in recipient 
countries.4 Recipient countries receiving aid from 
diverse sources are said to face an exceptionally difficult 
task in coping with the problems of aid management, both at 
the central government and at the sector level. It has been 
observed, particularly, that recipients' administrative and 
management institutions are inadequately equipped to cope 
with additional demands put on them by donors. This has 
been blamed for reducing the impact of aid on solving 
problems. 
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An adequately equipped and staffed aid management 
institution, and 	 a 	 cooperative 	 donor 	 community 	 are 
considered as being absolutely essential. It has also been 
implied in some quarters that a cooperative relationship 
between donors would be easy to obtain. The whole issue of 
aid coordination has been approached from a western donor 
perspective. In the recent meetings held no representatives 
from the Eastern bloc countries ever attended them. 
There are facts, fictions and exaggerations in some of the 
criticisms. For example, it is not entirely true that 
donors do not cooperate. In the modern day aid business 
some form of cooperation between and among donors is 
inevitable. Cooperation in such areas as project 
identification, feasibility studies, evaluation of projects, 
joint financing and staff recruitment for projects already 
exists in different degrees.5 	 However, cooperation in 
these circumstances usually operates at what can be called 
'non critical' levels. The relationships are ad hoc, 
purpose-specific and usually short-term. Cooperation of 
this kind does not involve decision making in the field 
which could compromise the interests of the individual donor 
agencies. Despite what has been described here, cooperation 
among donors has not completely eliminated competition. 
11.3 Coordination: The Zambian Views 
The tone of the Zambian officials on this subject was set in 
this statements: 'For quite sometime now the Party and its 
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Government have been worried that most of the benefits have 
been lost due to lack of close collaboration and cooperation 
by so many agents of development.' and that 	 'The multi- 
plicity of donor projects requiring local administration 
inputs are likely to create serious administrative 
problems.'6 A recognition that some coordination 
arrangements in Zambia's education aid management would be 
advantageous was indicated by several officials. 
In an unprecedented attempt to review independently the 
management of the donor projects in the sector, the MGEYS 
review committee conceded in 1989 that it had found a number 
of anomalies in the way some of the projects were being 
managed by both donors and the Ministry of General 
Education, Youth 	 and 	 Sport.7 	 The committee was not 
particularly happy with the administrative arrangements 
which some donors had adopted in their projects. The ODA 
and FINNIDA were criticised for setting up administrative 
structures which tended to operate outside the MGEYS' main 
management framework.8 	 The ODA was criticised for not 
involving the Inspectorate in the management of transport 
and the finances of the Mathematics Text Book Project.9  
That the funds for this project could not be included in the 
GRZ estimate -bOoks of the Ministry was viewed with 
particular concern. SIDA's running of the self-help schools 
pilot project outside the Ministry's long-established Zambia 
Education Projects Implementation Unit (ZEPIU) caused 
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concern. FINNIDA was said to be operating a financial 
management system which kept the Zambian officers outside 
the control of the aid funds in the sector. The School 
Population Project (SPP) aided by UNESCO and housed at the 
Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) was cited as example of 
a project which caused some disruption in the local 
administration arrangements. It was found that the Zambian 
officer appointed to oversee this project spent most of his 
time on the project leaving his normal duties unattended. 
The reasons for such tendencies are usually not hard to find. 
Incentives in aid projects tend to create such disruptions. 
The problems identified by the Zambians are significant in 
many ways. They serve to reveal the kinds of consequences 
uncoordinated aid can impose on local administration 
arrangements. Also the incentives which aid projects often 
carry can work both as a motivating factor as well as a 
potential source of management discord. The examples given 
help also to point out the areas of possible conflict which 
are already in place in Zambia in any future attempt to 
coordinate aid. FINNIDA's case merely emphasises a point 
about donors' different administrative arrangements. It 
also reveals a little about donors' distrust of MGEYS's 
capability to manage aid finances, hence the tendency to 
insulate some aspects of their management system. The 
degree to which this has been practiced tends to differ from 
project to project and from donor to donor. 
Although calls for coherence in the way aid is managed have 
been very strong and quite persistent for a long time, the 
kind of coherence called for had never been made explicit 
until late 1989 when the Government published the Financial 
and Economic Policy Framework paper under the banner of the 
NERP. Previously officials spoke of the quantum advantage 
Zambia would have if it had a centralised aid management unit. 
The modalities of the actual aid coordination were never 
discussed in detail. Nor were the possible costs of 
implementing a coherent coordination framework considered. 
Not all Zambian officials are convinced of the need for aid 
coordination without reservations. The Director of ETC in 
the NCDP had some reservations about Zambia's ability to 
achieve effective aid coordination." 
	 He foresaw 
difficulties and conflicts arising from the donors' desire 
to pursue particular objectives, and also the demand by some 
donor parliaments that their agencies should work in 
particular earmarked sectors. A further examination of the 
existing education aid management in the sector should help 
put some of the issues discussed here into perspective. It 
should also set the background against which donors' views 
on coordination will be analysed. 
11.4 Aid Management Framework 
There is no single central unit responsible for managing aid 
for the education and training sector. It is managed by 
different parties in a system involving the Ministry of 
Finance on the one hand and the MGEYS, MHEST, and donors on 
the other. 
The task of the MoF is to manage and disburse those funds 
that have been committed by donors through its channels. 
SIDA has a Swedish internal auditor at the MoF to assist in 
the financial management of SIDA aid funds. 11 The 
decision to employ this person may well have been 
necessitated by the large volume of SIDA funds which are 
employed 	 in 	 the 	 Education, Health, Agriculture, and 
Cooperatives sectors. There is a possibility also that the 
appointment could have been one of those measures donors 
take to protect aid programmes against internal management 
inefficiencies in recipient systems. NORAD is another 
agency which channels its aid funds through the MoF. 
FINNIDA on the other hand does not.12 	 Under its 
arrangement it produces financial statements for both 
foreign and local accounts to the MGEYS and the MoF. 
Multilateral organisations use the imprest system. The 
funds are released after a financial statement is prepared 
on the expenditure of the previous funds. The funds are 
released to the recipient Ministries via the Ministry of 
Finance. 
Within the sector and in the individual projects there are 
further variations in aid management styles. At the sector 
level SIDA channels its communications through the head of 
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the Planning Unit, MGEYS, which has been made responsible 
for SIDA supported projects. He takes charge of the funds 
for the project in the sector. However, unlike other SIDA 
projects, SHAPE has had a Swedish accountant attached to 
it. This is unusual, but could simply reflect the concern 
with which SIDA has viewed the capacity of the MGEYS and the 
MHEST 	 to 	 undertake 	 extra 	 financial 	 management 
responsibilities for this inter-ministerial programme. 
SHAPE has had a large overseas procurement component, which 
may have necessitated close monitoring of its spending. 
FINNIDA follows the practice of sub-contracting the 
management of its projects after public tender. The PSP 
project has been sub-contracted to a Finnish university, and 
the ZEMP project to a firm specialising in international 
book development and consultancy work. Until 1989, 
FINNIDA's ZEMP and PSP projects had FINNIDA-appointed 
coordinators. These were in charge of all financial matters 
concerning the running of the projects. The MGEYS's 
feelings over this arrangement have already been 
	 pointed 
out.13 
	
The PSP is being phased out after 16 years of 
operation under successive FINNIDA co-ordinators. The post 
of coordinator for ZEMP is about to be Zambianised. However 
it is not cle-ar whether he will continue with the same 
management style as his predecessor. 
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What has been presented here is an illustration of the 
diversity in approaches to aid and project management in the 
education and training sector. The two cases reveal a 
continuum to show the differences in aid management control, 
from the discreet double check mechanisms of SIDA to 
complete financial control in Finnish projects. Some 
aspects of these findings raise questions on how donors 
perceive their development missions. The exclusion of the 
Zambians from the financial management of some projects 
leaves big gaps in the realm of responsibility for 
development which donors claim they wish to establish. The 
present attempt to coordinate aid through the creation of 
the EAD must face and resolve some of these issues. 
11.5 Coordination: Donors' Perspectives 
The 	 following 	 aid agencies, HEDCO, FINNIDA, GTZ, NORAD, 
NUFFIC, ODA, and USAID were asked structured 	 questions 
relating to donor cooperation and aid coordination 
(see questionnaire in appendix). The questions ranged from 
an attempt to find out about the level of operational 
linkages among donors to questions about the kinds of 
agreements which govern their cooperative relationships, and 
donors' perceptions of what they consider to be the major 
obstacles to aid ,coordination. Except ODA all other 
agencies responded. 
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From the responses obtained it is quite clear that the 
majority of the donors working in the Zambian education and 
training sector have had cooperative operational linkages at 
some point. The degree of cooperation has often depended on 
the scale of projects undertaken jointly. The co-financing 
of ZEMP between FINNIDA and SIDA can be described as an 
example of a large cooperative commitment. The British 
Council, ODA, and the Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) do 
also 	 cooperate 	 in an in-house arrangement, especially 
through financing and administration arrangements. The 
SHAPE project has been a cooperative venture to some extent 
between SIDA and NORAD.14 However most of the cooperation 
arrangements in co-financing have been done on an informal 
basis between donors alongside the standing agreements 
between Zambia and each donor. 
Given this scenario one is tempted to say that the present 
concern over donor cooperation is redundant. But a closer 
examination of the cooperative relationships described here 
will reveal that they were all initiated by donors within 
the existing frameworks of their support programmes to 
the sector. Zambia has very little control over donor 
coordination decisions. In the present arrangement it is 
the prerogative of the donors to decide which projects they 
would want to co-finance. Consequently, the aid 
coordination and management perspective from the Zambian 
side is rather deceptive. 
At the level of aid coordination between and among donors, 
there was common agreement that good prior consultation and 
good working procedures in a responsive recipient 
development 	 environment 	 could 	 enhance 	 successful 
coordination of aid. SIDA emphasised that effective aid 
coordination has been made difficult by structural problems. 
Each donor tends to have its own agenda and working 
procedures, e.g a planning cycle which is different from 
other donors. 
All the respondents were in agreement that donors' 
preoccupation with the need to project their own national 
aid identity, and divergent donor policies and priorities 
were among the major obstacles to aid coordination. They 
all agreed that different administrative styles and 
practices could stand in the way of effective coordination 
and cooperation among donors. To emphasise this point 
donors admitted to following their own organisations' style 
and practices in the following areas: project planning, 
administration 
	 and 	 management, and project evaluation. 
Differences of opinion appeared on a few points. Not all 
donors believe their goals can best be met by cooperating 
with others, nor did all the respondents agree that failure 
to see mutual benefits from cooperative relationships is one 
of the obstacles to aid coordination. 
Overall, the responses indicate that the cooperation that 
exists in a few projects in the education and training 
sector is an exception. Operational linkages are mainly 
confined to co-financing and occur mainly between the 
Nordic donors. There is a case for example for aid 
coordination between the ODA and JICA of Japan in the 
DTEVT's present projects on plant maintenance and human 
resource development, but no such coordination takes place. 
While recognising the need for some coherence in Zambia's 
aid management, and the need for donors to cooperate in aid 
business, donors are aware of the entrenched obstacles which 
stand in the way of any attempts to coordinate aid by Zambia. 
There is also a general feeling that coordination processes 
tend to be time consuming, and that only projects attracting 
large sums of aid money should be considered for aid 
coordination. The signals from the responses suggest that 
there is qualified support for aid coordination from the 
donors. Further indications are that some donors do not mind 
entering into less enduring cooperative relationships if such 
relations will not affect their organisational policies, 
practices, and above all aid policy objectives. This 
discussion has clear implications for what Zambia could 
expect in its present attempt to create the EAD. 
11.6 Theoretical Perspectives on Aid Co-ordination 
Coordination in interorganisational relationships has been 
defined as an attempt to ensure that organisations take 
into account the activities of other organisations in joint 
undertakings.15 An extended definition suggests that the 
more widespread the general ideological conviction that the 
group can satisfy its needs through collaboration with other 
groups, the greater the tendency towards intergroup 
relations.15  
In the initial definition Zambia would be perceived as a 
third party organisation which is attempting to bring about 
rationalization of aid management through coordinating the 
activities of diverse donor groups. To achieve this the 
facilitative party needs to have strong influence which can 
bring together the organisations. Zambia as a poor 
recipient country seems to have limited leverage. This puts 
Zambia in a weak position as the mobiliser of a coordination 
process. The extended definition points to a position to 
which the donors who were interviewed reacted with 
reservations. 
In the context of inter-aid agency relationships, 
coordination should be perceived as a process embodying 
elements of active organisation and management through 
consultation and cooperation. Its application can take 
different forms. Matching available aid resources to 
specific development problems would be one aspect. Limiting 
the number of donors and resources according to perceived 
development aid needs at national, provincial and sector 
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level would be another aspect. The combination can be as 
complex or simple as the mobiliser wishes it to be. The 
extent of the organisational and management controls 
employed would determine the level of coordination. 
However, it 	 should 	 be mentioned 	 that 	 studies 	 in 
interorganisational relationships have so far been carried 
out only on non-development aid organisations. The focus 
has been mainly on local, central government and private 
organisations within national boundaries.17 These tend to 
receive a different kind of political pressure and have 
usually a 'smaller' and easily identifiable constituency. 
This is not the case with development aid organisations. 
Therefore the findings from these studies would tend to have 
limited explanatory application. 
The theories of interorganisational relationships have 
presented their own assumptions about interorganisational 
interactions. The exchange and the power-dependency 
theories have come up with explanations which provide a 
basis for analysing further the feasibility of effecting 
greater donor coordination and cooperation in the education 
and training sector. 
The Exchange Theory. From a sociological perspective the 
exchange model rests on several assumptions.18 	 These are 
that: an actor will seek to interact with others who can 
satisfy his or her needs or facilitate the attainment of 
desired goals, and the greater the probability that a 
potential exchange interaction will prove rewarding the more 
an actor is likely to initiate it. In management, exchange 
is defined as 'any voluntary activity between two 
organisations which has consequences actual or anticipated 
for the realisation of their respective goals.'19 It has 
been pointed out also that an exchange framework could 
contain different forms of interorganisational relationships 
(voluntary, formal, legal etc).20 	 Although all the donor 
agencies interviewed admitted to having some operational 
cooperation with some of their counterparts, none of them is 
based on any legal or other formal agreement. One could 
therefore say that these donors have been engaged in mainly 
voluntary interorganisational relations of a nature not 
governed by any legal provisions. 
The initial exchange framework as developed by Levine and 
White in 1961 was later extended on the basis of the results 
from further research by Benson.21 	 The results from 
Benson's research came up with the following conclusions 
organisations seek an adequate supply of resources to fulfil 
their programme requirements, to maintain their domain, to 
extend and defend the organisation's paradigm or way of 
doing things, and that when relationships among 
organisations are in equilibrium there would be domain 
consensus, ideological consensus, positive evaluation of the 
other organisations and work coordination among them. This 
is a very optimistic and positive set of conclusions. How 
close are they to reality? 
Interaction and subscription to cooperation are very 
important elements in the exchange framework. Levine and 
White have stressed the point that in the exchange framework 
symmetrical relations form when members of two or more 
organisations perceive mutual benefits from interacting. 
Motivation to form a cooperative relationship comes about 
when each organisation perceives that it will be better able 
to attain its goals by cooperating and interacting rather 
than remaining autonomous. The model suggests also that 
relationships of this type form usually in periods of scarce 
or declining resources. 
Against this theoretical background and given also the 
knowledge that cooperation among donors in the education and 
training sector already exists, donor agencies present 
possibilities of analysing their actual and possible 
interorganisational behaviours. 
The cases of cooperation that have been cited illustrate one 
example of an ad hoc cooperative interaction between donor 
agencies. SIDA's formal agreement to support ZEMP in its 
ESSP is with the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport and 
not with FINNIDA. Similarly, NORAD's initial support to 
SHAPE was a one-time purpose specific contribution. This 
emphasises the kind of cooperative structure which has 
existed in Zambia. It is unlikely that SIDA's and NORAD's 
participation in the two projects were motivated by any 
sense of declining resources or a realisation by FINNIDA and 
SIDA that they could not meet their contractual obligations 
in the projects without the intervention of the other 
donors. In fact each one of them is capable of financially 
supporting the project single-handedly if they wished to do 
so. SIDA's cooperation with FINNIDA in the ZEMP project can 
be described as of a coalition type.22 In this context 
each agency has its own set of goals, but collaborates 
informally and on an ad hoc basis where some of its goals 
are similar to those of the other 	 donors. Also, the 
coalition itself has no authority, the authority but for its 
behaviour rests with each individual donor agency. There 
are indeed other similar coalition cooperative relationships 
among donors in the education sector in different forms of 
assistance. 
It would therefore appear that SIDA's decision to finance 
the purchase of educational materials for the MGEYS from the 
ZEMP project had been motivated by the following: a 
practical desire to assist the MGEYS purchase the materials 
which the Ministry couldn't have done without assistance, 
and political calculation that it would be expedient for 
SIDA and its domestic constituency to be associated with the 
running of a key project in the sector. 
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The preceding discussion appears to make the following 
suggestions: 	 ad 	 hoc, purpose-specific 	 coalition 
relationships between donors are possible, and appear to be 
more prevalent than the other types. Donors seem to prefer 
loose informal operational linkages to rigid agreements. It 
would also appear that donors find these relationships 
easier to manage because they often involve specific 
financial or technical assistance commitments, and each 
donor remains in charge of its own policy and goal setting 
functions. 
The MGEYS role in facilitating the initiation of these 
operational relationships has been rather indirect, mainly 
through the presentation of resource and operational 
difficulties at the MGEYS/donor meetings. 
Power-Dependency Theory. This contends that the motivation 
to cooperate among organisations is asymmetrical. That is, 
only one party is usually motivated while the other is not, 
and that cooperation is often induced or forced on weaker 
organisations by the most powerful. Interaction or exchange 
in this model is characterised by conflict as each 
organisation seeks to achieve its own goals.23  
The World Bank's relationship with the government of Zambia 
can be examined from this perspective. The motivation to 
pursue economic policies and structural adjustments in the 
economic and social sectors has not been shared by Zambia in 
the way the World Bank and the IMF has perceived them. 
Consequently, the demand by the World Bank in 1987 that 
Zambia should reach an agreement with the IMF as a condition 
for getting further access to financial support caused 
severe conflicts which later resulted in Zambia suspending 
the implementation of the economic programme. This case can 
be described as an example of forcing a weak recipient 
country into a cooperative relationship it does not agree 
with fully. 
Seen against the present initiatives to coordinate aid more 
effectively and the experiences Zambia has had so far with 
donor cooperation, the assumptions stand to be given a 
qualified falsification on one hand, and an endorsement on 
the other. In the cooperative relationship among the Nordic 
donors discussed earlier, their relationship can hardly be 
described as asymmetrical. Could this be attributed to the 
fact that they are all members of a regional grouping 
sharing similar aid objectives? It is not clear how 
cooperative the relationship would have been had it involved 
donors from different camps. It is also unlikely that SIDA 
as a leading donor in the Nordic group may have been engaged 
in attempts to force the others to support its programmes. 
The discussion so far has highlighted interorganisational 
relationships in which the parties have remained autonomous 
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in their policy decision-making and other key organisational 
areas in the relationship. This has reduced the areas of 
possible conflict. Because donor agencies are not strictly 
like any other commercial or industrial company their 
competition and conflict tend to manifest themselves 
differently. Thus the failure of the power-dependency 
assumptions to apply to the existing inter-donor 
relationships should be seen in this light. If the 
circumstances were different the possibility of operating 
conflict and problems relating to dominance would occur. 
Given this background it would be erroneous to dismiss the 
assumptions as being totally inappropriate to the study of 
relationships among donors. 
In a recent (April 1990) outline of Zambia's Public 
Investment Programme (PIP) for the 1990-1993 period, the 
Government of Zambia and the World Bank have reiterated the 
need for Zambia to create an External Assistance Department 
(EAD).24 	 The Government has made a commitment to carry 
this out to facilitate the implementation of the structural 
adjustment programme. The EAD is intended to carry out the 
following: 
1. Management of aid flows. 
2. Develop• annual external aid strategies and 
plans. 
3. Establish a system to exercise control over 
external 	 loans, credits, and 	 grants 	 by 
Government entities, including parastatals. 
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4. Establish systems to monitor, record and control 
external grants to ensure that these do not 
place excessive recurrent cost burdens on 
Zambia. 
5. Establish systems to monitor the implementation 
of aid programmes and projects, including the 
use to which funds are being put, the rates of 
disbursement etc. 
6. Ensure aid is being used most effectively. 
7. Advise the Government on the negotiation of aid 
programmes and project assistance. 
8. Design and implement programmes to enhance the 
coordination of donor assistance, particularly 
at the local level and including mechanisms for 
responding to questions to all concerned of the 
donor community. 
9. Advise the government on its approach and 
presentations in aid affairs. 
Even in the absence of an outline of details of the specific 
tasks to be carried out in the proposed EAD, the new 
management proposals appear to be wide and quite far 
reaching. What is not clear however is whether the creation 
of the EAD is a separate initiative within the NCDP or part 
of a comprehensive reorganisation of the present Economic 
and Technical Cooperation (ETC) Department in the NCDP. 
Whatever is the case the measures proposed represent the 
undertaking of a long overdue action. 
Zambia's success in this undertaking is going to depend on 
the following: its' political will and interpretation of its 
aid management and coordination mandate, that is, how far 
Zambia intends to impose its will on donors' preferences and 
priorities (cf Chapter 5), how donors perceive their short 
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and long term position in the new coordination structure and 
management arrangements, and, most importantly, it will 
depend on the willingness of donors to cooperate. This the 
Government is aware of.25 It represents the first 
possible major obstacle the EAD should expect to encounter 
after its creation. 
While many bilateral aid donors have been looking forward to 
Zambia adopting a more coherent aid management approach, it 
is not clear how far they expect Zambia to go in its 
measures and how they themselves intend to respond to them. 
Are bilateral donors willing to accept policy and management 
measures from the Zambian government which could put a stop 
to the kinds of political pressures some donors have been 
putting on Zambia, as discussed in Chapter 5? Donors are 
often sensitive to committing themselves to arrangements 
which could compromise their preferred position. Thus the 
Japanese insist on maintaining their own management 
structure within the mainly ministrial or organisational 
management framework. It is most unlikely, to take another 
example, that Britain would agree to have a larger part of 
its training funds allocated to Zambia spent elsewhere than 
in Britain in the name of 'coordination'. There are other 
donor idiosyncrasies which the EAD will need to take account 
of and to reconcile with the new set of guidelines. 
Therefore a coordination process which seeks to order the 
behaviour of the donors by imposing new standards of 
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organisational and management behaviour needs to proceed 
very carefully. 
This suggests for example that attempts by Zambia to match 
foreign aid to perceived needs and problems will not be easy. 
Yet, the extent to which the proposed EAD measures will go 
and how they will be implemented will determine whether 
Zambia has opted for a radical and comprehensive 
coordination or a modest approach. 
For the NCDP as an institution which seeks to mobilise aid 
coordination and thereby indirectly promote donor 
cooperation, the 	 assumptions suggest that it needs to 
establish a stronger position if it expects to be able to 
influence the donors to come together or to accept its 
decisions. In the past it has been very difficult for the 
Ministry of Education and the NCDP to influence donors to 
accept some of Zambia's identified priority areas in the 
sector. Bringing together donors who do not share the same 
perspective on development problems and the kinds of 
solutions which should be applied is not going to be a 
lesser task. As a mobiliser, the Zambian 	 government's 
position is weakened by its dependence on external resources 
for its operations. This imposes severe limitations, 
including limitations on its power to influence even ad hoc 
cooperation relationships between donors. 
11.7 The World Bank 
The majority of the bilateral donors that were interviewed 
were not in favour of a multilateral agency being entrusted 
with the responsibility of coordinating aid in Zambia. 
Alternative proposals offered have ranged from: creating a 
loose framework in which regular donor meetings could take 
place under the leadership of Zambia or a chosen leading 
bilateral donor, to sector level coordination, and asking 
the World Bank to promote aid coordination under the 
auspices of the Zambian government. 
There are many reasons why the World Bank is an attractive 
alternative to other options. Because of its resources the 
Bank commands a status which could help it to execute the 
tasks 	 more 	 efficiently. And, bilateral donors and 	 the 
international financial community are more likely to feel 
assured of getting maximum discipline over the management of 
the volume and the direction of aid flows. This is 
particularly true now in respect of the priorities laid out 
in the PIP. The acceptance of the PIP, and the commitment 
to the New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP) indicate that 
political resistance to the IMF and the World Bank measures 
have for the time being softened. Therefore there is a 
possibility that in.a carefully worked out arrangement the 
World Bank could play a leading role in Zambia in promoting 
aid coordination. 
11.8 SUMMARY and CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the discussion has centred around issues of 
cooperation among donors and aid coordination in Zambia's 
education aid management. The discussion has drawn 
attention to the current debate and the assumptions on aid 
coordination by western donors. The major criticism has 
been that recipient countries like Zambia have 
administrative frameworks and arrangements which are 
inadequately equipped and staffed to cope with the large 
flow of resources and management demands made upon them by a 
diverse donor community. Therefore the assumption is that 
implementing an effective aid coordination strategy against 
a background of cooperative relationships among donors could 
enhance the management of aid resources. The current 
economic structural adjustment programme being implemented 
in Zambia has given its full endorsement of the need to 
coordinate aid more rationally and effectively. 
The views of Zambian officials on aid coordination have been 
supportive. However, internal politics have in the past made 
it very difficult for Zambia to implement its own measures 
aimed at coordinating aid. Until 1989 and with the 
assistance of external help, the call from Zambians for 
coherence in their aid management was never explicit in 
terms of what actually they wished to be done. The 1989 
brief MGEYS evaluation report of project management in the 
sector illustrates this point. 
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The discussion has also shown that despite these initiatives 
the management of aid resources and projects in the sector 
has continued the same practices which have been criticised. 
Donors have continued to fund and manage their projects in 
the way they had done before. 
Donors' 	 views 	 on 	 aid coordination have produced very 
significant signals in this discussion. They have pointed 
out the conditions they consider to be essential in efforts 
to promote effective aid coordination. On the other hand 
they have also made it known that there are entrenched 
obstacles on the donors' side which often stand in the way 
of attempts to coordinate aid. 
Contrary 	 to 	 what 	 is generally held, there has been 
cooperation between donors in a few projects in the 
education sector, mainly those funded by the Nordic donors. 
However, this cooperation has been usually of an ad hoc, 
purpose specific type. The relationships have also been 
characterised by loose coalition relations. Policy making, 
planning functions, and goal setting have all been kept out 
of the way of these short-term initiatives. This has of 
course given rise to questions about whether this is the 
most preferred form of inter-agency relationship, and indeed 
what implications this may have for the present initiatives 
in Zambia. 
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The discussion of the issues in the context of the chosen 
theoretical assumptions has produced the following findings. 
The assumptions of the exchange theory have been found to be 
partially valid in their application to the analysis of 
donor relationships. The key premise on which the theory is 
predicated has been found to apply more to non-aid 
organisations than to donor agencies. The need to 
collaborate between donors is for example not motivated by a 
state of declining resources as this becomes quite a 
sensitive 	 aspect 	 in 	 donors' 	 standing. Besides, the 
independent achievement of aid objectives is a particularly 
important matter for donors. The limited scope of the 
exchange explanations can perhaps be attributed to their 
research base. It has relied heavily on findings from non 
aid organisations in their own national settings. 
Similarly, the assumptions from the power-dependency theory 
should be seen in the light of some of the findings on the 
preferred form of relationships among donors. The view that 
relations between organisations are characterised by 
conflict and competition does not strictly hold in the 
examples of cooperative relationships cited in this 
discussion. However, were 	 the 	 donors 	 to 	 attempt to 
integrate their pglicy making and planning functions at the 
highest levels, conflicts would not only be inevitable, the 
proportion of disagreements as far as donors are concerned 
is likely to be much larger. This attempts to illustrate 
the point that donors exhibit characteristics which are 
somewhat 	 peculiar 	 to the aid relationship. Thus, the 
exchange and power-dependency theoretical assumptions cannot 
be taken as entirely useful guides to the study of 
inter-donor relationships. 
In conclusion it should be said that Zambia's latest 
initiative under World Bank sponsorship to set up the EAD 
should be seen against the background of the whole range of 
issues and trends discussed in this chapter. The effort is 
welcome 	 and it is opportune, but it faces formidable 
challenges both internally as well as externally from the 
donor community. The move has set Zambia and its donors on 
a difficult test course (et chapter 5). 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1. German International (1970, 37). 
2. ODA (1986). 
3. World Bank (1986). 
4. See the following: Mende, T. (1973, 67); Court, D. and 
Kinyanjui, K. (1985, 49); World 
	 Development 	 Report  
(1985,109); Kjellstrom, S. and D'Ameida, A. (1986, 37); 
Cassen, R. et al. (1986,318); Mosley, P. (1987, 100); 
Ridell, R.C. (1987), 210); and OECD (1985, 195). 
5. See the following: Forss, K. et al. (1988): Wright, C. 
(1987); UNESCO, EP/9601 of 20 March 1973 Letter to 
SIDA; SIDA, 1. Zam 42.2 of 9 September, 1977 letter to 
UNESCO on assistance to the School of Mines. 
6. Interview with Prof. L.K.H. Goma - Minister for Higher 
Education, Science and Technology. 19.5.88. 
7. MGEYS (1989). 
8. MGEYS (1989, 6). 
9. MGEYS (1989, 6). The Banda Report. 
10. Interview with the Director, ETC, National Commission 
for Development Planning. Lusaka 11.6.88. 
11. Ministry of Finance (1988). 
12. MGEYS (1989). 
13. MGEYS (1989, 9). 
14. Richard, H. et al. (1977, 459). 
15. Guetzkow, H. (1957, 53). 
16. MGEC/SIDA (1989,39). 
17. Hall, R.H. et, al. (1957, 459). 
18. Olson, M.E. (1978, 90). 
19. Levine, S. and White P.E. (1961, 563); Cook, K. (1977). 
20. Hall, R.H. et al. (1977, 457). 
21. Benson, J.K. (1975, 229). 
22. MGEC/SIDA (1989, 16). 
23. Warren, R.L. (1967, 405). 
24. GRZ (1990, 49). 
25. GRZ (1990,45). 
468 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
C O N C L U S I O N: 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has focused on foreign aid to education and 
training development in Zambia since the country's attainment 
of political independence in 1964. Aid has been discussed and 
analysed in terms of donor policy and priority objectives 
globally as well as how these objectives have applied to 
Zambia. The critical discussion of the following: education 
and training development aid process in -Zambia, and the 
structural and policy links between Britain's FCO, the ODA, 
and non-governmental organisations has been carried out to set 
the background and broad context and characteristics of 
development aid. The discussion of the issues raised in this 
study has also been put against certain theoretical 
assumptions. 
Thus the discussion in this chapter has been set out as 
follows: the first part analyses the findings from the policy 
and development trends in the -Zambian education and training 
sector, the second part discusses the findings from the 
sections on aid pro.cess, coordination and foreign aid policy 
links, the third part examines the findings on British aid 
policies and priorities, the fourth part examines the findings 
from Swedish aid, fifth, the analysis looks at the theoretical 
assumptions in light of the findings in this study, and finally 
the discussion looks at possible areas for future research. 
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12.2 Education and Training Policy and Development 
The findings in this study have shown that the structural 
problems colonialism left in the education sector, that is 
imbalances in the provision of facilities and opportunities, 
and segregative policies, acted as a powerful force behind 
UNIP's social action programme at independence. The need to 
address these problems became paramount and subsequently got 
translated into an ambitious expansionist policy. The buoyant 
economy which was inherited at independence gave strong 
impetus to the expansion programme. Thus education and 
training development were perceived in terms of responding to 
the inherited post-colonial crisis in the sector and the 
economic demands on education. The long term goals of 
education development 	 reflected 	 this 	 same 	 approach, a 
continued mechanical expansion of the system. Despite the 
timely internal warning given against unchecked expansion of 
the system little attention had been paid to the possible 
consequences of the expansion programme. It was hardly 
surprising therefore that by 1970 the system had began to 
register internal efficiency difficulties. 
The broader policy context of Zambia's education and training 
development was that UNIP was in effective control of the 
social policy and action programmes. The opposition party was 
in a weak position to present any strong alternative social 
policy and action programme. Outside parliament there were no 
interest groups to carry out a strong education lobby. The 
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policy regime consequently faced a situation in which the two 
events mentioned earlier dominated the political climate in 
policy and decision-making. The adoption of a one party state 
system in 1972 finally put UNIP in total control of all the 
affairs of the country. Since then political dissent and any 
lobby on internal or international affairs must be conducted 
within the framework of the party. The interpretation of this 
in practice has put severe limitations on the possibilities of 
getting diverse opinion inputs into the policy making process. 
From 1972 education policy and development had been operating 
in this political framework. 
In spite of being aware of the practical difficulties the 
system 	 was 	 facing, the 	 expansion 
	 policy 	 and 	 the 
diversification of the school curriculum continued amidst 
increasing practical difficulties of programme implementation 
and adjustment in the system. 
The education reform movement of 1984 came against this 
background. Its significance was that it was a policy 
initiative by the professionals to change the education 
system. The fact that this movement had received official 
approval from the highest political office (State House) did 
not imply a change in the political framework and conditions. 
The success of the movement to take off the ground was perhaps 
more due to a combination of these factors: personal 
initiative of the professionals in the Ministry of education, 
the timing of this initiative had coincided with international 
concern over education development in the region and more 
importantly, the internal problems in the education system 
which had been sounded as early as 1968 had subsequently 
reached proportions which could no longer be dealt with on an 
ad hoc basis. Despite the difficulties of implementing the 
reform programme fully, the reform document has since 1978 
constituted a policy for enhancing the quality of education 
and further attempts to achieve basic education for all. 
The findings have also indicated that external aid has played 
a significant role in facilitating education and training 
development. Politically, aid has been perceived to be nothing 
more than an international moral obligation to assist Zambia 
to develop. It had also been perceived to be a short term 
measure to help Zambia reorganise and implement its own 
development machinery. Up to the time of the reform movement 
this feeling was still strong in the government. This may 
have accounted for Zambia's failure to create a short or long 
term policy framework within which aid could operate. 
Besides, there are bilateral aid agreements which also could 
have made Zambia less inclined to take extra policy or 
organisational measures. The recent case involving UNZA's 
difficulties to service the 1967 GRZ/USSR technical 
cooperation agreement has served to show the inadequacy of the 
aid agreements as effective proxy internal policy frameworks. 
It has also been shown that aid is treated with a lot of 
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sensitivity by the Zambian bureaucrats, it is therefore not 
surprising that until now there have never been efforts to 
coordinate aid flows and its management. Lack of an explicit 
policy on external aid has been responsible for producing an 
ineffective and somewhat badly organised aid process in 
Zambia. 
12.3 Aid Process 
Although in this study aid process, foreign and aid policy 
links and aid coordination have been treated separately, the 
issues each one of them has raised has implication for all the 
three areas. For example, aid process and coordination in 
Zambia has provided a context in which foreign and aid policy 
outputs can be observed and discussed. 
This study has found that in the case of Britain and other 
donors covered in this study the link between foreign and aid 
policy objectives is apparently strong. Besides the FCO, the 
ODA, the British Council, as well as some NGOs have emerged as 
important public and private managers of British foreign and 
aid policy agendas. The NGOs are a mixed group of secular and 
religious organisations. These have been described as 
important private managers of British foreign policy.' The 
wider implication of.this finding is that the foreign and aid 
policy machinery is large and complex. This pluralism 
in foreign and aid policy management and delivery system 
presents a number of possible political and management 
difficulties 	 to 	 the 	 recipients. First, the 	 background 
relationship of the NGOs with the foreign affairs organ imply 
that they are not as strictly non-governmental as they project 
themselves. 	 This has implications for how far they can allow 
recipient governments to intervene or control their 
development aid programmes. Also this pluralism is a strategy 
intended to deal with recipients at different political 
levels, consequently local management of aid which could 
threaten the existence of this arrangement is unlikely to 
receive favourable cooperation from donors. 
The study has also drawn attention to the premium which the 
British government in recent years has placed on its 
international social and political objectives through cultural 
diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is a blend of diverse 
sub-objectives in the areas of politics, commerce and trade, 
internationalisation of and sustainability of British culture 
abroad etc. Because British education and training is well 
placed to achieve these objectives, the movement has put 
British aid to education and training and development needs in 
recipient countries in a new balancing act. For Zambia this 
carries the following signals: Zambia's requests for 
assistance which fall outside this and the project framework 
are less likely to be considered favourably in principle. 
Britain should be expected to adopt an aggressive and a 
competitive approach against other donors and towards the 
achievement of its aid objectives. It must be mentioned 
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however that the interpretation of the objectives of cultural 
diplomacy appear to be quite wide and covers a wide range of 
programmes and activities. This means that the chances of a 
recipient making a request which is not covered by some 
aspects of cultural diplomacy are small. 
While the present pluralist approach to British foreign and 
aid policy management has definite administrative advantages, 
this strategy however poses possible difficulties in Zambia's 
attempts to coordinate aid flows and its management. To gain 
further insight into what has been discussed and the issues 
raised, the outputs of the policy and institutional links (eg. 
policy objectives) ought to be examined in the context of an 
actual aid process. 
The major finding from this section concerning donors has been 
that, some donors such as the USSR and Japan have exerted a 
lot of pressure on the Ministries of Higher, and General 
Education to accept their own preferences in locating their 
aid projects. This has not only upset the priorities the 
Ministries had worked in capital development projects, it also 
reflects the extent of the politicisation of the aid process 
on the one hand, and the possibility that the preferences were 
intended to achieve, ,other undeclared objectives. It would 
also appear that interest in these projects resided at a very 
high political level in both Japan and the USSR. 
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This, together with the fragmented institutional framework for 
aid process in Zambia has made it very difficult for Zambia to 
manage external aid more effectively. The analysis of aid 
process in Zambia has shown that there are several 
institutional actors involved in various aspects of aid. 
These have ranged from the President's Office to individual 
Ministries and Freedom House. This is not a case of 
decentralising aid process management, but a reflection of 
incoherence at political and management levels in the approach 
to external aid. The loose framework and the fact that the 
NCDP does not have a full complement of the required number of 
professional workers has severely weakened the position of the 
NCDP in Zambia's aid business. This has sometimes opened it 
to undue internal as well as external intervention and 
influence attempts. The absence of an organised lobby on 
external aid affairs, and the exclusion of external aid from 
the Auditor-General's accounting measures has meant that many 
anomalies go unnoticed and unattended to. This exacerbates 
the administrative and management situation. 
One political explanation for this state of affairs is that, 
what appears to be a fragmented institutional aid framework in 
Zambia could be a strategy to avoid creating a powerful local 
institution (et the proposed creation of EAD, 1990). A strong 
local aid management institution, as will (in theory) be the 
case soon, would present accountability and efficiency demands 
which would most probably not accord well with the kind of 
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internal political control the government would wish to 
exercise over it. Thus one finds that aid has been caught up 
in an internal power struggle. Whatever benefits the 
government is able to derive from the existing aid process and 
management system are ad hoc and have been overwhelmingly 
counterbalanced by the more serious long term consequences as 
evidenced in the East Germany and the Russian technical 
cooperation agreements. 
12.4 British Aid 
this study has shown that British aid to education and 
training has been subjected to periodic policy adjustments 
over the last twenty-four years. The two key areas to which 
the shift in policy emphasis has been responding have been the 
target areas for assistance and ODA's internal administrative 
and operational procedures for conducting aid business. It is 
important to mention also that each British government has 
been associated with a particular impact on development aid, 
administratively or politically. 
The policy changes have reflected Britain's response to a 
wide-ranging set of signals from the following sources: from 
Britain's own internal administrative, economic and political 
constituency, from the aid policies and activities of other 
donors, and from the development environment of Britain's 
overseas aid constituency. 
The major internal administrative changes have usually 
involved the position of ODA. That is, at one time ODA (then 
called 	 ODM) was a full fledged Ministry, later it was 
transferred to the FCO as a department. These changes have 
had more to do with Britain's own internal power politics 
between the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives 
than actual development aid. ODA as a ministry or a 
department would still be subject to parliamentary 
administration and scrutiny. However, the strength of Foreign 
Office desire for control over aid policy cannot be 
underestimated. 
The scope of British assistance to education and training has 
largely consisted of a large technical assistance component, 
that is, either manpower supply or funding for training 
programmes in the UK or in a Third Country. In the 1960s the 
large number of British teachers and education advisors in the 
former colonies reflected these particular responses. A 
political commitment to assist former colonies in their 
development programmes, a political need to maintain a British 
presence in the former colonies. This was in fact a 
complicated blend of political and economic responses. Over 
the last twenty four years Britain has turned technical 
assistance (training) into a major education industry. 
Britain has been able to attract large numbers of non HMG 
funded students into British education and training 
institutions (see Appendix III table 
	 7). The 	 need 	 to 
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provide competitive training programme has now heightened as 
Britain competes with 	 other 	 donors, mainly, France, West 
German, Japan)Canada, and USA for Third World Student markets. 
The study has also shown that in the spirit of competition 
Britain seems to have embarked on a course of making big 
inroads in selected Francophone countries in search of new 
sources of students. Internally also there has been a 
sustained debate and lobby by interest groups, mainly the OST, 
that Britain should stand up to its own position as the 
world's training ground and to the competition from rival 
donors. 
An interesting trend revealed in this study concerns the 
changes that have taken place in the support to subject areas. 
It has been shown that the choice of subject areas for support 
have tended to reflect the special demands of each time 
period. Thus in the 1960s teacher training and public 
administration were among the range of subjects earmarked for 
support. In the mid 1970s the scope of assistance had been 
enlarged and diversified to include education management and 
supervision, curriculum development, the provision of books 
and improvement of English language teaching etc. 
Interestingly, the shift in focus coincided well with many of 
the recommendations of education reform movements across 
several African countries. Another way of looking at the 
shifts is simply that Britain regards its education and 
training service to overseas clients as a good and service 
that has to keep pace with particular demands in the market. 
It is therefore imperative that Britain should make 
adjustments along the way. This approach may be simply 
characterised as commercially rational. 
From 1979 to date the era of the Conservative government in 
Britain will be remembered for among other things, the 
initiatives it has taken and the impact it has had on matters 
concerning policies which affect its overseas aid clients. 
The areas covered are Third 
	 Country 
	 Training, Cultural 
Diplomacy, Overseas Student question, and the scholarship/ 
award schemes, and selectivity. The five areas of policy are 
closely linked. 
Britain's policy on Third Country Training is a revelation of 
protectionism in aid as well as a demonstration of the complex 
framework within which aid operates. The restrictive 
criteria which HMG's Treasury has set for expenditure on Third 
Country Training is a form of tying training aid. This in 
turn must be viewed in the broader perspective of the 
economics of British technical assistance (training aid), and 
the broader political framework in which it is expected to 
operate. The figures from Appendix III table 7 show that the 
number of HMG funded students has been comparatively smaller 
-'N:tA.N.- other groups. Consequently, any liberalisation of the 
present policy would reduce the number of HMG funded students 
further. This would pose the following possible problems for 
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Britain and its institutions. An increase in In-Country and 
Third Country training placements would inversely reduce 
overseas students in British institutions. The institutions 
would increasingly be left to Private student market forces, 
which cannot guarantee a sufficient flow of students, a factor 
which is very critical in the economy of many institutions. 
The present policy therefore has the economic value of 
ensuring that many institutions get a regular supply of HMG 
funded overseas students over whom HMG has control of 
placement and welfare matters. On account of this the 
protectionist approach in the policy appears quite 
understandable, besides, it has already been pointed out that 
the policy is backed up by a very competitive education and 
training facilities. 
At another level the policy should be seen as operating in the 
wider social and political framework of Britain's cultural 
diplomacy. An unrestricted policy on placement of overseas 
students would weaken the achievement of cultural diplomacy 
objectives. Given this background the restrictions imposed on 
the policy are not entirely of an economic and a financial 
nature, they also carry important political implications. For 
recipi,ent countries this means that they should expect mainly 
discretionary support in this area. Given also the negative 
political attitudes towards Third Country Training among some 
Third World leaders, and also the operational difficulties 
facing many Third World institutions, it is very unlikely that 
Britain could be persuaded to shift its policy. The need to 
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develop Third World institutions through Third Country 
training has therefore been caught between British policy 
restrictions and the politics of standards and national 
identity in education and training in developing countries. 
It is important to see the overseas student policy of 1980, 
the subsequent diversified scholarship and award schemes, and 
the new emphasis on selectivity in technical assistance as 
being closely linked. After all, it was the findings from the 
Overseas student debate which gave rise to the new scholarship 
schemes in the mid 1980s. The three aspects show Britain's 
economic and political responses to both internal as well as 
external signals. Internally, the decision to charge overseas 
students full economic fees was an economic measure intended 
to introduce a more economic approach to the recruitment of 
overseas students. It was a clear indication that the 
Conservative government viewed overseas students in more 
economic than political terms (et the OST views). The 
introduction of new scholarship and other award schemes to 
redress the consequences of the full cost fees policy that had 
appeared was also as much a response to internal pressures, 
especially from the OST lobby, as it was a response to 
perceived external signals. The fear that the full cost fees 
would send students• to the USA, Canada, Australia had been 
made abundantly clear, hence the need to take corrective 
measures. 
The introduction of diverse scholarship schemes has brought a 
new dimension to the overseas student subject. In it a new 
diversified vision of overseas students by Britain has 
emerged. The schemes have framed or boxed students into 
specific target groups which are expected by Britain to yield 
particular political or commercial outputs. Thus the CBI 
scholarships are expected to yield trade and other commercial 
benefits, the FCOSAS aims at achieving political objectives 
for Britain. Correspondingly, Britain expects recipients to 
benefit from the schemes. Strangely, the recipient countries 
were never consulted on how the schemes would work and what 
they could expect from them. Yet the schemes have far wider 
implications for the recipient countries' development process. 
The cultural diplomacy movement has come as a reaction to what 
internally was perceived to be a gradual decline in Britain's 
international standing against its own previous performance 
and also against the performance of other rival donor 
countries in the international aid system. Britain's concern 
with the latter shows that cultural diplomacy at one level has 
been a political response to the perceived trends in the 
international aid system. At another level cultural diplomacy 
is nothing more than an internal process of policy renewal and 
adjustment. It is also functioning as one of Britain's 
political window to the outside world. This makes it a rather 
complex political equation in Britain's development aid. 
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The implications of cultural diplomacy objectives for 
Britain's political social and cultural institutions are wide. 
It means that institutions and programmes/projects that have 
the capacity and capability to respond to the achievement of 
these objectives, such as education and training, have a 
special responsibility in this process. In terms of 
organisation it means that 
	 programmes 	 of 	 studies, and 
administrative arrangements which can enhance the achievement 
of the objectives have a critical role to play in the whole 
process of cultural diplomacy. It is in this light that the 
In-Country and Third Country Training policy, the packaging of 
overseas students into particular political or commercial 
categories, and the diversified scholarship Schemes should be 
seen. In the context of cultural diplomacy objectives these 
aspects serve special delivery and protectionist functions. 
Thus training in the UK as opposed to training in Third 
Countries performs a special function in the attempts to build 
Britain's international image among overseas students. 
Consequently, overseas students as targets of cultural 
diplomacy have a special place in this process (et 1986 OST 
Ditchley Park Colloquium). 
For the recipients the cultural diplomacy movement has spelt 
out a further tightening of British aid. Besides being a 
public relations exercise Britain expects to use it to account 
for some of its aid investment properly. However, cultural 
diplomacy objectives carry the risk of failing to strike an 
484 
adequate balance between the achievement of Britain's social, 
political and economic objectives and the provision of needed 
aid resources in the recipients' development process. 
The opening of the East European corridor has added a new 
dimension to the movement. Britain has to make quick 
adjustments in its aid focus and emphasis to deal with the new 
European opportunities in the East. There is every likelihood 
that this unfolding development has opened up another 
competition front in British aid, inevitably some recipient 
countries or regions should expect some keen competition from 
the East European region. 
Though not entirely new the project framework adopted by 
Britain in 1984 has presented wider implications for 
recipients of British aid. On the one hand the approach 
should be seen as an administrative strategy intended to 
introduce close control of aid programmes through effective 
project planning, design and rational organisation by both 
Britain and the recipients. One can therefore see that this 
approach is part of a larger package of administrative 
measures introduced in the 1980s to improve and enhance 
accountability and selectivity in the aid business. This 
decision marked also a departure from the open approach which 
had characterised some forms of British aid, such as technical 
assistance (training aid) in the 1960s and 1970s. For many 
recipients the demands of the project organisational and 
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planning resources, both in terms of competence and the 
institutional capacity to undertake comprehensive project 
planning and design tasks. Consequently, many have often 
sought external assistance in carrying out project design and 
presentation work. This unfortunately opens the recipients to 
possible donor or private consultant manipulations. It is 
also important that recipients should approach ODA's policy 
from a country framework perspective, that is, they should 
ensure that ODA's preferences in aid investment accord well 
with the development process components in the national grid. 
British aid to education and training in Zambia should be seen 
in light of the discussion and analysis of British aid made 
here. The findings have shown that aid has been given to 
Zambia according to ODA's global policy settings, goals and 
priorities. ODA's lack of a country specific policy has been 
made easier by Zambia's lack of an explicit policy on external 
aid. The absence of any explicit ODA aid policy to Zambia 
appears to serve Britain the following functions: 
.t gives Britain a broad framework within which to 
work. It also gives Britain broader discretion especially on 
decision-making, in this way Britain avoids 
	 being 
	 tied 
644444QoQiii4 
	 down to specific commitments which Zambia would 
regard as entitlements, as Sir William Ryrie remarked on the 
reasons why recipients are never told by ODA the financial aid 
allocated to them "the recipient country does not know how 
much has been allocated to it. If they were told, this would 
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become an entitlement and we would be under pressure to spend 
Such has been the extent of avoiding specific 
commitments. 
The study has also found that despite the present operational 
difficulties facing the Zambian school system due to the 
impact of the economic crisis, the emphasis in British aid has 
not been sufficiently adjusted to reflect the current demands 
in the system. This reflects among other possible reasons 
ODA's difficulty to respond quickly outside its normal aid 
framework to new demands in its aid constituency. In the 
present project framework approach the present state of 
affairs could also be attributed to Zambia's failure to 
present projects in the areas of greatest need. The 
relationship over this matter is fairly complex. But as 
pointed out earlier British aid to Zambia must be set within 
the global policy parameters and the economic, political and 
cultural frameworks of its development aid. These provide 
insights into the difficulties ODA faces in attempting to make 
rapid responses. 
12.5 Swedish Aid 
The findings of this study have indicated that Swedish aid to 
education and training has undergone changes at the following 
different 	 levels: 
	 at 	 the 	 conceptual, policy 
	
and 
administrative/management arrangement levels. Some changes 
have been more of a new emphasis than a shift of policy on 
earlier policy stands. These changes can also be described as 
careful and selective adjustments. 
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Sweden's 1972 policy on education and training has been 
described in this study as having been prescriptive and 
weighed down by the Swedish ideological perception of the 
Third World development context. The policy was therefore an 
attempt to reinterpret its own-development experiences and to 
give it an international dimension. The policy could also be 
viewed as simply an early expression of how Sweden saw the 
education development problems and the need to provide its own 
framework of assistance. The need to put a Swedish mark on 
the international development scene was clearly evident in its 
anti-western and anti-traditional pedagogy. 
The 1986 policy came as a response to the following: the 1972 
policy had done its fair share, its shortcomings had become 
apparent consequently it needed renewal. The development 
scene in Sweden's overseas aid constituency had undergone 
rapid development experiences in the fourteen years the policy 
had been in operation, the need to make some policy and 
operational adjustments had increasingly become inevitable in 
the face of those new changes and demands on the systems. 
SIDA had also gained immense field experience. This must have 
generated both inspiration as well as internal pressures on 
SIDA to consider making adjustments in its aid responses. 
Also, it cannot be denied that international trends in the aid 
environment have also had some impact on SIDA's aid 
adjustments reflected in the 1986 document. Therefore the 
period between 1972 and 1986 should be viewed as a time when 
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SIDA came under internal and external pressures. 
Internationally, the 1986 document showed SIDA's first public 
indication that it was now standing up to respond to 
international trends in the aid business. 
Some of the specific changes in SIDA's aid focus, orientation 
and emphasis at global and country level must be seen in the 
context of the trends discussed here. The key factors in this 
framework have been Sweden, the recipients, and other donors 
at one level, at another level aid policy in this framework 
has been a function of responses to Swedish foreign policy, 
economic/political, and Third World development consideration. 
Although SIDA's policy aims at emphasising basic education, 
the findings in this study have shown that within that policy 
framework SIDA maintains a certain level of discretion to 
support other sectors. This has been the case in Zambia where 
the University of Zambia and the technical colleges have been 
recipients of Swedish aid since the mid 1970s. Support to the 
University of Zambia has now been extended to include 
selective staff salary supplementation. Unlike ODA's BESS, 
the Swedish scheme is open to all eligible Third Country 
lecturers. These two examples serve to demonstrate SIDA's 
open and flexible approach. SIDA is able to spread out its 
aid resources because of, not only its flexible approach but 
also because of the worsening material and operational 
conditions in the system discussed earlier. 
Because of the adverse conditions in the education and 
training sector SIDA and other donors have not been presented 
with the real test of their aid policies. As indicated 
earlier in this study the multiple problems in the system has 
reduced many aid programmes/projects to the level of relief or 
rescue measures. In this situation every piece of foreign 
assistance appears to be essential. The real test for 
development aid would come if Zambia was in a position to 
present to the donors enduring priorities. This is not the 
case at present because donors have the opportunity to choose 
from many alternative areas in need of assistance. These 
distortions and of course donors preferences for certain areas 
have made it difficult for Zambia to attempt an integrated 
approach to development aid planning and utilisation. The 
prospects of major changes taking place on this front in the 
near future now await the implementation of the proposed EAD. 
12.6 Theoretical Assumptions 
In analysing aid relationships it is difficult to avoid taking 
a systems analysis approach because of the following: donors 
view themselves as existing in a world in which cultural, 
political, economic and other relationships across national 
frontiers are not only inevitable but also a fact of life. 
The individual nation states are also perceived as having 
important roles to play in the international system. It is 
also true to say that since the end of the Second World War 
the world setting has developed many institutions whose 
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objectives and procedures have brought nation states together 
as part of an integrated international system. 
For donors their view of their aid constituencies as part of 
the international system has been very explicit in their 
motivations and aid objectives. According to many donors aid 
is given to promote development. This, it is held, would 
enhance stability in the international system. Of course 
donors' perception of units in the system and their stability 
is also linked to their global interests, which 
	 partly 
accounts for who gets aid and from which donor. This leads 
one to understand donors' aid constituencies as their large 
subsystem units in the international system. The views of the 
recipient nation states on this subject have been dominated by 
the feeling that other countries (industrialised) have an 
international obligation to assist those that are striving to 
develop. Aid is therefore perceived by recipients also in its 
international dimension. 
The argument in this short discussion is simply that aid, its 
relationships and outcomes can best be understood by analysing 
both its nation state environment as well as its international 
context. 
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On the standing of other theoretical assumptions the study 
suggests that, while many of them have remained valid, others 
need to be subjected to new test grounds and rules. The study 
had demonstrated the limitations and difficulty in attempting 
to generalise the application of some of the theoretical 
assumptions. The case of the exchange theory stood out as a 
glaring example. So have others in different ways. 
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12.7 CONCLUDING COMMENT 
This study has traced and demonstrated the trends in policy 
changes concerning education and training development in 
Zambia on one hand, and British and Swedish external aid to 
education on the other. It has been shown that education 
development in Zambia has been a history of mixed 
achievements, challenges, frustrations, and a determination to 
persevere in the face of quite often overwhelming odds in a 
rapid%Nkcyn context. 
Since the mid 1960s foreign aid to education and training in 
Zambia has had to face these aspects in different role 
positions. That is, aid has provided solutions to some of the 
problems, it has supported local measures to facilitate the 
development process, and has also helped Zambia to prepare the 
education and training system to tackle some of the current 
and future tasks. This has taken place in a complex set of 
donor-recipient relationships. 
Despite the long and complex aid relationship 
	 Zambia has 
had with donors, Zambia has been conducting its aid business 
and management without any explicit aid policy framework. 
Consequently, aid process and management have lacked effective 
coordination. Domestic as well as external aid factors have 
contributed to the present incoherent approach in Zambia's aid 
organisation and management. 
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The study has shown that the donors' aid responses originate 
from very complex donor agendas and constituencies in which a 
diverse portfolio of economic, political, commercial, cultural 
and moral factors exert influence on the direction of aid 
policies. The pressures of these factors have sometimes made 
aid responses less responsive to particular development needs. 
Consequently, some field experiences with aid have tended to 
defy some of the theoretical explanations of external aid. 
The contribution of this study lies in the following areas: 
It is an important addition to the continuing debate of 
the contribution of bilateral assistance to education 
development in developing countries. It has revealed and made 
explicit the depth and extent of many issues and arguments in 
the discussion of British and Swedish aid policies. Thus the 
study has provided the impetus for further study, testing and 
refinement of some of the findings. There is need for example 
for Zambia to study more closely both the short and long term 
opportunity costs of receiving foreign aid in a wide range of 
areas. There is a need also for Zambia to examine the 
possible effective strategies it can employ in what is a very 
complex external aid service. 
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APPENDIX I  
1. Questionnaire 
2. The attached questionnaire was used to act as an agenda 
in most of the personal interviews with donors. It was 
also sent to donors who could not be visited. These 
were NORAD, FINNIDA, GTZ, HEDCO, and USAID. 
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1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How much operational linkage is there between your 
organisation and other donors in the education and 
training sector in Zambia? (Please tick) 
 
•n••• •••n 
   
(a) 	 Much 
  
(b) Some (c) None 
     
     
     
2. Are there agreements between your organisation and other 
bilateral and multilateral donors concerning assistance 
to projects of common support in Zambia? (Please tick) 
1. With Bilateral Donors  
(a) Formal agreement . V--1 
(b) Informal agreementA 	
 
(c) No agreement.V \ 
2 	 With Multilateral Donors  
(a) Formal agreement. 0 
(b) Informal agreement.‘___I 
(c) No agreement at all.\__A 
3. Please specify multilateral and bilateral aid 
organisations with whom you have had co-financing 
collaboration during the last 5 years. 
1. Bilateral Donors 	 2. Multilateral Donors  
(a) (a) 
(b) (b) 
(c) (c) 
(d) (d) 
(e) (e).  
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see mutual benefits from 	 such 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
	  disagree 
(d) Failure to 
interaction. 
Strongly 
agree 
(f) Other (specify) 
7. What are the major obstacles to effective aid 
coordination and cooperation among donors? (Please tick 
more than one if you wish). 
(a) 	 Donor's preocupation with projecting their own 
national aid identity. 
            
            
        
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
   
Agree 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
  
       
            
            
            
(b) Divergent donor policies and priorities. 
         
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
   
       
(c) Donors' belief that their goals can best be achieved 
by remaining autonomous. 
        
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
    
(e) Different donor administrative styles and practices. 
     
11........1 nnn 
   
Strongly 
agree 
  
Agree Disagree 
   
Strongly 
disagree 
  
           
           
           
            
(f) If you have any other views on major obstacles 
please specify. 
8. Which of the factors listed below has exerted influence on your 
organisation's policies on aid to education and training? 
(a) Recipient government's policies or advice. 
Muchn 
	
Some 11 
  
None 
 
  
(b) Other bilateral donor agencies' policies. 
MuchH SomeH 	 None 
(c) Multilateral organisations' policies(World Bank, ILO, 
UNESCO, UNICEF etc). 
Much SomeL NoneU 
(d) Your own organisation's education specialists and 
consultants. 
Muchli] 
	
Some' 
1----  
None 
(e) Your own organisation's experience in aid to education and 
training in developing countries. 
111nn•• ••, H Much Some None 
(f) Your own country's politics and political ideologies as to 
what good education is. 
Much fl 	 Some H Nonel I 
(g) If you have any other views on the factors please specify: 
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5 
9* Which of the factors listed below has exerted influence on 
your organisation's policy and decision to give assistance to 
Zambia's education and training sector? (Please tick) 
(a) Your country's capability to provide required assistance. 
Much1:11 	 Somer 
	
NoneE 
(b) To counterbalance other donors' assistance. 
Much 1 
	 Somen 
	 Non 
(c) To support other donors' assistance to Zambia. 
      
Nonen Much' 	 Som 
   
      
(d) Cultural exchange considerations. 
 
       
Mucht 
      
  
Som 
  
None 
      
      
(e) Zambia's education and training needs. 
Mucti 
	 Some( I 	 Nonel I 
(f) Zambia's education and training policies. 
Much Some{ 
 
None 
    
    
(g) Your country's foreign policy considerations. 
Much0 	 Somi---] 
(h) Trade and Commerce considerations. 
Much--] 	 ,Som 
(i) Other 	 (specify) 
	  
     
 
None 
   
     
 
Nonel 
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10.A To what extent do you feel that your organisation's chances of 
attaining its objectives in the Zambian education and training 
sector could be enhanced if your aid resources and those of 
other donors were effectively coordinated? (Please tick) 
1. To a great extent.  
2. To some extent.jJ  
3. Not at all. 
10.B How could such coordination be undertaken? (Please tick and 
specify where indicated) 
11,,M.1••n 
1. By a Zambian government agency. 
Specify which: 	  
2. By the donors themselves.! 
Specify how: 	  
3. By the UNDP. 
n 
4. By the World Banki.  
5. Other (specify) 
	  
• 
- 7 
• 11. How would you rate your organisation's perfomance in planning 
and executing aid programmes for the Zambian education and 
training sector, in the following respects. 
(a) Coordination with other donors. 
Very' ---' Good fl Poorrl Very poor 
(b) Coordination with recipient minstries and departments. 
   
Good! .1 	 Poor Very[11] 
poor 
Very 
good 
  
  
    
     
(c) Efforts to fill gaps not supported by other donors. 
Very 
good • Good Poor 
 
Very 
poor 
   
(d) Edacation and training outcomes in Zambia. 
Very 
good 
Good 	 Poor Very Li 
poor' 
(e) Strengthening recipient's capacity to manage programmes/ 
projects after your organisation's assistance has ceased. 
     
Very 
goodl 
f--] Good 
 
Poor Very 
poor 
    
    
12. To what extent do you see your organisation's style and practices 
in the aspects listed below as being significantly different 
from that of other donors? 
1. Project Planning  
(a) To a great extent .l 
(b) To some extent. 
(c) Not at all.r] 
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2. Project administration and management.  
(a) To a great extent.r1 
(b) To some extent.q 
(c) Not at all. 
3. Project evaluation.  
(a) To a great extent f] 
(b) To some extent.0 
(a) Not at all.[] 
4. Dissemination of results and recommendations from 
project evaluation studies.  
(a) To a great extent. 
(b) To some extent. 
(c) Not at all.j 
13. If you have ticked (a) and (b) to answer to Question 12, how 
would you describe the significant differences between your 
organisation and -other donor organisations of which you have 
knowledge? 
1 
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14 . What is the policy of your organisation with regard to 
management of your aided projects? (Please tick more than one 
if you wish) 
(a) Include a project management training component for local 
staff in all major projects.11  
(b) Your own specialists/consultants must be seconded to 
ministries and departments concerned to manage projects, or 
assist in managing them. 
(c) Involve other donor staff in project management.( i  
(d) Recipients must meet all local management costs. 
(e) No overall policy- only general guidelines. 
Specify the guidelines: 	  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
APPENDIX II  
List of People Interviewed and 
Organisations visited 
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PEOPLE INTERVIEWED - LUSAKA ZAMBIA 
NAME 
Prof L H Goma 
F Chelu 
J Z Banda 
R Mazonga 
W Hoppers 
Prof M Kelly 
F Lundstrom 
A M Pensulo 
L Makomani 
M Luoto 
I Mwamba 
J Simonsen 
Kisenga 
E N Phiri 
K M Joseph 
M Sikuyuba 
E A Y Mwambazi 
I Muchelemba 
Mrs Ngoma 
S Siame 
Dr Calvaro 
I Hoel 
I Colbro 
B B Nkonga 
Dr C Fundanga 
K Chali 
P Daka 
F Sheldon 
B O'Connor 
N Billany 
A Rasineu 
E M Mutale 
I Wamulwange 
J M F Calder 
S Chidumayo 
J Mulholland 
P Skelton 
M D Chanda 
G Chibesakunda 
L O'Keefe 
A Malama 
POSITION 
Minister, Higher Ed 
C I S (MGEC) 
Director, ZEPIU 
CEO (P/TC) Higher 
Exec Sec, SHAPE 
UNZA 
S/PLO, General Ed 
Special Ed Inspector 
As/Sec (PL) Gen Ed 
Prog Officer, (Fin) 
Psp Insp, fin Proj 
Norwegian Anthrop'st 
Indus Art Inspector 
As/Sec (P/TC) Gen Ed 
Head (TCAU) UNZA 
S/PLO, Gen Ed 
CMDO, (DTEVT) 
As/Dir, Manpower (NCDP) 
Economist, NCDP 
Dir (ETC) NCDP 
UNDP 
Prog Officer, NORAD 
Prog Officer, SIDA 
Ed Sec, Chr Council 
Perm Sec, (E&F) Cabinet 
Director, DMDT-Cabinet 
Spec Task Force, Cabinet 
Head, Irish DCO 
BPP Officer, Brit Coucil 
Coordinator, ZEMP 
Coordinator (PSP) 
Sectoral Planner, NCDP 
Science Insp, Higher Ed 
UNZA 
As/Dir (IPRD) NCDP 
Rep, Brit Council 
D/Rep, Brit Council 
S/PLO Higher Ed 
Science Inspector 
KELT Advisor 
ESP Curr Specialist 
NOTE : The positiOns as at the time of the interviews 
in 1988. 
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FIELDWORK REPORT 
The following fieldwork activities were undertaken. 
(a) Interviews Lusaka - Zambia  
SIDA - Stockholm and Lusaka. 
British council - Lusaka and London. 
FINNIDA - Lusaka. 
NORAD - Lusaka. 
HEDCO - Lusaka. 
British High commission - Lusaka. 
Ministry of General Education - Lusaka.  
Ministry of Higher Education - Lusaka. 
Zambia Education Projects Implementation Unit - Lusaka 
UNDP - Lusaka. 
University of Zambia - Lusaka. 
Cabinet Office - Lusaka. 
National Commission for Development Planning - Lusaka. 
SHAPE - Lusaka. 
Directorate of Manpower Development and Training - Lusaka. 
Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training - 
Lusaka. 
Christian Council of Zambia-Lusaka. 
USAID-Lusaka. 
(b) Access to archival and other official documents: 
SIDA - Archives and Library - Stockholm 
ODA - Library - London 
MGEC - Policy and Technical Assistance Files. 
MGE - Policy and Technical Assistance Files. 
NCDP - Documentation Centre - Lusaka. 
Stockholm - Sweden 
Then Head, Education - Now Deputy 
Director-General - SIDA. 
Programme Officer - SIDA. 
Programme Officer - SIDA. 
Programme Officer - SIDA. 
Now Head, DCO - SIDA - Botswana. 
Researcher, University of Stockholm. 
Director, Institute of International 
Education - University of Stockholm. 
Deputy Director-General - SIDA - Now 
Ambassador, Mozambique. 
(c) Interviews  
L Wohlgemuth 
K Rosecrantz 
G Rosengart 
G Melbring 
L Lawin 
A Johnston 
I Fagerlind. 
L 0 Edstrom 
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London - UK 
British Council-London, former 
Director NIPA, Lusaka 
British Council - London 
British Council - London 
Lecturer/ODA Education advisor 
Former Chief Education Adisor ODA. 
London. 
Former Manpower Advisor, Government 
of Zambia. Now Peat Marwick London. 
(d) Interviews 
I Mackinson 
D Titheridge 
C Stephens 
C Treffgarne 
W Dodd 
C L Carmichael 
Other  
Aklilu Habte 	 Former Director, Education World Bank. 
K B Van den Bosch Head, Education and Training NUFFIC. 
APPENDIX III 
Tables 
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Table 1 
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN 
ZAMBIA BY SOURCE AND TYPE 
BILATERAL DONORS 
1. BRITAIN 
ASSISTANCE/PROJECT 
1. Staff Development 
2. British Staff Supplementation 
(OSAS, BESS) 
3. Commodity Assistance 
4. Book Presentation 
5. English language Development 
(ESP, KELT) 
2. SWEDEN 
6. Mathematics Textbook Project 
7. DTEVT Equipment Maintenance 
Project 
8. CBU School of Technology 
9. Crafts Training Project. 
1. Staff Development (MGEC, 
DTEVT, UNZA) 
2. Technical and other support 
to LCTH. 
3. Technical assistance to UNZA 
4. Desk Provision. 
5. Multigrade Teaching Project. 
6. Provision of Primary School 
Teaching & Learning materials. 
7. Support to SHAPE 
8. Special Education Support 
9. Self-help School Project 
3. NORWAY 1. Secondary School Maintenance 
2. Continuing Education 
3. Staff Development 
4. Support to SHAPE 
4. FINLAND 1. Provision of Education Materials 
(ZEMP) 
2. Staff Development. 
3. Construction of Practical 
Subjects Workshops. 
5. FRANCE 1. Staff Development (Scholar- 
ships) 
2. Commodity Assistance. 
6. W. GERMANY 1. Staff Development (UNZA) 
2. School-leaver Programme 
3. Adult Education Support. 
7. CANADA 1. Staff Development 
	 (UNZA) 
2. Housing - 	 (UNZA) 
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8. JAPAN 
	 1. Vet. School - (UNZA) 
2. Maheba (Refugee) Sec.School. 
3. Human Resource Development 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
BULGARIA 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
POLAND 
INDIA 
CUBA 
(DTEVT). 
4. Staff Development (UNZA) 
5. Technical Assistance 
(see School) 
14. ROMANIA Staff Development, mainly 
15. E. GERMANY Scholarships for Overseas 
16. NORTH KOREA training. 
17. U.S.A. 
18. AUSTR4IA 
19. CHINA*1  
20. NEW ZEALAND 
MULTILATERAL DONORS ASSISTANCE 
1. WORLD BANK 1.  Construction of new school 
Buildings 
2.  Providing educational 
equipment. 
3.  Carrying out renovations 
to school buildings 
2. AFRICAN DEV.BANK 1.  Construction of new school 
buildings 
2.  Self-Help school Project 
3.  E.E.C. 1. Zambia Mathematics and 
Science Teachers Education 
Project (ZAMZTEP) 
4.  UNDP 1. Zambia Science Equipment 
Project. 
*1: 	 Has discussed with MHE and shown willingness to 
provide very limited technical assistance-technical 
lectures for colleges. 
SOURCE: Compiled from various MGEC and MHE sources. 
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Table 6 
Recommended Tuition Fees for Overseas Students, in 
1.  
the U.K.,• 	 1986 - 1988 by Level and Subject Group (s) 
University 	 1286 	 1987/88 	 1988/89 .12 
Arts Courses 3,480 3,690 3,950 
Sciences 4,570 4,840 5,180 
Clinical Courses 8,450 8,960 9,590 
2.  Maintained + Assisted 
Institutions 
Advanced Courses 3,540 3,720 4,017 
Non-Advanced 1,947 2,055 2,226 
SOURCE: 	 Tillman, 	 G. 	 (1988) 	 P.21. 
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Table 8 
ODA's Target Countries for Commercially Related 
Technical Education and Training, 1980 
Region  
Latin America 
Country  
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
North Africa + Middle East Algeria 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Yemen Arab Republic 
Africa 
Asia and Far East 
Angola 
Botswana 
Cameroon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Burma 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
SOURCE: Quoted by ODA Working Party in its Review of ODA 
TC Appendix III. (The Working Party's source being 
Appendix II to Annex C to OTM 6/80). 
Table 9 
BRITISH AID TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING-PROJECTS IN ZAMBIA, 
1989' 
1. Customs and Excise Staff Training. 
Two fully funded training officers (under recruitment), 
vehicles, equipment and teaching materials and short-term 
consultancies; to improve training of Customs and Excise 
Officers. 
2. National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA). 
Four supplemented officers, two in accountancy and two in 
legal training. Three further supplemented personnel in 
accountancy, health services, management and computers under 
recruitment: plus equipments; to strengthen teaching 
capability and advice on structural and Management issues. 
3. Management Services Board (MSB). 
Two 	 supplemented 	 personnel, one 	 under recruitment in 
financing 	 management 	 and 	 management 	 services, plus 
equipment; 	 to strengthen the structure and teaching 
capability. 
4. Copperbelt University Faculty of Technology. 
Four long-term TCOs plus equipment, books, and vehicles, to 
establish and operate a Higher Diploma Studies Programme in 
water and road engineering and a programme of short 
intensive in-service courses for District Council works 
personnel. 
5. English Methodology and Materials Development. 
Four fully-funded and ten supplemented officers, equipment, 
vehicles, books and links with U.K. institutiona; to help 
raise the quality of English teaching in primary and 
secondary schools. 
6. Mathematics Textbook Project. 
Bookds and equipment worth £350,000; to support and improve 
mathematics and science education in secondary schools. 
7. Craft Training Project. 
Two fully-funded officers (one under recruitment), books, 
vehicles, reprographic centre and in-country and U.K. 
training; to upgrade the quality of skill training in Trades 
Training Institutes. 
8. Technical Education Equipment Maintenance Project. 
One 	 fully 	 funded 	 adviser, plus 	 vehicle, equipment, 
in-country training and short-term consultancies; to provide 
support and maintenance of equipment in technical education 
institutions throughout Zambia. 
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Possible Future Projects. 
Projects under preparation or consideration. 
1. UNZA. 
2. CBU Schools of Technology and Environmental Sciencies. 
3. UNZA and CBU management consultancies. 
4. UNZA and CBU Libraries. 
5. Engineering and manpower support for NORTEC. 
6. Business studies training. 
7. Male Registered Nurse training. 
8. Pharmaceutical sector manpower and training. 
9. Paramedical training at Evelyn Hone College. 
SOURCE: ODA, (1989) British Bilateral aid to Zambia. 
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Table 10 
Swedish Education Assistance to Programme Countries 
Country 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 Total (MSEK) 
Angola 50.5 22.8 30.3 20.9 21.5 21.7 167.7 
Bangladesh 88.5 9.2 6.5 27.1 22.8 13.0 167.1 
Botswana 219.0 20.0 7.0 27.9 22.9 32.8 329.6 
Cuba 211.3 - - - - - 211.3 
Ethiopia 271.7 27.4 20.7 33.4 27.4 30.2 410.8 
Guinea-B 20.1 3.8 1.6 4.2 4.7 4.4 38.8 
India 126.4 2.1 38.7 - - 2.5 169.6 
Kenya 192.4 7.2 5.7 - - - 205.3 
Lesotho 4.0 - - - - - 4.0 
Mozambique 29.4 7.2 10.8 12.3 19.1 15.0 93.8 
Pakistan 30.8 - - - - - 30.8 
Portugal 18.9 1.8 - - - - 20.7 
Sri Lanka 38.6 10.0 11.4 6.8 4.4 11.9 83.1 
Swaziland 60.6 4.0 2.8 4.2 0.3 - 71.9 
Tanzania 472.1 55.9 52.8 39.9 50.5 47.4 718.6 
Tunisia 100.9 - - - - - 100.9 
Vietnam 5.2 0.1 5.1 *) *) *) 10.4 
Zambia 101.9 27.0 36.4 13.4 13.4 19.2 211.3 
Zimbabwe 86.6 37.3 69.4 39.9 39.6 46.7 319.5 
Total 2128.9 235.8 299.2 230.0 226.6 246.0 3366.5 
*) 	 Administered by Industry Division. 
Source: SIDA (1989). 
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Table 11 
SIDA Financed Education and Training Projects, 1974-1987. 
Country 	 Year 	 Project 
Bangladesh 	 1976-1986 	 1. Vocational Training. 
Botswana 	 1982-1985 	 1. Education Sector Support for 
Rural Development Promotion. 
2. Third Country Training. 
3. Teaching Aids Production. 
4. Education Evaluation and 
Research. 
5. Primary School Furniture and 
Equipment. 
Ethiopia 
India 
Kenya 
1976 	 1. Supply of Paper for Textbook 
Production. 
1983-1985 	 2. Education Sector Support 
Programme. 
1979-1985 	 1. Non-formal Education. 
2. Cover Costs for Paper for Books. 
1974-1984 	 1. Technical Education Programme. 
Mozambique 	 1977-1985 	 1. Production of Teaching 
Materials. 
2. Establishing Publishing Unit for 
Production of School Books. 
1981-1984 	 3. MONAP 1-4. Ministry of 
Agriculture Training and 
Capital Development Programme. 
Sri Lanka 	 1979-1985 	 1. Capital Development - 
Establishment of Training 
Institute for Manufacturing/ 
Construction/allied work, at 
Foremen Level. 
2. Technical, Vocational and 
Science Education Development 
Project. 
1983-1986 	 3. Technical Education, improve 
quality and manpower 
orientation. 
Establishment of Technical 
Teacher Training Institute. 
Swaziland 	 1983-1985 	 1. Education Planning. 
Tanzania 1982-1985 1.  Sector Support to Education - 
Adult, Primary, 	 In-Service 
Training. 	 Paper for Printing 
books. 	 Completing building 
Secondary School. 
1982-1984 2.  Vocational Training. 
- Moshi Vocational Training 
Centre. 
Zambia 1979-1985 1.  University of Zambia, School of 
Engineering (Telecoms and 
Electronics). 
1984-1985 2.  Teacher Training and Resource 
Centres and Production Units. 
3.  Education Planning at H/Q Mobile 
Education Planning Training 
Programme. 
1983-1985 4.  University of Zambia - 
Land Survey. 
1984-1985 5.  Education Materials Production - 
books, 	 furniture etc. 
6.  Special Education, 	 Staff 
Development, Curriculum 
Development. 
Zimbabwe 1980-1985 1.  School Reconstruction 
2.  Scholarship Fund. 
3.  Teacher Training. 
1981-1982 4.  Capital Development-Teacher 
houses, rural Secondary 
Schools. 
1980-1985 5.  Curriculum Development 
1982-1985 6.  Special Education. 
1983-1985 7.  Planning and Evaluation. 
8.  Setting up a Standards Control 
Services Unit. 
9.  Non-formal Education. 
NOTE: 	 Some programmes/projects have been extended beyond 
the dates indicated. 
Source: SIDA, (1987). 
Table 12 
Swedish Education Assistance - Personnel and consultancies, 1984-1988 
Personnel 1984  1985 1986 1987 1988 
No of contract employees on duty 71 81 86 91 99 
No of contract jobs started 34 32 34 30 42 
No of jobs under recruitment 36 22 27 41 13 
No of short-term employees on duty 33 55 47 68 45 
No of short-term jobs under 
recruitment 6 5 9 2 4 
Consultancies 1984 1986 1987 1988 
No of assignments 30 33 33 52 
No of participants 55 45 45 90 
No of man-mouths 78 54 64 194 
Tbtal Cost (MSEK) 5.6 7.0 8.5 11.8 
Source: 	 SIDA (1989) 
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Table 14 
Proportion of Capital Budget for Education Arising 
from Development Assistance in Zambia, 1980-1986 
Year 
Total 
Capital 
Budget* 
Local 
Funds 
Development Assistance 
Amount Percentage 
K'million K'million K'million % 
1980 9.30 6.96 2.34 25.2 
1981 12.63 5.27 7.36 58.3 
1982 15.26 7.08 8.18 53.6 
1983 13.41 6.72 6.69 49.9 
1984 19.57 13.02 6.55 33.5 
1985 26.80 7.90 18.90 70.5 
1986 99.86 25.08 74.78 74.9 
1980-86 196.83 72.03 124.80 63.4 
* 	 Does not include supplementary estimates. 
NOTE: 	 All amounts in current prices. 
Source: Reproduced from Kelly, M J etal (1986) 
Appendix xixb. 
Table 15 
Criteria for Selection and Prioritisation of Aided 
Projects, 1987 
Criterion 	 Weighting 
1.c&.) 
1. Projects with high multiplier effect 	 10.0 
2. Manpower Development 	 8.0 
	
3 	 Projects with a short gestation period 
	 7 8 
	
4 	 Import substitution projects using local materials 7.7 
	
5 	 Projects promoting non-traditional exports 	 7.6 
6. Projects with forward and backward linkages 	 7.5 
7. Projects using local raw materials 	 7.3 
8. Government Revenue generating projects 	 7.1 
	
9 	 Employment generating projects 	 6 6 
	
10 	 Labour intensive projects 
	
6.3 
11. Basic needs projects 	 6.2 
12. High internal rate of return projects 	 5.3 
	
13 	 Projects promoting balanced economic development 	 4 2 
14 Cost-effectiveness 	 3.5 
	
15 	 Projects nearing completion 	 3.0 
	
16 	 Loans for maintenance of capital stock 
	 1 5 
	
17 	 Externally aided projects with cross 
conditionalities 	 0.6 
	
18 	 Aided projects which impose policy reforms 	 0 0 
NOTE: 
Priority weighting were also given in each sector 
	 In the 
education sector it was .given as follows: Basic education 
28.7 
	 percent, maintenance of education facilities 26.3 
percent Vocational training 
	 22.5 percent, and 
	
skills 
oriented secondary education 22,5 percent, 
Source: INDP (1987, 16). 
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Table 16 
Public Investment Programme in Zambia, 1990-1993 
(Highest Priority) 
(Millions) 
Foreign 	 Local 
Com 	 Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Sector $ K K % 
Agriculture 329.1 5489.7 13717.2 28.2 
Mining 150.7 4111.5 7879.0 16.2 
Transportation+ 
Communications 352.4 3553.3 12363.3 25.4 
Energy 139.4 657.0 4142.0 8.5 
Manufacturing 87.5 644.6 2832.1 5.8 
Education 61.3 196.3 1449.0 3.0 
Health 49.7 206.5 1449.0 3.0 
Water, 	 Sanitation, 
Public Works 50.6 360.0 1625.0 3.3 
WOMEN IN 
DEVELOPMENT 5.5 43.6 181.1 0.4 
Non-Trad. 	 Exports 57.0 1322.8 2747.8 5.7 
TOTAL 1283.2 16585.3 48665.3 
(65.9%) (34.1%) (100.0%) 
Source: 	 Coombe, 	 T. et 	 al. 	 (1990). 
Table 17 
Non-Capital Aid Expenditure by Donor and Purpose, 1981-1983 
DONOR 	 TECH.ASSIST. 	 SCHOLARSHIPS 	 SCHOOL MATERIALS 
% % % 
Belgium 68.5 25.1 6.4 
Canada 50.6 21.1 28.3 
W. Germany 45.7 25.3 29.1 
France 84.5 11.6 3.8 
Italy 67.6 13.7 18.8 
Nederlands 60.6 19.1 20.2 
Sweden 33.3 1.4 65.3 
Switzerland 58.4 19.0 22.6 
U.K. 56.6 40.1 3.3 
U.S.A. 61.1 20.9 18.0 
USSR 17.6 82.3 0.1 
SOURCE: 	 Compiled from Orivel, F. 	 and Rasera, J.B. 	 (1985). 
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Table 18 
Technical Cooperation Flows and as Proportion of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) for DAC Countries 
(Total in US $ mn), 1988 
Country 
Bilateral 
ODA 
Technical 
Cooperation 
Contributions 
TC as 
% of 
ODA 
Australia 535 180 33.6 
Austria 155 64 41.3 
Belgium 425 166 39.1 
Canada 1259 
Denmark 459 65 14.2 
Finland 263 21 8.0 
France 5326 2369 44.5 
Germany 3090 1535 49.7 
Ireland 27 13 48.1 
Italy 1878 404 21.5 
Japan 5248 853 16.3 
Netherlands 1419 543 38.3 
New Zealand 66 15 22.7 
Norway 528 84 15.9 
Sweden 897 185 20.6 
Switzerland 389 75 19.3 
United Kingdom 1002 462 46.1 
United States 7007 1749 25.0 
EEC 1696 138 8.1 
Total DAC 29972 8784 29.3 
NOTE: 	 Data no available. 
Source: 	 OECD 1988, 	 Table 23. 
APPENDIX IV 
Terms of Reference for Aid Review 
in the MGEYS, 1988. 
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EXTRACT 1 
The Terms of Reference for the MGEYS Review 
Committee on Foreign Aided Projects, 1988. 
1. The manner in which projects are identified, processed 
and approved. 
2. Management of the projects including project related 
facilities and equipment. 
3. Financial arrangements. 
4. Relationship of projects to the principal activities of 
the MGEYS. 
5. Communication involving project staff, the Ministry and 
donors. 
6. Any other matters relevant under review. 
Source: MGEYS (1988). 
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EXTRACT II 
Terms, Duties and Responsibilities of the Planned 
NCDP Monitoring Centre (NM)* 
1. To compile information on the status of the on-going 
projects, including total cost, amount spent, the 
amount of external financing committed and disbursed 
for these projects. 
2. To create an appropriate mechanism that provides an 
early warning of difficulties encountered in project 
implementation for each Province and District. 
3. To analyse difficulties encountered in project 
implementation and indicating possible solutions. 
4. To prepare reports for NCDP on the implementation of 
particular projects and programmes, focusing on those 
for which there have been significant deviations. 
5. To act and/or cause implementing agencies to act on the 
recommendations and/or decisions made by GRZ, 
particularly to undertake follow up action where 
progress on implementation is behind schedule. 
6. To design and adopt appropriate procedural system in 
order to secure financial and physical "State of the 
Art" reports in a timely manner. 
7. To keep consolidating information on permanent basis 
and to prepare reports in an agreed manner. 
8. To design and maintain permanent training programmes, 
especially for those officers based in provinces and 
districts. 
9. To enhance mobilisation and disbursement of aid flows 
to Zambia. 
10. To provide a forum to keep GRZ and donor agencies 
informed of progress with aid utilization and projects 
implementation. 
NOTE: 	 This was the .earlier initiative within the NCDP which 
was never implemented and has now been superseded by 
the proposal to create an EAD. 
** 
	
This is a donor-proved expert working in the NCDP. 
SOURCE: Mirovic, D.** (1984, 14). 
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